Search criteria
3 vulnerabilities found for 15.4-stack by ti
FKIE_CVE-2020-16630
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2021-09-20 20:15 - Updated: 2024-11-21 05:07
Severity ?
Summary
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ti | 15.4-stack | - | |
| ti | ble5-stack | - | |
| ti | dynamic_multi-protocal_manager | - | |
| ti | easylink | - | |
| ti | openthread | - | |
| ti | z-stack | - | |
| ti | real-time_operating_system | - |
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CVE-2020-16630 (GCVE-0-2020-16630)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2021-09-20 19:20 – Updated: 2024-08-04 13:45
VLAI?
Summary
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- n/a
Assigner
References
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CVE-2020-16630 (GCVE-0-2020-16630)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2021-09-20 19:20 – Updated: 2024-08-04 13:45
VLAI?
Summary
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- n/a
Assigner
References
| URL | Tags | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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