ghsa-wjqf-4c62-v6g5
Vulnerability from github
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means.
[From the email thread]
The / Kernel thread / comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the user context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways:
- kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
-
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries.
-
/proc//task//syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the registers it returns.
-
PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
-
Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35871"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T09:15:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage\n\nchildregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread\nin user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-\u003egp is never used since\nthe kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the\ngp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other\nmeans.\n\n[From the email thread]\n\nThe /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used\nfor user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or\nwhen /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have\nPF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.\n\nchildregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable\nfrom userspace in at least five ways:\n\n1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting\n register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has\n sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers\n zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.\n\n This is a bug in its own right, but I\u0027m unwilling to bet that it is the only\n way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.\n\n2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread\n before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only\n happen at user/kernel boundaries.\n\n3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for\n user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the\n registers it returns.\n\n4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel\n addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses\n are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under\n LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.\n\n5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have\n not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user\n registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.",
"id": "GHSA-wjqf-4c62-v6g5",
"modified": "2024-06-26T00:31:43Z",
"published": "2024-05-19T09:34:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35871"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00effef72c98294edb1efa87ffa0f6cfb61b36a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9abc3e6f1116adb7a2d4fbb8ce20c37916976bf5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d14fa1fcf69db9d070e75f1c4425211fa619dfc8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8dcba0691b8e42bddb61aab201e4d918a08e5d9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dff6072124f6df77bfd36951fbd88565746980ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6583444d7e78dae750798552b65a2519ff3ca84"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.