ghsa-vr35-f6m3-rh89
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-05-21 18:31
Modified
2024-05-21 18:31
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tls: fix NULL deref on tls_sw_splice_eof() with empty record

syzkaller discovered that if tls_sw_splice_eof() is executed as part of sendfile() when the plaintext/ciphertext sk_msg are empty, the send path gets confused because the empty ciphertext buffer does not have enough space for the encryption overhead. This causes tls_push_record() to go on the split = true path (which is only supposed to be used when interacting with an attached BPF program), and then get further confused and hit the tls_merge_open_record() path, which then assumes that there must be at least one populated buffer element, leading to a NULL deref.

It is possible to have empty plaintext/ciphertext buffers if we previously bailed from tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() via the tls_trim_both_msgs() path. tls_sw_push_pending_record() already handles this case correctly; let's do the same check in tls_sw_splice_eof().

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-52767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T16:15:15Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix NULL deref on tls_sw_splice_eof() with empty record\n\nsyzkaller discovered that if tls_sw_splice_eof() is executed as part of\nsendfile() when the plaintext/ciphertext sk_msg are empty, the send path\ngets confused because the empty ciphertext buffer does not have enough\nspace for the encryption overhead. This causes tls_push_record() to go on\nthe `split = true` path (which is only supposed to be used when interacting\nwith an attached BPF program), and then get further confused and hit the\ntls_merge_open_record() path, which then assumes that there must be at\nleast one populated buffer element, leading to a NULL deref.\n\nIt is possible to have empty plaintext/ciphertext buffers if we previously\nbailed from tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() via the tls_trim_both_msgs() path.\ntls_sw_push_pending_record() already handles this case correctly; let\u0027s do\nthe same check in tls_sw_splice_eof().",
  "id": "GHSA-vr35-f6m3-rh89",
  "modified": "2024-05-21T18:31:20Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T18:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2214e2bb5489145aba944874d0ee1652a0a63dc8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53f2cb491b500897a619ff6abd72f565933760f0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/944900fe2736c07288efe2d9394db4d3ca23f2c9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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