ghsa-mxqp-c4m3-mg6r
Vulnerability from github
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: avoid data corruption caused by decline
We found a data corruption issue during testing of SMC-R on Redis applications.
The benchmark has a low probability of reporting a strange error as shown below.
"Error: Protocol error, got "\xe2" as reply type byte"
Finally, we found that the retrieved error data was as follows:
0xE2 0xD4 0xC3 0xD9 0x04 0x00 0x2C 0x20 0xA6 0x56 0x00 0x16 0x3E 0x0C 0xCB 0x04 0x02 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xE2
It is quite obvious that this is a SMC DECLINE message, which means that the applications received SMC protocol message. We found that this was caused by the following situations:
client server ¦ clc proposal -------------> ¦ clc accept <------------- ¦ clc confirm -------------> wait llc confirm send llc confirm ¦failed llc confirm ¦ x------ (after 2s)timeout wait llc confirm rsp
wait decline
(after 1s) timeout (after 2s) timeout ¦ decline --------------> ¦ decline <--------------
As a result, a decline message was sent in the implementation, and this message was read from TCP by the already-fallback connection.
This patch double the client timeout as 2x of the server value, With this simple change, the Decline messages should never cross or collide (during Confirm link timeout).
This issue requires an immediate solution, since the protocol updates involve a more long-term solution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52775"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T16:15:16Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: avoid data corruption caused by decline\n\nWe found a data corruption issue during testing of SMC-R on Redis\napplications.\n\nThe benchmark has a low probability of reporting a strange error as\nshown below.\n\n\"Error: Protocol error, got \"\\xe2\" as reply type byte\"\n\nFinally, we found that the retrieved error data was as follows:\n\n0xE2 0xD4 0xC3 0xD9 0x04 0x00 0x2C 0x20 0xA6 0x56 0x00 0x16 0x3E 0x0C\n0xCB 0x04 0x02 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00\n0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xE2\n\nIt is quite obvious that this is a SMC DECLINE message, which means that\nthe applications received SMC protocol message.\nWe found that this was caused by the following situations:\n\nclient server\n \u00a6 clc proposal\n -------------\u003e\n \u00a6 clc accept\n \u003c-------------\n \u00a6 clc confirm\n -------------\u003e\nwait llc confirm\n\t\t\tsend llc confirm\n \u00a6failed llc confirm\n \u00a6 x------\n(after 2s)timeout\n wait llc confirm rsp\n\nwait decline\n\n(after 1s) timeout\n (after 2s) timeout\n \u00a6 decline\n --------------\u003e\n \u00a6 decline\n \u003c--------------\n\nAs a result, a decline message was sent in the implementation, and this\nmessage was read from TCP by the already-fallback connection.\n\nThis patch double the client timeout as 2x of the server value,\nWith this simple change, the Decline messages should never cross or\ncollide (during Confirm link timeout).\n\nThis issue requires an immediate solution, since the protocol updates\ninvolve a more long-term solution.",
"id": "GHSA-mxqp-c4m3-mg6r",
"modified": "2024-05-21T18:31:20Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ada292b5c504720a0acef8cae9acc62a694d19c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7234d2b5dffa5af77fd4e0deaebab509e130c6b1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90072af9efe8c7bd7d086709014ddd44cebd5e7c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94a0ae698b4d5d5bb598e23228002a1491c50add"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6d71b437abc2f249e3b6a1ae1a7228e09c6e563"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.