FKIE_CVE-2020-16630

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2021-09-20 20:15 - Updated: 2024-11-21 05:07
Severity ?
6.8 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
References
cve@mitre.orghttp://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.htmlVendor Advisory
cve@mitre.orghttps://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdfExploit, Third Party Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.htmlVendor Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdfExploit, Third Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
ti 15.4-stack -
ti ble5-stack -
ti dynamic_multi-protocal_manager -
ti easylink -
ti openthread -
ti z-stack -
ti real-time_operating_system -
To clipboard 

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      "value": "TI\u2019s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK\u2019s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile\u2019s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission."
    },
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      "value": "La pila BLE de TI almacena en cach\u00e9 y reusa la propiedad del LTK para un m\u00f3vil vinculado. Una LTK puede ser una clave no autenticada y sin protecci\u00f3n MITM creada por Just Works o una clave autenticada y con protecci\u00f3n MITM creada por Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison u OOB. Supongamos que un m\u00f3vil v\u00edctima usa el emparejamiento seguro para emparejarse con un dispositivo BLE v\u00edctima basado en chips TI y genera una LTK autenticada y de protecci\u00f3n MITM. Si un m\u00f3vil falso con la direcci\u00f3n MAC del m\u00f3vil v\u00edctima usa Just Works y se empareja con el dispositivo v\u00edctima, el LTK generado sigue teniendo la propiedad de autenticaci\u00f3n y protecci\u00f3n MITM. Por lo tanto, el m\u00f3vil falso puede acceder a los atributos con el permiso de lectura/escritura autenticado"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2020-16630",
  "lastModified": "2024-11-21T05:07:11.853",
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          "value": "CWE-863"
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