Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from cleanstart

Published

2026-07-30 07:10

Modified

2026-07-30 09:35

Summary

Security fixes in kubernetes-dns-node-cache-fips 1.26.7-r1

Details

Package kubernetes-dns-node-cache-fips version 1.26.7-r1 fixes 3 vulnerabilities: ghsa-c9v3-4pv7-87pr, ghsa-h75p-j8xm-m278, ghsa-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq

References

URL

Type

https://github.com/kubernetes/dns

WEB

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Alpine",
        "name": "kubernetes-dns-node-cache-fips"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.26.7-r1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.26.7-r1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Package kubernetes-dns-node-cache-fips version 1.26.7-r1 fixes 3 vulnerabilities: ghsa-c9v3-4pv7-87pr, ghsa-h75p-j8xm-m278, ghsa-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-QO08875",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T09:35:10Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/dns"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fixes in kubernetes-dns-node-cache-fips 1.26.7-r1",
  "upstream": [
    "ghsa-c9v3-4pv7-87pr",
    "ghsa-h75p-j8xm-m278",
    "ghsa-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq"
  ]
}

GHSA-9H8M-3FM2-QJRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 20:07 – Updated: 2026-02-27 21:39

Summary

OpenTelemetry Go SDK Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via PATH Hijacking

Details

Impact

The OpenTelemetry Go SDK in version v1.20.0-1.39.0 is vulnerable to Path Hijacking (Untrusted Search Paths) on macOS/Darwin systems. The resource detection code in sdk/resource/host_id.go executes the ioreg system command using a search path. An attacker with the ability to locally modify the PATH environment variable can achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the context of the application.

Patches

This has been patched in d45961b, which was released with v1.40.0.

References

CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path

Severity

7.0 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.21.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.40.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24051"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-426"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T20:07:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T23:16:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe OpenTelemetry Go SDK in version `v1.20.0`-`1.39.0` is vulnerable to Path Hijacking (Untrusted Search Paths) on macOS/Darwin systems. The resource detection code in `sdk/resource/host_id.go` executes the `ioreg` system command using a search path. An attacker with the ability to locally modify the PATH environment variable can achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the context of the application.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched in [d45961b](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/d45961bcda453fcbdb6469c22d6e88a1f9970a53), which was released with `v1.40.0`.\n\n### References\n- [CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html)",
  "id": "GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T21:39:46Z",
  "published": "2026-02-02T20:07:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24051"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/d45961bcda453fcbdb6469c22d6e88a1f9970a53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4394"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenTelemetry Go SDK Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via PATH Hijacking"
}

GHSA-C9V3-4PV7-87PR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-06 18:04 – Updated: 2026-04-27 13:53

Summary

CoreDNS ACL Bypass

Details

A logical vulnerability in CoreDNS allows DNS access controls to be bypassed due to the default execution order of plugins. Security plugins such as acl are evaluated before the rewrite plugin, resulting in a Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) flaw.

Impact

In multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters, this flaw undermines DNS-based segmentation strategies.

Example scenario: 1. ACL blocks access to *.admin.svc.cluster.local 2. A rewrite rule maps public-name → admin.svc.cluster.local 3. An unprivileged pod queries public-name 4. ACL allows the request 5. Rewrite exposes the internal admin service IP

This allows unauthorized service discovery and reconnaissance of restricted internal infrastructure.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Workarounds

Reorder the default plugin.cfg so that:
rewrite and other normalization plugins run before acl, opa, and firewall
Ensure all access control checks are applied after name normalization.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coredns/coredns"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26017"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-06T18:04:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T16:16:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A logical vulnerability in CoreDNS allows DNS access controls to be bypassed due to the default execution order of plugins. Security plugins such as acl are evaluated before the rewrite plugin, resulting in a Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) flaw.\n\n\n### Impact\n\nIn multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters, this flaw undermines DNS-based segmentation strategies.\n\nExample scenario:\n1. ACL blocks access to *.admin.svc.cluster.local\n2. A rewrite rule maps public-name \u2192 admin.svc.cluster.local\n3. An unprivileged pod queries public-name\n4. ACL allows the request\n5. Rewrite exposes the internal admin service IP\n\nThis allows unauthorized service discovery and reconnaissance of restricted internal infrastructure.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Reorder the default plugin.cfg so that:\n   - rewrite and other normalization plugins run before acl, opa, and firewall\n- Ensure all access control checks are applied after name normalization.",
  "id": "GHSA-c9v3-4pv7-87pr",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T13:53:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T18:04:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns/security/advisories/GHSA-c9v3-4pv7-87pr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26017"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns/releases/tag/v1.14.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreDNS ACL Bypass"
}

GHSA-H75P-J8XM-M278

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-06 22:08 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:08

Summary

CoreDNS Loop Detection Denial of Service Vulnerability

Details

Executive Summary

A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in CoreDNS's loop detection plugin that allows an attacker to crash the DNS server by sending specially crafted DNS queries. The vulnerability stems from the use of a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for generating a secret query name, combined with a fatal error handler that terminates the entire process.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Description

The CoreDNS loop plugin is designed to detect forwarding loops by performing a self-test during server startup. The plugin generates a random query name (qname) using Go's math/rand package and sends an HINFO query to itself. If the server receives multiple matching queries, it assumes a forwarding loop exists and terminates.

The vulnerability arises from two design flaws:

Predictable PRNG Seed: The random number generator is seeded with time.Now().UnixNano(), making the generated qname predictable if an attacker knows the approximate server start time.
Fatal Error Handler: When the plugin detects what it believes is a loop (3+ matching HINFO queries), it calls log.Fatalf() which invokes os.Exit(1), immediately terminating the process without cleanup or recovery.

Affected Code

File: plugin/loop/setup.go

// PRNG seeded with predictable timestamp
var r = rand.New(time.Now().UnixNano())

// Qname generation using two consecutive PRNG calls
func qname(zone string) string {
    l1 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
    l2 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
    return dnsutil.Join(l1, l2, zone)
}

File: plugin/loop/loop.go

func (l *Loop) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
    // ... validation checks ...

    if state.Name() == l.qname {
        l.inc()  // Increment counter
    }

    if l.seen() > 2 {
        // FATAL: Terminates entire process
        log.Fatalf("Loop (%s -> %s) detected for zone %q...", ...)
    }

    // ...
}

File: plugin/pkg/log/log.go

func Fatalf(format string, v ...any) {
    logf(fatal, format, v...)
    os.Exit(1)  // Immediate process termination
}

Exploitation Window

The loop plugin remains active during the following conditions:

Condition	Window Duration	Attack Feasibility
Healthy startup	2 seconds	Requires precise timing
Self-test failure (upstream unreachable)	30 seconds	HIGH - Extended window
Network degradation	Variable	Depends on retry behavior

Attack Scenario

Primary Attack Vector: Network Degradation

When the upstream DNS server is unreachable (network partition, misconfiguration, outage), the loop plugin's self-test fails repeatedly. During this period:

The loop plugin remains active for up to 30 seconds
Each self-test attempt generates an HINFO query visible in CoreDNS logs
An attacker with log access (shared Kubernetes cluster, centralized logging) can observe the qname
The attacker sends 3 HINFO queries with the observed qname
The server immediately crashes

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         ATTACK TIMELINE                                  │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ T+0s     CoreDNS starts, PRNG seeded with UnixNano()                     │
│ T+0.5s   Self-test HINFO query sent (visible in logs)                    │
│ T+2s     Self-test fails (upstream timeout)                              │
│ T+3s     Retry #1 - counter resets, qname unchanged                      │
│ T+5s     Retry #2 - attacker observes qname in logs                      │
│ T+5.1s   ATTACKER: Send HINFO #1 → counter = 1                           │
│ T+5.2s   ATTACKER: Send HINFO #2 → counter = 2                           │
│ T+5.3s   ATTACKER: Send HINFO #3 → counter = 3 → os.Exit(1)              │
│ T+5.3s   SERVER CRASHES                                                  │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Impact Assessment

Attack Requirements

Requirement	Notes
Network Access	Must be able to send UDP packets to CoreDNS port
Log Access	Required to observe the qname (common in shared clusters)
Timing	Extended window during network degradation
Authentication	None required

Real-World Impact

CoreDNS is the default DNS server for Kubernetes clusters. A successful attack would:

Disruption: All DNS resolution fails within the cluster
Cascading Failures: Services unable to discover each other
Restart Loop: If attack persists, CoreDNS enters crash-restart cycle
Data Plane Impact: Application-level failures across the cluster

References

CoreDNS GitHub: https://github.com/coredns/coredns
Loop Plugin Documentation: https://coredns.io/plugins/loop/
Go math/rand Documentation: https://pkg.go.dev/math/rand

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coredns/coredns"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26018"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-337"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-06T22:08:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T16:16:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Executive Summary\n\nA Denial of Service vulnerability exists in CoreDNS\u0027s loop detection plugin that allows an attacker to crash the DNS server by sending specially crafted DNS queries. The vulnerability stems from the use of a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for generating a secret query name, combined with a fatal error handler that terminates the entire process.\n\n---\n## Technical Details\n\n### Vulnerability Description\n\nThe CoreDNS `loop` plugin is designed to detect forwarding loops by performing a self-test during server startup. The plugin generates a random query name (`qname`) using Go\u0027s `math/rand` package and sends an HINFO query to itself. If the server receives multiple matching queries, it assumes a forwarding loop exists and terminates.\n\n**The vulnerability arises from two design flaws:**\n\n1. **Predictable PRNG Seed**: The random number generator is seeded with `time.Now().UnixNano()`, making the generated qname predictable if an attacker knows the approximate server start time.\n\n2. **Fatal Error Handler**: When the plugin detects what it believes is a loop (3+ matching HINFO queries), it calls `log.Fatalf()` which invokes `os.Exit(1)`, immediately terminating the process without cleanup or recovery.\n\n### Affected Code\n\n**File: `plugin/loop/setup.go`**\n```go\n// PRNG seeded with predictable timestamp\nvar r = rand.New(time.Now().UnixNano())\n\n// Qname generation using two consecutive PRNG calls\nfunc qname(zone string) string {\n    l1 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())\n    l2 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())\n    return dnsutil.Join(l1, l2, zone)\n}\n```\n\n**File: `plugin/loop/loop.go`**\n```go\nfunc (l *Loop) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {\n    // ... validation checks ...\n    \n    if state.Name() == l.qname {\n        l.inc()  // Increment counter\n    }\n\n    if l.seen() \u003e 2 {\n        // FATAL: Terminates entire process\n        log.Fatalf(\"Loop (%s -\u003e %s) detected for zone %q...\", ...)\n    }\n    \n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n**File: `plugin/pkg/log/log.go`**\n```go\nfunc Fatalf(format string, v ...any) {\n    logf(fatal, format, v...)\n    os.Exit(1)  // Immediate process termination\n}\n```\n\n### Exploitation Window\n\nThe loop plugin remains active during the following conditions:\n\n| Condition | Window Duration | Attack Feasibility |\n|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|\n| Healthy startup | 2 seconds | Requires precise timing |\n| Self-test failure (upstream unreachable) | 30 seconds | **HIGH** - Extended window |\n| Network degradation | Variable | Depends on retry behavior |\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n**Primary Attack Vector: Network Degradation**\n\nWhen the upstream DNS server is unreachable (network partition, misconfiguration, outage), the loop plugin\u0027s self-test fails repeatedly. During this period:\n\n1. The loop plugin remains active for up to 30 seconds\n2. Each self-test attempt generates an HINFO query visible in CoreDNS logs\n3. An attacker with log access (shared Kubernetes cluster, centralized logging) can observe the qname\n4. The attacker sends 3 HINFO queries with the observed qname\n5. The server immediately crashes\n\n```\n\u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n\u2502                         ATTACK TIMELINE                                  \u2502\n\u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n\u2502 T+0s     CoreDNS starts, PRNG seeded with UnixNano()                     \u2502\n\u2502 T+0.5s   Self-test HINFO query sent (visible in logs)                    \u2502\n\u2502 T+2s     Self-test fails (upstream timeout)                              \u2502\n\u2502 T+3s     Retry #1 - counter resets, qname unchanged                      \u2502\n\u2502 T+5s     Retry #2 - attacker observes qname in logs                      \u2502\n\u2502 T+5.1s   ATTACKER: Send HINFO #1 \u2192 counter = 1                           \u2502\n\u2502 T+5.2s   ATTACKER: Send HINFO #2 \u2192 counter = 2                           \u2502\n\u2502 T+5.3s   ATTACKER: Send HINFO #3 \u2192 counter = 3 \u2192 os.Exit(1)              \u2502\n\u2502 T+5.3s   SERVER CRASHES                                                  \u2502\n\u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\n### Attack Requirements\n\n| Requirement | Notes |\n|-------------|-------|\n| Network Access | Must be able to send UDP packets to CoreDNS port |\n| Log Access | Required to observe the qname (common in shared clusters) |\n| Timing | Extended window during network degradation |\n| Authentication | None required |\n\n### Real-World Impact\n\nCoreDNS is the default DNS server for Kubernetes clusters. A successful attack would:\n\n1. **Disruption**: All DNS resolution fails within the cluster\n2. **Cascading Failures**: Services unable to discover each other\n3. **Restart Loop**: If attack persists, CoreDNS enters crash-restart cycle\n4. **Data Plane Impact**: Application-level failures across the cluster\n\n## References\n\n- CoreDNS GitHub: https://github.com/coredns/coredns\n- Loop Plugin Documentation: https://coredns.io/plugins/loop/\n- Go math/rand Documentation: https://pkg.go.dev/math/rand",
  "id": "GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T22:08:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T22:08:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns/security/advisories/GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26018"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coredns/coredns/releases/tag/v1.14.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreDNS Loop Detection Denial of Service Vulnerability"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

Vulnerability from cleanstart

GHSA-9H8M-3FM2-QJRQ

Impact

Patches

References

GHSA-C9V3-4PV7-87PR

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

GHSA-H75P-J8XM-M278

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Vulnerability Description

Affected Code

Exploitation Window

Attack Scenario

Impact Assessment

Attack Requirements

Real-World Impact

References

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature