ghsa-r3pw-96wv-8pj5
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-05-20 12:30
Modified
2024-05-20 12:30
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition

The cros_ec_uart_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open() before it calls serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This can trigger a NULL pointer dereference:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ...
 ? ttyport_receive_buf

A simplified version of crashing code is as follows:

static inline size_t serdev_controller_receive_buf(struct serdev_controller *ctrl,
                                                  const u8 *data,
                                                  size_t count)
{
        struct serdev_device *serdev = ctrl->serdev;

        if (!serdev || !serdev->ops->receive_buf) // CRASH!
            return 0;

        return serdev->ops->receive_buf(serdev, data, count);
}

It assumes that if SERPORT_ACTIVE is set and serdev exists, serdev->ops will also exist. This conflicts with the existing cros_ec_uart_probe() logic, as it first calls devm_serdev_device_open() (which sets SERPORT_ACTIVE), and only later sets serdev->ops via serdev_device_set_client_ops().

Commit 01f95d42b8f4 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: fix race condition") attempted to fix a similar race condition, but while doing so, made the window of error for this race condition to happen much wider.

Attempt to fix the race condition again, making sure we fully setup before calling devm_serdev_device_open().

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-35977"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-20T10:15:12Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition\n\nThe cros_ec_uart_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open() before\nit calls serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This can trigger a NULL pointer\ndereference:\n\n    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n    ...\n    Call Trace:\n     \u003cTASK\u003e\n     ...\n     ? ttyport_receive_buf\n\nA simplified version of crashing code is as follows:\n\n    static inline size_t serdev_controller_receive_buf(struct serdev_controller *ctrl,\n                                                      const u8 *data,\n                                                      size_t count)\n    {\n            struct serdev_device *serdev = ctrl-\u003eserdev;\n\n            if (!serdev || !serdev-\u003eops-\u003ereceive_buf) // CRASH!\n                return 0;\n\n            return serdev-\u003eops-\u003ereceive_buf(serdev, data, count);\n    }\n\nIt assumes that if SERPORT_ACTIVE is set and serdev exists, serdev-\u003eops\nwill also exist. This conflicts with the existing cros_ec_uart_probe()\nlogic, as it first calls devm_serdev_device_open() (which sets\nSERPORT_ACTIVE), and only later sets serdev-\u003eops via\nserdev_device_set_client_ops().\n\nCommit 01f95d42b8f4 (\"platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: fix race\ncondition\") attempted to fix a similar race condition, but while doing\nso, made the window of error for this race condition to happen much\nwider.\n\nAttempt to fix the race condition again, making sure we fully setup\nbefore calling devm_serdev_device_open().",
  "id": "GHSA-r3pw-96wv-8pj5",
  "modified": "2024-05-20T12:30:29Z",
  "published": "2024-05-20T12:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35977"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e700b384ec13f5bcac9855cb28fcc674f1d3593"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e9bb74a93b7daa32313ccaefd0edc529d40daf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfd758041d8b79aa8c3f811b6bd6105379f2f702"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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