GHSA-6MWQ-MRW3-3M6C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-27 21:31 – Updated: 2024-12-06 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367
CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch] do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch] ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0 genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 _syssendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 _sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0
The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000() raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame: ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
this frame has 2 objects: [32, 144) 'ovs_dst' [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked()
the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-46955"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-27T19:04:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nopenvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets\n\nrunning openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it\u0027s possible to see the\nfollowing splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:\n\n BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367\n\n CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418\n Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack+0x92/0xc1\n print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150\n kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111\n ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60\n ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]\n do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]\n ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]\n ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0\n genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380\n genl_rcv+0x24/0x40\n netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630\n netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0\n sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890\n ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160\n __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170\n do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07\n Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48\n RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e\n RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019\n RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000\n R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0\n\n The buggy address belongs to the page:\n page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7\n flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()\n raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000\n raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000\n page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\n\n addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:\n ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]\n\n this frame has 2 objects:\n [32, 144) \u0027ovs_dst\u0027\n [192, 424) \u0027ovs_rt\u0027\n\n Memory state around the buggy address:\n ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n \u003effff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n ^\n ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n\nfor IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,\nin the following call graph:\n\n ip_do_fragment()\n ip_skb_dst_mtu()\n ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()\n ip_mtu_locked()\n\nthe pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this\nturns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in\nthe stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets\nin ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.",
"id": "GHSA-6mwq-mrw3-3m6c",
"modified": "2024-12-06T18:30:44Z",
"published": "2024-02-27T21:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46955"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23e17ec1a5eb53fe39cc34fa5592686d5acd0dac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/490ad0a2390442d0a7b8c00972a83dbb09cab142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a52fa8ad45b5a593ed416adf326538638454ff1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c0ea5930c1c211931819d83cfb157bff1539a4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1478374b0bda89b4277a8afd39208271faad4be"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1d7280f9ba1bfdbc3af5bdb82e51f014854f26f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3502b04e84ac5349be95fc033c17bd701d2787a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d841d3cf5297fde4ce6a41ff35451d0e82917f3e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df9e900de24637be41879e2c50afb713ec4e8b2e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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