GHSA-Q4HP-86WF-HJ44
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-04 09:30 – Updated: 2024-12-20 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption
When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path, releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.
The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the memory has already been released.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26800"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T09:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption\n\nWhen the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt\nreturns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async\ndecryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption\nwill return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,\nreleasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async\ncallback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.\n\nThe only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns\n -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell\ntls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we\nneed to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new -\u003easync_done flag) that the\nmemory has already been released.",
"id": "GHSA-q4hp-86wf-hj44",
"modified": "2024-12-20T18:31:29Z",
"published": "2024-04-04T09:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26800"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ac9fb84bc7ecd4bc6428118301d9d864d2a58d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81be85353b0f5a7b660635634b655329b429eefe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2b85a4cc763841843de693bbd7308fe9a2c4c89"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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