Vulnerability-Lookup

(GHSA-69X3-G4R3-P962)

Vulnerability from cleanstart – Published: 2026-09-18 09:53 – Updated: 2026-07-31 11:30 – Source website

Summary

Security fix for ghsa-69x3-g4r3-p962 applied in: step-cli 0.27.5-r0

Details

Security vulnerability affects the step-cli package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-secu…	ADVISORY
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-69x3-g4r3-p962	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "CleanStart",
        "name": "step-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.27.5-r0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Security vulnerability affects the step-cli package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-ZG76614",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T11:30:58Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T09:53:11.912790Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/CLEANSTART-2026-ZG76614.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-69x3-g4r3-p962"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fix for ghsa-69x3-g4r3-p962 applied in: step-cli 0.27.5-r0",
  "upstream": [
    "ghsa-69x3-g4r3-p962"
  ]
}

GHSA-69X3-G4R3-P962

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 20:05 – Updated: 2026-02-07 00:33

Summary

Blocklist Bypass possible via ECDSA Signature Malleability

Details

Impact

When using P256 certificates (which is not the default configuration), it is possible to evade a blocklist entry created against the fingerprint of a certificate by using ECDSA Signature Malleability to use a copy of the certificate with a different fingerprint.

In order for this to affect a user or network, all of the following must be true: * CURVE_P256 certificates are being used * There are one or more entries on the blocklist * The certificates for those entries are signed by a trusted CA and not expired * An attacker has a copy of the private key, and corresponding certificate, for one of those blocklist entries

Patches

See attached

Workarounds

If full copies of each certificate on the existing blocklist are available, it is possible to compute their opposite-chirality signature, and then the appropriate second fingerprint to list in the blocklist.

Rotating out all CAs that have signed hosts on the blocklist will also prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.

Severity

7.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.10.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/slackhq/nebula"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T20:05:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T23:15:54Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWhen using P256 certificates (which is not the default configuration), it is possible to evade a blocklist entry created against the fingerprint of a certificate by using ECDSA Signature Malleability to use a copy of the certificate with a different fingerprint.\n\nIn order for this to affect a user or network, all of the following must be true:\n* `CURVE_P256` certificates are being used\n* There are one or more entries on the blocklist\n* The certificates for those entries are signed by a trusted CA and not expired\n* An attacker has a copy of the private key, and corresponding certificate, for one of those blocklist entries\n\n### Patches\n\nSee attached\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf full copies of each certificate on the existing blocklist are available, it is possible to compute their opposite-chirality signature, and then the appropriate second fingerprint to list in the blocklist.\n\nRotating out all CAs that have signed hosts on the blocklist will also prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962",
  "modified": "2026-02-07T00:33:38Z",
  "published": "2026-02-06T20:05:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/security/advisories/GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/commit/f573e8a26695278f9d71587390fbfe0d0933aa21"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/slackhq/nebula"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Blocklist Bypass possible via ECDSA Signature Malleability"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.