GHSA-F835-W392-M6QF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-23 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect()
Extend a critical section to prevent chan from early freeing. Also make the l2cap_connect() return type void. Nothing is using the returned value but it is ugly to return a potentially freed pointer. Making it void will help with backports because earlier kernels did use the return value. Now the compile will break for kernels where this patch is not a complete fix.
Call stack summary:
[use] l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd l2cap_connect ┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); │ chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); <- alloc chan │ __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan); │ l2cap_chan_hold(chan); │ list_add(&chan->list, &conn->chan_l); ... (1) └ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); chan->conf_state ... (4) <- use after free
[free] l2cap_conn_del ┌ mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); │ foreach chan in conn->chan_l: ... (2) │ l2cap_chan_put(chan); │ l2cap_chan_destroy │ kfree(chan) ... (3) <- chan freed └ mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock);
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect+0xa67/0x11a0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4260 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bf040a0 by task kworker/u3:1/311
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-36013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-23T07:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect()\n\nExtend a critical section to prevent chan from early freeing.\nAlso make the l2cap_connect() return type void. Nothing is using the\nreturned value but it is ugly to return a potentially freed pointer.\nMaking it void will help with backports because earlier kernels did use\nthe return value. Now the compile will break for kernels where this\npatch is not a complete fix.\n\nCall stack summary:\n\n[use]\nl2cap_bredr_sig_cmd\n l2cap_connect\n \u250c mutex_lock(\u0026conn-\u003echan_lock);\n \u2502 chan = pchan-\u003eops-\u003enew_connection(pchan); \u003c- alloc chan\n \u2502 __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);\n \u2502 l2cap_chan_hold(chan);\n \u2502 list_add(\u0026chan-\u003elist, \u0026conn-\u003echan_l); ... (1)\n \u2514 mutex_unlock(\u0026conn-\u003echan_lock);\n chan-\u003econf_state ... (4) \u003c- use after free\n\n[free]\nl2cap_conn_del\n\u250c mutex_lock(\u0026conn-\u003echan_lock);\n\u2502 foreach chan in conn-\u003echan_l: ... (2)\n\u2502 l2cap_chan_put(chan);\n\u2502 l2cap_chan_destroy\n\u2502 kfree(chan) ... (3) \u003c- chan freed\n\u2514 mutex_unlock(\u0026conn-\u003echan_lock);\n\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read\ninclude/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _test_bit\ninclude/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_connect+0xa67/0x11a0\nnet/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4260\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff88810bf040a0 by task kworker/u3:1/311",
"id": "GHSA-f835-w392-m6qf",
"modified": "2026-08-04T12:33:17Z",
"published": "2024-05-23T09:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d7b41c0e43995b0e992b9f8903109275744b658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/826af9d2f69567c646ff46d10393d47e30ad23c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8629a65a48890769c47ebc9b6e57c02a80a8975e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfe560c7050bfb37b0d2491bbe7cd8b59e77fdc5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/30/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/30/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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