ghsa-c33x-xqrf-c478
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-04-02 14:16
Modified
2024-04-05 18:53
Severity ?
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
QUIC's Connection ID Mechanism vulnerable to Memory Exhaustion Attack
Details

An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory by sending a large number of NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate.

I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management/. I also presented this attack in the IETF QUIC working group session at IETF 119: https://youtu.be/JqXtYcZAtIA?si=nJ31QKLBSTRXY35U&t=3683

There's no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.42.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-22189"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-02T14:16:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T15:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory by sending a large number of NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer\u0027s RTT estimate.\n\nI published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management/.\nI also presented this attack in the IETF QUIC working group session at IETF 119: https://youtu.be/JqXtYcZAtIA?si=nJ31QKLBSTRXY35U\u0026t=3683\n\nThere\u0027s no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-c33x-xqrf-c478",
  "modified": "2024-04-05T18:53:25Z",
  "published": "2024-04-02T14:16:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/security/advisories/GHSA-c33x-xqrf-c478"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/commit/4a99b816ae3ab03ae5449d15aac45147c85ed47a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqXtYcZAtIA\u0026t=3683s"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "QUIC\u0027s Connection ID Mechanism vulnerable to Memory Exhaustion Attack"
}


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