CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1200 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-75HX-6R6J-HW56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-26 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-01 09:30The mistral-dashboard plugin for openstack has a local file inclusion vulnerability through the 'Create Workbook' feature that may result in disclosure of arbitrary local files content.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "python-mistralclient"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-4472"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-28T16:51:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-26T19:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The mistral-dashboard plugin for openstack has a local file inclusion vulnerability through the \u0027Create Workbook\u0027 feature that may result in disclosure of arbitrary local files content.",
"id": "GHSA-75hx-6r6j-hw56",
"modified": "2025-12-01T09:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-11-26T21:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-4472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/horizon/+bug/1931558"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2417321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/12/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/12/msg00003.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://opendev.org/openstack/mistral-dashboard"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/mistral-dashboard/+/800952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/python-mistralclient/+/800950"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenStack\u0027s Mistral Client has a local file inclusion vulnerability"
}
GHSA-75M5-HH4R-Q9GX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-20 15:01 – Updated: 2024-03-20 21:04Summary
An arbitrary file renaming vulnerability exists that enables an authenticated administrator with permissions to modify stores through the REST Coverage Store or Data Store API to rename arbitrary files and directories with a name that does not end in ".zip".
Details
Store file uploads rename zip files to have a ".zip" extension if it doesn't already have one before unzipping the file. This is fine for file and url upload methods where the files will be in a specific subdirectory of the data directory but, when using the external upload method, this allows arbitrary files and directories to be renamed.
PoC
Coverage Store Example (workspace and store name are irrelevant and any valid coverage format can be used): curl -XPUT -H"Content-Type:application/zip" -u"admin:geoserver" -d"/file/to/move" "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/a/coveragestores/b/external.geotiff" Data Store Example (workspace and store name and data store format are irrelevant): curl -XPUT -H"Content-Type:application/zip" -u"admin:geoserver" -d"/file/to/move" "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/a/datastores/b/external.c"
Impact
Renaming GeoServer files will most likely result in a denial of service, either completely preventing GeoServer from running or effectively deleting specific resources (such as a workspace, layer or style). In some cases, renaming GeoServer files could revert to the default settings for that file which could be relatively harmless like removing contact information or have more serious consequences like allowing users to make OGC requests that the customized settings would have prevented them from making. The impact of renaming non-GeoServer files depends on the specific environment although some sort of denial of service is a likely outcome.
References
https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11213 https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/7289
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.geoserver:gs-restconfig"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.23.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.geoserver:gs-restconfig"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.24.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23634"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-20T15:01:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-20T16:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn arbitrary file renaming vulnerability exists that enables an authenticated administrator with permissions to modify stores through the REST Coverage Store or Data Store API to rename arbitrary files and directories with a name that does not end in \".zip\".\n\n### Details\nStore file uploads rename zip files to have a \".zip\" extension if it doesn\u0027t already have one before unzipping the file. This is fine for file and url upload methods where the files will be in a specific subdirectory of the data directory but, when using the external upload method, this allows arbitrary files and directories to be renamed.\n\n### PoC\nCoverage Store Example (workspace and store name are irrelevant and any valid coverage format can be used):\ncurl -XPUT -H\"Content-Type:application/zip\" -u\"admin:geoserver\" -d\"/file/to/move\" \"http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/a/coveragestores/b/external.geotiff\"\nData Store Example (workspace and store name and data store format are irrelevant):\ncurl -XPUT -H\"Content-Type:application/zip\" -u\"admin:geoserver\" -d\"/file/to/move\" \"http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/a/datastores/b/external.c\"\n\n### Impact\nRenaming GeoServer files will most likely result in a denial of service, either completely preventing GeoServer from running or effectively deleting specific resources (such as a workspace, layer or style). In some cases, renaming GeoServer files could revert to the default settings for that file which could be relatively harmless like removing contact information or have more serious consequences like allowing users to make OGC requests that the customized settings would have prevented them from making. The impact of renaming non-GeoServer files depends on the specific environment although some sort of denial of service is a likely outcome.\n\n### References\nhttps://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11213\nhttps://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/7289\n",
"id": "GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx",
"modified": "2024-03-20T21:04:06Z",
"published": "2024-03-20T15:01:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/security/advisories/GHSA-75m5-hh4r-q9gx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/7289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/commit/5d6af2f8ba9ad7dffae59575504a867159698772"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/commit/c37f58fbacdfa0d581a6f99195585f70b1201f0a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11213"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GeoServer Arbitrary file renaming vulnerability in REST Coverage/Data Store API"
}
GHSA-75PX-35P4-QQ6H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-21 18:57A vulnerability in aimhubio/aim version 3.19.3 allows an attacker to exploit the tarfile.extractall() function to extract the contents of a maliciously crafted tarfile to arbitrary locations on the host server. The attacker can control repo.path and run_hash to bypass directory existence checks and extract files to unintended locations, potentially overwriting critical files. This can lead to arbitrary data being written to arbitrary locations on the remote tracking server, which could be used for further attacks such as writing a new SSH key to the target server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "aim"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.19.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6829"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-21T18:57:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:33Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in aimhubio/aim version 3.19.3 allows an attacker to exploit the `tarfile.extractall()` function to extract the contents of a maliciously crafted tarfile to arbitrary locations on the host server. The attacker can control `repo.path` and `run_hash` to bypass directory existence checks and extract files to unintended locations, potentially overwriting critical files. This can lead to arbitrary data being written to arbitrary locations on the remote tracking server, which could be used for further attacks such as writing a new SSH key to the target server.",
"id": "GHSA-75px-35p4-qq6h",
"modified": "2025-03-21T18:57:33Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6829"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aimhubio/aim"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/7c97065c-1b63-4982-82c1-8038be0ed570"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Aim External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability"
}
GHSA-76GJ-49MH-J4CF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-14 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 18:31DeepWiki-Open through commit d92819a contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the unauthenticated /ws/chat WebSocket endpoint that accepts repo_url as a filesystem path with no containment. Attackers can supply arbitrary directory paths to read all files with supported extensions including Python, JavaScript, YAML, and JSON files containing hardcoded secrets and credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90946"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-14T18:20:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "DeepWiki-Open through commit d92819a contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the unauthenticated /ws/chat WebSocket endpoint that accepts repo_url as a filesystem path with no containment. Attackers can supply arbitrary directory paths to read all files with supported extensions including Python, JavaScript, YAML, and JSON files containing hardcoded secrets and credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-76gj-49mh-j4cf",
"modified": "2026-09-14T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-14T18:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90946"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AsyncFuncAI/deepwiki-open/issues/536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AsyncFuncAI/deepwiki-open"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AsyncFuncAI/deepwiki-open/blob/16f35a0fc0284e99b7963bbf4e8585e9957e2fe1/api/data_pipeline.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AsyncFuncAI/deepwiki-open/blob/d92819a9c9f3b99416e3580ff235fc9d3adf8b89/api/repository.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/deepwiki-open-through-commit-d92819a-arbitrary-file-read-via-ws-chat-websocket"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-77VP-2488-VMF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-20 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-28 18:30External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability in opentext Flipper allows Path Traversal. The vulnerability could allow a user to submit a stored local file path and then download the specified file from the system by requesting the stored document ID.
This issue affects Flipper: 3.1.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-20T20:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability in opentext Flipper allows Path Traversal. The vulnerability could allow a user to submit a stored local file\npath and then download the specified file from the system by requesting the\nstored document ID.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Flipper: 3.1.2.",
"id": "GHSA-77vp-2488-vmf6",
"modified": "2025-10-28T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-10-20T21:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.opentext.com/csm?id=ot_kb_unauthenticated\u0026sysparm_article=KB0850531"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Green",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7833-FR7J-V32Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:38 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:38[HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)
- CWE: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path)
- Affected component:
git/objects/submodule/base.py,Submodule._config_parser()(~line 273) constructingSubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only);git/config.py,GitConfigParser.__init__(merge_includesdefault),GitConfigParser.read()/_included_paths()(include-path resolution, ~lines 630-685),GitConfigParser._read()(~line 493-498,MissingSectionHeaderError) - Affected version: GitPython at HEAD (
9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e, 2026-08-05, VERSION3.1.58)
Reachability
GitConfigParser.__init__ defaults merge_includes=True: any config file it parses has its [include] (and, when a repo= is supplied, [includeIf ...]) directives followed and merged in. The maintainers already recognized this as dangerous for one specific case and fixed it in commit 41ecc6a4 ("Disable merge_includes in config writers"), which passes merge_includes=False when Repo.config_writer() builds its parser (git/repo/base.py).
That fix never touched Submodule._config_parser(). This method builds the parser used for every read of a repo's submodule configuration — repo.submodules, Submodule.iter_items(), Submodule.config() — via SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only), passing neither merge_includes=False nor repo=. The True class default is therefore inherited unchanged, and fp_module here is .gitmodules — the single most attacker-controlled config file in the entire codebase, since it ships verbatim as tracked content inside any cloned repository.
GitConfigParser.read()'s include-path resolution (~line 662-680) performs no containment check: osp.isabs(include_path) short-circuits the path join entirely for an absolute path, and a relative path is joined with osp.join(osp.dirname(file_path), include_path) / osp.normpath()'d with no check that the result stays under the repository. ~ is expanded via osp.expanduser. The only gate before opening is os.access(include_path, os.R_OK) — a readability check, not a path restriction.
Once opened, GitConfigParser._read() parses the target file as git-config INI. If the first non-blank/non-comment line is not a [section] header — true of virtually any non-gitconfig file (source code, /etc/passwd, .env files, credential files, logs, JSON/YAML) — it raises configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line). Python's stdlib formats this exception's str() as "File contains no section headers.\nfile: %r, line: %d\n%r" % (fpname, lineno, line) — it embeds the verbatim content of that file's first line in the exception message. Submodule.iter_items() catches only (IOError, BadName), not configparser.Error, so this exception propagates straight out of the ordinary, read-only repo.submodules call.
Root cause
Parity gap between two config-parser construction sites for the exact same footgun: Repo.config_writer() was hardened against merge_includes in 2023 (41ecc6a4); Submodule._config_parser() — which parses .gitmodules, content that is always attacker-controlled the moment a repository is cloned from an untrusted source — was never given the same treatment. (The submodule write-mode config parser at git/objects/submodule/base.py for .git/modules/<name>/config — a different, locally-generated file — has correctly passed merge_includes=False since 2022, underscoring that the omission for .gitmodules reads looks like an oversight rather than a considered exception.)
Exploit path
- Attacker crafts a repository whose
.gitmodulescontains a legitimate-looking[submodule ...]section plus:[include] path = /etc/passwd(an absolute path bypasses any traversal reasoning entirely; a relative../../../../etc/passwd-style path works too). - Victim performs the extremely common, entirely read-only operation of enumerating a cloned repo's submodules:
list(repo.submodules)(or anyfor sm in repo.submodules) — noupdate(),init(), or checkout of any kind required. SubmoduleConfigParser(inheritingmerge_includes=True) follows the[include]directive, opens/etc/passwd, andGitConfigParser._read()raisesMissingSectionHeaderErrorwhose message embeds/etc/passwd's first line verbatim.- This exception surfaces wherever the host application observes exceptions from GitPython — CI logs, error pages, exception trackers, or any dependency-scanner/code-review-bot/hosting-platform tool built on
repo.submodules— disclosing the targeted file's first line to the attacker (directly, or indirectly via any channel that echoes the error).
Impact
Non-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first MissingSectionHeaderError), but that line very often is the secret — .env files (DATABASE_URL=..., API_KEY=...), single-line credential/token files, /etc/passwd's root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based file-existence oracle for arbitrary host paths. This is materially stronger than the already-fixed, explicitly blind GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c ("Blind local file inclusion", CVSS 4.0, git/refs/symbolic.py ref-name resolution) — that advisory's own writeup states it cannot disclose content; this one does, verbatim, via a different module (git/config.py's include resolution).
Preconditions
- Victim clones (or otherwise opens with GitPython) a repository whose
.gitmodulesis attacker-controlled — the default trust model for any tool that processes third-party repositories (dependency scanners, CI, code hosting/review bots, "audit this repo" utilities — exactly the class of application GitPython itself is built for). - Victim performs any operation that touches
repo.submodules— one of the most ordinary GitPython operations, requiring no submoduleupdate/init/checkout. - No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself.
Evidence
git/config.py—GitConfigParser.__init__defaultsmerge_includes=True.git/objects/submodule/base.py:273—SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)passes neithermerge_includesnorrepo=;git blameshows this call unchanged since the class was introduced, andgit show 41ecc6a4confirms that commit touched onlygit/repo/base.py'sRepo.config_writer(), never this call site.git/config.py_included_paths()/read()(~630-685) — absolute include paths bypass the join/normpath entirely (osp.isabs()short-circuit); no repository-boundary containment check exists anywhere in this path.git/config.py_read()(~493-498) — raisescp.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)with the raw file line embedded, matching Python stdlibconfigparser's own__str__behavior.Submodule.iter_items()catches only(IOError, BadName)—configparser.Error(the base ofMissingSectionHeaderError) is not swallowed.- PoC (
gitpython-003-poc.py, embedded below) reproduces this end-to-end against this exact checkout via the public API only (Repo.clone_from+list(repo.submodules), default arguments, no monkeypatching), against both a throwaway secret file and/etc/passwd.
False-positive check (adversarial re-read)
- Is this the same bug as
GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc? No — that advisory is about the.gitmodulessubmodule name driving_module_abspath/os.makedirs()(creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the[include]directive in the same file reaching a config-parser read primitive — a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation). - Is this the same bug as
GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c(blind LFI)? No — that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives ingit/refs/symbolic.py's ref-name resolution feedingRepo.commit/tree/index.diff— an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content viagit/config.py's include-directive resolution. - Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks? No — this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard
clone_from+list(repo.submodules)workflow. - Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller? No — confirmed by reading
Submodule.iter_items()'s exception handling, which catches onlyIOError/BadName;configparser.MissingSectionHeaderErrorpropagates uncaught. - Verdict: no concrete blocker found. CONFIRMED — reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and
/etc/passwd.
Remediation
Pass merge_includes=False when constructing SubmoduleConfigParser in Submodule._config_parser() (git/objects/submodule/base.py), mirroring the existing fix in Repo.config_writer() (commit 41ecc6a4) — .gitmodules content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in include/includeIf directives. As defense in depth, GitConfigParser.read()'s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository's own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (MissingSectionHeaderError/ParsingError) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.
Confidence
High. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both git/config.py and git/objects/submodule/base.py, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and /etc/passwd).
Proof-of-Concept source (gitpython-003-poc.py)
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
GITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped
inside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = <any local path>`.
`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and
other submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`
without passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`
is inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn't valid
git-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python's
`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file's first line verbatim
in its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only
`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.
Run:
PYTHONPATH="<repo>:<repo>/gitdb:<repo>/smmap" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py <workdir> <target-file>
Benign: reads only the given <target-file> (defaults to a throwaway secret file
created under <workdir> if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere
except printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.
"""
import os
import subprocess
import sys
def main():
workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "/tmp/gitpython-003-poc"
target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else os.path.join(workdir, "secret.txt")
attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, "attacker-repo")
dest = os.path.join(workdir, "dest")
for p in (attacker_repo, dest):
os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)
if not os.path.exists(target_file):
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)
with open(target_file, "w") as f:
f.write("TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\n")
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", attacker_repo], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "config", "user.email", "a@example.com"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "config", "user.name", "Attacker"], check=True)
with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, "file.txt"), "w") as f:
f.write("hello\n")
with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, ".gitmodules"), "w") as f:
f.write(
'[submodule "totally-normal-dep"]\n'
"\tpath = vendor/dep\n"
"\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\n"
"[include]\n"
"\tpath = %s\n" % target_file
)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "add", "file.txt", ".gitmodules"], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", attacker_repo, "commit", "-q", "-m", "init"], check=True)
import git # gitpython under test
import configparser
repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)
try:
subs = list(repo.submodules)
print("NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =", subs)
sys.exit(1)
except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:
msg = str(e)
print("VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:")
print(msg)
with open(target_file) as f:
first_line = f.readline().rstrip("\n")
if first_line in msg:
print("Confirmed: target file's first line is present verbatim in the exception message.")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content")
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "GitPython"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78675"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:38:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# [HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via `[include]` directive in untrusted `.gitmodules` (`SubmoduleConfigParser` never disables `merge_includes`)\n\n- **CWE:** CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path)\n- **Affected component:** `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, `Submodule._config_parser()` (~line 273) constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`; `git/config.py`, `GitConfigParser.__init__` (`merge_includes` default), `GitConfigParser.read()`/`_included_paths()` (include-path resolution, ~lines 630-685), `GitConfigParser._read()` (~line 493-498, `MissingSectionHeaderError`)\n- **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)\n\n## Reachability\n`GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`: any config file it parses has its `[include]` (and, when a `repo=` is supplied, `[includeIf ...]`) directives followed and merged in. The maintainers already recognized this as dangerous for one specific case and fixed it in commit `41ecc6a4` (\"Disable merge_includes in config writers\"), which passes `merge_includes=False` when `Repo.config_writer()` builds its parser (`git/repo/base.py`).\n\nThat fix never touched `Submodule._config_parser()`. This method builds the parser used for **every** read of a repo\u0027s submodule configuration \u2014 `repo.submodules`, `Submodule.iter_items()`, `Submodule.config()` \u2014 via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`, passing neither `merge_includes=False` nor `repo=`. The `True` class default is therefore inherited unchanged, and `fp_module` here is `.gitmodules` \u2014 **the single most attacker-controlled config file in the entire codebase**, since it ships verbatim as tracked content inside any cloned repository.\n\n`GitConfigParser.read()`\u0027s include-path resolution (~line 662-680) performs no containment check: `osp.isabs(include_path)` short-circuits the path join entirely for an absolute path, and a relative path is joined with `osp.join(osp.dirname(file_path), include_path)` / `osp.normpath()`\u0027d with no check that the result stays under the repository. `~` is expanded via `osp.expanduser`. The only gate before opening is `os.access(include_path, os.R_OK)` \u2014 a readability check, not a path restriction.\n\nOnce opened, `GitConfigParser._read()` parses the target file as git-config INI. If the first non-blank/non-comment line is not a `[section]` header \u2014 true of virtually any non-gitconfig file (source code, `/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, credential files, logs, JSON/YAML) \u2014 it raises `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)`. Python\u0027s stdlib formats this exception\u0027s `str()` as `\"File contains no section headers.\\nfile: %r, line: %d\\n%r\" % (fpname, lineno, line)` \u2014 it embeds the **verbatim content** of that file\u0027s first line in the exception message. `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)`, not `configparser.Error`, so this exception propagates straight out of the ordinary, read-only `repo.submodules` call.\n\n## Root cause\nParity gap between two config-parser construction sites for the exact same footgun: `Repo.config_writer()` was hardened against `merge_includes` in 2023 (`41ecc6a4`); `Submodule._config_parser()` \u2014 which parses `.gitmodules`, content that is *always* attacker-controlled the moment a repository is cloned from an untrusted source \u2014 was never given the same treatment. (The submodule *write*-mode config parser at `git/objects/submodule/base.py` for `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e/config` \u2014 a different, locally-generated file \u2014 has correctly passed `merge_includes=False` since 2022, underscoring that the omission for `.gitmodules` reads looks like an oversight rather than a considered exception.)\n\n## Exploit path\n1. Attacker crafts a repository whose `.gitmodules` contains a legitimate-looking `[submodule ...]` section plus:\n ```\n [include]\n \tpath = /etc/passwd\n ```\n (an absolute path bypasses any traversal reasoning entirely; a relative `../../../../etc/passwd`-style path works too).\n2. Victim performs the extremely common, entirely read-only operation of enumerating a cloned repo\u0027s submodules: `list(repo.submodules)` (or any `for sm in repo.submodules`) \u2014 no `update()`, `init()`, or checkout of any kind required.\n3. `SubmoduleConfigParser` (inheriting `merge_includes=True`) follows the `[include]` directive, opens `/etc/passwd`, and `GitConfigParser._read()` raises `MissingSectionHeaderError` whose message embeds `/etc/passwd`\u0027s first line verbatim.\n4. This exception surfaces wherever the host application observes exceptions from GitPython \u2014 CI logs, error pages, exception trackers, or any dependency-scanner/code-review-bot/hosting-platform tool built on `repo.submodules` \u2014 disclosing the targeted file\u0027s first line to the attacker (directly, or indirectly via any channel that echoes the error).\n\n## Impact\nNon-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first `MissingSectionHeaderError`), but that line very often *is* the secret \u2014 `.env` files (`DATABASE_URL=...`, `API_KEY=...`), single-line credential/token files, `/etc/passwd`\u0027s root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based file-existence oracle for arbitrary host paths. This is materially stronger than the already-fixed, explicitly **blind** `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (\"Blind local file inclusion\", CVSS 4.0, `git/refs/symbolic.py` ref-name resolution) \u2014 that advisory\u0027s own writeup states it cannot disclose content; this one does, verbatim, via a different module (`git/config.py`\u0027s include resolution).\n\n## Preconditions\n- Victim clones (or otherwise opens with GitPython) a repository whose `.gitmodules` is attacker-controlled \u2014 the default trust model for any tool that processes third-party repositories (dependency scanners, CI, code hosting/review bots, \"audit this repo\" utilities \u2014 exactly the class of application GitPython itself is built for).\n- Victim performs any operation that touches `repo.submodules` \u2014 one of the most ordinary GitPython operations, requiring no submodule `update`/`init`/checkout.\n- No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself.\n\n## Evidence\n- `git/config.py` \u2014 `GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`.\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py:273` \u2014 `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)` passes neither `merge_includes` nor `repo=`; `git blame` shows this call unchanged since the class was introduced, and `git show 41ecc6a4` confirms that commit touched only `git/repo/base.py`\u0027s `Repo.config_writer()`, never this call site.\n- `git/config.py` `_included_paths()`/`read()` (~630-685) \u2014 absolute include paths bypass the join/normpath entirely (`osp.isabs()` short-circuit); no repository-boundary containment check exists anywhere in this path.\n- `git/config.py` `_read()` (~493-498) \u2014 raises `cp.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)` with the raw file line embedded, matching Python stdlib `configparser`\u0027s own `__str__` behavior.\n- `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)` \u2014 `configparser.Error` (the base of `MissingSectionHeaderError`) is not swallowed.\n- PoC (`gitpython-003-poc.py`, embedded below) reproduces this end-to-end against this exact checkout via the public API only (`Repo.clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)`, default arguments, no monkeypatching), against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## False-positive check (adversarial re-read)\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`?** No \u2014 that advisory is about the `.gitmodules` submodule *name* driving `_module_abspath`/`os.makedirs()` (creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the `[include]` directive in the *same file* reaching a config-parser read primitive \u2014 a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation).\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (blind LFI)?** No \u2014 that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives in `git/refs/symbolic.py`\u0027s ref-name resolution feeding `Repo.commit`/`tree`/`index.diff` \u2014 an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content via `git/config.py`\u0027s include-directive resolution.\n- **Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks?** No \u2014 this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard `clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)` workflow.\n- **Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller?** No \u2014 confirmed by reading `Submodule.iter_items()`\u0027s exception handling, which catches only `IOError`/`BadName`; `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` propagates uncaught.\n- Verdict: no concrete blocker found. **CONFIRMED** \u2014 reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## Remediation\nPass `merge_includes=False` when constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser` in `Submodule._config_parser()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`), mirroring the existing fix in `Repo.config_writer()` (commit `41ecc6a4`) \u2014 `.gitmodules` content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in `include`/`includeIf` directives. As defense in depth, `GitConfigParser.read()`\u0027s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository\u0027s own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (`MissingSectionHeaderError`/`ParsingError`) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.\n\n## Confidence\nHigh. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both `git/config.py` and `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`).\n\n\n## Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-003-poc.py`)\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nGITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped\ninside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = \u003cany local path\u003e`.\n`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and\nother submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`\nwithout passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`\nis inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn\u0027t valid\ngit-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python\u0027s\n`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file\u0027s first line verbatim\nin its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only\n`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.\n\nRun:\n PYTHONPATH=\"\u003crepo\u003e:\u003crepo\u003e/gitdb:\u003crepo\u003e/smmap\" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py \u003cworkdir\u003e \u003ctarget-file\u003e\n\nBenign: reads only the given \u003ctarget-file\u003e (defaults to a throwaway secret file\ncreated under \u003cworkdir\u003e if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere\nexcept printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\n\n\ndef main():\n workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \"/tmp/gitpython-003-poc\"\n target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 2 else os.path.join(workdir, \"secret.txt\")\n\n attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, \"attacker-repo\")\n dest = os.path.join(workdir, \"dest\")\n for p in (attacker_repo, dest):\n os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)\n\n if not os.path.exists(target_file):\n os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)\n with open(target_file, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\\n\")\n\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", attacker_repo], check=True)\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"a@example.com\"], check=True)\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"Attacker\"], check=True)\n\n with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \"file.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"hello\\n\")\n\n with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \".gitmodules\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\n \u0027[submodule \"totally-normal-dep\"]\\n\u0027\n \"\\tpath = vendor/dep\\n\"\n \"\\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\\n\"\n \"[include]\\n\"\n \"\\tpath = %s\\n\" % target_file\n )\n\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"add\", \"file.txt\", \".gitmodules\"], check=True)\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\"], check=True)\n\n import git # gitpython under test\n import configparser\n\n repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)\n\n try:\n subs = list(repo.submodules)\n print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =\", subs)\n sys.exit(1)\n except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:\n msg = str(e)\n print(\"VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:\")\n print(msg)\n with open(target_file) as f:\n first_line = f.readline().rstrip(\"\\n\")\n if first_line in msg:\n print(\"Confirmed: target file\u0027s first line is present verbatim in the exception message.\")\n sys.exit(0)\n else:\n print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q",
"modified": "2026-09-08T18:38:51Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T18:38:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ef7568e3b317ce617eacda39b8b54dcdff8c3b5c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.59"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3785.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-local-file-content-disclosure-via-gitmodules"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)"
}
GHSA-7869-M4GV-9V2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-01 00:31 – Updated: 2025-03-05 18:32The account file upload functionality in Syspass 3.2.x fails to properly handle special characters in filenames. This mismanagement leads to the disclosure of the web application s source code, exposing sensitive information such as the database password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-28T23:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The account file upload functionality in Syspass 3.2.x fails to properly handle special characters in filenames. This mismanagement leads to the disclosure of the web application s source code, exposing sensitive information such as the database password.",
"id": "GHSA-7869-m4gv-9v2j",
"modified": "2025-03-05T18:32:03Z",
"published": "2025-03-01T00:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sysentr0py/CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2025-25478"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-78FM-87R7-5P5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 00:34 – Updated: 2026-08-04 00:34External control of file name or path in Microsoft Edge for Android allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66310"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T00:17:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Microsoft Edge for Android allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.",
"id": "GHSA-78fm-87r7-5p5x",
"modified": "2026-08-04T00:34:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T00:34:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-66310"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-78FP-X36M-F5GF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-12 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-12 18:31External control of file name or path in Windows Security App allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53769"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-12T18:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Security App allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally.",
"id": "GHSA-78fp-x36m-f5gf",
"modified": "2025-08-12T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2025-08-12T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53769"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53769"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79PM-5425-72GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-22 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:01Advantech R-SeeNet versions 2.4.22 allows low-level users to access and load the content of local files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-22T17:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Advantech R-SeeNet \nversions 2.4.22 \nallows low-level users to access and load the content of local files.\n\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-79pm-5425-72gv",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:01:16Z",
"published": "2023-06-22T18:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-173-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.