GHSA-wfm5-v35h-vwf4
Vulnerability from github
8.6 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
When resolving a program, Python/Windows look for the current working directory, and after that the PATH environment (see big warning in https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#popen-constructor). GitPython defaults to use the git
command, if a user runs GitPython from a repo has a git.exe
or git
executable, that program will be run instead of the one in the user's PATH
.
Details
This is more of a problem on how Python interacts with Windows systems, Linux and any other OS aren't affected by this. But probably people using GitPython usually run it from the CWD of a repo.
The execution of the git
command happens in
https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/cmd.py#L277
https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/cmd.py#L983-L996
And there are other commands executed that should probably be aware of this problem.
PoC
On a Windows system, create a git.exe
or git
executable in any directory, and import or run GitPython from that directory
python -c "import git"
The git executable from the current directory will be run.
Impact
An attacker can trick a user to download a repository with a malicious git
executable, if the user runs/imports GitPython from that directory, it allows the attacker to run any arbitrary commands.
Possible solutions
- Default to an absolute path for the git program on Windows, like
C:\\Program Files\\Git\\cmd\\git.EXE
(default git path installation). - Require users to set the
GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE
environment variable on Windows systems. - Make this problem prominent in the documentation and advise users to never run GitPython from an untrusted repo, or set the
GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE
env var to an absolute path. - Resolve the executable manually by only looking into the
PATH
environment variable (suggested by @Byron)
[!NOTE] This vulnerability was reported via email, and it was decided to publish it here and make it public, so the community is aware of it, and a fix can be provided.
{ affected: [ { database_specific: { last_known_affected_version_range: "<= 3.1.32", }, package: { ecosystem: "PyPI", name: "GitPython", }, ranges: [ { events: [ { introduced: "0", }, { fixed: "3.1.33", }, ], type: "ECOSYSTEM", }, ], }, ], aliases: [ "CVE-2023-40590", ], database_specific: { cwe_ids: [ "CWE-426", ], github_reviewed: true, github_reviewed_at: "2023-08-29T23:33:53Z", nvd_published_at: "2023-08-28T18:15:08Z", severity: "HIGH", }, details: "### Summary\n\nWhen resolving a program, Python/Windows look for the current working directory, and after that the PATH environment (see big warning in https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#popen-constructor). GitPython defaults to use the `git` command, if a user runs GitPython from a repo has a `git.exe` or `git` executable, that program will be run instead of the one in the user's `PATH`.\n\n### Details\n\nThis is more of a problem on how Python interacts with Windows systems, Linux and any other OS aren't affected by this. But probably people using GitPython usually run it from the CWD of a repo.\n\nThe execution of the `git` command happens in\n\nhttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/cmd.py#L277 \n\nhttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/cmd.py#L983-L996\n\nAnd there are other commands executed that should probably be aware of this problem.\n\n### PoC\n\nOn a Windows system, create a `git.exe` or `git` executable in any directory, and import or run GitPython from that directory\n\n```\npython -c \"import git\"\n```\n\nThe git executable from the current directory will be run.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker can trick a user to download a repository with a malicious `git` executable, if the user runs/imports GitPython from that directory, it allows the attacker to run any arbitrary commands.\n\n### Possible solutions\n \n- Default to an absolute path for the git program on Windows, like `C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Git\\\\cmd\\\\git.EXE` (default git path installation).\n- Require users to set the `GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE` environment variable on Windows systems.\n- Make this problem prominent in the documentation and advise users to never run GitPython from an untrusted repo, or set the `GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE` env var to an absolute path.\n- Resolve the executable manually by only looking into the `PATH` environment variable (suggested by @Byron)\n\n---\n\n> [!NOTE]\n> This vulnerability was reported via email, and it was decided to publish it here and make it public, so the community is aware of it, and a fix can be provided.", id: "GHSA-wfm5-v35h-vwf4", modified: "2024-09-20T20:14:20Z", published: "2023-08-29T23:33:53Z", references: [ { type: "WEB", url: "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wfm5-v35h-vwf4", }, { type: "ADVISORY", url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40590", }, { type: "WEB", url: "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/issues/1635", }, { type: "WEB", url: "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/1636", }, { type: "WEB", url: "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8b75434e2c8a082cdeb4971cc6f0ee2bafec45bc", }, { type: "WEB", url: "https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#popen-constructor", }, { type: "PACKAGE", url: "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython", }, { type: "WEB", url: "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.33", }, { type: "WEB", url: "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2023-161.yaml", }, ], schema_version: "1.4.0", severity: [ { score: "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", type: "CVSS_V3", }, { score: "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", type: "CVSS_V4", }, ], summary: "GitPython untrusted search path on Windows systems leading to arbitrary code execution", }
Log in or create an account to share your comment.
This schema specifies the format of a comment related to a security advisory.
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.