CWE-639
AllowedAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
3390 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-26WV-WM3R-6RVC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 15:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 15:31A vulnerability was found in feiyuchuixue sz-boot-parent up to 1.3.2-beta. Affected is an unknown function of the file /api/admin/sys-message/ of the component API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument messageId results in authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 1.3.3-beta is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as aefaabfd7527188bfba3c8c9eee17c316d094802. The affected component should be upgraded. The project was informed beforehand and acted very professional: "We have implemented message ownership verification, so that users can only query messages related to themselves."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T14:16:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in feiyuchuixue sz-boot-parent up to 1.3.2-beta. Affected is an unknown function of the file /api/admin/sys-message/ of the component API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument messageId results in authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 1.3.3-beta is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as aefaabfd7527188bfba3c8c9eee17c316d094802. The affected component should be upgraded. The project was informed beforehand and acted very professional: \"We have implemented message ownership verification, so that users can only query messages related to themselves.\"",
"id": "GHSA-26wv-wm3r-6rvc",
"modified": "2026-02-25T15:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-02-25T15:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/feiyuchuixue/sz-boot-parent/commit/aefaabfd7527188bfba3c8c9eee17c316d094802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/feiyuchuixue/sz-boot-parent"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/feiyuchuixue/sz-boot-parent/releases/tag/v1.3.3-beta"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yuccun/CVE/blob/main/sz-boot-parent-IDOR_Message_ID_Enumeration.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.347743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.347743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.754036"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-272R-9R62-XGWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 00:31 – Updated: 2024-09-17 00:31An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 16.7 prior to 17.1.7, 17.2 prior to 17.2.5, and 17.3 prior to 17.3.2, where group runners information was disclosed to unauthorised group members.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-16T22:15:20Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 16.7 prior to 17.1.7, 17.2 prior to 17.2.5, and 17.3 prior to 17.3.2, where group runners information was disclosed to unauthorised group members.",
"id": "GHSA-272r-9r62-xgwc",
"modified": "2024-09-17T00:31:03Z",
"published": "2024-09-17T00:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2584372"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/472012"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27HF-5X7W-H2G3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-28 18:30Insecure Permissions vulnerability in kvf-admin v1.0.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the UserController.java component
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-38807"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insecure Permissions vulnerability in kvf-admin v1.0.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the UserController.java component",
"id": "GHSA-27hf-5x7w-h2g3",
"modified": "2026-05-28T18:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T18:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-38807"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cagexunxi/CVE/issues/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27HQ-XP89-25MQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 15:31An insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the Fullstep V5 registration process allows authenticated users to access data belonging to other registered users through various vulnerable authenticated resources in the application. The vulnerable endpoints result from: '/api/suppliers/v1/suppliers//false' to list user information; and '/#/supplier-registration/supplier-registration//2' to update your user information (personal details, documents, etc.).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5750"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T14:17:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the Fullstep V5 registration process allows authenticated users to access data belonging to other registered users through various vulnerable authenticated resources in the application. The vulnerable endpoints result from: \u0027/api/suppliers/v1/suppliers//false\u0027 to list user information; and \u0027/#/supplier-registration/supplier-registration//2\u0027 to update your user information (personal details, documents, etc.).",
"id": "GHSA-27hq-xp89-25mq",
"modified": "2026-04-22T15:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5750"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-fullstep"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-27HR-9V6H-XMX3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-03 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-12 18:30An Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in the component /getStudemtAllDetailsById?studentId=XX of Serosoft Solutions Pvt Ltd Academia Student Information System (SIS) EagleR v1.0.118 allows attackers to access sensitive user information via a crafted API request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-03T01:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in the component /getStudemtAllDetailsById?studentId=XX of Serosoft Solutions Pvt Ltd Academia Student Information System (SIS) EagleR v1.0.118 allows attackers to access sensitive user information via a crafted API request.",
"id": "GHSA-27hr-9v6h-xmx3",
"modified": "2025-12-12T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-03-03T03:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/VvV1per/Vulnerability-Research-CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2024-89639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/VvV1per/Vulnerability-Research-CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2025-25952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/el-viper/cve-research/tree/main/CVEs/CVE-2025-25952"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27JW-FM48-8F8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-14 09:30 – Updated: 2025-05-14 09:30The PeepSo Core: File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 6.4.6.0 via the file_download REST API endpoint due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to download files uploaded by others users and expose potentially sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8988"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-14T09:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The PeepSo Core: File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 6.4.6.0 via the file_download REST API endpoint due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to download files uploaded by others users and expose potentially sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-27jw-fm48-8f8j",
"modified": "2025-05-14T09:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-05-14T09:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8988"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.peepso.com/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d3184996-655c-41d5-a3c5-6b36fbff58dc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27P4-PJQV-WHGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:34 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:34Summary
Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity endpoint is gated by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) and dispatches to ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id), which executes SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment.
File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py, lines 32-43; services/activity_service.py's list_for_issue method.
Root cause: the route extracts workspace_id from the URL path, uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied issue_id directly to ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id) without verifying which workspace the issue belongs to. The companion list_workspace_activity endpoint at line 19-29 is implemented correctly (it passes workspace_id to svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id)) — the asymmetry is the smoking gun.
Affected Code
File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py, lines 19-43.
@router.get("/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_workspace_activity(
workspace_id: str,
limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
svc = ActivityService(session)
logs = await svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id, limit=limit, offset=offset) # correct: passes workspace_id
return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]
@router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_issue_activity(
workspace_id: str,
issue_id: str,
limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
svc = ActivityService(session)
logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset) # <-- BUG: no workspace_id
return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]
Why it's wrong: activity logs are typically the most sensitive operational record — they include actor identity, action type, entity references, and a free-form details JSON blob that may contain pre-/post-change values for any tracked field. Reading the foreign workspace's activity log gives the attacker a high-fidelity view into who did what when, which is gold for further reconnaissance (cross-workspace member enumeration, foreign issue title disclosure, knowing which projects exist). The same author got list_workspace_activity right by passing workspace_id — the issue-scoped variant is the gap.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker is a member of workspace
W_attackerand harvests a target issue UUIDI_Tfrom any side channel. State: attacker holdsI_T. - Attacker sends
GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/activity?limit=200withAuthorization: Bearer <attacker_jwt>. State: control flow enterslist_issue_activity. require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker)passes.ActivityService.list_for_issue(I_T)runsSELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = 'I_T' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200. State: response body is the full activity log for the foreign issue.- The activity entries reveal: every actor (member or agent) who touched the issue, every action (created, updated, commented, status_changed, assignee_changed, project_changed, label_added, dependency_added), and the
detailsJSON blob containing the before/after values of every change. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace's triage workflow, identifies who works on what, and sees the issue's complete history including any embedded secrets that ever passed through the description or comments. - Final state: with one workspace-member token plus one GET, the attacker reads the full activity timeline of any issue in the multi-tenant deployment given the issue UUIDs.
Security Impact
Severity: sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (full activity log including before/after details), no integrity claim (read-only), no availability claim.
Attacker capability: read the activity log of any issue in the deployment given its UUID. Combined with the companion issue-IDOR (which already gives full issue content), this is recon for the foreign workspace's operational tempo, member identity, and triage workflow.
Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any workspace-membership token; foreign issue UUIDs are reachable.
Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between list_workspace_activity (correctly workspace-scoped) and list_issue_activity (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the route first resolves the issue via IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id), returns 404 for foreign issues, and only then proceeds.
Suggested Fix
--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py
@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@
@router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_issue_activity(
workspace_id: str,
issue_id: str,
limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
+ issue_svc = IssueService(session)
+ if await issue_svc.get(workspace_id, issue_id) is None: # workspace-scoped get from issue-IDOR companion
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
svc = ActivityService(session)
logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)
return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]
The same single-key issue lookup pattern is filed separately as the IssueService IDOR; once that is fixed, the helper used here is just IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai-platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:34:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py`, lines 32-43; `services/activity_service.py`\u0027s `list_for_issue` method.\n\n**Root cause:** the route extracts `workspace_id` from the URL path, uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied `issue_id` directly to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying which workspace the issue belongs to. The companion `list_workspace_activity` endpoint at line 19-29 is implemented correctly (it passes `workspace_id` to `svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id)`) \u2014 the asymmetry is the smoking gun.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py`, lines 19-43.\n\n```python\n@router.get(\"/activity\", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])\nasync def list_workspace_activity(\n workspace_id: str,\n limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),\n offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n svc = ActivityService(session)\n logs = await svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id, limit=limit, offset=offset) # correct: passes workspace_id\n return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]\n\n\n@router.get(\"/issues/{issue_id}/activity\", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])\nasync def list_issue_activity(\n workspace_id: str,\n issue_id: str,\n limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),\n offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n svc = ActivityService(session)\n logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset) # \u003c-- BUG: no workspace_id\n return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** activity logs are typically the most sensitive operational record \u2014 they include actor identity, action type, entity references, and a free-form `details` JSON blob that may contain pre-/post-change values for any tracked field. Reading the foreign workspace\u0027s activity log gives the attacker a high-fidelity view into who did what when, which is gold for further reconnaissance (cross-workspace member enumeration, foreign issue title disclosure, knowing which projects exist). The same author got `list_workspace_activity` right by passing `workspace_id` \u2014 the issue-scoped variant is the gap.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W_attacker` and harvests a target issue UUID `I_T` from any side channel. State: attacker holds `I_T`.\n2. Attacker sends `GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/activity?limit=200` with `Authorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_jwt\u003e`. State: control flow enters `list_issue_activity`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker)` passes. `ActivityService.list_for_issue(I_T)` runs `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = \u0027I_T\u0027 ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200`. State: response body is the full activity log for the foreign issue.\n4. The activity entries reveal: every actor (member or agent) who touched the issue, every action (created, updated, commented, status_changed, assignee_changed, project_changed, label_added, dependency_added), and the `details` JSON blob containing the before/after values of every change. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace\u0027s triage workflow, identifies who works on what, and sees the issue\u0027s complete history including any embedded secrets that ever passed through the description or comments.\n5. Final state: with one workspace-member token plus one GET, the attacker reads the full activity timeline of any issue in the multi-tenant deployment given the issue UUIDs.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (full activity log including before/after `details`), no integrity claim (read-only), no availability claim.\n\n**Attacker capability:** read the activity log of any issue in the deployment given its UUID. Combined with the companion issue-IDOR (which already gives full issue content), this is recon for the foreign workspace\u0027s operational tempo, member identity, and triage workflow.\n\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any workspace-membership token; foreign issue UUIDs are reachable.\n\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between `list_workspace_activity` (correctly workspace-scoped) and `list_issue_activity` (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the route first resolves the issue via `IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id)`, returns 404 for foreign issues, and only then proceeds.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py\n@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@\n @router.get(\"/issues/{issue_id}/activity\", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])\n async def list_issue_activity(\n workspace_id: str,\n issue_id: str,\n limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),\n offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n+ issue_svc = IssueService(session)\n+ if await issue_svc.get(workspace_id, issue_id) is None: # workspace-scoped get from issue-IDOR companion\n+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Issue not found\")\n svc = ActivityService(session)\n logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)\n return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]\n```\n\nThe same single-key issue lookup pattern is filed separately as the IssueService IDOR; once that is fixed, the helper used here is just `IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id)`.",
"id": "GHSA-27p4-pjqv-whgj",
"modified": "2026-05-29T22:34:08Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T22:34:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-27p4-pjqv-whgj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "praisonai-platform: list_issue_activity returns activity log for any issue regardless of workspace ownership"
}
GHSA-27QM-JWXP-8WHW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-21 12:30 – Updated: 2025-04-30 15:30The WP-Polls WordPress plugin before 2.76.0 prioritizes getting a visitor's IP from certain HTTP headers over PHP's REMOTE_ADDR, which makes it possible to bypass IP-based limitations to vote in certain situations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-1581"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-21T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WP-Polls WordPress plugin before 2.76.0 prioritizes getting a visitor\u0027s IP from certain HTTP headers over PHP\u0027s REMOTE_ADDR, which makes it possible to bypass IP-based limitations to vote in certain situations.",
"id": "GHSA-27qm-jwxp-8whw",
"modified": "2025-04-30T15:30:42Z",
"published": "2022-11-21T12:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1581"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/c1896ab9-9585-40e2-abbf-ef5153b3c6b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hightechdad.com/2009/12/21/warning-wp-polls-wordpress-poll-plugin-can-be-exploited"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27R3-85X4-PFQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-05 06:30 – Updated: 2024-06-11 18:30The contains an IDOR vulnerability that allows a user to comment on a private post by manipulating the ID included in the request
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-05T06:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The contains an IDOR vulnerability that allows a user to comment on a private post by manipulating the ID included in the request",
"id": "GHSA-27r3-85x4-pfqv",
"modified": "2024-06-11T18:30:42Z",
"published": "2024-06-05T06:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/76e8591f-120c-4cd7-b9a2-79f8d4d98aa8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2884-H97F-466V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-24 03:30 – Updated: 2023-11-30 21:30SysAid before 23.2.15 allows Indirect Object Reference (IDOR) attacks to read ticket data via a modified sid parameter to EmailHtmlSourceIframe.jsp or a modified srID parameter to ShowMessage.jsp.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33706"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-24T02:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SysAid before 23.2.15 allows Indirect Object Reference (IDOR) attacks to read ticket data via a modified sid parameter to EmailHtmlSourceIframe.jsp or a modified srID parameter to ShowMessage.jsp.",
"id": "GHSA-2884-h97f-466v",
"modified": "2023-11-30T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2023-11-24T03:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33706"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.pridesec.com.br/en/insecure-direct-object-reference-idor-affects-helpdesk-sysaid"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Mitigation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Mitigation
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.