GHSA-VVC7-QVMV-VPJW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 12:30 – Updated: 2025-01-16 18:30
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported

There is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break the whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop.

Running the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet will reproduce this problem:

# ethtool -X eth0  hfunc toeplitz

This is how the problem happens:

1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh()

2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command()

3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss scatter-gather

4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last scatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0. sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size;

5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer with zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU function):

if (!sz) { virtio_error(vdev, "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed");

6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken

vdev->broken = true;

7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel.

8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function virtnet_send_command())

9) The kernel is waiting doing the following :

  while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) &&
     !virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq))
      cpu_relax();

10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel loops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does not look at the qemu vdev->broken, so, it never realizes that the vitio is broken at QEMU side.

Fix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in the device.

Severity ?
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-35981"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-835"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-20T10:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported\n\nThere is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break\nthe whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop.\n\nRunning the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet\nwill reproduce this problem:\n\n    # ethtool -X eth0  hfunc toeplitz\n\nThis is how the problem happens:\n\n1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh()\n\n2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command()\n\n3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss\nscatter-gather\n\n4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last\nscatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0.\nsg_buf_size = vi-\u003erss_key_size;\n\n5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer\nwith zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU\nfunction):\n\n  if (!sz) {\n      virtio_error(vdev, \"virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed\");\n\n6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken\n\n    vdev-\u003ebroken = true;\n\n7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel.\n\n8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function\nvirtnet_send_command())\n\n9) The kernel is waiting doing the following :\n\n      while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi-\u003ecvq, \u0026tmp) \u0026\u0026\n\t     !virtqueue_is_broken(vi-\u003ecvq))\n\t      cpu_relax();\n\n10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel\nloops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does\nnot look at the qemu `vdev-\u003ebroken`, so, it never realizes that the\nvitio is broken at QEMU side.\n\nFix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in\nthe device.",
  "id": "GHSA-vvc7-qvmv-vpjw",
  "modified": "2025-01-16T18:30:58Z",
  "published": "2024-05-20T12:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35981"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/059a49aa2e25c58f90b50151f109dd3c4cdb3a47"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28e9a64638cd16bc1ecac9ff74ffeacb9fb652de"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43a71c1b4b3a6d4db857b1435d271540279fc7de"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/539a2b995a4ed93125cb0efae0f793b00ab2158b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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