ghsa-c33x-xqrf-c478
Vulnerability from github
An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory by sending a large number of NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate.
I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management/. I also presented this attack in the IETF QUIC working group session at IETF 119: https://youtu.be/JqXtYcZAtIA?si=nJ31QKLBSTRXY35U&t=3683
There's no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.42.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-02T14:16:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T15:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory by sending a large number of NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer\u0027s RTT estimate.\n\nI published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management/.\nI also presented this attack in the IETF QUIC working group session at IETF 119: https://youtu.be/JqXtYcZAtIA?si=nJ31QKLBSTRXY35U\u0026t=3683\n\nThere\u0027s no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-c33x-xqrf-c478",
"modified": "2024-04-05T18:53:25Z",
"published": "2024-04-02T14:16:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/security/advisories/GHSA-c33x-xqrf-c478"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/commit/4a99b816ae3ab03ae5449d15aac45147c85ed47a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqXtYcZAtIA\u0026t=3683s"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "QUIC\u0027s Connection ID Mechanism vulnerable to Memory Exhaustion Attack"
}
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.