ts-2022-004
Vulnerability from tailscale

Reference: CVE-2022-41924

Severity: Critical

CVSS vector string: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H

Description: A vulnerability identified in the Tailscale Windows client allows a malicious website to reconfigure the Tailscale daemon tailscaled, which can then be used to remotely execute code.

Affected platforms: Windows

Patched Tailscale client versions: v1.32.3 or later, v1.33.257 or later (unstable)

What happened?

In the Tailscale Windows client, the local API was bound to a local TCP socket, and communicated with the Windows client GUI in cleartext with no Host header verification. This allowed an attacker-controlled website visited by the node to rebind DNS to an attacker-controlled DNS server, and then make local API requests in the client, including changing the coordination server to an attacker-controlled coordination server.

Who is affected?

All Windows clients prior to version v1.32.3 are affected.

What is the impact?

An attacker-controlled coordination server can send malicious URL responses to the client, including pushing executables or installing an SMB share. These allow the attacker to remotely execute code on the node.

Reviewing all logs confirms this vulnerability was not triggered or exploited.

What do I need to do?

If you are running Tailscale on Windows, upgrade to v1.32.3 or later to remediate the issue.

Credits

We would like to thank Emily Trau and Jamie McClymont (CyberCX) for reporting this issue. Further detail is available in their blog post.

Show details on source website


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