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14 vulnerabilities found for unknown by unknown
GCVE-1988-2026-0379
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 08:27 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[ADVISORY] Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Parsing (CVE-2025-70290 through CVE-2025-70293)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Title: Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Handling
Author: Timo Preißl <t.preissl () proton me>
Date: 2026-02-11
CVEs: CVE-2025-70290, CVE-2025-70291, CVE-2025-70292, CVE-2025-70293
Affected: Denx U-Boot <= v2026.01-rc4
Fixed in: v2026.04-rc1 (commit adccdb2)
== Overview ==
Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities were discovered in the U-Boot
bootloader's filesystem handling code and command-line interface. These
flaws can lead to heap memory under-allocation followed by heap-based
buffer overflows, potentially allowing Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
in the pre-boot environment.
== Vulnerability Details ==
--- CVE-2025-70290: ZFS Metadata Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/zfs/zfs.c, function zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist
Impact: A crafted ZFS filesystem image with malformed on-disk metadata
can trigger an integer overflow during the size calculation
passed to calloc(), resulting in an undersized allocation and
subsequent out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix: Validation of allocation size using __builtin_add_overflow.
--- CVE-2025-70291: Heap Buffer Overflow in do_mv Command ---
Component: fs/fs.c, function do_mv
Impact: Missing length checks in the directory move command allow an
integer overflow during string length addition. An attacker
with U-Boot shell access can trigger an under-allocation,
resulting in a heap buffer overflow via strcpy().
Fix: Safe addition of string lengths using compiler intrinsics.
--- CVE-2025-70292: SquashFS Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/squashfs/sqfs.c, function sqfs_concat_tokens
Impact: Manipulated token lists trigger an overflow in
sqfs_get_tokens_length(), causing heap under-allocation
subsequently overflown by strcpy().
Fix: Validation of total token length before allocation.
--- CVE-2025-70293: EXT4 Block Group Descriptor Table Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/ext4/ext4_write.c, function ext4fs_get_bgdtable
Impact: An integer overflow in the block group descriptor table size
calculation results in an undersized buffer being passed to
memcpy(), causing memory corruption.
Fix: Guarded multiplication of block group count and descriptor size.
== Patch ==
All issues are fixed in the U-Boot master branch.
Commit: adccdb2f605a6e8e046712398712398123
"fix integer overflows in filesystem code"
https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/adccdb2
== Timeline ==
Patch series submitted to upstream mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/20251231100831.119142-1-t.preissl () proton me/T/
Fix merged: v2026.04-rc1
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0379 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-70290
- related CVE-2025-70293
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GCVE-1988-2026-0377
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 08:27 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Parsing (CVE-2025-70290 through CVE-2025-70293)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Title: Multiple Integer Overflows in U-Boot Filesystem Handling
Author: Timo Preißl <t.preissl () proton me>
Date: 2026-02-11
CVEs: CVE-2025-70290, CVE-2025-70291, CVE-2025-70292, CVE-2025-70293
Affected: Denx U-Boot <= v2026.01-rc4
Fixed in: v2026.04-rc1 (commit adccdb2)
== Overview ==
Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities were discovered in the U-Boot
bootloader's filesystem handling code and command-line interface. These
flaws can lead to heap memory under-allocation followed by heap-based
buffer overflows, potentially allowing Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
in the pre-boot environment.
== Vulnerability Details ==
--- CVE-2025-70290: ZFS Metadata Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/zfs/zfs.c, function zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist
Impact: A crafted ZFS filesystem image with malformed on-disk metadata
can trigger an integer overflow during the size calculation
passed to calloc(), resulting in an undersized allocation and
subsequent out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix: Validation of allocation size using __builtin_add_overflow.
--- CVE-2025-70291: Heap Buffer Overflow in do_mv Command ---
Component: fs/fs.c, function do_mv
Impact: Missing length checks in the directory move command allow an
integer overflow during string length addition. An attacker
with U-Boot shell access can trigger an under-allocation,
resulting in a heap buffer overflow via strcpy().
Fix: Safe addition of string lengths using compiler intrinsics.
--- CVE-2025-70292: SquashFS Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/squashfs/sqfs.c, function sqfs_concat_tokens
Impact: Manipulated token lists trigger an overflow in
sqfs_get_tokens_length(), causing heap under-allocation
subsequently overflown by strcpy().
Fix: Validation of total token length before allocation.
--- CVE-2025-70293: EXT4 Block Group Descriptor Table Integer Overflow ---
Component: fs/ext4/ext4_write.c, function ext4fs_get_bgdtable
Impact: An integer overflow in the block group descriptor table size
calculation results in an undersized buffer being passed to
memcpy(), causing memory corruption.
Fix: Guarded multiplication of block group count and descriptor size.
== Patch ==
All issues are fixed in the U-Boot master branch.
Commit: adccdb2f605a6e8e046712398712398123
"fix integer overflows in filesystem code"
https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/adccdb2
== Timeline ==
Patch series submitted to upstream mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/20251231100831.119142-1-t.preissl () proton me/T/
Fix merged: v2026.04-rc1
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0377 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-70290
- related CVE-2025-70293
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GCVE-1988-2026-0370
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34473 - Unauthenticated DoS in 17+ ZTE Router Models (140K+ Devices)
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-001
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34473
Title: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via Oversized POST Body
in ZTE Router CGILua Parser
Affected: 17+ ZTE ZXHN router models (~140,000 publicly exposed
devices)
CVSS Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34473-unauthenticated-dos-zte-routers
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34473
AFFECTED PRODUCTS
-----------------
17+ ZTE ZXHN router models sharing the CGILua firmware stack.
Estimated 140,000+ devices publicly reachable on the Internet at time of
research.
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
The CGILua post.lua parser used in ZTE ZXHN routers does not enforce an
upper
bound on the body size of application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST requests.
An unauthenticated attacker can crash or freeze the router's web management
service by sending a single HTTP POST request with an oversized body to any
CGI endpoint. No authentication, session cookie, or prior access is
required.
ROOT CAUSE
----------
Firmware analysis of extracted squashfs images confirms that post.lua reads
the entire POST body into memory before parsing. There is no Content-Length
check or body-size limiter before the allocation occurs. Oversized payloads
cause the LuCI/CGILua process to exhaust memory or fault, taking down the
web management interface until the device is power-cycled.
PROOF OF CONCEPT
----------------
import requests
url = "http://TARGET_IP/cgi-bin/luci";
payload = "a=" + "A" * (256 * 1024) # 256 KB
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
try:
r = requests.post(url, data=payload, headers=headers, timeout=15)
print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
print("Timeout - DoS successful")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
print("Connection dropped - DoS successful")
IMPACT
------
An unauthenticated attacker on the LAN or WAN (if management interface is
publicly exposed, as is the case for ~140,000 devices) can permanently
disable remote management access, forcing a physical reboot to restore
access.
ISP-deployed devices with no physical access for end users are especially
vulnerable.
TIMELINE
--------
2024-05: Local validation on hardware. Firmware extraction and root-cause
confirmed.
2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.
2025-01: Escalated to MITRE after ZTE failed to respond.
2026-03: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34473.
2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.
VENDOR RESPONSE
---------------
ZTE PSIRT did not respond to the initial report. MITRE assigned the CVE
directly. No patch has been issued.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0370 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34473
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"value": "-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----\n\nAdvisory ID: MONX-2026-001\nCVE ID: CVE-2026-34473\nTitle: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via Oversized POST Body\nin ZTE Router CGILua Parser\nAffected: 17+ ZTE ZXHN router models (~140,000 publicly exposed\ndevices)\nCVSS Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\nDate: 2026-05-20\nAuthor: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)\nContact: minanageh379 () gmail com\nPublic URL:\nhttps://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34473-unauthenticated-dos-zte-routers\nMITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34473\n\n\nAFFECTED PRODUCTS\n-----------------\n17+ ZTE ZXHN router models sharing the CGILua firmware stack.\nEstimated 140,000+ devices publicly reachable on the Internet at time of\nresearch.\n\n\nVULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION\n--------------------------\nThe CGILua post.lua parser used in ZTE ZXHN routers does not enforce an\nupper\nbound on the body size of application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST requests.\nAn unauthenticated attacker can crash or freeze the router\u0027s web management\nservice by sending a single HTTP POST request with an oversized body to any\nCGI endpoint. No authentication, session cookie, or prior access is\nrequired.\n\n\nROOT CAUSE\n----------\nFirmware analysis of extracted squashfs images confirms that post.lua reads\nthe entire POST body into memory before parsing. There is no Content-Length\ncheck or body-size limiter before the allocation occurs. Oversized payloads\ncause the LuCI/CGILua process to exhaust memory or fault, taking down the\nweb management interface until the device is power-cycled.\n\n\nPROOF OF CONCEPT\n----------------\n import requests\n url = \"http://TARGET_IP/cgi-bin/luci\";\n payload = \"a=\" + \"A\" * (256 * 1024) # 256 KB\n headers = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"}\n try:\n r = requests.post(url, data=payload, headers=headers, timeout=15)\n print(f\"HTTP {r.status_code}\")\n except requests.exceptions.Timeout:\n print(\"Timeout - DoS successful\")\n except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:\n print(\"Connection dropped - DoS successful\")\n\n\nIMPACT\n------\nAn unauthenticated attacker on the LAN or WAN (if management interface is\npublicly exposed, as is the case for ~140,000 devices) can permanently\ndisable remote management access, forcing a physical reboot to restore\naccess.\nISP-deployed devices with no physical access for end users are especially\nvulnerable.\n\n\nTIMELINE\n--------\n2024-05: Local validation on hardware. Firmware extraction and root-cause\nconfirmed.\n2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.\n2025-01: Escalated to MITRE after ZTE failed to respond.\n2026-03: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34473.\n2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.\n\n\nVENDOR RESPONSE\n---------------\nZTE PSIRT did not respond to the initial report. MITRE assigned the CVE\ndirectly. No patch has been issued.\n\n\nCREDITS\n-------\nMina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)\nhttps://github.com/minanagehsalalma\n\n-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0372
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34474 - ZTE H298A/H108N Unauthenticated Admin Credential Exposure
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-003
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34474
Title: ZTE ZXHN H298A / H108N - Unauthenticated Admin Password &
WLAN Credential Exposure
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H298A 1.1, ZTE ZXHN H108N 2.6 (EOL; no patch
planned)
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34474-zte-h298a-h108n-sensitive-data-exposure
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34474
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
A single unauthenticated HTTP GET to /getpage.lua?pid=1000ÐCheat=1 on ZTE
H298A or H108N routers returns the live administrator password
(OBJ_USERINFO_IDPassword1), WLAN PSK (WLANPSK_KeyPassphrase1), and SSID in
plaintext HTML. A second endpoint exposes the device serial number.
Note: ZTE declined vendor-side assignment citing product EOL. MITRE assigned
CVE-2026-34474 directly and published the record 2026-05-06. These devices
remain deployed by some ISPs.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0372 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34474
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GCVE-1988-2026-0373
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2021-21735 - ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 Unauthenticated Admin Credential Leak
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2021-001
CVE ID: CVE-2021-21735
Title: ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 - Unauthenticated Wizard Credential
Disclosure to Full Admin Compromise
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2021-21735-zte-zxhn-h168n-admin-compromise
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-21735
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
The ZTE ZXHN H168N V3.5 firmware exposes quick-setup wizard endpoints that
return PPPoE credentials (ADUsername, VDUsername) and the WLAN KeyPassphrase
via the GetPassword action without requiring authentication. The firmware
routing allowlists these endpoints through a QuickSetupEnable branch.
In ISP-deployed configurations where the Wi-Fi password is reused as the
default admin password, this credential disclosure is a full admin
compromise
chain requiring a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
A bulk PoC script (zte_zxhn_h168n_bulk_poc.py) is included in the repository
for verifying scale of exposure.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0373 (this record)
- related CVE-2021-21735
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GCVE-1988-2026-0371
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SECURITY ADVISORY] CVE-2026-34472 - ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 Authentication Bypass via Pre-Login Wizard
Summary
-----BEGIN SECURITY ADVISORY-----
Advisory ID: MONX-2026-002
CVE ID: CVE-2026-34472
Title: ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 - Authentication Bypass via Pre-Login
Wizard Credential Leakage
Affected: ZTE ZXHN H188A V6.0.10P2_TE, V6.0.10P3N3_TE
Date: 2026-05-20
Author: Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
Contact: minanageh379 () gmail com
Public URL:
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma/cve-2026-34472-auth-bypass-zte-h188a-router
MITRE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34472
VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
--------------------------
Unauthenticated requests to the root path of ZTE ZXHN H188A V6 firmware can
reach pre-login wizard handlers and disclose WLAN PSKs, SSIDs, and PPPoE
usernames. The leaked Wi-Fi password is also the default administrator
password after uppercasing, resulting in full authentication bypass.
ROOT CAUSE
----------
router_logic_impl.lua accepts attacker-controlled _type and _tag parameters
for empty-path requests. urlpath_2type_modifier.lua only activates the
QuickSetupEnable gate when _type is absent. Supplying _type explicitly
causes
the wizard handlers (getPassword, wlan_get, ppp_get) to execute for
unauthenticated requests, returning WLAN PSKs, SSIDs, and PPPoE credentials.
TIMELINE
--------
2024-04-26: Local validation and PoC artifacts created.
2024-05: Report sent to ZTE PSIRT.
2024-05-10: ZTE PSIRT stopped responding.
2026-01-17: Escalated to MITRE.
2026-02-02: ZTE PSIRT explicitly declined CVE assignment.
2026-03-27: MITRE assigned CVE-2026-34472.
2026-05-20: Full public disclosure.
CREDITS
-------
Mina Nageh Salalma (Monx Research)
https://github.com/minanagehsalalma
-----END SECURITY ADVISORY-----
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0371 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34472
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GCVE-1988-2026-0325
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 07:55
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multiple vulnerabilities in Sparx Pro Cloud Server and Enterprise Architect
Summary
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Multiple vulnerabilities in Sparx Pro Cloud Server and Enterprise Architect
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
General information
═══════════════════
Multiple vulnerabilities in Sparx Pro Cloud Server (PCS) versions <=
6.1 and Sparx Enterprise Architect versions <=17.1 allow a remote
unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary sql queries (both read
and write) within any configured database. In case where PCS is
installed with WebEA the vulnerabilities allow further for remote
unauthenticated code execution (RCE) within the web server context.
CVSSv4 chained score: *10.0 Critical*
(AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)
Fix
═══
Currently vendor *did not resolve* any of the CVEs. The PCS
authentication bypass and race condition seem to be easy to implement
and I hope vendor will release patches soon.
As a workaround it is best to isolate the PCS instances from internet
and untrusted networks. Create frequent backups and review access logs
if possible. You could also setup a proxy to limit the PCS
authentication bypass (dropping requests with no or wrong model query
parameter.
[Vulnerabilitiy #1] Sparx Pro Cloud Server SQL Command Execution
════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CVE
───
CVE-2026-42096 - Broken Access Control in Sparx Pro Cloud Server
Affected versions
─────────────────
Sparx Pro Cloud Server versions <= 6.1 build 167
CVSSv4
──────
9.4 Critical
(CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)
Impact
──────
PCS works as a remote model for a thick client, running on user's
computers, called Enterprise Architect (EA). EA connects to PCS and
works with the exposed database by directly running SQL queries.
Besides user authentication (which is also vulnerable - see
vulnerability #2 below) there is no additional access control. Any low
privileged user can actually run any sql queries permitted by the
configured external database user. Usually the user configured is at
least having full access to the model database - thus any low
privileged user can actually destroy the whole model, retrieve and
change other user's password hashes and more.
The problem seems to be with legacy thick client EA architecture which
simply works on a database to manage all the model details.
Details
───────
The client (EA) is connecting to the PCS HTTP server. The server might
require authentication *if it is properly configured* - an admin can
check "Enable Security" in EA but still not select "Require a secure
and authenticated connection" in PCS configuration what results in *NO
SERVER SIDE authentication at all*.
Assuming the server side authentication is required the PCS verifies
the authentication according to configuration - e.g. login/password,
Active Directory or OpenID.
Then the EA client sends request to perform SQL queries on the
database in an ecrypted form but the whole encryption scheme is built
into the client EA binary (actually downloadable from the vendor
webside without any authentication - as trial version). The encryption
is symmetric using a key contained within the binary itself thus
simply this is not any security measure (security by obscurity).
An attacker can obtain the key and then *create and send custom SQL
queries to be performed by the database*.
PoC
───
Exploit: https://github.com/br0xpl/sparx_hack/blob/main/eacrypt.py
is a python script which exploits the SQL vulnerability by encrypting
any SQL command and sending it to the server. For security,
the real key is removed from the exploit code.
This script receives all users and their hashes from PCS:
┌────
│ python3 eacrypt.py http://${PCS_HOSTNAME} model "select * from t_secuser, t_xref where t_xref.Type='User Setting'
and t_xref.Name ='SHA-256' and t_xref.Client=t_secuser.UserID"
└────
Solution
────────
It will be hard to introduce proper authorization for all types of SQL
queries - this would require to rewrite the logic to use some higher
abstraction API which can be properly authorized.
Until a proper authorized API will be provided a quick solution could
be at least to verify the SQL queries executed and block the most
dangerous like asking about other users' passwords and so on. Maybe a
query whitelist with limiting the view of some critical assets like
hashes.
For sure it should be transparently stated in the PCS and EA
documentation web page. Some integrators and admins are aware of this
risk (there are some topics on the forum mentioning that the model
security is not in fact security) but this *should be well described
in both product documentations* as a limitation and risk which needs
to be understood by clients and taken into consideration at an early
stage while designing a production system. Otherwise it poses a high
risk for any company using those products.
[Vulnerability #2] Sparx Pro Cloud Server Authentication Bypass
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CVE
───
CVE-2026-42097 - Authentication Bypass in Sparx Pro Cloud Server
Affected versions
─────────────────
Sparx Pro Cloud Server versions <= 6.1 build 167
CVSSv4
──────
9.2 Critical
(CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
Impact
──────
An attacker can *omit PCS authentication* and e.g. combined with the
previous vulnerability be able to remotely execute arbitrary SQL
commands (read and write) *without authentication*.
Details
───────
It seems that PCS requires authentication based on requested URL. EA
clients sending the encrypted SQL query to PCS are using an url which
looks as follows:
┌────
│ https://${PCS_SERVER_HOSTNAME}/SparxCloudLink.sseap?model=${MODEL_NAME}
└────
PCS seems to look at the URL and decides how to authenticate the
request. Unfortunately the SQL command query sends a POST request with
a binary blob where the model name is defined one more time and this
is the value that is further used by PCS to execute the query.
Thus an attacker can simply omit the model query parameter and send
the model name only in the binary blob in both TLS and non-TLS ports
and the query will be executed even thought there was no
authentication.
PoC
───
To quickly verify compare the authenticated response for a request:
┌────
│ curl 'https://${PCS_HOSTNAME}/SparxCloudLink.sseap?model=${MODEL_NAME}' -X POST -vvv --data 'whatever' -k
└────
which responds 401 Access Denied to response of a request without the
query param:
┌────
│ curl 'https://${PCS_HOSTNAME}/SparxCloudLink.sseap' -X POST -vvv --data 'whatever' -k
└────
which responds 500 Internal Server Error.
To proof this properly use the python code which exploits the #1
SQL vulnerability and uses the URL without model query parameter to
omit the authentication.
Solution
────────
Make a single parameter pointing the model (either in the blob or in
query param) and hook authentication and query logic on the same
parameter.
[Vulnerability #3] Sparx Enterprise Architect Authorization Bypass
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CVE
───
CVE-2026-42098 - Authorization Bypass in Sparx Enterprise Architect
Affected versions
─────────────────
Sparx Enterprise Architect versions <= 17.1
CVSSv4
──────
7.7 High
(CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
Impact
──────
Sparx Enterprise Architect software has a security feature which can
be enabled. When enabled the users can be limited to perform only some
actions by roles but this is not a real security measure as it can be
easily bypassed.
*Any authenticated user can actually perform any action on the model*
including deletion, stealing of other users' passwords and many
others. This *includes configurations with Pro Cloud Server* where
vendor advertises that PCS brings high level of security for the
model:
Robust security features are designed to protect sensitive
model information, *including role-based access control*,
encryption, authentication mechanisms and audit trails.
source: <https://www.sparxsystems.eu/pro-cloud-server/>
Details
───────
This vulnerability, most probably, is a result of the legacy thick
client architecture described in the vulnerability #1.
The EA documentation states briefly that the security is not a real
security:
The Security system in Enterprise Architect is designed to
facilitate collaboration, *not as a barrier to incursion*.
source:
<https://sparxsystems.com/enterprise_architect_user_guide/17.1/guide_books/tools_ba_security.html>
but right below it suggests that model assets should be secured:
The information contained in the Repository is a valuable
organizational asset that needs to be maintained and
secured as such. The asset must be protected from both
*intentional* and inadvertent compromises of content. The
Security system allows update functions to be restricted
to a set of users or groups with the appropriate defined
permission. Packages, elements and diagrams can be locked
by users, preventing others from updating them.
source:
<https://sparxsystems.com/enterprise_architect_user_guide/17.1/guide_books/tools_ba_security.html>
Unfortunately the current design is not protecting against intentional
compromises of content. An attacker can modify the EA client behavior
(e.g. using a debugger) to login in as any other user or administrator
- then it is possible to do every possible change to the repository.
PoC
───
To show how it works it is enough to patch the binary to change the
logic and accept all incorrect passwords and reject correct ones. For
the file version 17.1.0.1714 of EA.exe (md5sum:
69dfe7b98d1fc156d15d8aeff726cfce) the following would patch the logic:
┌────
│ printf '\x84' | dd of=EA.exe bs=1 seek=$((0x34657B2)) conv=notrunc
└────
Then run the patched exe and try to login to local model with
different password. It also works obviously for cloud models which do
not require server HTTP authentication or when using the "Login as
different user option".
Solution
────────
The way security works for EA should be properly and transparently
presented in the EA documentation and installation notes. The sentence
quoted above is not enough and can be easily misinterpreted by many
users leading to vulnerabilities.
Also it should be explained that even when using PCS after
authentication there is no authorization until visibility levels are
enabled which are working per whole database manager not user - so in
fact there is no user based RBAC but rather database manager RBAC what
is much more coarse grained then per user roles access control.
In terms of combination of EA and PCS it is possible to secure the
design by e.g. following the recommendations proposed in vulnerability
#1.
[Vulnerability #4] Sparx Pro Cloud Server WebEA Remote Code Execution
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CVE
───
CVE-2026-42099 - Race Condition in Sparx Pro Cloud Server
Affected versions
─────────────────
Sparx Pro Cloud Server versions <= 6.1 build 167
CVSSv4
──────
9.0 Critical
(CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)
Impact
──────
PCS configured with WebEA PHP application allows for remote command
execution using the /data_api/dl_internal_artifact.php endpoint. This
URL is used by WebEA to download content of a internal artifact. A
remote attacker having access to the PCS repository is able to inject
a malicious php file into the
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
20 references
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0325 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-42096
- related CVE-2026-42097
- related CVE-2026-42098
- related CVE-2026-42099
- related CVE-2026-42100
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"value": "\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\nMultiple vulnerabilities in Sparx Pro Cloud Server and Enterprise Architect\n\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\u2501\n\nGeneral information\n\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\n\n Multiple vulnerabilities in Sparx Pro Cloud Server (PCS) versions \u003c=\n 6.1 and Sparx Enterprise Architect versions \u003c=17.1 allow a remote\n unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary sql queries (both read\n and write) within any configured database. In case where PCS is\n installed with WebEA the vulnerabilities allow further for remote\n unauthenticated code execution (RCE) within the web server context.\n\n CVSSv4 chained score: *10.0 Critical*\n (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)\n\n\nFix\n\u2550\u2550\u2550\n\n Currently vendor *did not resolve* any of the CVEs. The PCS\n authentication bypass and race condition seem to be easy to implement\n and I hope vendor will release patches soon.\n\n As a workaround it is best to isolate the PCS instances from internet\n and untrusted networks. Create frequent backups and review access logs\n if possible. You could also setup a proxy to limit the PCS\n authentication bypass (dropping requests with no or wrong model query\n parameter.\n\n\n[Vulnerabilitiy #1] Sparx Pro Cloud Server SQL Command Execution\n\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\n\nCVE\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n CVE-2026-42096 - Broken Access Control in Sparx Pro Cloud Server\n\n\nAffected versions\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Sparx Pro Cloud Server versions \u003c= 6.1 build 167\n\n\nCVSSv4\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n 9.4 Critical\n (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)\n\n\nImpact\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n PCS works as a remote model for a thick client, running on user\u0027s\n computers, called Enterprise Architect (EA). EA connects to PCS and\n works with the exposed database by directly running SQL queries.\n Besides user authentication (which is also vulnerable - see\n vulnerability #2 below) there is no additional access control. Any low\n privileged user can actually run any sql queries permitted by the\n configured external database user. Usually the user configured is at\n least having full access to the model database - thus any low\n privileged user can actually destroy the whole model, retrieve and\n change other user\u0027s password hashes and more.\n\n The problem seems to be with legacy thick client EA architecture which\n simply works on a database to manage all the model details.\n\n\nDetails\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n The client (EA) is connecting to the PCS HTTP server. The server might\n require authentication *if it is properly configured* - an admin can\n check \"Enable Security\" in EA but still not select \"Require a secure\n and authenticated connection\" in PCS configuration what results in *NO\n SERVER SIDE authentication at all*.\n\n Assuming the server side authentication is required the PCS verifies\n the authentication according to configuration - e.g. login/password,\n Active Directory or OpenID.\n\n Then the EA client sends request to perform SQL queries on the\n database in an ecrypted form but the whole encryption scheme is built\n into the client EA binary (actually downloadable from the vendor\n webside without any authentication - as trial version). The encryption\n is symmetric using a key contained within the binary itself thus\n simply this is not any security measure (security by obscurity).\n\n An attacker can obtain the key and then *create and send custom SQL\n queries to be performed by the database*.\n\n\nPoC\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Exploit: https://github.com/br0xpl/sparx_hack/blob/main/eacrypt.py\n is a python script which exploits the SQL vulnerability by encrypting\n any SQL command and sending it to the server. For security,\n the real key is removed from the exploit code.\n\n This script receives all users and their hashes from PCS:\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n \u2502 python3 eacrypt.py http://${PCS_HOSTNAME} model \"select * from t_secuser, t_xref where t_xref.Type=\u0027User Setting\u0027 \nand t_xref.Name =\u0027SHA-256\u0027 and t_xref.Client=t_secuser.UserID\"\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n\nSolution\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n It will be hard to introduce proper authorization for all types of SQL\n queries - this would require to rewrite the logic to use some higher\n abstraction API which can be properly authorized.\n\n Until a proper authorized API will be provided a quick solution could\n be at least to verify the SQL queries executed and block the most\n dangerous like asking about other users\u0027 passwords and so on. Maybe a\n query whitelist with limiting the view of some critical assets like\n hashes.\n\n For sure it should be transparently stated in the PCS and EA\n documentation web page. Some integrators and admins are aware of this\n risk (there are some topics on the forum mentioning that the model\n security is not in fact security) but this *should be well described\n in both product documentations* as a limitation and risk which needs\n to be understood by clients and taken into consideration at an early\n stage while designing a production system. Otherwise it poses a high\n risk for any company using those products.\n\n\n[Vulnerability #2] Sparx Pro Cloud Server Authentication Bypass\n\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\n\nCVE\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n CVE-2026-42097 - Authentication Bypass in Sparx Pro Cloud Server\n\n\nAffected versions\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Sparx Pro Cloud Server versions \u003c= 6.1 build 167\n\n\nCVSSv4\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n 9.2 Critical\n (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)\n\n\nImpact\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n An attacker can *omit PCS authentication* and e.g. combined with the\n previous vulnerability be able to remotely execute arbitrary SQL\n commands (read and write) *without authentication*.\n\n\nDetails\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n It seems that PCS requires authentication based on requested URL. EA\n clients sending the encrypted SQL query to PCS are using an url which\n looks as follows:\n\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n \u2502 https://${PCS_SERVER_HOSTNAME}/SparxCloudLink.sseap?model=${MODEL_NAME}\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n PCS seems to look at the URL and decides how to authenticate the\n request. Unfortunately the SQL command query sends a POST request with\n a binary blob where the model name is defined one more time and this\n is the value that is further used by PCS to execute the query.\n\n Thus an attacker can simply omit the model query parameter and send\n the model name only in the binary blob in both TLS and non-TLS ports\n and the query will be executed even thought there was no\n authentication.\n\n\nPoC\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n To quickly verify compare the authenticated response for a request:\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n \u2502 curl \u0027https://${PCS_HOSTNAME}/SparxCloudLink.sseap?model=${MODEL_NAME}\u0026apos; -X POST -vvv --data \u0027whatever\u0027 -k\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n which responds 401 Access Denied to response of a request without the\n query param:\n\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n \u2502 curl \u0027https://${PCS_HOSTNAME}/SparxCloudLink.sseap\u0026apos; -X POST -vvv --data \u0027whatever\u0027 -k\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n which responds 500 Internal Server Error.\n\n To proof this properly use the python code which exploits the #1\n SQL vulnerability and uses the URL without model query parameter to\n omit the authentication.\n\n\nSolution\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Make a single parameter pointing the model (either in the blob or in\n query param) and hook authentication and query logic on the same\n parameter.\n\n\n[Vulnerability #3] Sparx Enterprise Architect Authorization Bypass\n\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\n\nCVE\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n CVE-2026-42098 - Authorization Bypass in Sparx Enterprise Architect\n\n\nAffected versions\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Sparx Enterprise Architect versions \u003c= 17.1\n\n\nCVSSv4\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n 7.7 High\n (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)\n\n\nImpact\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Sparx Enterprise Architect software has a security feature which can\n be enabled. When enabled the users can be limited to perform only some\n actions by roles but this is not a real security measure as it can be\n easily bypassed.\n\n *Any authenticated user can actually perform any action on the model*\n including deletion, stealing of other users\u0027 passwords and many\n others. This *includes configurations with Pro Cloud Server* where\n vendor advertises that PCS brings high level of security for the\n model:\n\n Robust security features are designed to protect sensitive\n model information, *including role-based access control*,\n encryption, authentication mechanisms and audit trails.\n\n source: \u003chttps://www.sparxsystems.eu/pro-cloud-server/\u003e\n\n\nDetails\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n This vulnerability, most probably, is a result of the legacy thick\n client architecture described in the vulnerability #1.\n\n The EA documentation states briefly that the security is not a real\n security:\n\n The Security system in Enterprise Architect is designed to\n facilitate collaboration, *not as a barrier to incursion*.\n\n source:\n \u003chttps://sparxsystems.com/enterprise_architect_user_guide/17.1/guide_books/tools_ba_security.html\u003e\n\n but right below it suggests that model assets should be secured:\n\n The information contained in the Repository is a valuable\n organizational asset that needs to be maintained and\n secured as such. The asset must be protected from both\n *intentional* and inadvertent compromises of content. The\n Security system allows update functions to be restricted\n to a set of users or groups with the appropriate defined\n permission. Packages, elements and diagrams can be locked\n by users, preventing others from updating them.\n\n source:\n \u003chttps://sparxsystems.com/enterprise_architect_user_guide/17.1/guide_books/tools_ba_security.html\u003e\n\n Unfortunately the current design is not protecting against intentional\n compromises of content. An attacker can modify the EA client behavior\n (e.g. using a debugger) to login in as any other user or administrator\n - then it is possible to do every possible change to the repository.\n\n\nPoC\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n To show how it works it is enough to patch the binary to change the\n logic and accept all incorrect passwords and reject correct ones. For\n the file version 17.1.0.1714 of EA.exe (md5sum:\n 69dfe7b98d1fc156d15d8aeff726cfce) the following would patch the logic:\n\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n \u2502 printf \u0027\\x84\u0027 | dd of=EA.exe bs=1 seek=$((0x34657B2)) conv=notrunc\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Then run the patched exe and try to login to local model with\n different password. It also works obviously for cloud models which do\n not require server HTTP authentication or when using the \"Login as\n different user option\".\n\n\nSolution\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n The way security works for EA should be properly and transparently\n presented in the EA documentation and installation notes. The sentence\n quoted above is not enough and can be easily misinterpreted by many\n users leading to vulnerabilities.\n\n Also it should be explained that even when using PCS after\n authentication there is no authorization until visibility levels are\n enabled which are working per whole database manager not user - so in\n fact there is no user based RBAC but rather database manager RBAC what\n is much more coarse grained then per user roles access control.\n\n In terms of combination of EA and PCS it is possible to secure the\n design by e.g. following the recommendations proposed in vulnerability\n #1.\n\n\n[Vulnerability #4] Sparx Pro Cloud Server WebEA Remote Code Execution\n\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\n\nCVE\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n CVE-2026-42099 - Race Condition in Sparx Pro Cloud Server\n\n\nAffected versions\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n Sparx Pro Cloud Server versions \u003c= 6.1 build 167\n\n\nCVSSv4\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n 9.0 Critical\n (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)\n\n\nImpact\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n PCS configured with WebEA PHP application allows for remote command\n execution using the /data_api/dl_internal_artifact.php endpoint. This\n URL is used by WebEA to download content of a internal artifact. A\n remote attacker having access to the PCS repository is able to inject\n a malicious php file into the "
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GCVE-1988-2026-0229
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
Hello Yuffie,
Upon further investigation, the VulnCheck CNA determined that these
vulnerabilities were not suitable for CVE assignment. The
vulnerabilities exist within a SaaS product and are mitigated at the
CSP-level which in this case, would be the vendor, EQS Group. Rather than
contribute unactionable CVE records, the VulnCheck CNA used its
discretionary prowess to move forward with rejecting these records. This
policy aligns with a 2022 blog from MITRE
<https://www.cve.org/Media/News/item/blog/2022/09/13/Dispelling-the-Myth-CVE-ID>.
It
should be noted that the vendor informed us that they have published
advisories for the respective vulnerabilities in their "Trust Center"
customer portal.
These actions should not be a deterrent for you to pursue CVE assignment
through MITRE or another research CNA.
Best regards,
<https://www.vulncheck.com/>
Wade Sparks III
VulnCheck
Senior Vulnerability Analyst
On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 12:13 PM Yuffie Kisaragi <
yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io> wrote:
Dear Art,
Thank you for sharing your detailed evaluation and for pointing out the
relevant sections of the CNA Rules.
Your argument is well reasoned, particularly with respect to the current
guidance on SaaS and exclusively hosted services.
I have forwarded your evaluation to the CNA for further consideration. It
will also be important to understand the vendor’s perspective in light of
the points you raised, especially regarding the applicability of the
“exclusively-hosted-service” tag and the removal of prior restrictions.
We look forward to receive transparent feedback from the CNA and/or the
vendor.
To date, the vendor has remained silent with regard to informing their
users about the reported issues. As far as we can determine, no public
advisory or user-facing communication has been issued via their
vulnerability reporting channel (
https://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/) or elsewhere.
Best regards,
Yuffie
On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 7:26 PM <zmanion () protonmail com> wrote:
Hi,
the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking,
despite being real, independently discovered, responsibly disclosed, and
acknowledged by the vendor.
CVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly "cloud only" software.
For a period of time, there was a restriction that only the provider could
make or request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this
restriction:
4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud,
on-premises, artificial intelligence, machine learning) as the sole basis
for determining assignment.
It would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411
and CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them as affecting an
"exclusively-hosted-service:"
5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the “exclusively-hosted-service” tag
when all known Products listed in the CVE Record exist only as fully hosted
services. If the Vulnerability affects both hosted services and on-premises
Products, then this tag MUST NOT be used.
Rules: https://www.cve.org/resourcessupport/allresources/cnarules
Regards,
- Art
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0229 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
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GCVE-1988-2026-0213
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
Dear Art,
Thank you for sharing your detailed evaluation and for pointing out the relevant
sections of the CNA Rules.
Your argument is well reasoned, particularly with respect to the current
guidance on SaaS and exclusively hosted services.
I have forwarded your evaluation to the CNA for further consideration. It will
also be important to understand the vendor’s perspective in light of the points
you raised, especially regarding the applicability of the
“exclusively-hosted-service” tag and the removal of prior restrictions.
We look forward to receive transparent feedback from the CNA and/or the vendor.
To date, the vendor has remained silent with regard to informing their users
about the reported issues. As far as we can determine, no public advisory or
user-facing communication has been issued via their vulnerability reporting
channel () or elsewhere.
Best regards,
Yuffie
On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 7:26 PM <> wrote:
Hi,
the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking,
despite being real, independently discovered, responsibly disclosed, and
acknowledged by the vendor.
CVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly "cloud only" software. For a
period of time, there was a restriction that only the provider could make or
request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction:
4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises,
artificial intelligence, machine learning) as the sole basis for determining
assignment.
It would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and
CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them as affecting an
"exclusively-hosted-service:"
5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the “exclusively-hosted-service” tag when all
known Products listed in the CVE Record exist only as fully hosted services.
If the Vulnerability affects both hosted services and on-premises Products,
then this tag MUST NOT be used.
Rules: https://www.cve.org/resourcessupport/allresources/cnarules
Regards,
- Art
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0213 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
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"value": "Dear Art,\n\n\n\n\nThank you for sharing your detailed evaluation and for pointing out the relevant\nsections of the CNA Rules.\n\n\n\n\nYour argument is well reasoned, particularly with respect to the current\nguidance on SaaS and exclusively hosted services.\n\n\n\n\nI have forwarded your evaluation to the CNA for further consideration. It will\nalso be important to understand the vendor\u2019s perspective in light of the points\nyou raised, especially regarding the applicability of the\n\u201cexclusively-hosted-service\u201d tag and the removal of prior restrictions.\n\n\n\nWe look forward to receive transparent\u00a0feedback from the CNA and/or the vendor.\n\n\nTo date, the vendor has remained silent with regard to informing their users\nabout the reported issues. As far as we can determine, no public advisory or\nuser-facing communication has been issued via their vulnerability reporting\nchannel () or elsewhere.\n\n\nBest regards,\n\n\nYuffie\n\n\nOn Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 7:26 PM \u003c\u003e wrote:\n\nHi,\n\nthe vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking,\ndespite being real, independently discovered, responsibly disclosed, and\nacknowledged by the vendor.\nCVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly \"cloud only\" software. For a\nperiod of time, there was a restriction that only the provider could make or\nrequest such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction:\n\n4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises,\nartificial intelligence, machine learning) as the sole basis for determining\nassignment.\n\nIt would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and\nCVE-2025-34412 published and identify them as affecting an\n\"exclusively-hosted-service:\"\n\n5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the \u201cexclusively-hosted-service\u201d tag when all\nknown Products listed in the CVE Record exist only as fully hosted services.\nIf the Vulnerability affects both hosted services and on-premises Products,\nthen this tag MUST NOT be used.\n\nRules: https://www.cve.org/resourcessupport/allresources/cnarules\n\nRegards,\n\n- Art\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0185
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
Hello everyone,
Kindly let me introduce myself. This is the first – and potentially, last – message on this mailing list. I am Marco,
the CISO of EQS Group. Kindly allow me to address some of the statements expressed publicly here.
About the Convercent application
Convercent was acquired by OneTrust in 2021, and in turn, EQS has acquired it from OneTrust at the end of 2024. Before
being acquired by EQS, the Convercent application has not received much love in the latest years, and EQS has since
then proceeded to migrate its customers to the EQS Compliance COCKPIT, which is a modern, supported, and secure SaaS.
The Convercent application is sunset and will be finally switched off by mid of 2026.
Currently, Convercent is supported by EQS on a best-effort basis; despite that, EQS Group has committed to fix all
critical vulnerabilities until the last customer is fully migrated. We want our customers to migrate to our best
service because it is better – not rush them in our new product because what we inherited from an acquisition is
insecure.
The vulnerabilities
The two issues disclosed are either minor in nature or do not constitute vulnerabilities. One was a lack of certain
HTTP headers (some of the reported ones where wrong, but regardless, still hardly something CVE-worthy), and the second
was about an “exposed” API; however, it is public by design as this is how the application works: it is a page where
customers – who have explicitly agreed and signed off to be present – are added to a drop-down list, fed from this
public API. The web page exposes the list of customers by design.
While we may reasonably question whether this page reflects current secure-by-design standards, this brings zero added
risk to any of the EQS customers and Convercent users.
I strongly disagree with the ideas that those “vulnerabilities” could become CVEs – regardless of the status of the
SaaS security and how CVEs are handled. Therefore, we proceeded to ask for their removal from the CVSS database, so not
to alarm our customers with false positives. The responsible CNA agreed immediately to remove them (thank you very
much, VulnCheck!).
Communication with our customers
EQS Group communicates with its customers through established and appropriate channels – notably, our Trust Center –
and not via anonymous mailing lists. Customers have received and will continue to receive all the notifications they
have contractually required to obtain, and where relevant, additional context beyond those obligations.
Customers have received a briefing about the activity happening on this mailing list via our Trust Center.
The status of SaaS Security
As EQS Group is a CNA candidate, we participate and closely follow discussions between MITRE, CISA, and the German BSI,
about vulnerability reporting for SaaS. While we have not heard any news on this front since the last two years, EQS
Group remains committed to aligning with applicable best practices as they evolve.
We believe that meaningful progress in SaaS security is best achieved through structured, collaborative forums with
clear governance, rather than responding to ad-hoc reports of unvetted findings. EQS Group already participates to
proper, professional working groups on SaaS security, for instance through the Cloud Security Alliance. If other
working groups will emerge through any of the official organisms already mentioned, we will certainly participate.
In general, as a principle, CVEs have been created many years ago, at a time where “the Cloud” did not exist in its
current form. They were conceived so that users who procured a software from a development company and installed it on
their system, could be notified when the software they have installed, manifested a security issue. In that way, they
could procure the patch and fix it before a misuse could happen.
Now, except for very particular and edge cases, this is largely inapplicable to SaaS, where there is very little users
can do and solely rely on the Cloud Service Provider to fix any vulnerability. There is almost never any real ground
for a SaaS provider to notify a customer – unless of course a breach has been detected, but in that case we are way
beyond a CVE and we are on a different territory. For a SaaS, even knowing that the application had a bug, does not
help the user in any way. This is why typically CVEs as a concept are not the proper tool to address SaaS
vulnerabilities, and in general, rushing to disclose them only damages the users; a disclosure does not help them in
any way.
Response to the “Responsible" Disclosure
About the “responsible" disclosure: EQS Group receives a significant volume of “vulnerability notifications” like that
one. Almost all of them are low or irrelevant issues from anonymous users looking to make a buck; they are typically
about a missing HTTP headers or lack of optional DNS records. Given the scale of our environment, it can happen that
some record is not updated, but this has little relevance to the security of our platforms. We also cannot always reply
to all those messages, and most of them seem AI or automatically generated.
The notification from “Yuffie Kisaragi” was sent to us on the 4th of December and went to Junk due to the low
reputation of the email used. The author then rushed to obtain two CVE IDs less than two weeks later and subsequently
lost no time posting them on this list.
EQS Group is certainly not perfect, but if these would have been real vulnerabilities, I argue that this would have not
qualified as a “responsible” disclosure by any reasonable standard.
Further communications
EQS Group’s vulnerability handling policy is listed here<https://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/#handle> –
https://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/ – and we strongly suggest anyone to read it before they issue a report.
In this regard, we would like to point out the followings:
1. For several reasons – legal, commercial, policy, and ethical – EQS Group is unable to respond to requests for
payment of bounties outside of an official bug bounty program.
2. EQS Group does nor remunerate bugs that were already discovered internally and were already in resolution.
3. EQS Group strongly discourages non-approved, un-vetted testing on EQS Group’s infrastructure. They can and will
be perceived as hostile activity. Testing is encouraged only within officially approved bug bounty programs, in respect
to the established rules of engagement.
4. Kindly avoid pointless reports on MTA-STS records, DMARC, quantum ciphers, and other junk like that. It makes our
life easier.
Thank you for your attention.
Best regards / mit freundlichen Grüßen / Cordiali saluti
Dr Marco Ermini (He/Him)
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
Marco.Ermini () eqs com<mailto:Marco.Ermini () eqs com;>
[LinkendIn]<https://www.linkedin.com/in/marcoermini/>
Vereinbaren Sie einen Termin mit mir<https://outlook.office365.com/owa/calendar/BookaMeetingwithMarco () eqs
com/bookings/>
[EQS Group Logo]<https://www.eqs.com/?keyword=email-footer>
[EQS Compliance COCKPIT]<https://www.eqs.com/de/platform-compliance-ethics/?keyword=email-footer>
EQS Group GmbH | Karlstr. 47 | 80333 München | www.eqs.com<https://www.eqs.com/?keyword=email-footer> |
www.integrityline.com<http://www.integrityline.com/?keyword=email-footer>
[linkedIn Logo]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/1273779>
[X Logo]<https://twitter.com/eqsgroup>
[Instagram Logo]<https://www.instagram.com/eqsgroup/>
[YouTube Logo]<https://www.youtube.com/user/EquityStory>
[RSS Logo]<https://www.eqs.com/compliance-knowledge/>
[Xing Logo]<https://www.xing.com/companies/eqsgroup>
Register Court: Munich | Register Number: HRB 297048
Managing Directors: Achim Weick (CEO), André Silverio Marques, Marcus Sultzer
The preceding email message contains information that is confidential and may constitute non-public information that is
intended to be conveyed only to the designated recipient(s).
If you are not an intended recipient of this message, please notify the sender at +49 89 444430-000<tel:+4989444430000>.
Unauthorized use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message is strictly prohibited and may be
unlawful.
From: Wade Sparks <wsparks () vulncheck com>
Date: Wednesday, 21. January 2026 at 17:29
To: Yuffie Kisaragi <yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io>
Cc: Security Vulnerability <security-vulnerability () eqs com>, fulldisclosure () seclists org <fulldisclosure ()
seclists org>
Subject: Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing
Platform (EQS Group)
EXTERNAL EMAIL WARNING: Please check the sender of the message
Hello Yuffie,
Upon further investigation, the VulnCheck CNA determined that these vulnerabilities were not suitable for CVE
assignment. The vulnerabilities exist within a SaaS product and are mitigated at the CSP-level which in this case,
would be the vendor, EQS Group. Rather than contribute unactionable CVE records, the VulnCheck CNA used its
discretionary prowess to move forward with rejecting these records. This policy aligns with a 2022 blog from
MITRE<https://www.cve.org/Media/News/item/blog/2022/09/13/Dispelling-the-Myth-CVE-ID>. It should be noted that the
vendor informed us that they have published advisories for the respective vulnerabilities in their "Trust Center"
customer portal.
These actions should not be a deterrent for you to pursue CVE assignment through MITRE or another research CNA.
Best regards,
[https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/-9dCGnQIZaW0ehyK1B0bqLmef7d7ZWuSmmmWUYJGhzNgtzRhqFPZrtO3AnQt8PETFHiv6_YST3DacZVgrxPdAYXErAMnJrF6Isn27caszruLjby7jLRuuU__5emkqFjU8hczQ307--yVVMpVSiK7Qg]<https://www.vulncheck.com/>
Wade Sparks III
VulnCheck
Senior Vulnerability Analyst
On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 12:13 PM Yuffie Kisaragi <yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io<mailto:yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail
io>> wrote:
Dear Art,
Thank you for sharing your detailed evaluation and for pointing out the relevant sections of the CNA Rules.
Your argument is well reasoned, particularly with respect to the current guidance on SaaS and exclusively hosted
services.
I have forwarded your evaluation to the CNA for further consideration. It will also be important to understand the
vendor’s perspective in light of the points you raised, especially regarding the applicability of the
“exclusively-hosted-service” tag and the removal of prior restrictions.
We look forward to receive transparent feedback from the CNA and/or the vendor.
To date, the vendor has remained silent with regard to informing their users about the reported issues. As far as we
can determine, no public advisory or user-facing communication has been issued via their vulnerability reporting
channel (https://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/) or elsewhere.
Best regards,
Yuffie
On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 7:26 PM <zmanion () protonmail com<mailto:zmanion () protonmail com>> wrote:
Hi,
the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered,
responsibly disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor.
CVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly "cloud only" software. For a period of time, there was a restriction
that only the provider could make or request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction:
4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises, artificial intelligence, machine
learning) as the sole basis for determining assignment.
It would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them
as affecting an "exclusively-hosted-service:"
5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the “exclusively-hosted-service” tag when all known Products listed in the CVE Record
exist only as fully
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
21 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0185 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
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}
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"credits": [
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"type": "finder",
"value": "Marco Ermini via Fulldisclosure"
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"value": "Hello everyone,\n\n\n\nKindly let me introduce myself. This is the first \u2013 and potentially, last \u2013 message on this mailing list. I am Marco, \nthe CISO of EQS Group. Kindly allow me to address some of the statements expressed publicly here.\n\n\n\nAbout the Convercent application\n\n\n\nConvercent was acquired by OneTrust in 2021, and in turn, EQS has acquired it from OneTrust at the end of 2024. Before \nbeing acquired by EQS, the Convercent application has not received much love in the latest years, and EQS has since \nthen proceeded to migrate its customers to the EQS Compliance COCKPIT, which is a modern, supported, and secure SaaS. \nThe Convercent application is sunset and will be finally switched off by mid of 2026.\n\n\n\nCurrently, Convercent is supported by EQS on a best-effort basis; despite that, EQS Group has committed to fix all \ncritical vulnerabilities until the last customer is fully migrated. We want our customers to migrate to our best \nservice because it is better \u2013 not rush them in our new product because what we inherited from an acquisition is \ninsecure.\n\n\n\n\n\nThe vulnerabilities\n\n\n\nThe two issues disclosed are either minor in nature or do not constitute vulnerabilities. One was a lack of certain \nHTTP headers (some of the reported ones where wrong, but regardless, still hardly something CVE-worthy), and the second \nwas about an \u201cexposed\u201d API; however, it is public by design as this is how the application works: it is a page where \ncustomers \u2013 who have explicitly agreed and signed off to be present \u2013 are added to a drop-down list, fed from this \npublic API. The web page exposes the list of customers by design.\n\n\n\nWhile we may reasonably question whether this page reflects current secure-by-design standards, this brings zero added \nrisk to any of the EQS customers and Convercent users.\n\n\n\nI strongly disagree with the ideas that those \u201cvulnerabilities\u201d could become CVEs \u2013 regardless of the status of the \nSaaS security and how CVEs are handled. Therefore, we proceeded to ask for their removal from the CVSS database, so not \nto alarm our customers with false positives. The responsible CNA agreed immediately to remove them (thank you very \nmuch, VulnCheck!).\n\n\n\n\n\nCommunication with our customers\n\n\n\nEQS Group communicates with its customers through established and appropriate channels \u2013 notably, our Trust Center \u2013 \nand not via anonymous mailing lists. Customers have received and will continue to receive all the notifications they \nhave contractually required to obtain, and where relevant, additional context beyond those obligations.\n\n\n\nCustomers have received a briefing about the activity happening on this mailing list via our Trust Center.\n\n\n\n\n\nThe status of SaaS Security\n\n\n\nAs EQS Group is a CNA candidate, we participate and closely follow discussions between MITRE, CISA, and the German BSI, \nabout vulnerability reporting for SaaS. While we have not heard any news on this front since the last two years, EQS \nGroup remains committed to aligning with applicable best practices as they evolve.\n\n\nWe believe that meaningful progress in SaaS security is best achieved through structured, collaborative forums with \nclear governance, rather than responding to ad-hoc reports of unvetted findings. EQS Group already participates to \nproper, professional working groups on SaaS security, for instance through the Cloud Security Alliance. If other \nworking groups will emerge through any of the official organisms already mentioned, we will certainly participate.\n\n\nIn general, as a principle, CVEs have been created many years ago, at a time where \u201cthe Cloud\u201d did not exist in its \ncurrent form. They were conceived so that users who procured a software from a development company and installed it on \ntheir system, could be notified when the software they have installed, manifested a security issue. In that way, they \ncould procure the patch and fix it before a misuse could happen.\n\n\nNow, except for very particular and edge cases, this is largely inapplicable to SaaS, where there is very little users \ncan do and solely rely on the Cloud Service Provider to fix any vulnerability. There is almost never any real ground \nfor a SaaS provider to notify a customer \u2013 unless of course a breach has been detected, but in that case we are way \nbeyond a CVE and we are on a different territory. For a SaaS, even knowing that the application had a bug, does not \nhelp the user in any way. This is why typically CVEs as a concept are not the proper tool to address SaaS \nvulnerabilities, and in general, rushing to disclose them only damages the users; a disclosure does not help them in \nany way.\n\n\n\n\nResponse to the \u201cResponsible\" Disclosure\n\n\n\nAbout the \u201cresponsible\" disclosure: EQS Group receives a significant volume of \u201cvulnerability notifications\u201d like that \none. Almost all of them are low or irrelevant issues from anonymous users looking to make a buck; they are typically \nabout a missing HTTP headers or lack of optional DNS records. Given the scale of our environment, it can happen that \nsome record is not updated, but this has little relevance to the security of our platforms. We also cannot always reply \nto all those messages, and most of them seem AI or automatically generated.\n\n\n\nThe notification from \u201cYuffie Kisaragi\u201d was sent to us on the 4th of December and went to Junk due to the low \nreputation of the email used. The author then rushed to obtain two CVE IDs less than two weeks later and subsequently \nlost no time posting them on this list.\n\n\n\nEQS Group is certainly not perfect, but if these would have been real vulnerabilities, I argue that this would have not \nqualified as a \u201cresponsible\u201d disclosure by any reasonable standard.\n\n\n\nFurther communications\n\n\nEQS Group\u2019s vulnerability handling policy is listed here\u003chttps://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/#handle\u003e \u2013 \nhttps://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/ \u2013 and we strongly suggest anyone to read it before they issue a report.\n\n\n\nIn this regard, we would like to point out the followings:\n\n 1. For several reasons \u2013 legal, commercial, policy, and ethical \u2013 EQS Group is unable to respond to requests for \npayment of bounties outside of an official bug bounty program.\n 2. EQS Group does nor remunerate bugs that were already discovered internally and were already in resolution.\n 3. EQS Group strongly discourages non-approved, un-vetted testing on EQS Group\u2019s infrastructure. They can and will \nbe perceived as hostile activity. Testing is encouraged only within officially approved bug bounty programs, in respect \nto the established rules of engagement.\n 4. Kindly avoid pointless reports on MTA-STS records, DMARC, quantum ciphers, and other junk like that. It makes our \nlife easier.\n\n\n\nThank you for your attention.\n\nBest regards / mit freundlichen Gr\u00fc\u00dfen / Cordiali saluti\n\nDr Marco Ermini (He/Him)\nChief Information Security Officer (CISO)\n\nMarco.Ermini () eqs com\u003cmailto:Marco.Ermini () eqs com;\u003e\n\n[LinkendIn]\u003chttps://www.linkedin.com/in/marcoermini/\u003e\nVereinbaren Sie einen Termin mit mir\u003chttps://outlook.office365.com/owa/calendar/BookaMeetingwithMarco () eqs \ncom/bookings/\u003e\n[EQS Group Logo]\u003chttps://www.eqs.com/?keyword=email-footer\u003e\n\n[EQS Compliance COCKPIT]\u003chttps://www.eqs.com/de/platform-compliance-ethics/?keyword=email-footer\u003e\nEQS Group GmbH | Karlstr. 47 | 80333 M\u00fcnchen | www.eqs.com\u003chttps://www.eqs.com/?keyword=email-footer\u003e | \nwww.integrityline.com\u003chttp://www.integrityline.com/?keyword=email-footer\u003e\n[linkedIn Logo]\u003chttps://www.linkedin.com/company/1273779\u003e\n[X Logo]\u003chttps://twitter.com/eqsgroup\u003e\n[Instagram Logo]\u003chttps://www.instagram.com/eqsgroup/\u003e\n[YouTube Logo]\u003chttps://www.youtube.com/user/EquityStory\u003e\n[RSS Logo]\u003chttps://www.eqs.com/compliance-knowledge/\u003e\n[Xing Logo]\u003chttps://www.xing.com/companies/eqsgroup\u003e\nRegister Court: Munich | Register Number: HRB 297048\nManaging Directors: Achim Weick (CEO), Andr\u00e9 Silverio Marques, Marcus Sultzer\n\nThe preceding email message contains information that is confidential and may constitute non-public information that is \nintended to be conveyed only to the designated recipient(s).\nIf you are not an intended recipient of this message, please notify the sender at +49 89 444430-000\u003ctel:+4989444430000\u003e.\nUnauthorized use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message is strictly prohibited and may be \nunlawful.\n\n\nFrom: Wade Sparks \u003cwsparks () vulncheck com\u003e\nDate: Wednesday, 21. January 2026 at 17:29\nTo: Yuffie Kisaragi \u003cyuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io\u003e\nCc: Security Vulnerability \u003csecurity-vulnerability () eqs com\u003e, fulldisclosure () seclists org \u003cfulldisclosure () \nseclists org\u003e\nSubject: Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing \nPlatform (EQS Group)\n\n\nEXTERNAL EMAIL WARNING: Please check the sender of the message\n\nHello Yuffie,\n\nUpon further investigation, the VulnCheck CNA determined that these vulnerabilities were not suitable for CVE \nassignment. The vulnerabilities exist within a SaaS product and are mitigated at the CSP-level which in this case, \nwould be the vendor, EQS Group. Rather than contribute unactionable CVE records, the VulnCheck CNA used its \ndiscretionary prowess to move forward with rejecting these records. This policy aligns with a 2022 blog from \nMITRE\u003chttps://www.cve.org/Media/News/item/blog/2022/09/13/Dispelling-the-Myth-CVE-ID\u003e. It should be noted that the \nvendor informed us that they have published advisories for the respective vulnerabilities in their \"Trust Center\" \ncustomer portal.\n\nThese actions should not be a deterrent for you to pursue CVE assignment through MITRE or another research CNA.\n\nBest regards,\n\n[https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/-9dCGnQIZaW0ehyK1B0bqLmef7d7ZWuSmmmWUYJGhzNgtzRhqFPZrtO3AnQt8PETFHiv6_YST3DacZVgrxPdAYXErAMnJrF6Isn27caszruLjby7jLRuuU__5emkqFjU8hczQ307--yVVMpVSiK7Qg]\u003chttps://www.vulncheck.com/\u003e\n\nWade Sparks III\n\nVulnCheck\nSenior Vulnerability Analyst\n\n\nOn Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 12:13\u202fPM Yuffie Kisaragi \u003cyuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io\u003cmailto:yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail \nio\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\n\nDear Art,\n\n\nThank you for sharing your detailed evaluation and for pointing out the relevant sections of the CNA Rules.\n\n\nYour argument is well reasoned, particularly with respect to the current guidance on SaaS and exclusively hosted \nservices.\n\n\nI have forwarded your evaluation to the CNA for further consideration. It will also be important to understand the \nvendor\u2019s perspective in light of the points you raised, especially regarding the applicability of the \n\u201cexclusively-hosted-service\u201d tag and the removal of prior restrictions.\n\nWe look forward to receive transparent feedback from the CNA and/or the vendor.\n\nTo date, the vendor has remained silent with regard to informing their users about the reported issues. As far as we \ncan determine, no public advisory or user-facing communication has been issued via their vulnerability reporting \nchannel (https://www.eqs.com/report-a-vulnerability/) or elsewhere.\n\nBest regards,\n\nYuffie\n\nOn Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 7:26 PM \u003czmanion () protonmail com\u003cmailto:zmanion () protonmail com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\nHi,\n\nthe vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered, \nresponsibly disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor.\nCVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly \"cloud only\" software. For a period of time, there was a restriction \nthat only the provider could make or request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction:\n\n4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises, artificial intelligence, machine \nlearning) as the sole basis for determining assignment.\n\nIt would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them \nas affecting an \"exclusively-hosted-service:\"\n\n5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the \u201cexclusively-hosted-service\u201d tag when all known Products listed in the CVE Record \nexist only as fully"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0195
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
UPDATE:
Following the publication of these vulnerabilities and the subsequent CVE
assignments, the CVE identifiers have now been revoked.
The vendor (EQS Group) contacted the CVE Program (via a CNA) and disputed the
records, stating that the affected product is an exclusively hosted SaaS
platform with no customer-managed deployment or versioning. Based on this
argument, the CVE Program concluded that CVE assignment is “not a suitable
solution for vulnerability identification” in this case, as customers do not
take direct action to apply fixes.
In other words, because the service is centrally hosted and patched at the
provider’s discretion, the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for
CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered, responsibly
disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor.
The vendor has stated that fixes are being implemented and that private customer
notifications will be issued internally.
While remediation is of course welcome, this outcome highlights a broader issue:
vulnerabilities in SaaS platforms can effectively disappear from public
vulnerability tracking, simply because the deployment model removes user agency,
a model that arguably incentivizes security through obscurity, rather than
transparency.
The technical findings remain valid.
This update is shared purely for accuracy and record-keeping.
On Sun, Jan 4, 2026 at 4:40 PM <yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io
[yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io]> wrote:
UPDATE:
The reported vulnerabilities have now been assigned CVE identifiers:
CVE-2025-34411: https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34411
[https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34411]
CVE-2025-34412: https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34412
[https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34412]
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0195 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
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GCVE-1988-2026-0197
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
Hi,
the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered,
responsibly disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor.
CVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly "cloud only" software. For a period of time, there was a restriction
that only the provider could make or request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction:
4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises, artificial intelligence, machine
learning) as the sole basis for determining assignment.
It would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them
as affecting an "exclusively-hosted-service:"
5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the “exclusively-hosted-service” tag when all known Products listed in the CVE Record
exist only as fully hosted services. If the Vulnerability affects both hosted services and on-premises Products, then
this tag MUST NOT be used.
Rules: https://www.cve.org/resourcessupport/allresources/cnarules
Regards,
- Art
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0197 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
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CVE-2023-53899 (GCVE-0-2023-53899)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2025-12-16 17:03 – Updated: 2026-07-28 01:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
PodcastGenerator 3.2.9 Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via XML Injection
Summary
PodcastGenerator 3.2.9 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows attackers to inject XML in the episode upload form. Attackers can manipulate the 'shortdesc' parameter to trigger external HTTP requests to arbitrary endpoints during podcast episode creation.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-12-16 21:42 UTC
CWE
- CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51565 | exploit |
| https://podcastgenerator.net/ | product |
| https://github.com/PodcastGenerator/PodcastGenerator | product |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/podcastgener… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2023-07-03 00:00
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CVE-2023-53899 (GCVE-0-2023-53899)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-16 17:03 – Updated: 2026-07-28 01:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
PodcastGenerator 3.2.9 Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via XML Injection
Summary
PodcastGenerator 3.2.9 contains a blind server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows attackers to inject XML in the episode upload form. Attackers can manipulate the 'shortdesc' parameter to trigger external HTTP requests to arbitrary endpoints during podcast episode creation.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-12-16 21:42 UTC
CWE
- CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51565 | exploit |
| https://podcastgenerator.net/ | product |
| https://github.com/PodcastGenerator/PodcastGenerator | product |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/podcastgener… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2023-07-03 00:00
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