ghsa-7xq6-jm62-ww8g
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-04-03 15:30
Modified
2024-06-26 00:31
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup

shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order, however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock.

This opens multiple races: - shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event channel:

CPU0 CPU1 shutdown_pirq { xen_evtchn_close(e) __startup_pirq { EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq -> returns just freed evtchn e set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq) } xen_irq_info_cleanup() { set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1) } }

Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel number. After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).

  • __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because __startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can be unset in evtchn_to_irq.

The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already. This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.

On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal [un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq. With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.

------------[ cut here ]------------ blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006 Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 ? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0 ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd ? die+0x2b/0x50 ? do_trap+0x90/0x110 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0x ---truncated---

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-26687"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-03T15:15:52Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxen/events: close evtchn after mapping cleanup\n\nshutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the\nirq_mapping_update_lock because they can\u0027t due to lock inversion. Both\nare called with the irq_desc-\u003elock being taking. The lock order,\nhowever, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc-\u003elock.\n\nThis opens multiple races:\n- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event\n  channel:\n\n  CPU0                        CPU1\n  shutdown_pirq {\n    xen_evtchn_close(e)\n                              __startup_pirq {\n                                EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq\n                                  -\u003e returns just freed evtchn e\n                                set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)\n                              }\n    xen_irq_info_cleanup() {\n      set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)\n    }\n  }\n\n  Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel\n  number.\n  After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).\n\n- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because\n  __startup_pirq doesn\u0027t take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the\n  evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In\n  this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can\n  be unset in evtchn_to_irq.\n\nThe fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event\nchannel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it\u0027s\npotential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.\nThis is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event\nchannel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.\n\nOn a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 (\"xen/events: modify internal\n[un]bind interfaces\"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe\ndevices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq\nis called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.\nWith many nvme devices it\u0027s therefore likely to hit this race during\nboot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and\nstartup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.\n\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled\n  kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!\n  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI\n  CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1\n  Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006\n  Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work\n  RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0\n  Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff \u003c0f\u003e 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00\n  RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046\n  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006\n  RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff\n  RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00\n  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed\n  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002\n  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0\n  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n  Call Trace:\n   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9\n   ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9\n   ? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0\n   ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd\n   ? die+0x2b/0x50\n   ? do_trap+0x90/0x110\n   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0\n   ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80\n   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0\n   ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70\n   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0\n   ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20\n   ? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0x\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-7xq6-jm62-ww8g",
  "modified": "2024-06-26T00:31:36Z",
  "published": "2024-04-03T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26687"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fc88aeb2e32b76db3fe6a624b8333dbe621b8fd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20980195ec8d2e41653800c45c8c367fa1b1f2b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/585a344af6bcac222608a158fc2830ff02712af5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9470f5b2503cae994098dea9682aee15b313fa44"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9be71aa12afa91dfe457b3fb4a444c42b1ee036b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea592baf9e41779fe9a0424c03dd2f324feca3b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa765c4b4aed2d64266b694520ecb025c862c5a9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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