GSD-2024-31463
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-04-11 05:03Details
Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1.
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31463"
],
"details": "Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. ",
"id": "GSD-2024-31463",
"modified": "2024-04-11T05:03:20.650740Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
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"ID": "CVE-2024-31463",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
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"affects": {
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"product_name": "ironic-image",
"version": {
"version_data": [
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"version_affected": "=",
"version_value": "\u003c 24.1.1"
}
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"vendor_name": "metal3-io"
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"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
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"lang": "eng",
"value": "Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. "
}
]
},
"impact": {
"cvss": [
{
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.7,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"problemtype": {
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"description": [
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"cweId": "CWE-288",
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel"
}
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"references": {
"reference_data": [
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"name": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/security/advisories/GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r"
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{
"name": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/pull/494"
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"name": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4"
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"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-g2cm-9v5f-qg7r",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1. "
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Ironic-image es una implementaci\u00f3n de OpenStack Ironic empaquetada y configurada por Metal3. Cuando el modo de proxy inverso est\u00e1 habilitado mediante la variable `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` establecida en `true`, 1) las credenciales b\u00e1sicas HTTP se validan en el lado HTTPD en un contenedor separado, no en el servicio Ironic en s\u00ed y 2) Ironic escucha en la red host en un puerto privado 6388 en localhost de forma predeterminada. Como resultado, cuando se utiliza el modo de proxy inverso, cualquier usuario Pod o Unix local en el plano de control Node puede acceder a la API Ironic en el puerto privado sin autenticaci\u00f3n. Un problema similar afecta a Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` establecido en `true`), aunque el potencial de ataque es menor all\u00ed. Este problema afecta a los operadores que implementan ironic-image en el modo de proxy inverso, que es el modo recomendado cuando se usa TLS (tambi\u00e9n recomendado), con la variable `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` desarmada o configurada en un valor num\u00e9rico. En este caso, un atacante con privilegios suficientes para iniciar un pod en el plano de control con red de host puede acceder a la API Ironic y usarla para modificar la m\u00e1quina b\u00e1sica, por ejemplo, aprovisionarla con una nueva imagen o cambiar la configuraci\u00f3n del BIOS. Esta vulnerabilidad se soluciona en 24.1.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-31463",
"lastModified": "2024-04-17T16:51:07.347",
"metrics": {
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{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.7,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
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"published": "2024-04-17T16:15:08.637",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-image/commit/48e40bd30d49aefabac6fc80204a8650b13d10b4"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
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"value": "CWE-288"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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}
}
}
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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