GHSA-MGPJ-GVMW-XQ4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-19 09:34 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/mm/pat: fix VM_PAT handling in COW mappings

PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or, in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon folios. Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.

Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().

In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.

To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios, and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings if we run into that.

We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we don't need the cachemode. We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.

For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already, and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.

Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():

<--- C reproducer ---> #include #include #include #include

int main(void) { struct io_uring_params p = {}; int ring_fd; size_t size; char *map;

     ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &p);
     if (ring_fd < 0) {
             perror("io_uring_setup");
             return 1;
     }
     size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);

     /* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
     map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
                ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
     if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
             perror("mmap");
             return 1;
     }

     /* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
     *map = 0;
     pause();
     return 0;

} <--- C reproducer --->

On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured: # ./iouring & # memhog 16G # killall iouring [ 301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g [ 301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1 [ 301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4 [ 301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000 [ 301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047 [ 301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200 [ 301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000 [ 301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 301.564186] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 301.564773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 301.565725] PKRU: 55555554 [ 301.565944] Call Trace: [ 301.566148] [ 301.566325] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 301.566618] ? __warn+0x81/0x130 [ 301.566876] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100 [ 3 ---truncated---

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-35877"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-401"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T09:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/mm/pat: fix VM_PAT handling in COW mappings\n\nPAT handling won\u0027t do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,\nin fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon\nfolios.  Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using\nfollow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.\n\nUsing follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon\nfolio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing\nfollow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and\ntrack_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().\n\nIn free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn\u0027t call memtype_free() or would call\nit with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.\n\nTo fix that, let\u0027s update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,\nand fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma-\u003evm_pgoff for COW mappings\nif we run into that.\n\nWe will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we\ndon\u0027t need the cachemode.  We\u0027ll have to fail fork()-\u003etrack_pfn_copy() if\nthe first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we\u0027d have to store\nthe cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.\n\nFor now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that\ncase: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,\nand it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.\n\nSimple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():\n\n\u003c--- C reproducer ---\u003e\n #include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n #include \u003csys/mman.h\u003e\n #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n #include \u003cliburing.h\u003e\n\n int main(void)\n {\n         struct io_uring_params p = {};\n         int ring_fd;\n         size_t size;\n         char *map;\n\n         ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, \u0026p);\n         if (ring_fd \u003c 0) {\n                 perror(\"io_uring_setup\");\n                 return 1;\n         }\n         size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);\n\n         /* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */\n         map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,\n                    ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);\n         if (map == MAP_FAILED) {\n                 perror(\"mmap\");\n                 return 1;\n         }\n\n         /* We have at least one page. Let\u0027s COW it. */\n         *map = 0;\n         pause();\n         return 0;\n }\n\u003c--- C reproducer ---\u003e\n\nOn a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:\n # ./iouring \u0026\n # memhog 16G\n # killall iouring\n[  301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[  301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100\n[  301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g\n[  301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1\n[  301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4\n[  301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100\n[  301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000\n[  301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282\n[  301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047\n[  301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200\n[  301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000\n[  301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000\n[  301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000\n[  301.564186] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[  301.564773] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[  301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\n[  301.565725] PKRU: 55555554\n[  301.565944] Call Trace:\n[  301.566148]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[  301.566325]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100\n[  301.566618]  ? __warn+0x81/0x130\n[  301.566876]  ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100\n[  3\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-mgpj-gvmw-xq4j",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T12:31:47Z",
  "published": "2024-05-19T09:34:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35877"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04c35ab3bdae7fefbd7c7a7355f29fa03a035221"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09e6bb53217bf388a0d2fd7fb21e74ab9dffc173"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1341e4b32e1fb1b0acd002ccd56f07bd32f2abc6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51b7841f3fe84606ec0bd8da859d22e05e5419ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7cfee26d1950250b14c5cb0a37b142f3fcc6396a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97e93367e82752e475a33839a80b33bdbef1209f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2b2430b48f3c9eaccd2c3d2ad75bb540d4952f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f18681daaec9665a15c5e7e0f591aad5d0ac622b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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