ghsa-2fqm-m4r2-fh98
Vulnerability from github
Impact
Kiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks.
The upload validation checks were not 100% robust which left the possibility to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file which allows execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. Additionally we've discovered that Nginx's proxy_pass
directive will strip some headers negating protections built into Kiwi TCMS when served behind a reverse proxy.
Patches
- Improved file upload validation code
- Updated Nginx reverse proxy configuration for *.tenant.kiwitcms.org
Workarounds
If serving Kiwi TCMS behind a reverse proxy make sure that additional header values are still passed to the client browser. If they aren't redefine them inside the proxy configuration. See etc/nginx.conf#L66-L68 and etc/nginx.conf#L87
References
Disclosed by M Nadeem Qazi.
{ "affected": [ { "database_specific": { "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.3" }, "ecosystem_specific": { "affected_functions": [ "tcms.kiwi_attachments.validators.deny_uploads_containing_script_tag" ] }, "package": { "ecosystem": "PyPI", "name": "kiwitcms" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "12.4" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2023-33977" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-434", "CWE-79" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-06T16:46:16Z", "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-06T19:15:12Z", "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Impact\n\nKiwi TCMS allows users to upload attachments to test plans, test cases, etc. Earlier versions of Kiwi TCMS had introduced upload validators in order to prevent potentially dangerous files from being uploaded and Content-Security-Policy definition to prevent cross-site-scripting attacks. \n\nThe upload validation checks were not 100% robust which left the possibility to circumvent them and upload a potentially dangerous file which allows execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the browser. Additionally we\u0027ve discovered that Nginx\u0027s `proxy_pass` directive will strip some headers negating protections built into Kiwi TCMS when served behind a reverse proxy.\n\n### Patches\n\n- Improved file upload validation code\n- Updated Nginx reverse proxy configuration for ***.tenant.kiwitcms.org**\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf serving Kiwi TCMS behind a reverse proxy make sure that additional header values are still passed to the client browser. If they aren\u0027t redefine them inside the proxy configuration. See [etc/nginx.conf#L66-L68](https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/blob/master/etc/nginx.conf#L66-L68) and [etc/nginx.conf#L87](https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/blob/master/etc/nginx.conf#L87)\n\n### References\n\nDisclosed by [M Nadeem Qazi](https://huntr.dev/bounties/6aea9a26-e29a-467b-aa5a-f767f0c2ec96/).", "id": "GHSA-2fqm-m4r2-fh98", "modified": "2023-06-06T16:46:16Z", "published": "2023-06-06T16:46:16Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/security/advisories/GHSA-2fqm-m4r2-fh98" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33977" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/kiwi/commit/d789f4b51025de4f8c747c037d02e1b0da80b034" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/blob/master/etc/nginx.conf#L66-L68" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/blob/master/etc/nginx.conf#L87" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/6aea9a26-e29a-467b-aa5a-f767f0c2ec96" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://kiwitcms.org/blog/kiwi-tcms-team/2023/06/06/kiwi-tcms-124" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "kiwitcms vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting via unrestricted file upload" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.