GHSA-2PG7-R8HW-8M7V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 12:31 – Updated: 2024-09-18 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ucma: Protect mc during concurrent multicast leaves
Partially revert the commit mentioned in the Fixes line to make sure that allocation and erasing multicast struct are locked.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ucma_cleanup_multicast drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:491 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ucma_destroy_private_ctx+0x914/0xb70 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:579 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801bb74b00 by task syz-executor.1/25529 CPU: 0 PID: 25529 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x320 mm/kasan/report.c:247 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450 ucma_cleanup_multicast drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:491 [inline] ucma_destroy_private_ctx+0x914/0xb70 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:579 ucma_destroy_id+0x1e6/0x280 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:614 ucma_write+0x25c/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732 vfs_write+0x28e/0xae0 fs/read_write.c:588 ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:643 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Currently the xarray search can touch a concurrently freeing mc as the xa_for_each() is not surrounded by any lock. Rather than hold the lock for a full scan hold it only for the effected items, which is usually an empty list.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T12:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/ucma: Protect mc during concurrent multicast leaves\n\nPartially revert the commit mentioned in the Fixes line to make sure that\nallocation and erasing multicast struct are locked.\n\n BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ucma_cleanup_multicast drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:491 [inline]\n BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ucma_destroy_private_ctx+0x914/0xb70 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:579\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801bb74b00 by task syz-executor.1/25529\n CPU: 0 PID: 25529 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc7-syzkaller #0\n Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011\n Call Trace:\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106\n print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x320 mm/kasan/report.c:247\n __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]\n kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450\n ucma_cleanup_multicast drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:491 [inline]\n ucma_destroy_private_ctx+0x914/0xb70 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:579\n ucma_destroy_id+0x1e6/0x280 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:614\n ucma_write+0x25c/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732\n vfs_write+0x28e/0xae0 fs/read_write.c:588\n ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:643\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\nCurrently the xarray search can touch a concurrently freeing mc as the\nxa_for_each() is not surrounded by any lock. Rather than hold the lock for\na full scan hold it only for the effected items, which is usually an empty\nlist.",
"id": "GHSA-2pg7-r8hw-8m7v",
"modified": "2024-09-18T18:30:49Z",
"published": "2024-06-20T12:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2923948ffe0835f7114e948b35bcc42bc9b3baa1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36e8169ec973359f671f9ec7213547059cae972e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75c610212b9f1756b9384911d3a2c347eee8031c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee2477e8ccd3d978eeac0dc5a981b286d9bb7b0a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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