cve-2024-35803
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-05-17 13:23
Modified
2024-11-05 09:22
Severity ?
Summary
x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2149f8a56e2ed345c7a4d022a79f6b8fc53ae926
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/725351c036452b7db5771a7bed783564bc4b99cc
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/930775060ca348b8665f60eef14b204172d14f31
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefcd4fe2e3aaf792c14c9e56dab89e3d7a65d02
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fba7ee7187581b5bc222003e73e2592b398bb06d
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux
Show details on NVD website

To clipboard 

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                "timestamp": "2024-05-28T15:53:37.707964Z",
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          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
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          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware\u0027s stack\n\nNormally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack\nthat was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec,\nthis stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but\nall asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same\nstack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice.\n\nIn mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls\nthe 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor\u0027s 32-bit\nentry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation\nof 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in\n64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using\nthe decompressor\u0027s limited boot stack.\n\nDue to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any\nstack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit\n\n  5c4feadb0011983b (\"x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code\")\n\nmoved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot\nstack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will\ncorrupt the end of the .data section.\n\nWhile it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of\nthe boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode\nsystems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base.\n\nSo instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from\nthe 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot\nservice call is made."
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    "cveId": "CVE-2024-35803",
    "datePublished": "2024-05-17T13:23:12.183Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-05-17T12:19:12.341Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-11-05T09:22:38.188Z",
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  }
}


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