GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q
Vulnerability from github
Impact
Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuild_proxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).
Current vulnerable behavior(s):
- HTTP → HTTPS: leak
- HTTPS → HTTP: no leak
- HTTPS → HTTPS: leak
- HTTP → HTTP: no leak
For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.
The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxy_manager_for. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxy_headers and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.
Patches
Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.
For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuild_proxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.
Workarounds
For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.
You may disable redirects by setting allow_redirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.
import requests
r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.
Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/) Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@gmail.com)
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": [
"requests.sessions.SessionRedirectMixin.rebuild_proxies"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "requests"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.31.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32681"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-22T20:36:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-26T18:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nSince Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how `rebuild_proxies` is used to recompute and [reattach the `Proxy-Authorization` header](https://github.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/sessions.py#L319-L328) to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has _only_ been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. `https://username:password@proxy:8080`).\n\n**Current vulnerable behavior(s):**\n\n1. HTTP \u2192 HTTPS: **leak**\n2. HTTPS \u2192 HTTP: **no leak**\n3. HTTPS \u2192 HTTPS: **leak**\n4. HTTP \u2192 HTTP: **no leak**\n\nFor HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the `Proxy-Authorization` header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.\n\nThe reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the `Proxy-Authorization` header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with [`proxy_manager_for`](https://github.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/adapters.py#L199-L235). This will compute the required proxy headers in `proxy_headers` and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.\n\n### Patches\nStarting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3\u0027s ProxyManager.\n\nFor users with custom adapters, this _may_ be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of `rebuild_proxies` doesn\u0027t make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.\n\n### Workarounds\nFor users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.\n\nYou may disable redirects by setting `allow_redirects` to `False` on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you\u0027re currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.\n```\nimport requests\nr = requests.get(\u0027http://github.com/\u0027, allow_redirects=False)\n```\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.\n\nDennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)\nTobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@gmail.com)",
"id": "GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q",
"modified": "2024-03-12T17:11:27Z",
"published": "2023-05-22T20:36:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/psf/requests"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/requests/PYSEC-2023-74.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/06/msg00018.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KOYASTZDGQG2BWLSNBPL3TQRL2G7QYNZ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202309-08"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unintended leak of Proxy-Authorization header in requests"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.