ghsa-7x45-phmr-9wqp
Vulnerability from github
Published
2023-03-30 20:16
Modified
2024-10-01 19:20
Severity ?
8.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
6.3 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
Summary
Arbitrary file write in mindsdb when Extracting Tarballs retrieved from a remote location
Details

Summary

An unsafe extraction is being performed using shutil.unpack_archive() from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant.

Details

Unpacking files using the high-level function shutil.unpack_archive() from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory.

As can be seen in the vulnerable snippet code source, an archive is being retrieved using the download_file() function from a remote location which is a user-provided permanent storage bucket s3. Immediately after being retrieved, the tarball is unsafely unpacked using the function shutil.unpack_archive().

The vulnerable code is L128..L129 in fs.py file.

```python3 def init(self): super().init() if 's3_credentials' in self.config['permanent_storage']: self.s3 = boto3.client('s3', **self.config['permanent_storage']['s3_credentials']) else: self.s3 = boto3.client('s3')

    # User provided remote storage!
    self.bucket = self.config['permanent_storage']['bucket']

def get(self, local_name, base_dir):
    remote_name = local_name
    remote_ziped_name = f'{remote_name}.tar.gz'
    local_ziped_name = f'{local_name}.tar.gz'
    local_ziped_path = os.path.join(base_dir, local_ziped_name)
    os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)

    # Retrieve a potentially malicious tarball
    self.s3.download_file(self.bucket, remote_ziped_name, local_ziped_path)

    # Perform an unsafe extraction
    shutil.unpack_archive(local_ziped_path, base_dir)

    os.system(f'chmod -R 777 {base_dir}')
    os.remove(local_ziped_path)

```

PoC

The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file sim4n6.txt to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.

```bash

tar --list -f archive.tar tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names ../../../sim4n6.txt

python3 Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.

import shutil shutil.unpack_archive("archive.tar") exit()

test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists" sim4n6.txt exists ```

Attack Scenario

An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely using a personal bucket s3, thus, retrieve the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server.

Mitigation

Potential mitigation could be to: - Use a safer module, like zipfile. - Validate the location of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path .. or absolute path such as /etc/password. - Perform a checksum verification for the retrieved archive, but hard-coding the hashes may be cumbersome and difficult to manage.

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mindsdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "22.11.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23522"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-30T20:16:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-30T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn unsafe extraction is being performed using `shutil.unpack_archive()` from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a **TarSlip** or a **ZipSlip variant**.\n\n### Details\n\nUnpacking files using the high-level function `shutil.unpack_archive()` from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory.\n\nAs can be seen in the vulnerable snippet code source, an archive is being retrieved using the `download_file()` function from a remote location which is a user-provided permanent storage bucket `s3`. Immediately after being retrieved, the tarball is unsafely unpacked using the function `shutil.unpack_archive()`.\n\nThe vulnerable code is [L128..L129](https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py#L128..L129) in [fs.py](https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py) file.\n\n```python3\n    def __init__(self):\n        super().__init__()\n        if \u0027s3_credentials\u0027 in self.config[\u0027permanent_storage\u0027]:\n            self.s3 = boto3.client(\u0027s3\u0027, **self.config[\u0027permanent_storage\u0027][\u0027s3_credentials\u0027])\n        else:\n            self.s3 = boto3.client(\u0027s3\u0027)\n       \n        # User provided remote storage!\n        self.bucket = self.config[\u0027permanent_storage\u0027][\u0027bucket\u0027] \n\n    def get(self, local_name, base_dir):\n        remote_name = local_name\n        remote_ziped_name = f\u0027{remote_name}.tar.gz\u0027\n        local_ziped_name = f\u0027{local_name}.tar.gz\u0027\n        local_ziped_path = os.path.join(base_dir, local_ziped_name)\n        os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)\n        \n        # Retrieve a potentially malicious tarball\n        self.s3.download_file(self.bucket, remote_ziped_name, local_ziped_path)\n\n        # Perform an unsafe extraction\n        shutil.unpack_archive(local_ziped_path, base_dir)\n\n        os.system(f\u0027chmod -R 777 {base_dir}\u0027)\n        os.remove(local_ziped_path)\n```  \n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file `sim4n6.txt` to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.\n\n```bash\n\u003e tar --list -f archive.tar\ntar: Removing leading \"../../../\" from member names\n../../../sim4n6.txt\n\n\u003e python3 \nPython 3.10.6 (main, Nov  2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux\nType \"help\", \"copyright\", \"credits\" or \"license\" for more information.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e import shutil\n\u003e\u003e\u003e shutil.unpack_archive(\"archive.tar\")\n\u003e\u003e\u003e exit()\n\n\u003e test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt \u0026\u0026 echo \"sim4n6.txt exists\"\nsim4n6.txt exists\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\nAn attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as `../../../../../../../../etc/passwd`, and then serve the archive remotely using a personal bucket `s3`, thus, retrieve the tarball through **mindsdb** and overwrite the system files of the hosting server. \n\n### Mitigation\n\nPotential mitigation could be to:\n - Use a safer module, like `zipfile`.\n -  Validate the location of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path `..` or absolute path such as `/etc/password`.\n -  Perform a checksum verification for the retrieved archive, but hard-coding the hashes may be cumbersome and difficult to manage.",
  "id": "GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp",
  "modified": "2024-10-01T19:20:52Z",
  "published": "2023-03-30T20:16:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23522"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py#L128..L129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/releases/tag/v22.11.4.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mindsdb/PYSEC-2023-26.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arbitrary file write in mindsdb when Extracting Tarballs retrieved from a remote location "
}


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