Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-06-30 23:39
Modified
2026-09-08 08:34
Summary
Envoy: Embedded NUL in TLS DNS SAN Truncation in the Default TLS Certificate Validator. (Auth Bypass)
Details

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1, a structural flaw was identified in DefaultCertValidator::verifySubjectAltName where the extracted DNS SAN string is cast to a C-style string using .c_str() before being passed to the Utility::dnsNameMatch() algorithm. If the attacker serves a certificate with a dNSName SAN containing an embedded NUL byte, the helper Utility::generalNameAsString captures the complete string including the NUL. However, when .c_str() evaluates it, implicit conversion to absl::string_view inside dnsNameMatch relies on strlen(), prematurely truncating the evaluation context. Envoy evaluates trucated string against the exact required config_san match and returns true, thereby successfully validating the string with the Nul byte for an upstream routing. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "envoy",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.11"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.36.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.36.7"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.37.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.37.3"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.38.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47778"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1, a structural flaw was identified in DefaultCertValidator::verifySubjectAltName where the extracted DNS SAN string is cast to a C-style string using .c_str() before being passed to the Utility::dnsNameMatch() algorithm. If the attacker serves a certificate with a dNSName SAN containing an embedded NUL byte, the helper Utility::generalNameAsString captures the complete string including the NUL. However, when .c_str() evaluates it, implicit conversion to absl::string_view inside dnsNameMatch relies on strlen(), prematurely truncating the evaluation context. Envoy evaluates trucated string against the exact required config_san match and returns true, thereby successfully validating the string with the Nul byte for an upstream routing. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1.",
  "id": "BIT-envoy-2026-47778",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T08:34:36.952Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T23:39:30.542Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-f8x4-rw5x-f3r7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47778"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "Envoy: Embedded NUL in TLS DNS SAN Truncation in the Default TLS Certificate Validator. (Auth Bypass)"
}



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