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6 vulnerabilities found for samly by dropbox
CVE-2026-53425 (GCVE-0-2026-53425)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-08-20 17:26 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Missing InResponseTo validation in Samly allows acceptance of unsolicited SAML responses
Summary
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.
Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53425.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53425 | related |
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
0.3.0 , < *
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| handnot2 | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-53424 (GCVE-0-2026-53424)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-08-20 17:27 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:37
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Missing one-time-use enforcement in Samly allows replay of SAML bearer assertions
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.
Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53424.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53424 | related |
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
0.3.0 , < *
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| handnot2 | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2024-25718 (GCVE-0-2024-25718)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2024-02-11 00:00 – Updated: 2025-04-24 15:45
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2024-08-01 18:06 UTC
CWE
- n/a
- CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Assigner
References
Impacted products
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CVE-2026-53424 (GCVE-0-2026-53424)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 17:27 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:37
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Missing one-time-use enforcement in Samly allows replay of SAML bearer assertions
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.
Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53424.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53424 | related |
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
0.3.0 , < *
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| handnot2 | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-53425 (GCVE-0-2026-53425)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 17:26 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Missing InResponseTo validation in Samly allows acceptance of unsolicited SAML responses
Summary
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.
Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53425.html | relatedthird-party-advisory |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53425 | related |
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
0.3.0 , < *
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| dropbox | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| handnot2 | samly |
Affected:
8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.\n\n`Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3` in `lib/samly/sp_handler.ex` validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the `RelayState` value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares `SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo` against the ID of the `AuthnRequest` the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose `InResponseTo` does not match a request it made. The underlying `esaml` library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects `InResponseTo`, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a `RelayState` matching the victim\u0027s session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.\n\nThis issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward."
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"value": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.\n\nSamly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim\u0027s session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.\n\nThis issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-62",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-62 Cross Site Request Forgery"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
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"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
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"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
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"baseScore": 7.6,
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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"value": "GENERAL"
}
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],
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"cweId": "CWE-345",
"description": "CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
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"dateUpdated": "2026-08-20T18:38:13.727Z",
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53425.html"
},
{
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"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53425"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Missing InResponseTo validation in Samly allows acceptance of unsolicited SAML responses"
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CVE-2024-25718 (GCVE-0-2024-25718)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-02-11 00:00 – Updated: 2025-04-24 15:45
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2024-08-01 18:06 UTC
CWE
- n/a
- CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Assigner
References
Impacted products
{
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{
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:samly:elixr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "elixr",
"vendor": "samly",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.4.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
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"metrics": [
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"baseScore": 9.1,
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
{
"other": {
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"options": [
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},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
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}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-08-01T18:06:21.342589Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
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"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
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{
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"dateUpdated": "2024-08-01T23:52:05.515Z",
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"references": [
{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://hex.pm/packages/samly"
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"url": "https://github.com/handnot2/samly"
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"url": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly"
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"url": "https://diff.hex.pm/diff/samly/1.3.0..1.4.0"
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly/pull/13"
},
{
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly/pull/13/commits/812b5c3ad076dc9c9334c1a560c8e6470607d1eb"
}
],
"title": "CVE Program Container"
}
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"cna": {
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{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
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