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    RUSTSEC-2026-0334 (GHSA-5CHW-87W3-J9CV)

    Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-08-14 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-09 08:12 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses
    Details

    Affected versions of bip322 accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in applications using verify_simple, verify_simple_encoded, verify_full, or verify_full_encoded as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address.

    In verify_full, the verifier obtained the public key from the caller-controlled witness and passed it to verify_full_p2wpkh, where the supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and compared it with itself:

    let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1];

if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key {
    return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch);
}

    Since pub_key was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this public key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322's requirement that the message_signature satisfy the message_challenge (the claimed address's scriptPubKey).

    As a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign it with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No victim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do not mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and sign the current challenge message with their own key.

    P2TR verification is not affected: the public key is derived from the address's witness program rather than from the caller-controlled witness.

    The flaw was corrected in commit e8accbe by deriving the expected scriptPubKey from the witness public key (P2WPKH(HASH160(pubkey)), wrapped in P2SH for the nested case) and requiring it to exactly equal the scriptPubKey of the claimed address before signature verification, failing with Error::PublicKeyMismatch otherwise. The fix is included in version 0.0.11. Affected versions 0.0.6 through 0.0.10 have been yanked from crates.io.

    There is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to version 0.0.11 is the recommended course of action.

    Severity
    9.1 (Critical)
    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
    References
    To clipboard 

    {
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "bip322::verify_full",
            "bip322::verify_full_encoded",
            "bip322::verify_simple",
            "bip322::verify_simple_encoded"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "bip322",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/bip322"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-5chw-87w3-j9cv"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `bip322` accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an\nattacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim\nP2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in\napplications using `verify_simple`, `verify_simple_encoded`, `verify_full`, or\n`verify_full_encoded` as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address.\n\nIn `verify_full`, the verifier obtained the public key from the\ncaller-controlled witness and passed it to `verify_full_p2wpkh`, where the\nsupposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and\ncompared it with itself:\n\n```rust\nlet witness_pub_key = \u0026witness.to_vec()[1];\n\nif \u0026pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key {\n    return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch);\n}\n```\n\nSince `pub_key` was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this\ncomparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid\nfor the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this\npublic key hashes to the claimed address, violating BIP-322\u0027s requirement\nthat the `message_signature` satisfy the `message_challenge` (the claimed\naddress\u0027s scriptPubKey).\n\nAs a result, an attacker could select any victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH\naddress, construct the BIP-322 challenge for that address and message, sign\nit with their own unrelated private key, and have the proof accepted. No\nvictim key or victim interaction was required. Application-level nonces do\nnot mitigate this, since the attacker can construct and sign the current\nchallenge message with their own key.\n\nP2TR verification is not affected: the public key is derived from the\naddress\u0027s witness program rather than from the caller-controlled witness.\n\nThe flaw was corrected in commit\n[e8accbe](https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/bip322/commit/e8accbe7d39f48f030e44f333b4796e28f6aad80)\nby deriving the expected scriptPubKey from the witness public key\n(`P2WPKH(HASH160(pubkey))`, wrapped in P2SH for the nested case) and\nrequiring it to exactly equal the scriptPubKey of the claimed address before\nsignature verification, failing with `Error::PublicKeyMismatch` otherwise.\nThe fix is included in version\n[0.0.11](https://crates.io/crates/bip322/0.0.11). Affected versions 0.0.6\nthrough 0.0.10 have been yanked from crates.io.\n\nThere is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to\nversion 0.0.11 is the recommended course of action.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0334",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T08:12:02Z",
  "published": "2026-08-14T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/bip322"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0334.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/bip322/commit/e8accbe7d39f48f030e44f333b4796e28f6aad80"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses"
}