Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2024-03-06 11:08
Modified
2026-09-08 08:34
Summary
Denial of service in nghttp2
Details

In nghttp2 before version 1.41.0, the overly large HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame payload causes denial of service. The proof of concept attack involves a malicious client constructing a SETTINGS frame with a length of 14,400 bytes (2400 individual settings entries) over and over again. The attack causes the CPU to spike at 100%. nghttp2 v1.41.0 fixes this vulnerability. There is a workaround to this vulnerability. Implement nghttp2_on_frame_recv_callback callback, and if received frame is SETTINGS frame and the number of settings entries are large (e.g., > 32), then drop the connection.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "node",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.21.0"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "12.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.18.0"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "14.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-11080"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:nodejs:node.js:*:*:*:*:-:*:*:*",
      "cpe:2.3:a:nodejs:node.js:*:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "In nghttp2 before version 1.41.0, the overly large HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame payload causes denial of service. The proof of concept attack involves a malicious client constructing a SETTINGS frame with a length of 14,400 bytes (2400 individual settings entries) over and over again. The attack causes the CPU to spike at 100%. nghttp2 v1.41.0 fixes this vulnerability. There is a workaround to this vulnerability. Implement nghttp2_on_frame_recv_callback callback, and if received frame is SETTINGS frame and the number of settings entries are large (e.g., \u003e 32), then drop the connection.",
  "id": "BIT-node-2020-11080",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T08:34:36.952Z",
  "published": "2024-03-06T11:08:52.092Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-06/msg00024.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/commit/336a98feb0d56b9ac54e12736b18785c27f75090"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/commit/f8da73bd042f810f34d19f9eae02b46d870af394"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/nghttp2/nghttp2/security/advisories/GHSA-q5wr-xfw9-q7xr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/10/msg00011.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/10/msg00023.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4OOYAMJVLLCLXDTHW3V5UXNULZBBK4O6/"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AAC2AA36OTRHKSVM5OV7TTVB3CZIGEFL/"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4696"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com//security-alerts/cpujul2021.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2021.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2020.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2020.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11080"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.5.0",
  "summary": "Denial of service in nghttp2"
}



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