CVE-2020-16630 (GCVE-0-2020-16630)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2021-09-20 19:20 – Updated: 2024-08-04 13:45
VLAI?
Summary
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
  • n/a
Assigner
References
Show details on NVD website
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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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