GHSA-hxf5-99xg-86hw
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-11-05 22:19
Modified
2024-11-06 14:28
Severity ?
2.3 (Low) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
cap-std doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames
Details

Impact

cap-std's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as "COM1", "COM2", "LPT0", "LPT1", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as "COM¹", "COM²", "LPT⁰", "LPT¹", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports.

Patches

The bug is fixed in https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade.

References

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "cap-std"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "cap-async-std"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "cap-primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-51756"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-05T22:19:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T22:15:21Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\ncap-std\u0027s filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as \"COM1\", \"COM2\", \"LPT0\", \"LPT1\", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as \"COM\u00b9\", \"COM\u00b2\", \"LPT\u2070\", \"LPT\u00b9\", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe bug is fixed in https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade.\n\n### References\n\n - [Microsoft\u0027s documentation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions) of the special device filenames\n - [ISO-8859-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_8859-1)\n - https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371\n",
  "id": "GHSA-hxf5-99xg-86hw",
  "modified": "2024-11-06T14:28:24Z",
  "published": "2024-11-05T22:19:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/security/advisories/GHSA-hxf5-99xg-86hw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51756"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/commit/dcc3818039761331fbeacbb3a40c542b65b5ebf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_8859-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "cap-std doesn\u0027t fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.