Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Cosign is a project under the sigstore organization which aims to make signatures invisible infrastructure. In versions prior to 1.12.0 a number of vulnerabilities have been found in cosign verify-blob, where Cosign would successfully verify an artifact when verification should have failed. First a cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature. Second, when providing identity flags, the email and issuer of a certificate is not checked when verifying a Rekor bundle, and the GitHub Actions identity is never checked. Third, providing an invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag results in a successful verification. And fourth an invalid transparency log entry will result in immediate success for verification. Details and examples of these issues can be seen in the GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 advisory linked. Users are advised to upgrade to 1.12.0. There are no known workarounds for these issues.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "cosign",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/cosign"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36056"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:cosign:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "Cosign is a project under the sigstore organization which aims to make signatures invisible infrastructure. In versions prior to 1.12.0 a number of vulnerabilities have been found in cosign verify-blob, where Cosign would successfully verify an artifact when verification should have failed. First a cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature. Second, when providing identity flags, the email and issuer of a certificate is not checked when verifying a Rekor bundle, and the GitHub Actions identity is never checked. Third, providing an invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag results in a successful verification. And fourth an invalid transparency log entry will result in immediate success for verification. Details and examples of these issues can be seen in the GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 advisory linked. Users are advised to upgrade to 1.12.0. There are no known workarounds for these issues.",
"id": "BIT-cosign-2022-36056",
"modified": "2025-05-20T10:02:07.006Z",
"published": "2024-03-06T10:51:15.106Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/80b79ed8b4d28ccbce3d279fd273606b5cddcc25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.5.0",
"summary": " Vulnerabilities with blob verification in sigstore cosign"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.