ghsa-gv48-p56m-p3qj
Vulnerability from github
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size
plpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to provide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this is communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has no idea.
For example, if I write a bug like this:
long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...);
This compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack corruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end of the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not found a real instance yet.)
To make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized array parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall APIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now provokes a diagnostic like this:
error: array argument is too small; is of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds] 60 | plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, | ^ ~~~~~~
[1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit 0da6e5fd6c37 ("gcc: disable '-Warray-bounds' for gcc-13 too") and related changes.
{ "affected": [], "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-40974" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [], "github_reviewed": false, "github_reviewed_at": null, "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-12T13:15:18Z", "severity": null }, "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/pseries: Enforce hcall result buffer validity and size\n\nplpar_hcall(), plpar_hcall9(), and related functions expect callers to\nprovide valid result buffers of certain minimum size. Currently this\nis communicated only through comments in the code and the compiler has\nno idea.\n\nFor example, if I write a bug like this:\n\n long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE]; // should be PLPAR_HCALL9_BUFSIZE\n plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf, ...);\n\nThis compiles with no diagnostics emitted, but likely results in stack\ncorruption at runtime when plpar_hcall9() stores results past the end\nof the array. (To be clear this is a contrived example and I have not\nfound a real instance yet.)\n\nTo make this class of error less likely, we can use explicitly-sized\narray parameters instead of pointers in the declarations for the hcall\nAPIs. When compiled with -Warray-bounds[1], the code above now\nprovokes a diagnostic like this:\n\nerror: array argument is too small;\nis of size 32, callee requires at least 72 [-Werror,-Warray-bounds]\n 60 | plpar_hcall9(H_ALLOCATE_VAS_WINDOW, retbuf,\n | ^ ~~~~~~\n\n[1] Enabled for LLVM builds but not GCC for now. See commit\n 0da6e5fd6c37 (\"gcc: disable \u0027-Warray-bounds\u0027 for gcc-13 too\") and\n related changes.", "id": "GHSA-gv48-p56m-p3qj", "modified": "2024-07-12T15:31:29Z", "published": "2024-07-12T15:31:29Z", "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40974" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19c166ee42cf16d8b156a6cb4544122d9a65d3ca" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/262e942ff5a839b9e4f3302a8987928b0c8b8a2d" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ad0034910a57aa88ed9976b1431b7b8c84e0048" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8aa11aa001576bf3b00dcb8559564ad7a3113588" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8c988d752b3d98d5cc1e3929c519a55ef55426c" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa6107dcc4ce9a3451f2d729204713783b657257" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acf2b80c31c37acab040baa3cf5f19fbd5140b18" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff2e185cf73df480ec69675936c4ee75a445c3e4" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [] }
Sightings
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