ghsa-fw47-mxv2-w4h2
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-05-19 09:34
Modified
2024-11-13 21:30
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel

When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by looking for a matching socket. This is performed in udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list.

We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path, the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to kernel crashes.

One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled) skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list, although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues.

Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances) but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early.

This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must be segmented.

[1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408! RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70 __udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-35884"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T09:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudp: do not accept non-tunnel GSO skbs landing in a tunnel\n\nWhen rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when\nbeing forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause\nvarious issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn\u0027t the case by\nlooking for a matching socket. This is performed in\nudp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue\nwith tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such\ncases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various\nissues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list.\n\nWe saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such\ncase gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path,\nthe geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs\nare not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit\nskb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible\ndepending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to\nkernel crashes.\n\nOne example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the\nfrag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled)\nskb_segment thinks there is \"geneve header size\" of data in frag_list,\nalthough it\u0027s in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to\ndo with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues.\n\nLooking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the\nlookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances)\nbut nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we\ncould still not find a matching socket. It\u0027s OK to keep the current\nlogic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure\nwe handle tunnel packets being GROed too early.\n\nThis is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets\nlacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must\nbe segmented.\n\n[1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408!\n    RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70\n    __udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560",
  "id": "GHSA-fw47-mxv2-w4h2",
  "modified": "2024-11-13T21:30:31Z",
  "published": "2024-05-19T09:34:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35884"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3001e7aa43d6691db2a878b0745b854bf12ddd19"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3391b157780bbedf8ef9f202cbf10ee90bf6b0f8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35fe0e0b5c00bef7dde74842a2564c43856fbce4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d010c8031e39f5fa1e8b13ada77e0321091011f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d12245080cb259d82b34699f6cd4ec11bdb688bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d49ae15a5767d4e9ef8bbb79e42df1bfebc94670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading...

Loading...

Loading...

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.